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Preface
The research program in corporate governance
This report is part of the The Corporate Governance Program1 at the Norwegian School of Management.
This program has two overall objectives. The ﬁrst is to construct a high-quality data base on a wide
set of corporate governance characteristics for Norwegian ﬁrms. The second objective is to empirically
explore the determinants of a ﬁrm's corporate governance characteristics and the relationship between
such governance characteristics and the ﬁrm's behavior as an economic entity. The Corporate Governance
Program, which consists of a series of individual projects, has been sponsored by the Norwegian School
of Management and the Research Council of Norway over the period 20032005.
The project on ownership duration
This project asks whether the length of the holding period (ownership duration) of large stockholders
inﬂuences the behavior and economic performance of ﬁrms. This question is often raised in the public
debate. Almost without exception, the commentators praise the patient investor and argue that because
too many owners are shortterm, the macro economy suﬀers. The problem is, however, that to the best
of our knowledge, there does not exist any reliable theoretical or empirical justiﬁcation for making such
strong normative statements about corporate governance design. In fact, this phenomenon has received
very limited attention in the research community.
The reason the issue of ownership duration is unexplored empirically is probably due to the lack
of time series data on corporate governance mechanisms. Our project utilizes a rather unique time
series of ownership structure data over the period 19891999 to describe the anatomy of ownership
duration. When doing this, we consider ownership duration a corporate governance mechanism, i.e., a
tool owners can use to inﬂuence the ﬁrm's behavior in their preferred direction. For instance, we describe
the empirical frequency distribution of ownership duration for large owners and explore how it relates
to owner characteristics like investor type and ﬁrm characteristics like ﬁrm size. We also analyze the
relationship between ownership duration and the ﬁrm's ability to create value, while controlling for other
determinants of economic performance.
Major ﬁndings
Analyzing all non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1989-1999, we ﬁnd
that a ﬁrm's largest owner keeps that position for less than three years on average. The typical own-
ership duration lasts longer the larger the stake and is longer for national as opposed to international
investors. Individual owners and industrial owners have longer duration than ﬁnancial institutions and
foreigners. Firms investing in short-term projects have more short-term owners, supporting the idea
that project duration matches with ownership duration. That is, ﬁrms with long-term (short-term)
investment projects tend to have long-term (short-term) owners. We also estimate the full frequency
distribution of ownership duration, adjusting for truncation bias. This bias occurs because we do not
know the true entering (termination) year of owners observed in the ﬁrst (last) year of the sample period.
Based on this frequency distribution, we ﬁnd that the exit probabilities are duration dependent. That
is, the owner's decision to stay on or leave in a given year depends on how long the owner has stayed so
1More details can be found at the web site http://finance.bi.no/governance.
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far. Most owners leave within two years, whereas those who pass the three year hurdle are less likely to
leave the longer they have stayed already. Thus, large owners tend to be either stay in the ﬁrms either
for a quite short or a quite long period of time.
We ﬁnd that when we do not distinguish between owner types, ownership duration and ﬁrm perfor-
mance are always negatively related. This pattern is consistent with the notion that long-term owners
are sleepy monitors and with the often heard claim that owners and analysts push managers into myopic
behavior at the expense of long-run value maximization. Interestingly, when we examine the relationship
between performance and the holdings of speciﬁc owner types, we ﬁnd that the negative relation between
long-term ownership and performance is due to ﬁnancial institutions and industrial ﬁrms, which both
represent indirect ownership (delegated monitoring). This is consistent with the notion that these owner
types have weak monitoring incentives and allow managers to destroy value. To the extent that ﬁnancial
institutions also emphasize reported short-term earnings more than others, this could be an additional
reason why ﬁrms inﬂuenced by such owners over extended periods perform more poorly than others,
including ﬁrms with industrial owners. In contrast, we show that longer ownership by individuals has a
moderately positive relation to performance.
It has become quite popular to argue that owners are too impatient, and that the owners' tendency
to vote with their feet forces management to overinvest in projects with short payback in order to
keep current earnings high. Similarly, owners are accused of being restless, lacking the commitment,
competence and persistence needed to monitor and support the management team as an integral part of
good corporate governance. According to this view, short-term investors are bad owners, long-term ones
are good, and economic welfare is thought to suﬀer because ownership duration is too short. Our results
suggest that conventional wisdom is inconsistent with reality on most of these issues, and particularly
that the unconditional praise of the long-term owner is misplaced.
The structure of this report
Chapter 1 contains the academic paper, which is also published separately. This paper rests on a com-
prehensive set of underlying analyses and discussions which are documented in the remaining chapters
of this report. Chapter 2 is a short introduction to the problems facing a researcher looking for suitable
measures of ownership duration. This chapter also deﬁnes six alternative ownership duration measures
and four alternative ways of restricting the relevant sample of ﬁrms Chapter 3 describes our sample
of ﬁrms and summarizes various characteristics of these ﬁrms except their ownership duration, such as
ownership concentration, equity holdings by oﬃcers and directors (insiders), ﬁrms size, project duration,
and economic performance. Chapter 4 describes ownership duration in various ways, such as the correla-
tion between the duration measures, the stability of the measures over time, and how mean and median
duration varies across ﬁrm types, ﬁrm size, and owner type. Chapter 5 considers the determinants of
duration, i.e., the characteristics of the ﬁrm and its owners which jointly make an owner be longterm vs.
shortterm. On this background, we address the relationship between ownership duration and economic
performance in chapter 6. Whereas this chapter is concerned with correlation rather than the much
more diﬃcult question of causation, chapter 7 takes one step further by addressing potential reverse
causation: Is ownership duration driven by performance rather than the other way around? Finally,
chapter 8 compares our approach to an alternative method based on so called relationship investors.
This framework has recently been used by Bhagat et al. (2004) to analyze ownership duration in the US.
Appendix A describes the data sources and deﬁnes the variables used in the report.
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The Duration of Equity Ownership
Abstract
To date little is known about how long equity ownership lasts, what determines its length, and
whether ownership duration is related to ﬁrm performance. Using a unique time series of equity holdings
over eleven years, we ﬁnd that on average the ﬁrm's largest owner stays less than three years and stays
longer than owners with smaller stakes. The duration of ﬁnancial institutions and foreigners is shorter
than that of individuals and industrial ﬁrms. We show that ownership duration is duration dependent
as the probability of closing an equity position is a function of how long the owner has held the stake.
Ownership duration appears to match the duration of the ﬁrm's investment projects. We ﬁnd no evidence
that large owners vote by foot in the sense that bad news about earnings leads to duration ending. There
is a negative relationship between ownership duration and a ﬁrm's performance in general, but the sign
and strength of this relationship diﬀers across owner types. Long duration by ﬁnancial institutions and
industrial corporations is negatively related to performance, whereas the opposite is true for individuals.
This suggests that long term ownership may improve ﬁrm performance if the monitoring is direct as
opposed to delegated.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Short-termism, Ownership Duration, Patient Owners, Economic
Performance.
Ownership duration is the length of time an investor holds on to his equity position. This aspect of
equity ownership has been largely ignored by ﬁnancial economists. In informationally eﬃcient capital
markets with no agency costs equity can be freely bought and sold at prices reﬂecting the value of the
ﬁrm. Therefore, a commitment by an owner to increase his duration can not change ﬁrm value. Any
argument that ownership duration does matter for ﬁrm value must stress additional roles for owners
other than that of passive providers of capital.
Considering imperfections such as agency costs and information asymmetries there seems to be a
general view that ownership duration is economically important. For example, owners with a large
stake and long holding periods may have particularly strong incentives to monitor and support the
management team. This corporate governance role of patient, committed owners who do not focus solely
on short-term earnings has been forcefully argued by both academics and practitioners (Stein, 1988;
Jacobs, 1991; Porter, 1992; Bebchuk and Stole, 1993; Fuller and Jensen, 2002). On the other hand, if
such long-term owners become sleepy and passive, they may too easily allow self-serving managers to
expropriate shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, long ownership duration could
have both positive and negative corporate governance eﬀects, and the net impact on ﬁrm behavior and
its relationship to ﬁrm performance remains an open and unexplored empirical question.
The role of ownership duration may diﬀer across owner types. For instance, some argue that fund
managers and ﬁnancial analysts put pressure on ﬁrms to undertake investments that maximize short-term
earnings at the expense of long-term shareholder wealth. Thus, long-term ownership by certain owner
types who are not directly involved in corporate governance may adversely aﬀect long-term performance.
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This may happen because these owners threaten to sell their stakes and drive the stock price down if
short-term earnings expectations are not met.
Despite the various functions that ownership duration may have, little is known about how it should
be measured, how long it actually is, how it diﬀers across owner types, what factors determine it,
and how it relates to ﬁrm performance. Knowing the answer to such questions is important from at
least two perspectives. First, existing corporate governance research shows that characteristics like
ownership concentration and insider ownership matter for ﬁrm performance in a static setting. We
consider ownership duration a separate governance mechanism which comes in addition to the well-
explored ones. Thus, it is not just be a matter of how much you own, who you are, and if you are on the
board. It may also be critical whether you keep these characteristics for a short or a long time period.
For example, if owners are monitoring managers then duration is likely to be important since it takes
time to learn about the ﬁrm and the managers. Thus, if the duration of an ownership stake reﬂects
its quality as a governance mechanism, knowing its determinants and how ownership duration relates
to performance can improve the insights into optimal governance structures and also the rationale for
regulating governance by law, codes, and charter.
Second, understanding ownership duration may be useful for other areas than corporate governance.
For example, short term ownership may lead to more asymmetric information and hence stronger ﬁnancial
constraints. This will inﬂuence the ﬁrm's ability to raise external ﬁnancing, aﬀect its cost of capital, and
ultimately determine its ability to exploit investment opportunities in an optimal way.
The contribution of our paper is to provide the ﬁrst comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics
of ownership duration. We estimate the actual duration of large equity positions, how it varies with
owner type, what factors determine its length, and how ownership duration relates to ﬁrm performance.
We do this by using a data set which allows us to observe the entire ownership structure of every
Norwegian listed ﬁrm over an eleven year period. Using the econometric technique of duration analysis,
we describe the ownership duration for the ﬁrm's ﬁve largest owners and show that the probability of
terminating the equity stake, measured by the hazard function, is increasing up to three years and then
decreasing. Therefore, for owners who survive beyond three years there is a diminishing probability that
they terminate their relationship to the ﬁrm. This pattern indicates the presence of two types of owners
in our sample. The impatient type has less than 50% probability of continuing after one year, and an
increasing conditional probability of leaving within the next two years. Once the three year hurdle is
passed, however, the conditional probability of exit falls markedly, producing the second group of very
patient investors who do not terminate their holdings. This property of the hazard function reﬂects
duration dependence. That is, how long an owner has kept the stake so far aﬀects the likelihood of exit
in the next period.
The average duration for the ﬁrm's largest owner is less than three years, but there is substantial
variation across owner types. The most impatient owners are foreigners and ﬁnancial institutions, whereas
the most patient ones are industrial ﬁrms and individuals (families).1 We also ﬁnd that ownership
duration grows as the fraction held increases. In addition, ﬁrms with long-term investment projects
keep their owners the longest. This ﬁnding suggests that ownership duration matches the duration of
the ﬁrm's real investments. We also consider the question of whether owners vote with their feet as a
reaction to unfavorable news and ﬁnd no support for this hypothesis.
After having analyzed the length and the determinants of ownership duration, we assess whether
ownership duration matters for ﬁrm performance. When we look at all owner types as a group, ownership
duration and performance are always negatively related. However, given the substantial diﬀerences in
ownership duration across owner types, the possibility that diﬀerent owner types may have diﬀerent
corporate governance roles, and that they may be diﬀerently informed, it is natural to ask whether
ownership type matters for performance. We ﬁnd that it does. Notably, the relationship between
ownership duration and performance remains negative for both industrial and ﬁnancial owners, but is
positive for individuals and foreigners. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that direct
monitoring outperforms delegated (indirect) monitoring.
In addition to estimating how ownership duration relates to performance within the same time period,
we use a methodology similar to Gompers et al. (2003), who assess whether the ﬁrms's current corporate
governance system aﬀects its subsequent performance. They ﬁnd that an index of corporate governance
1The state is actually the investor with the longest duration. However, we pay little attention to state owners since
their objectives may diﬀer from those of owners who invest to maximize wealth.
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quality (that does not include ownership duration) predicts future performance. Similarly, we ﬁnd
that the current ownership duration is related to subsequent performance, Moreover, the estimates
are consistent with our ﬁndings on the contemporaneous relationship between ownership duration and
performance. In contrast, we ﬁnd no convincing evidence that current performance drives subsequent
duration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 surveys the literature. Section 1.2 presents
data sources, the institutional setting, and descriptive statistics. We deﬁne ownership duration and
discuss its potential determinants in section 1.3. Formal duration analysis and the determinants of
ownership duration are analyzed in section 1.4. Section 1.5 explores the interaction between ownership
duration and economic performance. We conclude in section 1.6.
1.1 Literature review
Academics and CEOs have repeatedly argued that unless management is given suﬃcient time to innovate,
develop, and commercialize new ideas, ﬁrm value will be destroyed. The information asymmetry rationale
of this argument has been forwarded in diﬀerent versions by Stein (1988), Jacobs (1991), Porter (1992),
and Bebchuk and Stole (1993). They posit that uninformed equity owners indirectly distort the ﬁrm's real
investments because they force managers to focus on short-term earnings rather than long-run shareholder
value. Fuller and Jensen (2002) argue that Wall Street is partly responsible for this problem, as powerful
ﬁnancial analysts force managers to meet unreasonable analyst earnings forecasts by investing for short-
term earnings maximization rather than proﬁtable cash ﬂow growth. Similar views are expressed by
managers. For example, survey results from the US and the UK ﬁnd that over 80% of managers blame
impatient stock market investors for implicitly forcing management to reduce corporate investing which
would be proﬁtable in the longer run (Wall Street Journal, 1986; Coopers and Lybrand, 1997).2 However,
Wahal and McConnel (2000) ﬁnd no evidence that ﬁrms with institutional owners cause managers to be
myopic.
A second way in which ownership duration can aﬀect managerial decision making is through corporate
governance. For instance, Bhagat et al. (2004) argue that patient investors can act as a substitute
governance mechanism for hostile takeovers. Compared to uninformed and short-term investors, owners
with a longer relationship to the ﬁrm are better monitors in regular times and may more easily counter
management's resistance to valuable corporate restructuring in tougher times.
These ideas reﬂect the belief that patient owners are beneﬁcial because they (i) counter short-termism
in the ﬁrm's investment decisions (the information argument), and (ii) provide valuable ownership func-
tions which impatient investors cannot oﬀer (the committed governance argument). Both ideas suggest
that ﬁrms perform better the longer their owners stay.3
There are at least two arguments against the hypothesis that longer ownership duration beneﬁts the
ﬁrm. The ﬁrst is based on the principal-agent logic, which suggests patient owners may become passive
monitors who leave managers too much power and discretion to waste corporate resources on value-
destroying activities like empire building and corporate diversiﬁcation. Also, large, long-term owners
may use their extended presence to extract private beneﬁts from minority stockholders. Thus, increased
ownership duration may destroy rather than create value.
The second counterargument follows when we allow for duration diﬀerences not just across owners,
but also across the ﬁrms they invest in. In such a setting, the owners' ability to monitor and support
management may depend on the combination of the owners' holding period and the ﬁrm's technology.
This argument is forwarded by Becht and Mayer (2001) who posit that there is an optimal, ﬁrmspeciﬁc
ownership duration that is a function of the ﬁrm's project duration. In particular, the longer the optimal
project duration, the longer the optimal ownership duration. In such a world, cross-sectional diﬀerences
in ownership duration reﬂect optimal responses to cross-sectional diﬀerences in project duration. There-
2Regulators often take a stand on ownership duration by designing tax codes where the capital gains tax rate on stocks
decreases as the holding period grows. Such a tax system encourages long ownership duration by punishing short-term
owners relative to long-term ones.
3In fact, the information asymmetry argument may also be thought of as corporate governance. In particular, active
governance in the Bhagat et al. (2004) sense is informed monitoring through participation and voting in the stockholder
and board meetings. Passive governance is voting by foot when outside, uninformed investors buy and sell the ﬁrm's equity
in response to earnings announcements. In this perspective, our paper deals with active versus passive monitoring, which
are two diﬀerent ways of executing corporate governance.
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fore, ownership duration will not inﬂuence ﬁrm performance unless project duration per se matters for
performance. This means there is no inconsistency between eﬃcient capital markets and the idea that
diﬀerent owners are imperfect substitutes.
There is little theoretical analysis that looks directly at ownership duration. In a modelling framework,
the challenge is twofold. First, the model has to specify exactly what the role of an owner is. In a
theoretical corporate governance framework typical assumptions are private beneﬁts of control, or owners'
incentives to monitor and inﬂuence management. Second, the model has to set up a dynamic environment
in which the choice between long and short term ownership enters, either directly or indirectly.4
One approach is the model of Du (2001). In his model, ownership matters because current owners are
potential providers of future capital. Owners enter into a multiperiod relationship where they choose to
provide further ﬁnancing in a second stage based on information about the ﬁrm in a ﬁrst stage. As such
the model is similar to traditional models of venture capital, but more focussed on corporate governance
of larger, more opaque corporations. Du endogenizes ownership duration for outside, informationally
disadvantaged owners who invest in ﬁrms with potentially serious agency problems. The weaker the
perceived quality of a ﬁrm's governance system, the stronger the uninformed investors' suspicion that
low reported earnings reﬂect bad governance, and the more strongly they will respond by selling their
shares, i.e., by reducing ownership duration. Du shows that voting by foot may be a rational investor
response to earnings releases under information asymmetry. Investors' trading behavior may also disci-
pline management towards making value-maximizing real investment decisions if current earnings and
long-term cash ﬂow quality are suﬃciently correlated.5 In Du's model the owners matter because they
have a monopolistic bargaining position in the second round of ﬁnancing. The model would break down
if the company had alternative sources of capital in the second round.
The empirical literature on ownership duration deals primarily with institutional investors. Bhagat
et al. (2004) examine the relationship between ﬁrm performance and the so called relational investor,
which they deﬁne as an institutional owner holding at least x% of the ﬁrm's equity for at least y years,
where the choice of x and y is arbitrary. Overall, they ﬁnd no convincing association between their
concept of relational investing and corporate performance.6 Gaspar et al. (2005) examine the eﬀect of
ownership duration by institutional investors in the market for corporate control. They ﬁnd that target
ﬁrms with short-term shareholders are more likely to receive a takeover bid, that the premium is lower,
and that bidder ﬁrms with such shareholders experience lower abnormal returns than others around
and after the merger announcement. These ﬁndings suggest that short-term institutional owners are
low-quality monitors because they allow managers to proceed with low-quality acquisitions.
The part of our analysis dealing with the relationship between duration and performance is most
closely related to the literature on the valuation eﬀect of corporate governance mechanisms. Examples
of this research tradition, which ignores ownership duration, are Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Morck
et al. (1988), while Gugler (2001) provides a comprehensive survey. These papers use a static setting,
where the empirical question is whether there is a cross-sectional link between the ﬁrm's performance
and characteristics of its governance system, such as the ownership structure and board composition.
Most studies ﬁnd that governance and performance are related. A robust result is that unless they
become dominant, increased equity ownership by insiders is positively associated with contemporaneous
ﬁrm performance. Moreover, Gompers et al. (2003) form a governance quality index for each ﬁrm based
on a wide variety of governance mechanisms and show that this index predicts subsequent stock returns.
Finally, the family ﬁrms literature (see for example, Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit
(2004) and Mishra et al. (2001)) deals implicitly with ownership duration. Family owners are more likely
to be long term owners. This literature has examined whether family-controlled ﬁrms perform better
4The literature on the choice of going public involves decisions about ownership duration, see, for example, Boot et al.
(2005). However, we deal with the duration of equity stakes in listed public companies.
5In this respect Du (2001) shows that the criticism against impatient investors may not be warranted if their behavior
and the resulting eﬃciency loss is framed as the optimal solution to a costly information asymmetry problem.
6Whereas Bhagat et al. (2004) relate relational investing to ﬁrm performance in a univariate setting, we measure actual
ownership duration of all owner types, estimate its determinants, and study its eﬀect on performance in a multivariate
setting. Compared to our sample of Norwegian ﬁrms, the US ﬁrms studied by Bhagat et al. (2004) operate in a diﬀerent legal
and institutional regime, are considerably larger, and their ownership structures are much less concentrated. Speciﬁcally,
the legal regime is common law in the US and civil law in Norway. The size of the average Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrm is
15% the average NYSE ﬁrm, ownership concentration as measured by the stake of the largest owner is 3% in the US and
30% in Norway, and both institutional and individual investors hold a higher portion of the market portfolio in the US
than in Norway.
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than widely held ﬁrms. For instance, Villalonga and Amit (2004) ﬁnd that unless the founder is the CEO,
family-controlled ﬁrms underperform other ﬁrms. In our sample of listed ﬁrms this issue is unlikely to
be important since there are only two shipping companies that are controlled by their founders.
1.2 Data
The aggregate market capitalization of the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) was equivalent to 64 bill. USD
by year-end 1999. This ranks the OSE eighteenth among the twentythree European stock exchanges
for which comparable data is available. From 1989 to 1999 the number of ﬁrms listed increased from 129
to 215, market capitalization grew by an average of 12% per annum, and market liquidity, measured by
annual transaction value over average market value, roughly doubled from 52% in 1989 to 98% in 1999.7
Norway has a civil law regime, which is generally considered less investorprotective than common
law. Nevertheless, La Porta et al. (2000) ﬁnd that Norway's regulatory environment provides better
protection of shareholder rights than the average common law country. This may be one reason why,
with the exception of the UK, Norway's listed ﬁrms have less concentrated ownership than any other
European country. For example, the average largest owner holds close to 50% of voting equity in a
continental-European listed ﬁrm, 30% in Norway, and 15% in the UK.8
Our main data source is the Norwegian Securities Registry (Verdipapirsentralen) which provides the
complete end of year ownership structure for every listed company. This means we know the number
of shares held and the market value of the holding for every single investor in any ﬁrm. Although the
owner is anonymous, an identiﬁer allows us to follow the owner across ﬁrms and years.
We separate owners into the ﬁve types of state, ﬁnancial institutions, industrial (non-ﬁnancial) ﬁrms,
individuals (persons; families), and foreigners. This split is based on the agency argument that diﬀer-
ent owner types have diﬀerent incentives and monitoring abilities. In particular, direct principal-agent
relationships represented by individual investors are thought to produce higher monitoring quality than
indirect ownership and delegated monitoring, where other people's money is invested by ﬁnancial institu-
tions, industrial corporations, or the state (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Another reason for singling out
ﬁnancial institutions is that, more than any other investor type, they have been criticized for excessive
impatience. Finally, foreign investors may be diﬀerent from national investors since the former may
invest more to obtain portfolio diversiﬁcation beneﬁts than to be active in corporate governance (Kang
and Stulz, 1994; Brennan and Cao, 1997).
Table 1.1 The propensity of diﬀerent owner types to be among the ﬁrm's ﬁve largest owners
Owner Rank Average Fraction of
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 fraction held market cap held
State owner 8.5 6.8 5.2 5.3 4.0 4.7 16.8
Foreign owner 18.2 21.5 21.3 22.6 23.7 19.9 30.4
Family (individual) owner 10.3 8.3 9.9 12.3 11.8 19.8 9.2
Financial owner 11.9 21.6 27.1 29.6 31.8 18.1 19.2
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 51.2 41.8 36.6 30.3 28.8 37.8 24.5
Mean fraction held 27.8 10.4 6.6 4.7 3.7
The table shows the frequency distributions across owner types for the largest, second, third, fourth, and ﬁfth largest owner. The
bottom row shows the mean ownership fraction held per owner rank per ﬁrm, and the two rightmost columns show the aggregate
fraction held per owner type across all ranks and ﬁrms. The ﬁgures in the two rightmost columns are equally weighted and value
weighted, respectively. The sample is all ﬁrms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange during the period 1989-1999.
Table 1.1 shows the frequency by which each owner type is found among the ﬁrm's ﬁve largest owners
over the eleven year sample period. Rank one is assigned to the largest owner, rank two is the second
largest, etc. The bottom row shows the average ownership fraction held per owner rank, and the ﬁnal
two columns show the owner type's aggregate fraction held across all ﬁrms (equally weighted and value
weighted, respectively).
7Sources: www.ose.no and www.fibv.com.
8The corresponding US ﬁgure is just 3%. More details can be found in Barca and Becht (2001) and Bøhren and Ødegaard
(2005).
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The bottom row of the table documents that the largest owner holds on average 28% of the ﬁrm's
equity, declining through 10, 7, 5, and 4% as the rank drops to 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Industrial
owners, who hold 25% of the OSE market capitalization, have the highest stake in 51% of all cases, and
are also most often the second, third and fourth largest owner. In contrast, foreign owners hold the
largest share of the market portfolio (30%), but are considerably less often a large owner per ﬁrm. This
pattern goes some way to supporting the notion that foreigners may invest for reasons of diversiﬁcation
rather than active monitoring and control.
The state seems to play a relatively anonymous role in corporate governance. It is seldom among
the largest owners and even compared to individuals, whose aggregate portfolio value is just about half
of the state's, the state holds fewer large positions. The fact that the state's equally weighted stake is
less than one third of the value weighted one documents that a few very large stakes in large companies
account for most of the state's portfolio.
1.3 Measuring ownership duration and its determinants
Our focus is on the governance aspects of ownership duration. We therefore concentrate on the largest
owners of a ﬁrm. In implementing our analysis we face the problem that there is no single, agreed upon
measure of ownership duration in the literature. Ideally we want to consider not only the absolute size,
but also the relative size of an owner. The measure we have settled for in our analysis is based on
calculating ownership duration as the number of years an investor keeps at least the fraction of the ﬁrm
he held at the ﬁrst observation. For instance, ownership duration is four years if an investor bought a
10% stake in 1992, increased it to 19% in 1993 and reduced the stake below 10% in 1996. Thus, our
duration measure reﬂects how long owners maintain the invested stake, given that they have suﬃcient
pricing impact when they trade and suﬃcient incentives and power to invest in monitoring.9
As discussed earlier, we separate owners into ﬁve diﬀerent types types (state, foreign, individual,
ﬁnancial, industrial). Moreover, certain ﬁrm characteristics may also matter for ownership duration. For
example, Hawawini and Keim (2000) document cross-country evidence of a signiﬁcant inverse relationship
between ﬁrm size and performance. Although we do not know what underlying ﬁrm qualities size is
proxying for, one possibility is that size partially reﬂects ownership characteristics. One model with this
implication is Becht and Mayer (2001), who argue that project duration and ownership duration should
be matched. If small ﬁrms are more often in earlier stages of their project development cycle than big
ﬁrms, the matching hypothesis implies that optimal ownership duration decreases as ﬁrm size grows.
Project duration is a key ﬁrm characteristic in our analysis for which we have two alternative proxies.
The ﬁrst is depreciation to long-term assets, which is higher the shorter the average duration of the real
investments. The second proxy is long-term debt over total debt. If the ﬁrm's risk management includes
asset-liability matching, we expect that the higher this ratio, the higher will be the fraction of the ﬁrm's
assets that are long-term. Since this measure rests on the assumption the ﬁrm is matching assets and
liabilities, we expect the more direct depreciation-based measure to be the more robust proxy.
A ﬁnal issue we want to address is whether ownership duration is aﬀected by news about a company
that leads investors to vote by foot. We use earnings growth as our measure of news and lag it one period
to ensure it is observable before the decision to leave or stay is considered.
1.4 Characterizing ownership duration
In this section we characterize ownership duration for the sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms over the
period 19891999. We ﬁrst show some simple descriptive statistics for ownership duration over the eleven
years, before giving a full characterization of the probability distribution of ownership duration using
9A number of alternative ownership duration measures could be considered. For example, we could use the duration of
owners of a given rank, such as how long an investor is the largest, the second largest, etc. However, except for the very
largest owner (rank 1) this measure would ignore the fact that power and incentives increase rather than decrease when
the owner moves to higher rather than lower ranks. Thus, regardless of whether the owner moves up or down in rank,
this rank-based measure mistakenly suggests power is lost because the initial rank is no longer held. We have considered
this measure as well as other deﬁnitions, such as the number of years the rank does not fall (but may increase) and the
number of years the owner stays among the ﬁve largest (without necessarily keeping the same rank every year). These
three alternative measures produce results that are similar to those reported in the paper. These results are available on
request.
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the econometric technique of duration analysis. Using the same econometric methods we explore more
closely the relationship between project duration and ownership duration. We ﬁnally analyze whether
the owner's decision to stay or leave is aﬀected by earnings surprises.
1.4.1 Average ownership duration
When measuring ownership duration, underestimation is a potential problem for two reasons. First,
the time series of ownership is necessarily censored because the ﬁrst (last) sample year may not be the
owner's ﬁrst (last) investment year. The longer the sample period, the smaller this problem. Second,
measured duration may be short only because the ﬁrm has a limited number of listing years and not
because the investor is unwilling to invest longer. This bias decreases with the length of the ﬁrm's listing
period.
To minimize the ﬁrst underestimation problem we use eleven years of ownership data. We assess the
magnitude of the second bias by alternatively including ﬁrms that have survived the whole sample period
1989-1999 (Surviving ﬁrms) and every listed ﬁrm regardless of listing period (All ﬁrms). Moreover, since
a ﬁrm may have more than one owner of a given initial rank over the sample period, we alternatively
include all owners of a given initial rank in a ﬁrm over the sample period (All owners) or only the one
who stayed the longest (Longest duration owner).
These alternative restrictions on ﬁrms and owners produce four diﬀerent samples, where we expect
duration estimates to be the longest under the sample deﬁned as (Surviving ﬁrms; Longest duration
owner) and shortest under (All ﬁrms; All owners). The two remaining samples should fall somewhere in
between these two extremes.
Table 1.2 Average ownership duration for large owners
Owner Rank average
Sample Firms Owners 1 2 3 4 5 10 n
(1) Surviving Longest Duration 4.4 4.1 4.5 4.6 3.9 3.7 75
(2) Surviving All 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 446
(3) All Longest Duration 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.2 318
(4) All All 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1180
The table shows average ownership duration for the largest, second, third, fourth, ﬁfth, and tenth largest equity stake in a ﬁrm.
The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
Table 1.2 shows that average ownership duration of a stake is quite independent of where the owner
started out in the power hierarchy. Average duration is generally low and varies between less than two
years and about ﬁve years. As expected, the average is longer for ﬁrms that survived the full sample
period and when we only consider the owner of a given rank in a ﬁrm who stayed the longest.10
We only report ﬁndings for samples (2) and (4) in the following. Even though samples (1) and (3)
reduce the downward bias in ownership duration due to truncation, they ignore all owners of a given
rank that the ﬁrm actually had except the one who stayed the longest. Thus, we consider all owners of
a given rank and report the ﬁndings for all ﬁrms and for those of them that survived the sample period.
1.4.2 Estimating survival and hazard functions
The method used to quantify ownership duration in the previous subsection has at least two drawbacks.
First, we only estimated the mean of the probability distribution, ignoring any other distributional
properties. Second, although recognizing the existence of a censoring problem, our only attempt at
reducing the inherent downward bias in the duration estimates was to construct sub-samples which
include only ﬁrms that survived the full eleven-year sample period.11
10The ownership duration distributions are quite symmetric, as all means are close to their corresponding medians. When
we split the sample into two subperiods, average duration in the two is quite similar, suggesting that ownership duration
is stable over time.
11However, because average duration in the ﬁrms that survived the 11 year sample period is only 2.2 years for the largest
owner (who has the longest duration), we doubt that the remaining truncation problem causes noticeable downward bias
in sample (2).
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A more suitable way to deal with both problems is to use formal duration analysis and estimate a
survival function. This approach, which takes into account the truncation problem that ownership is
only observed over the sample period, estimates the probability that the owner ends the relationship with
the ﬁrm after time t.12 Although the survival function completely characterizes duration, it is easier to
understand key duration properties if we transform the survival function into a hazard function. The
hazard function expresses the conditional probability that the owner ends the relationship at time t,
given that it has already lasted to t. If the hazard function is a constant function of ownership duration,
the exit probability does not depend on how long the relationship has lasted so far. If it is not constant,
the exit probability increases (decreases) with the holding period if the hazard function grows (falls) with
the current holding period.
Figure 1.1 Estimated survival and hazard functions for all surviving ﬁrms in the sample.
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The plots show estimated survival and hazard functions. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
The sample is all ﬁrms at the Oslo Stock Exchange that survived throughout the whole period 19891999. The estimation uses
a Weibull functional speciﬁcation for the hazard function. Analysis time in days. Estimation is carried out with Stata 8's streg
function.
Figure 1.1 shows estimated survival and hazard functions for all ﬁrms in the sample. We will base
the discussion on the two graphs on the left, which are estimated adjusting for right truncation. The
12Kiefer (1988) and van den Berg (2001) give overviews of the econometric duration analysis framework. Ongena and
Smith (2001) use the methodology in a ﬁnance setting to estimate the duration of banking relationships.
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main empirical result is most easily seen from the truncation adjusted hazard function in panel B, which
increases for durations up to three years and then decreases. Thus, owners are most likely to leave early,
but once they have stayed for three years, the exit probability falls monotonically. The righttail behavior
is best seen from the survival function in panel A, which shows that there is about 10% probability that
owners survive beyond eleven years.13 The importance of adjusting for truncation bias is shown by the
two graphs on the right. Without this adjustment the estimated hazard function starts increasing in
year six. This misleading impression is driven by the fact that if truncation is ignored, no ownership
duration estimate is allowed to exceed eleven years.
The hazard function shows clear duration dependence. That is, how long an owner has kept a stake
aﬀects the likelihood of exit. The pattern in ﬁgure 1.1 suggests that owners can be roughly classiﬁed into
two groups. One is impatient, having less than 50% probability of maintaining the stake for a year, and
also an increasing conditional probability of leaving over the next two years. Once the three year hurdle
is passed, however, the conditional exit probability falls markedly year by year, producing the second
group of patient investors.
1.4.3 Determinants of ownership duration
Before doing a more formal, multivariate analysis, we present univariate patterns by estimating separate
hazard functions for various categorizations of owner type, owner rank, ﬁrm type, and ﬁrm size. Figure 1.2
shows the results. Considering ﬁrst owner type and focusing on the ﬁve largest owners, the top left graph
shows that foreign owners and ﬁnancial owners are considerably more likely to leave early than other
owner types.14 The hazard functions grouped by owner rank in the top right graph also show clear
diﬀerences. The largest and second largest owners are less likely to terminate their relationships early.
Thus, the larger the stake, the longer the ownership duration. This relationship between owner rank and
ownership durations is consistent with the unadjusted average durations for this sample (sample (2))
in table 1.2. However, these averages could not reveal that once the ﬁrst four years have passed most
hazard functions are fairly similar.
Considering next ﬁrm characteristic in the bottom half of the ﬁgure, industrial and shipping ﬁrms
tend to have the least patient owners, whereas owners of small/young ﬁrms are the most patient. Finally,
the hazard functions in the bottom right corner show no clear pattern in ownership duration across ﬁrms
of diﬀering size.
To formalize the impressions given in ﬁgure 1.2, table 1.3 shows results from estimating a model of
the contribution of duration determinants to the baseline hazard function. In this type of estimation, a
coeﬃcient value of one means the exit probability does not depend on the explanatory variable. A value
below one means the probability of exit decreases, and hence longer expected duration. Correspondingly,
a value above one reﬂects higher exit probability and shorter duration.
The model, which includes ownership fraction held, owner type, and ﬁrm size as duration determi-
nants, conﬁrms the graphical analysis in ﬁgure 1.2. The coeﬃcient on fraction owned is signiﬁcantly
below unity. Therefore, the larger the equity stake held, the longer the duration. The coeﬃcients for
owner types show foreign owners to have the shortest duration, followed by ﬁnancial owners. In contrast,
the coeﬃcients for individual and industrial owners are much closer to one, although they are statistically
diﬀerent from one. This reﬂects the fact that their ownership duration is more similar to that of the state
owner, which is the control group. Firm size does not seem to make a big diﬀerence since the coeﬃcients
are very close to one for both surviving ﬁrms (sample (2)) and all ﬁrms (sample (4)).
1.4.4 Ownership duration and project duration
As discussed in section 1.1, there are two potential reasons to expect a systematic relationship be-
tween project duration and ownership duration. According to the matching idea, long-term (short-term)
projects have long-term (short-term) owners, i.e., the two are positively correlated. The information
asymmetry argument is just the opposite: Because ﬁrms lose owners if they invest in long-term projects,
13In the sample of ﬁrms that were listed over the whole period, 12% of the largest owners maintained their stake for the
whole eleven year period.
14The erratic behavior of the hazard function for state owners is due to the low number of such owners. In the sample
of ﬁrms surviving the eleven year sample period, there are only seven cases where state owners are among the ﬁve largest.
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The ﬁgures graph hazard functions grouped by owner type, owner rank, ﬁrm type and ﬁrm size. The analysis is performed for
the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm. The sample is all ﬁrms at the Oslo Stock Exchange that survived throughout the
whole period 19891999. The estimation uses a Weibull functional speciﬁcation for the hazard function. Analysis time in days.
Estimation is carried out with Stata 8's streg function. Owner types: 1State owner, 2Foreign owner, 3Family (individual)
owner, 4Financial owner, 5Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner. Owner rank goes from 1; the largest owner, to 5; the ﬁfth largest
owner. Firm types: 1Industrial ﬁrm, 2Shipping ﬁrm, 3Financial ﬁrm, 4Small/young ﬁrm. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size
groups, where group 1 contains the smallest ﬁrms, and group 5 the largest.
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Table 1.3 Determinants of the hazard function
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.423 (0.01) 0.424 (0.00)
Foreign owner 3.249 (0.00) 2.726 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.395 (0.04) 1.628 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.506 (0.00) 1.490 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.395 (0.00) 2.072 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 1.016 (0.31) 0.968 (0.00)
n 1764 4576
The table shows results from estimating the hazard function. The coeﬃcients represent marginal contributions to the hazard
function. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm. The two samples are: (2) All ﬁrms at the Oslo
Stock Exchange that survived the sample period 19891999, and (4) All ﬁrms listed at the Oslo Exchange at some point during
the period 19891999. The estimation uses a Weibull functional speciﬁcation for the hazard function. Analysis time in days.
Estimation is carried out with Stata 8's streg function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to
the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Fraction owned: Fraction of company owned by the given owner, Foreign
owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is an international owner, Individual (family) owner: Indicator variable equal
to one if the owner is a individual (private) owner, State owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a state owner,
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a nonﬁnancial owner, Financial (institutional)
owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a ﬁnancial owner, Firm Size: Total ﬁrm value estimated as the sum of market
value of equity and book value of debt Variables that vary over time (Firm Size) are measured as averages over the estimation
period.
ﬁrms tend to get long-term owners when they invest in short-term projects. That is, project duration
and ownership duration are negatively related.
Panels A and B of table 4 both include project duration as a duration determinant, operationalizing
it either as depreciation over long-term assets (panel A) or as long-term debt over total debt (panel B).
Both speciﬁcations support the matching idea that duration of ownership is longer in ﬁrms with long
term projects. The coeﬃcient on depreciation over long term assets is signiﬁcantly above one, whereas
the coeﬃcient on long term debt over total debt is below one. Both results support a link between long
term projects ﬁnanced with long term debt and long term ownership. In both cases one of the coeﬃcients
is statistically signiﬁcant.
1.4.5 Voting by foot
Voting by foot relates to the selling (buying) of shares after bad (good) news. An example would be selling
an ownership stake after a negative earnings surprise. Investigating this hypothesis requires a diﬀerent
econometric methodology because the duration analysis of the previous two subsections assumes that
the explanatory variables are either constant throughout the period, or linear functions of time. Neither
assumption is particularly useful when we want to model the exit probability as a function of surprises
in the explanatory variables. Consequently, we model the owner's annual decision of whether to stay one
more period as a binary choice using a logit model.
We use the initial two years of the sample period to measure initial duration. We then start in 1991
and model the owner's decision of whether to keep the stake for one more year as a function of a number
of explanatory variables. One of these variables is the time period the owner has already held the stake,
which will pick up duration dependence. While there is a truncation bias in this variable, our ﬁndings
from the duration analysis in section 1.4.2 suggest it will not be a major problem. This is because the
estimated survival function shows that 70% of the owners have left after two years. Thus, a current
duration longer than two years is already a good indication that the owner is long-term. Moreover, the
focus in this estimation is not on the tail behavior of duration dependence, but whether ﬁrm information
such as earnings matters for an owner's decision to leave.
Earnings surprise is the new explanatory variable which is used along with the determinants based on
ownership duration, owner size, owner type, project duration and ﬁrm size. We operationalize earnings
surprise as the lagged change in earnings.15 The higher the value of this proxy, the more positive the
15This is a rather primitive estimate of earnings surprise which assumes that earnings are martingales. A better estimate
would have been to use, for example, analysts' earnings forecasts. Unfortunately, such data is not available for the time
period we are studying. We lag the earnings surprise measure one period to make sure it is in the decision maker's
information set.
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Table 1.4 Determinants of the hazard function including project duration
Panel A: Depreciation over assets as project duration proxy.
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.355 (0.00) 0.341 (0.00)
Foreign owner 2.867 (0.00) 2.251 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.303 (0.10) 1.430 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.380 (0.01) 1.255 (0.01)
Financial owner 2.344 (0.00) 1.807 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 1.018 (0.34) 0.952 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.585 (0.04) 1.121 (0.38)
n 1658 4264
Panel B: Long-term debt over total debt as project duration proxy.
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.366 (0.00) 0.352 (0.00)
Foreign owner 2.859 (0.00) 2.284 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.308 (0.10) 1.470 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.327 (0.03) 1.276 (0.01)
Financial owner 2.292 (0.00) 1.812 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.994 (0.69) 0.953 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.971 (0.79) 0.842 (0.01)
n 1674 4366
The table shows results from estimating two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the hazard function. The coeﬃcients represent marginal
contributions to the hazard function. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm. The two samples are:
(2) All ﬁrms at the Oslo Stock Exchange that survived the sample period 19891999, and (4) All ﬁrms listed at the Oslo Exchange
at some point during the period 19891999. The estimation uses a Weibull functional speciﬁcation for the hazard function. Analysis
time in days. Estimation is carried out with Stata 8's streg function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values
are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Fraction owned: Fraction of company owned by the given
owner, Foreign owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is an international owner, Individual (family) owner: Indicator
variable equal to one if the owner is a individual (private) owner, State owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is
a state owner, Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a nonﬁnancial owner, Financial
(institutional) owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a ﬁnancial owner, Firm Size: Total ﬁrm value estimated
as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt, Depreciation over long term assets: Annual depreciation divided
by the current book value of long term assets, Long term debt over total debt: Fraction of company's debt which is long term.
Variables that vary over time (Firm Size, Depreciation over assets, and Long term debt over total debt) are measured as averages
over the estimation period.
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news. According to the information asymmetry argument, an impatient owner reduces his stake when
reported earnings are unexpectedly low. Thus, if such behavior pushes ﬁrms into short-termism, we
expect that as ﬁrms invest in projects with shorter payback, the probability decreases that the owner
will terminate the relationship to the ﬁrm. Thus, short-termist ﬁrms end up with long-term owners.
The opposite is true under the matching hypothesis, where ﬁrms who invest in long term projects have
long-term owners.
Table 1.5 The binary choice of whether or not to terminate an ownership relationship
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.125 (0.06) -0.623 (0.18)
Fraction owned -1.229 (0.01) -1.220 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.007 (0.00) 0.999 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.502 (0.06) 0.453 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.162 (0.40) 0.153 (0.32)
Financial owner 0.825 (0.00) 0.654 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.040 (0.25) 0.027 (0.32)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.601 (0.00) 1.865 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.083 (0.23) -0.028 (0.60)
Duration -0.099 (0.00) -0.107 (0.00)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.049
The table shows results from a binary choice (logit) regression where the dependent variable is whether the ownership stake is
terminated in the present year. Success in the logit is that the relationship ends. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest
owners of any given ﬁrm. For each owner and each year we ﬁnd the corresponding owner rank and type. The two samples are: (2)
All ﬁrms at the Oslo Stock Exchange that survived the sample period 19891999, and (4) All ﬁrms listed at the Oslo Exchange
at some point during the period 19891999. Fraction owned: Fraction of company owned by the given owner Foreign owner:
Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is an international owner, Individual (family) owner: Indicator variable equal to one if
the owner is a individual (private) owner, State owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a state owner, Nonﬁnancial
(industrial) owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a nonﬁnancial owner, Financial (institutional) owner: Indicator
variable equal to one if the owner is a ﬁnancial owner, Firm Size: Total ﬁrm value estimated as the sum of market value of equity
and book value of debt, Depreciation over long term assets: Annual depreciation divided by the current book value of long term
assets, Earnings surprise: Percentage change in earnings from one year to the next, Duration: Duration is measured as the time
until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake.
Table 1.5 shows the results of the logit regressions, where a positive coeﬃcient means an increased
probability that the relationship ends next period. The results show that our proxy for earnings surprise
has the correct estimated sign, but is not statistically signiﬁcant. While this may suggest owners are
not consistently voting with their feet or that they base their voting on other information than reported
earnings, the result may also be due to a noisy earnings surprise measure. It is also interesting to note
that the result from section 4.4 on the matching between project duration and ownership duration is
robust to the estimation methodology.
Summarizing section 1.4, the survival and hazard functions show that when we estimate the full
probability distribution of ownership duration and adjust for truncation bias, the exit probabilities are
duration dependent. Most large owners leave within two years. Those that pass the three year hurdle are
less likely to leave the longer they have stayed already. The largest owner stays longer than others, foreign
owners stay the shortest, and individuals the longest. Firms investing in short-term projects have more
short-term owners, supporting the matching hypothesis that project duration and ownership duration
are positively correlated. We ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant support for earnings surprises aﬀecting an
owner's decision to stay.
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1.5 Ownership duration and ﬁrm performance
We have argued that ownership duration may inﬂuence a ﬁrm's economic performance for information
asymmetry reasons and for corporate governance reasons. According to the information logic, ﬁnancial
analysts and certain owner types may pressure management to invest in projects that produce high
earnings early on, even if this means less present value than investing in longer-term projects. In order
to avoid a negative stock price eﬀect and the exit of owners, ﬁrms overinvest in short-term projects,
and hence long-term performance will suﬀer. Consequently, the information hypothesis posits a negative
relationship between ownership duration and ﬁrm performance.
There are two major and internally conﬂicting governance reasons why ownership duration may
matter for performance. The sleepy monitor argument, which is particularly prevalent under delegated
monitoring, suggests that because patient owners exert too little pressure on management, ownership
duration and performance will be negatively related. In contrast, the committed governance hypothesis
argues that because monitors need time to learn about the ﬁrm before they can contribute as valuable
monitors, ownership duration and economic performance will be positively related.
Although ownership duration may be considered a separate governance mechanism, it is not the
only one.16 Consequently, when relating ownership duration to ﬁrm performance we need to consider
the simultaneous eﬀect of a battery of governance mechanisms. We use outside and inside ownership
concentration to capture the eﬀects of other owners because existing research has shown theoretically
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Morck et al., 1988) and empirically (Gugler, 2001) that these two ownership
characteristics often matter for ﬁrm performance. We measure outside ownership concentration by the
Herﬁndahl index.17 Since there are reasons to expect a non-linear relationship between insider holdings
and performance (McConnell and Servaes, 1990), we include the equity fraction of corporate oﬃcers and
directors (the inside owners) and also its squared value as proxies for inside ownership concentration.
The relationship between ownership duration and performance may diﬀer across owner types. Direct
ownership by individuals involves stronger monitoring incentives than indirect ownership through inter-
mediaries like industrial ﬁrms and ﬁnancial institutions. Also, diﬀerent owner types may hold equity for
diﬀerent purposes. For instance, a foreign owner investing for diversiﬁcation reasons may be uninterested
in taking a governance role. Financial institutions, who themselves are monitored and rewarded based on
their own short-term performance, may push harder than others on the ﬁrms they invest in to maintain
high short-term earnings at the expense of long-term performance.
Diﬀerent owner types may have diﬀerent governance roles and diﬀerent performance horizons and,
consequently, the length of ownership duration across owner types may have a diﬀerent impact on ﬁrm
behavior. We account for this possibility by not just considering ownership duration across all owner
types as a group (basic model), but we also examine the performance eﬀect of ownership duration per
owner type (extended model).
We measure ﬁrm performance by Tobin's Q, operationalized as the ﬁrm's market value over book
value, setting the market value of debt equal to its book value. The relationship between ownership
duration and economic performance in this section is analyzed in three diﬀerent ways. We ﬁrst extend
the traditional static cross-sectional governance-performance framework to a multi-period formulation.
We next relate ownership duration to future performance. Finally, we explore potential reverse causation
by asking whether there is any evidence of performance aﬀecting duration.
1.5.1 Ownership duration and contemporaneous performance
The analysis in this section extends the methodology of classical governance-performance studies such
as Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). This involves
relating the corporate governance to economic performance using cross-sectional regressions, either as
single multivariate regressions, or a system of equations.18 Note the important feature here is that since
16Additional mechanisms are the regulatory environment, competition in products, labor, and takeover markets, outside
ownership concentration, insider ownership, owner types, board characteristics, security design, and ﬁnancial policy (Becht
et al., 2003).
17The Herﬁndahl index is the sum of squared ownership fractions across all the ﬁrm's investors of a given category
(outside owners in our case). Its maximum value is one (a single investor owns every share), approaching its minimum of
zero as the ownership structure gets increasingly diﬀuse.
18The systems analysis is exempliﬁed by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Cho (1998), and analyzed in the Norwegian
setting in Bøhren and Ødegaard (2005).
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this analysis is performed for a cross-section, all the variables must be observed at the same time. In our
case we have the problem that one of the variables we want to use to explain performance is ownership
duration, which is inherently multi-period. We solve this problem by matching duration and performance
in the following way: For each owner we calculate this owner's duration and for the matching period we
calculate averages of performance measure and explanatory variables. Figure 1.3 illustrates the principle.
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Table 1.6 reports the results from performing such regressions where the duration is that of the
largest owner, and the control variables are a measure of ownership concentration, the fraction owned
by insiders, and the fraction owned by insiders squared. These control variables are chosen because
they are governance variables that are known to aﬀect performance.19 In panel A, which ignores owner
type, we ﬁnd a consistently negative association between ownership duration and Q. The relationship
is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels in one of the two samples. Moreover, the coeﬃcient
estimates are large in magnitude, suggesting the economic impact is important. For example, if ownership
duration increased by one year Q would fall by around 0.1 in the sample where duration is statistically
signiﬁcant. Given that in equilibrium the marginal Q is 1, this is a 10% decline.
This negative sign for the estimated coeﬃcient could be explained by the governance based claim that
long-term owners are passive monitors. The result is also consistent with the information based argument
that certain owners push managers into accepting too many investment projects with high short-term
earnings and low long-term cash ﬂows. In contrast, the results refute the competent monitoring idea
that owners need to be around for a while to contribute positively to the ﬁrm beyond just ﬁnancing it.
In line with evidence from several countries, the estimates in the table also show that high outside
ownership concentration is associated with low Tobin's Q, and that insider ownership is value creating
unless too much of it causes conﬂicts of interest between inside and outside owners (McConnell and
Servaes, 1990; Lehmann and Weigand, 2000; Gugler, 2001).
The relationship between performance and duration is estimated with separate duration terms for
each owner type in panel B. We do this by interacting ownership duration with indicator variables for
the speciﬁed owner types.20 This decomposition provides a considerably sharper picture. There is a
negative and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between Q and the duration of ﬁnancial institutions
in both samples. The size of the estimated coeﬃcients are -0.13 and -0.20, respectively, indicating that
the eﬀect of an increase in duration by this type of owner is related to a substantial fall in Q. This
is consistent with the idea that indirect monitoring through ﬁnancial institutions is a poor corporate
governance mechanism. It is also consistent with the information hypothesis that institutional owners
push managers into adopting short-term projects that are value destroying.
The negative relationship between performance and ownership duration is also found for industrial
owners, although the statistical signiﬁcance is less convincing than for ﬁnancial institutions. However, it
is statistically signiﬁcant in one sample and economically important in this sample too. One potential
explanation for the fact that ﬁnancial institutions have a more negative relationship to performance than
industrials is that ﬁnancial institutions are not just poor monitors. They also pressure managers more
19We have also used risk adjusted stocks returns as performance measures. The results, which are available on request,
are consistent with those based on Q.
20Since the model is estimated with a constant term, one owner-type dummy must be omitted. We leave out state
owners, since this type may invest for the long or short term neither for governance, information nor performance reasons.
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Table 1.6 The relationship between economic performance and ownership duration of the ﬁrm's largest
owner
Panel A: Base-case model
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 1.298 (0.00) 1.650 (0.00)
Duration −0.033 (0.15) −0.094 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.411 (0.29) −0.337 (0.27)
Primary insiders 3.857 (0.00) 3.888 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −3.797 (0.00) −4.194 (0.00)
R¯2 0.10 0.04
n 214 627
Panel B: Extended model
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 1.294 (0.00) 1.650 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.077 (0.19) −0.119 (0.06)
interaction(Duration,Family (individual) owner) 0.085 (0.15) 0.048 (0.47)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.019 (0.42) −0.080 (0.01)
interaction(Duration,Financial owner) −0.132 (0.01) −0.202 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.817 (0.03) −0.453 (0.14)
Primary insiders 3.714 (0.00) 3.822 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −3.568 (0.00) −4.171 (0.00)
R¯2 0.14 0.05
n 214 627
The table shows the results from regressions where the dependent variable is ﬁrm performance measured by Tobin's Q. The
explanatory variables are ownership duration (for the largest owner), a measure of outside ownership concentration and a measure
of the insider ownership. We also control for owner type. Panels B splits the eﬀect of ownership duration across owner types by
interacting ownership duration with dummy variables for the various owner types. The two samples are: (2) All ﬁrms at the Oslo
Stock Exchange that survived the sample period 19891999, and (4) All ﬁrms listed at the Oslo Exchange at some point during
the period 19891999. Q : Q is estimated as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book
value of assets, Duration: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake, Foreign owner:
Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is an international owner, Individual (family) owner: Indicator variable equal to one
if the owner is a individual (private) owner, Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a
nonﬁnancial owner, Financial (institutional) owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a ﬁnancial owner, Herﬁndahl
(excluding largest): Herﬁndahl concentration index calculated for all owners except the largest owner, Primary insiders: The
aggregate fraction of a company's equity held by primary insiders.
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strongly than other indirect owners into over investing in short run projects because they themselves are
judged on short-term performance.
The two remaining owner types are individuals and foreigners.21 The estimated coeﬃcient is positive
in both samples for individuals, and positive in one sample for foreigners. However, no coeﬃcient is
statistically signiﬁcant.
In summary, when we aggregate owner types together, we ﬁnd a negative relationship between eco-
nomic performance and ownership duration. These results are consistent with both longer duration
leading to poor governance through sleepy monitoring and with investors pushing managers into invest-
ing in projects that deliver higher short-term gains at the expense of lower long-term returns. When
we consider ownership duration across diﬀerent owner types, the story becomes more complex, but also
more familiar and intuitive. We ﬁnd that the negative relationship between ownership duration and
performance is primarily due to ﬁnancial institutions and to a certain extent due to industrial owners.
1.5.2 Ownership duration and future performance
As an alternative to the matching idea of linking duration and performance contemporaneously, we do a
simple attempt at introducing dynamics. The method is illustrated in ﬁgure 1.4. We start with the four
year period 19891993. Taking the largest owner at the end of 1993 we relate this owner's duration over
the previous four years to next period's performance, measured as Q at the end of 1994. We then move
one year forward, relating the duration for the largest owner in the period 19901994 to performance
in 1995. That is, for each year from 1994 to the end of the sample period we predict next year's Q
from the largest owner's duration over the past four years. While this method gives some ﬂavor of a
predicting performance using the historical duration, one cannot use the results to argue strongly for
causality. This is because of the persistent nature of most of the relevant variables, such as ownership
duration, concentration, and performance.22 Nevertheless, this methodology will be better at catching
time variation in these relations than the averages used in the previous method.23
Figure 1.4 Performing the forward looking regressions









Panel A of table 1.7 shows results when we do not distinguish between owner types. The estimated
coeﬃcient for ownership duration is negative in both cases and statistically signiﬁcant in one. This
tells us that across all owner types, the longer the owner has stayed already, the lower the expected
performance in the next period.
We next split the eﬀects by owner types. Considering our earlier ﬁndings in table 6 that ownership
duration and performance are related, we expect to ﬁnd that increased duration by indirect owners (ﬁ-
nancial institutions and industrials) predicts lower future performance. In contrast, longer duration by
direct owners (individuals and possibly foreigners) had a much less clear relationship in the contempo-
raneous regressions. The coeﬃcients indicated a positive link, but they were never signiﬁcant. Panel B
reports the results and shows that there is a negative and statistically signiﬁcant duration coeﬃcient for
ﬁnancial institutions in both samples. The coeﬃcients are also negative for industrial owners and statis-
tically signiﬁcant in one case. These results tell us that if ﬁnancial institutions and industrials choose to
stay on another year, next year's performance is expected to decline. As in the contemporaneous setting,
21The data does not allow us to separate foreign owners into individuals and institutions,. We therefore cannot tell to
what extent a foreign owner represents direct or indirect monitoring.
22However, the results remain largely unchanged when we measure performance by stock returns which are not persistent.
23This method has some similarities to the way Gompers et al. (2003) construct an index of 24 corporate governance
mechanisms and estimate the relationship between a ﬁrm's score on this index and its subsequent returns.
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Table 1.7 Relating current ownership duration to the ﬁrm's performance in the next period
Panel A: Base-case model
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.306 (0.00) 1.600 (0.00)
Duration -0.042 (0.18) -0.095 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.169 (0.54) -0.313 (0.24)
Primary insiders 2.829 (0.00) 3.171 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -3.512 (0.00) -3.137 (0.00)
n 404 942
R2 0.05 0.04
Panel B: Extended model
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.198 (0.00) 1.513 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.405 (0.00) 0.080 (0.17)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.121 (0.01) 0.082 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.017 (0.55) -0.074 (0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.146 (0.00) -0.213 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.419 (0.09) -0.505 (0.06)
Primary insiders 1.881 (0.00) 2.589 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.362 (0.00) -2.497 (0.00)
n 404 942
R2 0.20 0.06
The table shows the results from regressions which relate ownership duration in this period to ﬁrm performance in the next period.
The dependent variable is ﬁrm performance measured as Tobin's Q. The explanatory variable in the base case model is ownership
duration, outside ownership concentration, and insiders holdings. We include the squared insider holdings to allow for nonlinearity.
Panel B splits the eﬀect of ownership duration across owner types by interacting ownership duration with dummy variables for
the diﬀerent types. The Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying the samples are (2): (Surviving ﬁrms;
All owners), and (4): (All ﬁrms; All owners).Q : Q is estimated as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of
debt divided by the book value of assets, Duration: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the
initial stake, Foreign owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is an international owner, Individual (family) owner:
Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a individual (private) owner, Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner: Indicator variable
equal to one if the owner is a nonﬁnancial owner, Financial (institutional) owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner
is a ﬁnancial owner, Herﬁndahl (excluding largest): Herﬁndahl concentration index calculated for all owners except the largest
owner, Primary insiders: The aggregate fraction of a company's equity held by primary insiders.
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the coeﬃcients are stronger for the institutional owners. Again, this could be due to ﬁnancial institutions
suﬀering more from the information asymmetry problem than industrial owners. For both individual
investors and foreign investors the estimated coeﬃcients are positive and statistically signiﬁcant in one
case. These results are in line with our earlier ﬁndings on the contemporaneous relationship between
performance and ownership duration in section 1.5.1, but stronger both statistically and economically.
1.5.3 Does ﬁrm performance cause ownership duration?
We have so far shown that ownership duration and ﬁrm performance are related, and that this relation-
ship varies across owner types in ways which are consistent with corporate governance and information
asymmetry arguments. Moreover, section 1.5.2 showed that past ownership duration predicts future
performance. Unfortunately, and just like most results in the research literature on governance and
performance, this ﬁnding on lagged duration does not justify strong conclusions about causality. Even if
ownership duration does drives performance, the opposite order of causation may also exist. For example,
we found a negative relationship between performance and ownership duration by ﬁnancial institutions.
This result would naturally come up if such investors tend to realize gains (i.e., exit winner stocks), but
hesitate to take losses (i.e., hold on to loser stocks). Thus, performance would cause ownership duration.
In order to improve our understanding of this issue, we will explore whether ownership duration responds
to ﬁrm performance in systematic ways. The more it does, the stronger the argument that ownership
duration is driven by the ﬁrm's performance.24
To investigate the possibility of reverse causation we extend the logit model from section 1.4.3 by
adding performance as an explanatory variable, using market-based performance measures which we
know are in the information set when the decision to stay or leave is made.
Table 1.8 Performance as a determinant of ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owner
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.823 (0.60) -1.603 (0.15)
Fraction owned -2.635 (0.00) -1.643 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.931 (0.06) 1.170 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.248 (0.66) 0.220 (0.60)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.254 (0.55) -0.005 (0.99)
Financial owner 0.869 (0.14) 1.046 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) 0.024 (0.78) 0.065 (0.32)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.621 (0.10) 2.279 (0.05)
Earnings surprise 0.106 (0.56) 0.235 (0.07)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.140 (0.53) 0.114 (0.23)
n 299 542
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.088
The table shows results from a binary choice (logit) regression where the dependent variable is whether the ownership stake is
terminated in the present year. Success in the logit is that the relationship ends. The Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in
19891999 underlying the samples are (2): (Surviving ﬁrms; All owners), and (4): (All ﬁrms; All owners).Q : Q is estimated as
the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets, Fraction owned: Fraction
of company owned by the given owner, Foreign owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is an international owner,
Individual (family) owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a individual (private) owner, Nonﬁnancial (industrial)
owner: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a nonﬁnancial owner, Financial (institutional) owner: Indicator variable
equal to one if the owner is a ﬁnancial owner, Firm Size: Total ﬁrm value estimated as the sum of market value of equity and book
value of debt, Depreciation over long term assets: Annual depreciation divided by the current book value of long term assets,
Earnings surprise: Percentage change in earnings from one year to the next.
Table 1.8 reports the ﬁndings. The estimated coeﬃcients in both samples show that lagged perfor-
mance is far from being a statistically signiﬁcant determinant of ownership duration. Therefore, whilst
we found ample evidence that ownership duration is related to performance, we ﬁnd no clear sign that
this relationships is due to reverse causation.
24This question of reverse causation resembles the setting under the information asymmetry theory in section 1.1, where
we asked whether a negative earnings surprise makes owners vote with their feet by selling stock. Although we found
no such evidence in the data, one possible explanation is that the eﬀect is actually there, but the performance measure
and particularly the deﬁnition of a surprise are too noisy to pick it up. Since eﬃciently priced securities reﬂect public
information such as earnings, and since prices directly measure the valuation eﬀect for the owners, stock returns and
changes in Tobin's Q may be better signals than earnings for owners who consider voting with their feet.
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Summarizing section 1.5, we have found that although the overall relationship between ownership
duration and ﬁrm performance is negative, this is primarily due to the negative eﬀect of long term
ownership by ﬁnancial institutions and industrial corporations. This result could be due to delegated
monitoring producing low governance quality over time. In contrast, longer ownership duration by owner
types representing direct monitoring has a moderately positive relation to performance. These results
on the contemporaneous relationship between ownership duration and performance are supported by
our ﬁnding that current ownership duration predicts future performance in a corresponding way. This
predictive ability of a corporate governance mechanism is also in line with the results in Gompers et al.
(2003). As we ﬁnd that performance is driven by ownership duration, but not vice versa, reverse causation
does not appear to be a serious problem in our setting.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper provides the ﬁrst comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics of ownership duration.
Using an unusually long time series of equity ownership, we estimate the holding period of large equity
positions, show how ownership duration varies across owner and ﬁrm types, what factors determines its
length, and analyze how it relates to ﬁrm performance.
We ﬁnd that the ﬁrm's largest owner keeps that position for less than three years on average. The
typical ownership duration lasts longer the larger the stake and is longer for national as opposed to
international investors. Individual owners and industrial owners have longer duration than ﬁnancial
institutions and foreigners. Firms investing in short-term projects have more short-term owners, sup-
porting the idea that project duration matches with ownership duration. When we estimate the full
probability distribution of ownership duration and adjust for truncation bias, we ﬁnd the exit probabil-
ities to be duration dependent. Most owners leave within two years, whereas those who pass the three
year hurdle are less likely to leave the longer they have stayed already.
Ownership duration and ﬁrm performance are always negatively related when we do not distinguish
between owner types. This pattern is consistent with the notion that long-term owners are sleepy
monitors and with the often heard claim that owners and analysts push managers into myopic behavior
at the expense of long-run value maximization. Interestingly, when we examine the relationship between
performance and the holdings of speciﬁc owner types, we ﬁnd that the negative relation between long-term
ownership and performance is due to ﬁnancial institutions and industrial ﬁrms, which both represent
indirect ownership. This is consistent with the notion that the weak monitoring incentives of these
owner types allow managers to destroy value. To the extent that ﬁnancial institutions also emphasize
reported short-term earnings more than others, this could be an additional reason why ﬁrms inﬂuenced
by such owners over extended periods perform more poorly than others. In contrast, we show that longer
ownership by individuals has a moderately positive relation to performance.
It has become quite popular to argue that owners are too impatient, and that the owners' tendency
to vote with their feet forces management to overinvest in projects with short payback in order to
keep current earnings high. Similarly, owners are accused of being restless, lacking the commitment,
competence and persistence needed to monitor and support the management team as an integral part
of good corporate governance. According to this view, short-term investors are considered bad owners,
long-term ones good, and economic welfare is thought to suﬀer because ownership duration is too short.
Our results suggest that conventional wisdom is inconsistent with reality on most of these issues, and
particularly that the unconditional praise of the long-term owner is misplaced.
How might our results aﬀect future research in corporate governance? We have shown that a number
of factors aﬀect ownership duration, and that it is linked to ﬁrm performance. Thus, ownership duration
does matter. Although we have no theoretical model to tell us exactly why it matters, we would still argue
that explicitly considering ownership duration improves our insight into the role of corporate governance.
This seems particularly true given our ﬁndings on how the performance impact of ownership duration
diﬀers across owner types. Therefore, since ownership duration seems to represent a unique and relevant
dimension of how governance mechanisms actually work, corporate governance theorists need to consider
this unexplored property in their model building.
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Chapter 2
How should ownership duration be
measured?
2.1 The nature of the measurement problem
Figure 2.1 The selection problem in calculating ownership duration
-
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Company A: -Owner A:1 -Owner A:2 -Owner A:3
Company B: -Owner B:1
Company C: -Owner C:1 -Owner C:2 -Owner C:3 -Owner C:4 -Owner C:5 -Owner C:6 -Owner C:7
Company D: -Owner D:1 -Owner D:2 -Owner D:3
We want to construct a measure of ownership duration for a given ﬁrm. The problem is, however, that
there is no single, obvious candidate. This happens because ownership duration has several dimensions.
This point is illustrated by ﬁgure 2.1. The ﬁgure shows four diﬀerent example ﬁrms, and how long the
largest owner in the ﬁrm held his stake. Each arrow corresponds to the length of the owner's holding
period, which is the number of years the owner remains the ﬁrm's largest owner.
Several observations can be made using this ﬁgure. Consider company A. It has had one owner for two
years, another for two years, and then a third that stayed for six years. If we want a ﬁgure representing
the number of years an owner stays, and call this ownership duration, should we only consider the owner
that stayed the longest, and conclude that ownership duration in this ﬁrm is six years? Or should we
consider all owners, and conclude that duration is 3.3 years (10/3), which is the average holding period
across the three owners? What about company D? Unlike companies A, B and C, company D did not
survive the whole sample period, but only stayed in the sample for four of the ten sample years. Should
company D enter the sample? If so, with what duration?
A diﬀerent dimension of the duration measurement problem is illustrated by ﬁgure 2.2. We want to
account for two aspects of an owner's situation: (i) the owner's stake (the fraction of the ﬁrm's equity
held by this owner), and (ii) how this stake compares to the stakes of other owners in the ﬁrm. We can
think of this as the desire to capture both the absolute (property (i)) and the relative (property (ii))
dimension of an ownership stake.
Based on the holdings of owners A and B (for simplicity, think of A and B as the only owners of the
ﬁrm) over the six year period, the table below the graph deﬁnes ownership duration in three alternative
ways. One is to consider the owner's initial stake when we start measuring, deﬁning ownership duration
as the time until the the stake is lowered. This is deﬁnition (1) in the table. Alternatively, we can consider
owner rank, and check when this rank changes (deﬁnition (2)). But for purposes of corporate governance
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Time0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Owner
Duration deﬁnition A B
(1) Time until owner lowers ownership stake 6 6
(2) Time until owner changes rank 3 3
(3) Time until owner lowers rank 3 6
there is an asymmetry here. Increases in rank should not necessary be counted as a termination of the
relationship. In fact, the owner did not just keep his relative power, but even increased it. However,
decreases in rank is a true reduction of relative power.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the censoring (cutoﬀ) problem. This is primarily an econometric issue, caused
by the fact that we only observe a ﬁnite number of ownership years for our sample ﬁrms. Considering an
owner for in the ﬁrst sample year (year 0 in the example), we do not know how long an owner observed
this year has kept the stake already. Thus, we do not know when the relationship starts. Correspondingly,
in the ﬁnal sample year (year 6), we do not know whether owners observed this year will continue the
relationship in subsequent years (year 7 and later). Both censoring problems, which cause true ownership
duration to be underestimated, will be accounted for using the econometric technique of duration analysis.
Figure 2.3 The censoring problem
-
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2.2 Implementing a duration measure
As is clear from the above discussion, choosing a relevant duration measure is not trivial. We have to ﬁnd
a way of keeping track of when an owner enters and leaves. Moreover, we must deal with the censoring
problem in contexts where the statistical technique of duration analysis cannot be used. Given these
challenges, we have chosen to implement several alternative deﬁnitions of both ownership duration and
sample restrictions. This approach also allows to evaluate how sensitive our conclusions are to these
alternative deﬁnitions. Whereas the academic paper only uses one of the duration deﬁnitions (Maintain
Stake; see below), this report documents the results for ﬁve additional duration measures. Moreover, we
will estimate these duration measures under four alternative sample restrictions.
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2.2.1 Alternative deﬁnitions of ownership duration
1 Duration: Maintain Stake We count the number of years until the owner's stake declines,
deﬁning stake as the fraction of the ﬁrm's outstanding equity held. For instance, if the investor
buys a 10% stake in 1992, increases it to 16% in 1994 and lets it drop to 2% in 1997, ownership
duration is ﬁve years according to the Maintain Stake deﬁnition.
2 Duration: Keep Same Rank This deﬁnition uses the number of years until the owner's rank
changes. By rank we mean the ﬁrm's largest, second largest, third largest owner, etc. To illustrate,
suppose an investor becomes the ﬁrm's third largest owner in 1992, the largest in 1995, drops to
rank 5 in 1996 and stays there though 1999, selling completely out in 1999. According to the Keep
Same Rank measure, this investor generates three duration estimates: Three years as rank 3, one
year as rank 1, and three years as rank 5.
3 Duration: Maintain Rank The key here is the number of years until the owner's rank declines.
Imagine once more an investor who becomes the ﬁrm's third largest owner in 1992, becomes the
largest in 1995, drops to rank 5 in 1996 and stays there though 1999, selling out completely in
1999. There will be three Maintain Rank estimates for this owner: he ﬁrst maintains rank 3 or
higher for four years, then rank 1 for one year, and ﬁnally maintains rank 5 for three years.
4 Duration: Stay among 5 Largest Under this deﬁnition, we count the number of years until
the owner's rank declines below ﬁve. (i.e., how long the owner stays among the ﬁrm's ﬁve largest).
In the example, there will be just one duration estimate under this deﬁnition: The owner stayed
in the ﬁrm for seven years.
These four measures are calculated for each separate owner. Based on two of these owner-speciﬁc
measures, we deﬁne two averages across owners. Due to the averaging, there is only one estimate of each
such duration measure per ﬁrm.
5 Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% We ﬁrst compute the ownership duration for any
owner who has at least a 1% stake. Next, we calculate average ownership duration across all these
owners.
6 Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest We calculate the average ownership duration
across all owners in the ﬁrm who have a rank of ﬁve or higher over the sample period.
2.2.2 Alternative sample restrictions
• Surviving ﬁrms or all ﬁrms?
Measured ownership duration may be short not because the investor is unwilling to invest longer,
but because the ﬁrm is delisted and thus disappears from our sample. This bias decreases with the
length of the ﬁrm's listing period. We assess the magnitude of this bias by alternatively including
ﬁrms which have survived the whole sample period 1989-1999 (Surviving Firms) and every listed
ﬁrm regardless of listing period (All Firms).
• Longest duration owner or all owners?
Since a ﬁrm may have more than one owner of a given rank over the sample period, we alternatively
include all these owners or only the one who stayed the longest. For instance, suppose a ﬁrm which
was listed over the 19891999 period had one largest owner who stayed from 1989 to 1995, one
stayed through 1996 and the third one from 1997 to 1999. If we use only the longest duration
owner, duration was seven years. If we instead deﬁne the sample in terms of all owners during the
period, the ﬁrm generates three duration measures for the largest owner: seven years, one year,
and three years.
These alternative sampling restrictions on ﬁrms and owners leave us with four diﬀerent samples:
(1) Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners.
(2) Surviving Firms; All Owners.
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(3) All Firms; Longest Duration Owners.
(4) All Firms; All Owners.
We expect ownership duration estimates to be highest under the sample the (Surviving Firms; Longest
Duration Owners) sample and shortest under (All Firms; All Owners). The two remaining samples will




This chapter describes our sample of ﬁrms and summarizes various characteristics of these ﬁrms except
their ownership duration, such as ownership concentration, equity holdings by oﬃcers and directors
(insiders), ﬁrms size, project duration, and economic performance.
3.1 The number of ﬁrms
















For each year we show the number of ﬁrms active at the Oslo Stock Exchange in that year. The average is the average of these
numbers. The number of surviving ﬁrms is the number of companies that remained listed during the whole sample period 1989
1999. These ﬁrms constitute our sample of surviving ﬁrms. When the sample is All Firms rather than Surviving Firms, the number
of sample ﬁrms equals all ﬁrms listed that year.
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Table 3.2 The number of owners per ﬁrm
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 3.7 (1.9) 1 4 8 78
2 5.6 (2.1) 1 6 10 78
3 6.2 (2.2) 1 6 11 78
4 7.0 (1.8) 3 7 11 78
5 7.5 (2.1) 3 8 11 78
10 8.4 (1.9) 3 9 11 78
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.7 (1.6) 0 2 9 323
2 3.6 (2.0) 0 3 10 323
3 4.1 (2.2) 0 4 11 323
4 4.4 (2.3) 0 4 11 323
5 4.7 (2.5) 0 4 11 323
10 5.1 (2.7) 0 5 11 323
The table describes the number of large owners in the sample period. For a given ﬁrm and owner rank, we ﬁnd the number of
diﬀerent owners with that particular rank. Note that only samples (2) and (4), which use all owners, are relevant here. Thus, we
ignore samples (1) and (3), which only includes owners with the largest duration per rank.
Table 3.3 The number of distinct owners for diﬀerent sample deﬁnitions
Sample Owner Rank
Deﬁnition Firms Owners 1 2 3 4 5 10
(1) Surviving Longest Duration 77 77 77 77 77 77
(2) Surviving All 288 427 471 539 576 650
(3) All Longest Duration 222 222 222 222 222 222
(4) All All 653 880 997 1094 1180 1293
The table shows the number of distinct owners who enter a sample under four alternative sample restrictions. For each owner
rank, we ﬁnd the number of distinct owners who has had this particular rank across all ﬁrms and years in the sample. The sample
of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
Table 3.4 The number of ﬁrms in diﬀerent subperiods
Period Number of ﬁrms Surviving Number of ﬁrms
in ﬁrst year ﬁrms in last year
19891999 161 77 275
19891994 161 106 176
19941999 176 131 275
The number of ﬁrms the ﬁrst (last) year equals the number of ﬁrms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange at yearend at the beginning
(end) of the relevant sample period. Surviving ﬁrms is the number of ﬁrms that remained listed over the whole sample period.
These ﬁrms constitute our sample of surviving ﬁrms. The table shows the number of ﬁrms for the whole period and for two
subperiods 19891994 and 19941999.
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3.2 Nonduration characteristics of owners and ﬁrms
Table 3.5 Descriptive statistics for non-duration variables
Mean StDev Q1 Median Q3 n
Ownership Concentration
Herﬁndahl index 0.16 (0.20) 0.04 0.09 0.20 15671
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.16 (0.19) 0.04 0.09 0.20 15565
Primary insiders 0.05 (0.16) 0.00 0.00 0.01 23040
Firm Characteristics
Depreciation over investment 17.86 (541.39) 0.26 0.60 1.14 1323
Investment over depreciation 13.73 (179.96) 0.87 1.66 3.79 1323
Depreciation over long term assets 0.12 (0.14) 0.06 0.09 0.14 1448
Earnings surprise -0.00 (0.78) -0.20 0.18 0.47 818
Investments over income 1.59 (22.65) 0.04 0.08 0.32 1285
ln(Firm Size) 13.86 (1.62) 12.73 13.81 14.89 1532
Long term debt over total debt 0.51 (0.29) 0.29 0.53 0.76 1481
Firm Performance
Q 1.43 (1.11) 0.93 1.13 1.53 1526
Marginal Q 1.16 (2.43) 0.23 1.10 2.13 1177
Q relative to industry 0.00 (0.97) -0.40 -0.17 0.15 1173
RoA 6.28 (15.11) 2.69 7.88 12.64 1434
RoS 38.54 (417.02) -21.26 10.60 45.57 1424
Market Model Residual -2.47 (44.54) -25.34 -2.79 16.94 1543
Fama French Residual -6.41 (54.16) -35.34 -4.34 23.05 1246
The table describes variables measuring ownership characteristics other than ownership duration, ﬁrm characteristics, and ﬁrm
performance. The table provides means, standard deviations, ﬁrst quartile (Q1), median, third quartile (Q3) and number of




This chapter describes ownership duration in various ways, such as the stability of the measures over
time, how mean and median duration varies across ﬁrm types, ﬁrm size, and owner types, and the
correlation between the alternative duration measures.
4.1 Entering and leaving
This section illustrates further the challenges of deﬁning ownership duration. We do this by asking when
owners present at the beginning of the sample period (1989) subsequently terminated their relationship
to the ﬁrm. For instance, consider the ﬁve largest owners at the beginning of the sample period. For
each such owner we ask when this owner leaves his position. Correspondingly, we ﬁnd the entry year of
owners observed at the end of the sample period (1999)
Table 4.1 illustrates this logic under two deﬁnitions of rank. In panel A we require that the owner has
the same rank. Thus, for an owner of rank 1 in 1989 to have stayed to 1999 he must have had rank 1 in
1989 and kept that rank for all the remaining years. uses a less restrictive deﬁnition, as we only require
that the given owner in 1989 was among the ﬁve largest owners from 19891998 to qualify for having
stayed until 1999. Clearly, only requiring that the owner is among the ﬁve largest is less restrictive than
requiring the owner to maintain the same rank. This is borne out in the two panels. The departure year
is typically much later in panel B than A. Table 4.2 shows the corresponding pattern using the entry
year for owners present in the ﬁnal sample year.
4.1.1 All owners
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Table 4.1 What happened to owners present at the beginning of the sample period?
When did owners from 1989 subsequently change rank?
Leaving in year
Rank in 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
1989 or later no comps
1 34% 16% 8% 10% 0% 3% 5% 2% 5% 5% 13% 62
2 56% 18% 8% 3% 6% 3% 2% 2% 0% 0% 2% 62
3 68% 18% 5% 6% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 2% 62
4 76% 15% 5% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 62
5 81% 11% 2% 5% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 62
When did owners from 1989 subsequently drop below rank 5?
Leaving in year
Rank in 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
1989 or later no comps
1 16% 13% 15% 15% 3% 3% 2% 5% 5% 3% 21% 62
2 24% 29% 10% 6% 6% 6% 2% 2% 2% 0% 13% 62
3 26% 26% 11% 13% 6% 3% 3% 0% 0% 2% 10% 62
4 40% 31% 6% 8% 5% 2% 0% 2% 2% 2% 3% 62
5 63% 13% 5% 11% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 62
The table documents how fast owners change their position in a given company. We ﬁrst identify the ﬁve largest owners at the
beginning of the sample period (1989). We then ﬁnd in what subsequent year the owner changes this position. We deﬁne position
in two alternative ways. counts the number of years the same rank is kept (Keep Same Rank). counts the number of years until
the owner drops below rank 5 (Stay Among 5 Largest). We only consider ﬁrms that survived the whole sample period 19891999.
Table 4.2 When did the owners at the end of the sample period get into their position?
When did owners present in 1999 achieve that rank?
Entering in year
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Rank in Tot
or before 1999 no comps
12% 2% 2% 6% 6% 3% 3% 6% 9% 14% 36% 1 64
2% 2% 0% 2% 3% 6% 2% 6% 8% 22% 48% 2 64
2% 0% 0% 2% 2% 2% 3% 6% 3% 23% 58% 3 64
0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 2% 5% 20% 72% 4 64
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 8% 17% 73% 5 64
When did owners in 1999 achieve at least rank 5?
Entering in year
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Rank in Tot
or before 1999 no comps
22% 2% 3% 11% 6% 5% 2% 6% 14% 9% 20% 1 64
8% 0% 8% 6% 8% 5% 12% 6% 6% 16% 25% 2 64
11% 5% 2% 5% 5% 3% 6% 6% 11% 19% 28% 3 64
3% 2% 2% 5% 6% 0% 6% 5% 16% 19% 38% 4 64
3% 0% 0% 5% 0% 2% 8% 5% 8% 20% 50% 5 64
The tables illustrates how fast owners change their positions in a given company. We ﬁrst gather the ﬁve largest owners at the
end of the sample period. We then ﬁnd in what of the previous years the owner entered into that position. We deﬁne position in
two alternative ways. counts the number of years the same rank is kept (Keep Same Rank). counts the number of years until the
owner drops below rank 5 (Stay Among 5 Largest). We only consider ﬁrms that survived the whole sample period 19891999.
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4.1.2 Entering and leaving grouped by type of owner
Table 4.3 When did the owners at the beginning leave?
Family (individual) owners
Leaving in year
Rank in 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
1989 or later no comps
1 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 20% 40% 5
2 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1
3 0% 25% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 25% 4
4 33% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 3
5 75% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4
Financial owners
Leaving in year
Rank in 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
1989 or later no comps
1 12% 38% 25% 12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 8
2 17% 50% 8% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12
3 21% 42% 11% 11% 5% 5% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 19
4 17% 58% 8% 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12
5 54% 23% 15% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13
Foreign owners
Leaving in year
Rank in 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
1989 or later no comps
1 10% 20% 40% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 10
2 46% 23% 0% 0% 15% 8% 0% 8% 0% 0% 0% 13
3 33% 25% 8% 17% 0% 8% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12
4 44% 26% 7% 11% 7% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 27
5 75% 12% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 16
State owners
Leaving in year
Rank in 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
1989 or later no comps
1 0% 25% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 25% 4
2 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1
3 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1
4 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1
5 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owners
Leaving in year
Rank in 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
1989 or later no comps
1 23% 6% 6% 14% 6% 6% 3% 6% 6% 0% 26% 35
2 20% 20% 14% 3% 6% 9% 3% 0% 3% 0% 23% 35
3 27% 19% 8% 15% 12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 19% 26
4 42% 32% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 5% 0% 11% 19
5 61% 11% 0% 14% 0% 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 28
The table documents how fast owners change their position in a given company. We ﬁrst identify the ﬁve largest owners at the
beginning of the sample period (1989). We then ﬁnd in what subsequent year the owner changes this position. We deﬁne position
by the number of years until the owner drops below rank 5 (Stay Among 5 Largest). We only consider ﬁrms that survived the
whole sample period 19891999.
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Table 4.4 When did the owners at the end get into their position?
Family (individual) owners
Entering in year
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Rank in Tot
or before 1999 no comps
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1 1
25% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 25% 0% 25% 0% 0% 2 4
12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 12% 0% 12% 50% 3 8
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 33% 0% 33% 4 3
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 12% 25% 50% 5 8
Financial owners
Entering in year
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Rank in Tot
or before 1999 no comps
0% 0% 0% 11% 11% 11% 0% 11% 22% 0% 33% 1 9
0% 0% 12% 12% 0% 0% 12% 12% 12% 12% 25% 2 8
0% 6% 0% 6% 0% 6% 12% 6% 6% 31% 25% 3 16
5% 0% 0% 5% 10% 0% 5% 5% 5% 25% 40% 4 20
0% 0% 0% 8% 0% 0% 12% 0% 8% 8% 62% 5 24
Foreign owners
Entering in year
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Rank in Tot
or before 1999 no comps
0% 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 10% 30% 0% 50% 1 10
0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 7% 21% 14% 7% 0% 43% 2 14
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 12% 25% 38% 12% 3 8
0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0% 9% 18% 55% 4 11
8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 33% 42% 5 12
State owners
Entering in year
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Rank in Tot
or before 1999 no comps
12% 0% 12% 25% 12% 0% 0% 0% 12% 12% 12% 1 8
0% 0% 33% 33% 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 2 6
0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 17% 0% 17% 33% 0% 0% 3 6
0% 0% 0% 29% 14% 0% 0% 0% 29% 0% 29% 4 7
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 25% 0% 50% 5 4
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owners
Entering in year
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Rank in Tot
or before 1999 no comps
31% 3% 3% 8% 5% 5% 3% 5% 8% 13% 18% 1 39
12% 0% 6% 3% 6% 6% 9% 3% 3% 25% 25% 2 32
23% 8% 4% 8% 4% 0% 0% 0% 8% 12% 35% 3 26
4% 4% 0% 0% 4% 0% 4% 9% 22% 22% 30% 4 23
6% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 12% 0% 6% 31% 38% 5 16
The tables illustrates how fast owners change their positions in a given company. We ﬁrst gather the ﬁve largest owners at the
end of the sample period. We then ﬁnd in what of the previous years the owner entered into that position. We deﬁne position by
the number of years until the owner drops below rank 5 (Stay Among 5 Largest). We only consider ﬁrms that survived the whole
sample period 19891999.
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4.2 Descriptive statistics of the basic ownership duration mea-
sures
Using the six duration measures and the four alternative sample restrictions deﬁned in chapter 2, this
section shows key properties of the frequency distributions of ownership duration across a range of ﬁrm
and owner characteristics.
4.2.1 Ownership duration in the ungrouped sample
Table 4.5 Average ownership duration by owner rank across duration deﬁnitions and sample restrictions
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner Rank average
Sample Firms Owners 1 2 3 4 5 10 n
(1) Surviving Longest Duration 4.4 4.1 4.5 4.6 3.9 3.7 75
(2) Surviving All 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 446
(3) All Longest Duration 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.2 318
(4) All All 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1180
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner Rank average
Sample Firms Owners 1 2 3 4 5 10 n
(1) Surviving Longest Duration 5.6 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.3 1.7 75
(2) Surviving All 2.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 446
(3) All Longest Duration 3.3 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.3 318
(4) All All 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1180
Duration: Maintain Rank
Owner Rank average
Sample Firms Owners 1 2 3 4 5 10 n
(1) Surviving Longest Duration 5.6 4.5 4.7 4.3 4.0 4.1 75
(2) Surviving All 2.7 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 446
(3) All Longest Duration 3.3 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 318
(4) All All 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1180
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner Rank average
Sample Firms Owners 1 2 3 4 5 10 n
(1) Surviving Longest Duration 7.0 6.0 5.9 4.8 4.0 1.6 75
(2) Surviving All 3.6 2.8 2.7 2.2 1.7 1.1 446
(3) All Longest Duration 3.9 3.4 3.2 2.9 2.5 1.3 318
(4) All All 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.1 1180
The table summarizes the average duration of ownership under alternative duration deﬁnitions and sample restrictions. The four
duration deﬁnitions are as follows: Duration: Maintain Stake : Duration terminates when owner lowers stake from the initial
stake. Duration: Keep Same Rank: Duration terminates when owner changes rank relative to initial rank. Duration: Maintain
Rank: Duration terminates when owner lowers rank relative to initial rank. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest: Duration terminates
when owner lowers rank below ﬁve. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving
Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All
Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.6 Ownership duration by owner rank across duration deﬁnitions; shown sample by sample
Sample (1)
Owner Rank average
Duration deﬁnition 1 2 3 4 5 10 n
Duration: Maintain Stake 4.3 4.1 4.5 4.5 3.8 3.6 75
Duration: Keep Same Rank 5.6 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.3 1.7 75
Duration: Maintain Rank 5.6 4.5 4.7 4.3 4.0 4.1 75
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 7.0 6.0 5.9 4.8 4.0 1.6 75
Sample (2)
Owner Rank average
Duration deﬁnition 1 2 3 4 5 10 n
Duration: Maintain Stake 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 446
Duration: Keep Same Rank 2.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 446
Duration: Maintain Rank 2.7 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 446
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 3.6 2.8 2.7 2.2 1.7 1.1 446
Sample (3)
Owner Rank average
Duration deﬁnition 1 2 3 4 5 10 n
Duration: Maintain Stake 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.2 318
Duration: Keep Same Rank 3.3 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.3 318
Duration: Maintain Rank 3.3 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 318
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 3.9 3.4 3.2 2.9 2.5 1.3 318
Sample (4)
Owner Rank average
Duration deﬁnition 1 2 3 4 5 10 n
Duration: Maintain Stake 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1180
Duration: Keep Same Rank 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1180
Duration: Maintain Rank 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1180
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.1 1180
The table summarizes the average duration of ownership under alternative duration deﬁnitions and sample restrictions. The four
duration deﬁnitions are as follows: Duration: Maintain Stake : Duration terminates when owner lowers stake from the initial
stake. Duration: Keep Same Rank: Duration terminates when owner changes rank relative to initial rank. Duration: Maintain
Rank: Duration terminates when owner lowers rank relative to initial rank. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest: Duration terminates
when owner lowers rank below ﬁve. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving
Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All
Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.7 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 4.27 (2.8) 1 3 11 75
2 4.05 (2.3) 1 3 11 75
3 4.45 (2.6) 1 4 11 75
4 4.48 (2.6) 1 4 11 75
5 3.83 (2.2) 1 3 11 75
10 3.64 (2.0) 1 3 9 75
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.13 (2.1) 1 1 11 261
2 1.93 (1.6) 1 1 11 388
3 2.00 (1.8) 1 1 11 434
4 1.86 (1.7) 1 1 11 483
5 1.79 (1.5) 1 1 11 521
10 1.57 (1.3) 1 1 9 589
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.53 (2.0) 1 2 11 318
2 2.51 (1.8) 1 2 11 318
3 2.49 (2.0) 1 2 11 318
4 2.57 (1.9) 1 2 11 318
5 2.40 (1.7) 1 2 11 318
10 2.22 (1.6) 1 2 9 318
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 1.73 (1.5) 1 1 11 800
2 1.65 (1.3) 1 1 11 1047
3 1.60 (1.3) 1 1 11 1180
4 1.59 (1.3) 1 1 11 1260
5 1.55 (1.2) 1 1 11 1336
10 1.40 (1.0) 1 1 9 1460
Duration: Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The table
shows characteristics of the ownership duration for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):(All Firms;
Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.8 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 5.61 (3.1) 1 5 11 75
2 3.55 (2.2) 1 3 11 75
3 3.00 (1.8) 1 2 11 75
4 2.49 (1.3) 1 2 7 75
5 2.25 (1.1) 1 2 6 75
10 1.68 (0.8) 1 2 5 75
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.66 (2.6) 1 2 11 261
2 1.74 (1.4) 1 1 11 388
3 1.48 (1.1) 1 1 11 434
4 1.34 (0.8) 1 1 7 483
5 1.25 (0.7) 1 1 6 521
10 1.11 (0.4) 1 1 5 589
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 3.28 (2.4) 1 3 11 318
2 2.31 (1.6) 1 2 11 318
3 1.97 (1.3) 1 2 11 318
4 1.74 (1.0) 1 1 7 318
5 1.64 (0.9) 1 1 6 318
10 1.35 (0.6) 1 1 5 318
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.07 (1.8) 1 1 11 800
2 1.52 (1.1) 1 1 11 1047
3 1.33 (0.8) 1 1 11 1180
4 1.24 (0.6) 1 1 7 1260
5 1.19 (0.5) 1 1 6 1336
10 1.09 (0.3) 1 1 5 1460
Duration: Keep Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The table shows characteristics of
the ownership duration for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors underlying (1)(4) are (1):
(Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and
(4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.9 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 5.61 (3.1) 1 5 11 75
2 4.45 (2.6) 1 4 11 75
3 4.72 (2.7) 1 4 11 75
4 4.25 (2.4) 1 4 11 75
5 4.04 (2.1) 1 4 11 75
10 4.05 (2.1) 1 3 10 75
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.66 (2.6) 1 2 11 261
2 2.07 (1.8) 1 1 11 388
3 2.02 (1.8) 1 1 11 434
4 1.88 (1.7) 1 1 11 483
5 1.75 (1.4) 1 1 11 521
10 1.71 (1.4) 1 1 10 589
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 3.28 (2.4) 1 3 11 318
2 2.72 (1.9) 1 2 11 318
3 2.69 (2.0) 1 2 11 318
4 2.58 (1.8) 1 2 11 318
5 2.50 (1.7) 1 2 11 318
10 2.44 (1.7) 1 2 10 318
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.07 (1.8) 1 1 11 800
2 1.75 (1.4) 1 1 11 1047
3 1.65 (1.4) 1 1 11 1180
4 1.61 (1.3) 1 1 11 1260
5 1.54 (1.1) 1 1 11 1336
10 1.50 (1.1) 1 1 10 1460
Duration: Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The table shows characteristics of
the ownership duration for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors underlying (1)(4) are (1):
(Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and
(4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.10 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 7.01 (2.8) 1 7 11 75
2 5.97 (2.9) 1 6 11 75
3 5.87 (2.8) 1 5 11 75
4 4.81 (2.5) 1 4 11 75
5 4.04 (2.1) 1 4 11 75
10 1.60 (1.3) 1 1 9 75
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 3.58 (2.9) 1 3 11 261
2 2.84 (2.3) 1 2 11 388
3 2.65 (2.2) 1 2 11 434
4 2.16 (1.8) 1 1 11 483
5 1.75 (1.4) 1 1 11 521
10 1.08 (0.5) 1 1 9 589
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 3.92 (2.6) 1 3 11 318
2 3.43 (2.3) 1 3 11 318
3 3.24 (2.3) 1 3 11 318
4 2.88 (2.0) 1 2 11 318
5 2.50 (1.7) 1 2 11 318
10 1.31 (0.9) 1 1 9 318
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.60 (2.1) 1 2 11 800
2 2.25 (1.8) 1 2 11 1047
3 2.04 (1.7) 1 1 11 1180
4 1.80 (1.4) 1 1 11 1260
5 1.54 (1.1) 1 1 11 1336
10 1.07 (0.4) 1 1 9 1460
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank ﬁve. The table shows
characteristics of the ownership duration for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors underlying
(1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):(All Firms; Longest Duration
Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.11 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Average; Maintain
Stake; > 1%
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 3.86 (3.0) 1 3 11 75
2 3.07 (2.0) 1 2 11 75
3 2.85 (1.4) 1 2 8 75
4 2.72 (1.1) 1 2 7 75
5 2.63 (1.0) 1 2 7 75
10 2.55 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 3.86 (3.0) 1 3 11 75
2 3.07 (2.0) 1 2 11 75
3 2.85 (1.4) 1 2 8 75
4 2.72 (1.1) 1 2 7 75
5 2.63 (1.0) 1 2 7 75
10 2.55 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.49 (2.0) 1 2 11 318
2 2.11 (1.3) 1 2 11 318
3 2.01 (1.0) 1 2 8 318
4 1.96 (0.9) 1 2 7 318
5 1.92 (0.8) 1 2 7 318
10 1.86 (0.7) 1 2 6 318
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.49 (2.0) 1 2 11 318
2 2.11 (1.3) 1 2 11 318
3 2.01 (1.0) 1 2 8 318
4 1.96 (0.9) 1 2 7 318
5 1.92 (0.8) 1 2 7 318
10 1.86 (0.7) 1 2 6 318
The table shows characteristics of ownership duration for the average duration measure Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; >
1%. For each ﬁrm, the average duration is calculated. The table describes properties of this average across ﬁrms. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.12 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Average; Stay among
5 Largest
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.01 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
2 2.01 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
3 2.01 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
4 2.01 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
5 2.01 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
10 2.01 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.01 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
2 2.01 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
3 2.01 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
4 2.01 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
5 2.01 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
10 2.01 (0.9) 1 2 6 75
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 1.55 (0.6) 1 1 6 318
2 1.55 (0.6) 1 1 6 318
3 1.55 (0.6) 1 1 6 318
4 1.55 (0.6) 1 1 6 318
5 1.55 (0.6) 1 1 6 318
10 1.55 (0.6) 1 1 6 318
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 1.55 (0.6) 1 1 6 318
2 1.55 (0.6) 1 1 6 318
3 1.55 (0.6) 1 1 6 318
4 1.55 (0.6) 1 1 6 318
5 1.55 (0.6) 1 1 6 318
10 1.55 (0.6) 1 1 6 318
The table shows characteristics of ownership duration for the average duration measure Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest.
For each ﬁrm, the average duration is calculated. The table describes properties of this average across ﬁrms. The sample of Oslo
Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2):
(Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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4.2.2 Ownership duration grouped by fraction held
Table 4.13 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ownership fraction. Sample (1)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 2.5 3.5 4.3 4.5 3.8 3.6





Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.2 1.7







Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 2.5 3.3 4.4 4.2 4.0 4.1





Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 4.9 5.1 5.6 4.8 4.0 1.6





The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We
ﬁrst ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the ﬁrm's
outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4)
are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration
Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.14 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ownership fraction. Sample (2)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6





Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1







Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7





Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 3.3 2.7 2.6 2.2 1.7 1.1





The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We
ﬁrst ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the ﬁrm's
outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4)
are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration
Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.15 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ownership fraction. Sample (3)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.2
10-20% 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.4




Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.3
10-20% 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.6






Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.4
10-20% 2.2 2.4 2.4 1.9 2.3




Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 3.2 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.5 1.3
10-20% 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.2 2.3




The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We
ﬁrst ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the ﬁrm's
outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4)
are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration
Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.16 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ownership fraction. Sample (4)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4
10-20% 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.4




Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
10-20% 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.5






Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5
10-20% 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.2




Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Ownership fraction 1 2 3 4 5 10
0-10% 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.1
10-20% 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.0 2.2




The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We
ﬁrst ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the ﬁrm's
outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4)
are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration
Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.17 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Maintain Stake. Sam-
ples (1) and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 2.5 (2.0) 1 2 8 30
1 10-20% 2.8 (2.1) 1 3 10 40
1 20-30% 2.9 (2.5) 1 2 9 27
1 30-40% 2.1 (1.7) 1 1 7 14
1 40-50% 3.7 (2.9) 1 2 11 10
1 50-100% 4.0 (3.7) 1 2 11 21
2 0-10% 3.5 (2.2) 1 3 11 65
2 10-20% 2.6 (2.0) 1 2 10 47
2 20-30% 3.2 (2.2) 1 3 9 12
3 0-10% 4.3 (2.6) 1 3 11 72
3 10-20% 2.7 (2.2) 1 2 11 24
4 0-10% 4.5 (2.6) 1 4 11 75
4 10-20% 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 3 7
5 0-10% 3.8 (2.2) 1 3 11 75
5 10-20% 1.5 () 1 2 2 2
10 0-10% 3.6 (2.0) 1 3 9 75
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 1.7 (1.5) 1 1 8 76
1 10-20% 2.0 (1.7) 1 1 10 87
1 20-30% 2.2 (2.1) 1 1 9 46
1 30-40% 1.7 (1.5) 1 1 7 21
1 40-50% 3.3 (2.8) 1 2 11 12
1 50-100% 3.4 (3.5) 1 2 11 27
2 0-10% 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 11 264
2 10-20% 1.8 (1.6) 1 1 10 113
2 20-30% 2.9 (2.0) 1 2 9 16
3 0-10% 2.0 (1.8) 1 1 11 396
3 10-20% 2.2 (1.9) 1 2 11 39
4 0-10% 1.9 (1.7) 1 1 11 473
4 10-20% 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 3 11
5 0-10% 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 11 518
5 10-20% 1.3 (0.5) 1 1 2 3
10 0-10% 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 9 589
The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We
ﬁrst ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the ﬁrm's
outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4)
are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration
Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
48
Table 4.18 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Maintain Stake. Sam-
ples (3) and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 2.0 (1.4) 1 1 8 92
1 10-20% 2.0 (1.5) 1 1 10 127
1 20-30% 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 9 112
1 30-40% 1.9 (1.2) 1 1 7 60
1 40-50% 2.4 (2.0) 1 2 11 48
1 50-100% 2.0 (2.1) 1 1 11 112
2 0-10% 2.3 (1.7) 1 2 11 247
2 10-20% 2.0 (1.6) 1 1 10 169
2 20-30% 2.0 (1.6) 1 1 9 54
2 30-40% 1.2 (0.4) 1 1 2 9
2 40-50% 1.0 () 1 1 1 3
3 0-10% 2.4 (1.9) 1 2 11 298
3 10-20% 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 11 95
3 20-30% 1.0 () 1 1 1 3
4 0-10% 2.6 (2.0) 1 2 11 311
4 10-20% 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 3 27
5 0-10% 2.4 (1.7) 1 2 11 317
5 10-20% 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 3 7
10 0-10% 2.2 (1.6) 1 2 9 318
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 8 187
1 10-20% 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 10 217
1 20-30% 1.7 (1.5) 1 1 9 146
1 30-40% 1.7 (1.2) 1 1 7 73
1 40-50% 2.3 (2.0) 1 2 11 54
1 50-100% 1.9 (2.0) 1 1 11 133
2 0-10% 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 11 680
2 10-20% 1.7 (1.3) 1 1 10 302
2 20-30% 2.0 (1.5) 1 1 9 65
2 30-40% 1.2 (0.4) 1 1 2 9
2 40-50% 1.0 () 1 1 1 3
3 0-10% 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 11 1041
3 10-20% 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 11 140
3 20-30% 1.0 () 1 1 1 3
4 0-10% 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 11 1224
4 10-20% 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 3 37
5 0-10% 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 11 1328
5 10-20% 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 3 8
10 0-10% 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 9 1460
The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We
ﬁrst ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the ﬁrm's
outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4)
are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration
Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.19 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Keep Same Rank.
Samples (1) and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 2.5 (1.7) 1 2 8 30
1 10-20% 3.5 (2.6) 1 3 11 40
1 20-30% 4.3 (3.0) 1 4 11 27
1 30-40% 3.8 (3.5) 1 2 11 14
1 40-50% 4.9 (3.6) 1 4 11 10
1 50-100% 4.8 (3.9) 1 3 11 21
2 0-10% 2.6 (1.7) 1 2 8 65
2 10-20% 2.9 (1.8) 1 2 8 47
2 20-30% 3.9 (3.4) 1 2 11 12
3 0-10% 2.7 (1.5) 1 2 8 72
3 10-20% 2.6 (2.3) 1 2 11 24
4 0-10% 2.5 (1.3) 1 2 7 75
4 10-20% 1.7 (0.9) 1 1 3 7
5 0-10% 2.2 (1.1) 1 2 6 75
5 10-20% 2.5 () 2 2 3 2
10 0-10% 1.7 (0.8) 1 2 5 75
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 8 76
1 10-20% 2.4 (2.1) 1 2 11 87
1 20-30% 3.2 (2.7) 1 2 11 46
1 30-40% 2.9 (3.1) 1 1 11 21
1 40-50% 4.3 (3.5) 1 2 11 12
1 50-100% 4.1 (3.7) 1 2 11 27
2 0-10% 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 8 264
2 10-20% 1.9 (1.5) 1 1 8 113
2 20-30% 3.6 (3.1) 1 2 11 16
3 0-10% 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 8 396
3 10-20% 2.1 (2.0) 1 1 11 39
4 0-10% 1.3 (0.8) 1 1 7 473
4 10-20% 1.5 (0.8) 1 1 3 11
5 0-10% 1.2 (0.7) 1 1 6 518
5 10-20% 2.0 (0.8) 1 2 3 3
10 0-10% 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 5 589
The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We
ﬁrst ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the ﬁrm's
outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4)
are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration
Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.20 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Keep Same Rank.
Samples (3) and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 2.0 (1.3) 1 2 8 92
1 10-20% 2.2 (1.8) 1 2 11 127
1 20-30% 2.7 (2.1) 1 2 11 112
1 30-40% 2.5 (2.1) 1 2 11 60
1 40-50% 2.9 (2.5) 1 2 11 48
1 50-100% 2.6 (2.5) 1 2 11 112
2 0-10% 1.9 (1.3) 1 2 8 247
2 10-20% 2.0 (1.4) 1 2 8 169
2 20-30% 2.3 (2.1) 1 2 11 54
2 30-40% 1.3 (0.5) 1 1 2 9
2 40-50% 1.0 () 1 1 1 3
3 0-10% 1.8 (1.1) 1 2 8 298
3 10-20% 1.9 (1.5) 1 1 11 95
3 20-30% 1.3 (0.5) 1 1 2 3
4 0-10% 1.7 (1.0) 1 1 7 311
4 10-20% 1.5 (0.8) 1 1 4 27
5 0-10% 1.6 (0.9) 1 1 6 317
5 10-20% 1.6 (0.7) 1 1 3 7
10 0-10% 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 5 318
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 8 187
1 10-20% 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 11 217
1 20-30% 2.4 (2.0) 1 2 11 146
1 30-40% 2.3 (2.0) 1 1 11 73
1 40-50% 2.8 (2.4) 1 2 11 54
1 50-100% 2.4 (2.3) 1 1 11 133
2 0-10% 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 8 680
2 10-20% 1.7 (1.1) 1 1 8 302
2 20-30% 2.2 (2.0) 1 1 11 65
2 30-40% 1.3 (0.5) 1 1 2 9
2 40-50% 1.0 () 1 1 1 3
3 0-10% 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 8 1041
3 10-20% 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 11 140
3 20-30% 1.3 (0.5) 1 1 2 3
4 0-10% 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 7 1224
4 10-20% 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 4 37
5 0-10% 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 6 1328
5 10-20% 1.5 (0.7) 1 1 3 8
10 0-10% 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 5 1460
The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We
ﬁrst ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the ﬁrm's
outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4)
are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration
Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.21 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Maintain Rank. Sam-
ples (1) and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 2.5 (1.7) 1 2 8 30
1 10-20% 3.5 (2.6) 1 3 11 40
1 20-30% 4.3 (3.0) 1 4 11 27
1 30-40% 3.8 (3.5) 1 2 11 14
1 40-50% 4.9 (3.6) 1 4 11 10
1 50-100% 4.8 (3.9) 1 3 11 21
2 0-10% 3.3 (2.2) 1 3 11 65
2 10-20% 3.5 (2.3) 1 3 11 47
2 20-30% 5.1 (3.6) 1 5 11 12
3 0-10% 4.4 (2.8) 1 3 11 72
3 10-20% 3.1 (2.3) 1 2 11 24
4 0-10% 4.2 (2.5) 1 4 11 75
4 10-20% 2.4 (0.9) 1 2 4 7
5 0-10% 4.0 (2.1) 1 4 11 75
5 10-20% 4.0 () 2 4 6 2
10 0-10% 4.1 (2.1) 1 3 10 75
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 8 76
1 10-20% 2.4 (2.1) 1 2 11 87
1 20-30% 3.2 (2.7) 1 2 11 46
1 30-40% 2.9 (3.1) 1 1 11 21
1 40-50% 4.3 (3.5) 1 2 11 12
1 50-100% 4.1 (3.7) 1 2 11 27
2 0-10% 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 11 264
2 10-20% 2.3 (1.9) 1 2 11 113
2 20-30% 4.6 (3.3) 1 4 11 16
3 0-10% 2.0 (1.8) 1 1 11 396
3 10-20% 2.5 (2.1) 1 2 11 39
4 0-10% 1.9 (1.7) 1 1 11 473
4 10-20% 2.1 (1.0) 1 2 4 11
5 0-10% 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 11 518
5 10-20% 3.3 (1.9) 2 2 6 3
10 0-10% 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 10 589
The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We
ﬁrst ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the ﬁrm's
outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4)
are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration
Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.22 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Maintain Rank. Sam-
ples (3) and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 2.0 (1.3) 1 2 8 92
1 10-20% 2.2 (1.8) 1 2 11 127
1 20-30% 2.7 (2.1) 1 2 11 112
1 30-40% 2.5 (2.1) 1 2 11 60
1 40-50% 2.9 (2.5) 1 2 11 48
1 50-100% 2.6 (2.5) 1 2 11 112
2 0-10% 2.3 (1.6) 1 2 11 247
2 10-20% 2.4 (1.8) 1 2 11 169
2 20-30% 2.7 (2.4) 1 2 11 54
2 30-40% 1.3 (0.5) 1 1 2 9
2 40-50% 1.0 () 1 1 1 3
3 0-10% 2.5 (2.0) 1 2 11 298
3 10-20% 2.4 (1.7) 1 2 11 95
3 20-30% 2.0 (0.8) 1 2 3 3
4 0-10% 2.6 (1.8) 1 2 11 311
4 10-20% 1.9 (1.0) 1 2 4 27
5 0-10% 2.5 (1.7) 1 2 11 317
5 10-20% 2.3 (1.7) 1 2 6 7
10 0-10% 2.4 (1.7) 1 2 10 318
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 8 187
1 10-20% 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 11 217
1 20-30% 2.4 (2.0) 1 2 11 146
1 30-40% 2.3 (2.0) 1 1 11 73
1 40-50% 2.8 (2.4) 1 2 11 54
1 50-100% 2.4 (2.3) 1 1 11 133
2 0-10% 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 11 680
2 10-20% 1.9 (1.5) 1 1 11 302
2 20-30% 2.6 (2.3) 1 2 11 65
2 30-40% 1.3 (0.5) 1 1 2 9
2 40-50% 1.0 () 1 1 1 3
3 0-10% 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 11 1041
3 10-20% 2.0 (1.6) 1 1 11 140
3 20-30% 2.0 (0.8) 1 2 3 3
4 0-10% 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 11 1224
4 10-20% 1.8 (0.9) 1 1 4 37
5 0-10% 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 11 1328
5 10-20% 2.2 (1.6) 1 2 6 8
10 0-10% 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 10 1460
The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We
ﬁrst ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the ﬁrm's
outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4)
are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration
Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.23 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest.
Samples (1) and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 4.9 (2.8) 1 4 11 30
1 10-20% 4.7 (3.0) 1 4 11 40
1 20-30% 5.1 (3.2) 1 5 11 27
1 30-40% 4.4 (3.6) 1 3 11 14
1 40-50% 5.2 (3.5) 1 5 11 10
1 50-100% 5.3 (3.8) 1 4 11 21
2 0-10% 5.1 (2.7) 1 5 11 65
2 10-20% 4.1 (2.6) 1 3 11 47
2 20-30% 5.5 (4.0) 1 5 11 12
3 0-10% 5.6 (2.8) 1 5 11 72
3 10-20% 3.6 (2.6) 1 2 11 24
4 0-10% 4.8 (2.5) 1 4 11 75
4 10-20% 3.1 (2.2) 1 2 8 7
5 0-10% 4.0 (2.1) 1 4 11 75
5 10-20% 4.0 () 2 4 6 2
10 0-10% 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 9 75
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 3.3 (2.5) 1 3 11 76
1 10-20% 3.3 (2.5) 1 3 11 87
1 20-30% 3.8 (3.0) 1 2 11 46
1 30-40% 3.3 (3.3) 1 2 11 21
1 40-50% 4.6 (3.5) 1 4 11 12
1 50-100% 4.4 (3.7) 1 3 11 27
2 0-10% 2.7 (2.2) 1 2 11 264
2 10-20% 2.7 (2.2) 1 2 11 113
2 20-30% 4.9 (3.7) 1 4 11 16
3 0-10% 2.6 (2.2) 1 2 11 396
3 10-20% 2.8 (2.4) 1 2 11 39
4 0-10% 2.2 (1.8) 1 1 11 473
4 10-20% 2.5 (2.0) 1 2 8 11
5 0-10% 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 11 518
5 10-20% 3.3 (1.9) 2 2 6 3
10 0-10% 1.1 (0.5) 1 1 9 589
The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We
ﬁrst ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the ﬁrm's
outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4)
are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration
Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.24 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest.
Samples (3) and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 3.2 (2.2) 1 3 11 92
1 10-20% 3.0 (2.2) 1 2 11 127
1 20-30% 3.2 (2.4) 1 3 11 112
1 30-40% 3.0 (2.4) 1 2 11 60
1 40-50% 3.1 (2.5) 1 2 11 48
1 50-100% 2.7 (2.5) 1 2 11 112
2 0-10% 3.0 (2.2) 1 2 11 247
2 10-20% 2.9 (2.0) 1 2 11 169
2 20-30% 2.8 (2.6) 1 2 11 54
2 30-40% 1.7 (0.9) 1 1 4 9
2 40-50% 1.0 () 1 1 1 3
3 0-10% 3.0 (2.3) 1 2 11 298
3 10-20% 2.8 (2.0) 1 2 11 95
3 20-30% 2.0 (0.8) 1 2 3 3
4 0-10% 2.9 (2.0) 1 2 11 311
4 10-20% 2.2 (1.5) 1 2 8 27
5 0-10% 2.5 (1.7) 1 2 11 317
5 10-20% 2.3 (1.7) 1 2 6 7
10 0-10% 1.3 (0.9) 1 1 9 318
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Ownership fraction mean (std) min med max n
1 0-10% 2.5 (1.9) 1 2 11 187
1 10-20% 2.5 (1.9) 1 2 11 217
1 20-30% 2.8 (2.2) 1 2 11 146
1 30-40% 2.7 (2.3) 1 2 11 73
1 40-50% 2.9 (2.4) 1 2 11 54
1 50-100% 2.5 (2.4) 1 1 11 133
2 0-10% 2.2 (1.7) 1 2 11 680
2 10-20% 2.4 (1.8) 1 2 11 302
2 20-30% 2.8 (2.5) 1 2 11 65
2 30-40% 1.7 (0.9) 1 1 4 9
2 40-50% 1.0 () 1 1 1 3
3 0-10% 2.0 (1.7) 1 1 11 1041
3 10-20% 2.4 (1.8) 1 2 11 140
3 20-30% 2.0 (0.8) 1 2 3 3
4 0-10% 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 11 1224
4 10-20% 2.0 (1.4) 1 2 8 37
5 0-10% 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 11 1328
5 10-20% 2.2 (1.6) 1 2 6 8
10 0-10% 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 9 1460
The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We
ﬁrst ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the ﬁrm's
outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4)
are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration
Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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4.2.3 Ownership duration grouped by owner type
Table 4.25 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Sample (1)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 3.3 2.4 3.5 3.0 3.3 1.5
Foreign owner 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.8
Family (individual) owner 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.9 2.1 2.0
Financial owner 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.5 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.6 2.3
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 3.5 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.5
Foreign owner 2.4 2.3 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.2
Family (individual) owner 5.0 1.6 1.2 1.8 1.6 1.2
Financial owner 2.6 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 4.5 2.8 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.4
Duration: Maintain Rank
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 3.5 2.7 3.8 3.3 2.8 1.5
Foreign owner 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9
Family (individual) owner 5.0 2.0 2.2 2.4 1.9 2.3
Financial owner 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.6
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 4.5 3.6 3.4 2.7 2.6 2.7
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 5.2 3.7 4.8 3.9 2.8 1.0
Foreign owner 3.2 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.0 1.2
Family (individual) owner 6.1 3.2 3.2 3.0 1.9 1.0
Financial owner 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.7 1.4
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.1 2.6 1.2
The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into ﬁve
types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 1989
1999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms;
Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.26 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Sample (2)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 2.7 2.3 3.3 3.0 3.1 1.7
Foreign owner 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3
Family (individual) owner 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.0 1.7
Financial owner 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.6
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.7
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 3.0 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.4
Foreign owner 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1
Family (individual) owner 5.0 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.1
Financial owner 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.1 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2
Duration: Maintain Rank
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 3.0 2.5 3.5 3.1 2.7 1.7
Foreign owner 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4
Family (individual) owner 5.0 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.9
Financial owner 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.1 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.9
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 4.2 3.5 4.4 3.7 2.7 1.0
Foreign owner 2.7 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.1
Family (individual) owner 6.1 2.8 2.7 2.5 1.8 1.0
Financial owner 3.1 2.7 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.1
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.9 3.2 3.1 2.3 1.8 1.1
The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into ﬁve
types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 1989
1999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms;
Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.27 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Sample (3)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 2.7 2.2 2.8 2.7 2.7 1.6
Foreign owner 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4
Family (individual) owner 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.6
Financial owner 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.8
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.7
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 3.1 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.4
Foreign owner 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1
Family (individual) owner 2.7 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2
Financial owner 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.1
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.9 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.2
Duration: Maintain Rank
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 3.1 2.4 3.0 2.8 2.6 1.6
Foreign owner 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5
Family (individual) owner 2.7 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.8
Financial owner 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.9
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.9
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 4.2 3.0 3.6 3.3 2.6 1.1
Foreign owner 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.1
Family (individual) owner 3.3 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.5 1.1
Financial owner 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.2
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.3 1.9 1.2
The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into ﬁve
types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 1989
1999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms;
Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.28 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Sample (4)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 2.4 2.1 2.7 2.7 2.6 1.8
Foreign owner 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.2
Family (individual) owner 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.4
Financial owner 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.4
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 2.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.3
Foreign owner 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
Family (individual) owner 2.6 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.1
Financial owner 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.3 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1
Duration: Maintain Rank
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 2.8 2.3 2.8 2.7 2.5 1.8
Foreign owner 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3
Family (individual) owner 2.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6
Financial owner 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 10
State owner 3.7 3.0 3.5 3.2 2.5 1.1
Foreign owner 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.0
Family (individual) owner 3.2 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.1
Financial owner 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.1
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.7 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.1
The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into ﬁve
types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 1989
1999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms;
Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.29 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples
(1) and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 3.3 (2.8) 1 2 10 19
1 Foreign owner 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 8 31
1 Family (individual) owner 2.3 (3.0) 1 1 11 10
1 Financial owner 2.2 (1.7) 1 2 8 28
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.5 (2.8) 1 2 11 63
2 State owner 2.4 (1.9) 1 2 6 24
2 Foreign owner 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 7 37
2 Family (individual) owner 2.5 (2.0) 1 2 7 15
2 Financial owner 2.3 (1.5) 1 2 8 42
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.4 (2.5) 1 3 11 64
3 State owner 3.5 (2.3) 1 3 8 24
3 Foreign owner 2.0 (1.1) 1 2 5 47
3 Family (individual) owner 2.2 (1.7) 1 2 8 24
3 Financial owner 2.3 (1.6) 1 2 8 54
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.1 (2.9) 1 2 11 65
4 State owner 3.0 (2.5) 1 2 8 26
4 Foreign owner 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 9 50
4 Family (individual) owner 2.9 (2.5) 1 2 11 25
4 Financial owner 2.4 (1.9) 1 2 9 61
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.7 (2.5) 1 2 11 65
5 State owner 3.3 (2.2) 1 3 9 24
5 Foreign owner 2.0 (1.6) 1 2 11 52
5 Family (individual) owner 2.1 (1.8) 1 1 10 34
5 Financial owner 2.5 (2.0) 1 2 10 60
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.6 (1.9) 1 2 10 59
10 State owner 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 4 6
10 Foreign owner 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 6 54
10 Family (individual) owner 2.0 (1.6) 1 1 8 44
10 Financial owner 2.5 (1.9) 1 2 9 64
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.3 (1.9) 1 2 9 60
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 2.7 (2.6) 1 2 10 25
1 Foreign owner 1.4 (1.1) 1 1 8 60
1 Family (individual) owner 2.3 (3.0) 1 1 11 10
1 Financial owner 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 8 47
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.5 (2.4) 1 1 11 119
2 State owner 2.3 (1.7) 1 2 6 30
2 Foreign owner 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 7 94
2 Family (individual) owner 2.2 (1.8) 1 2 7 20
2 Financial owner 1.8 (1.2) 1 1 8 86
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.2 (2.0) 1 1 11 158
3 State owner 3.3 (2.3) 1 3 8 27
3 Foreign owner 1.6 (0.9) 1 1 5 105
3 Family (individual) owner 2.0 (1.6) 1 1 8 31
3 Financial owner 1.7 (1.2) 1 1 8 130
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.3 (2.4) 1 1 11 141
4 State owner 3.0 (2.4) 1 2 8 28
4 Foreign owner 1.4 (1.1) 1 1 9 128
4 Family (individual) owner 2.3 (2.2) 1 1 11 38
4 Financial owner 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 9 150
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.0 (2.0) 1 1 11 139
5 State owner 3.1 (2.2) 1 3 9 26
5 Foreign owner 1.4 (1.1) 1 1 11 142
5 Family (individual) owner 2.0 (1.5) 1 2 10 55
5 Financial owner 1.7 (1.5) 1 1 10 160
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.9 (1.5) 1 1 10 138
10 State owner 1.7 (1.2) 1 1 4 7
10 Foreign owner 1.3 (0.9) 1 1 6 157
10 Family (individual) owner 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 8 89
10 Financial owner 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 9 201
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 9 135
The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into ﬁve
types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 1989
1999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms;
Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
60
Table 4.30 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples
(3) and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 2.7 (2.3) 1 2 10 38
1 Foreign owner 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 8 120
1 Family (individual) owner 1.8 (1.6) 1 1 11 56
1 Financial owner 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 8 90
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.3 (2.0) 1 2 11 230
2 State owner 2.2 (1.5) 1 1 6 53
2 Foreign owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 7 142
2 Family (individual) owner 1.5 (1.3) 1 1 7 85
2 Financial owner 1.8 (1.1) 1 1 8 145
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.4 (1.9) 1 2 11 214
3 State owner 2.8 (2.1) 1 2 8 41
3 Foreign owner 1.6 (0.9) 1 1 6 159
3 Family (individual) owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 8 108
3 Financial owner 1.7 (1.2) 1 1 8 179
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.2 (2.0) 1 1 11 211
4 State owner 2.7 (2.2) 1 2 8 45
4 Foreign owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 9 157
4 Family (individual) owner 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 11 121
4 Financial owner 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 9 191
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.0 (1.7) 1 1 11 211
5 State owner 2.7 (2.0) 1 2 9 43
5 Foreign owner 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 11 175
5 Family (individual) owner 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 10 122
5 Financial owner 1.9 (1.5) 1 1 10 201
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.9 (1.4) 1 1 10 200
10 State owner 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 4 8
10 Foreign owner 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 6 167
10 Family (individual) owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 8 153
10 Financial owner 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 9 214
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.7 (1.3) 1 1 9 220
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 2.4 (2.2) 1 2 10 47
1 Foreign owner 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 8 197
1 Family (individual) owner 1.8 (1.6) 1 1 11 60
1 Financial owner 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 8 127
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.9 (1.7) 1 1 11 369
2 State owner 2.1 (1.5) 1 1 6 59
2 Foreign owner 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 7 248
2 Family (individual) owner 1.5 (1.2) 1 1 7 98
2 Financial owner 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 8 240
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 11 402
3 State owner 2.7 (2.0) 1 2 8 45
3 Foreign owner 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 6 282
3 Family (individual) owner 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 8 139
3 Financial owner 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 8 324
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.8 (1.7) 1 1 11 390
4 State owner 2.7 (2.2) 1 2 8 48
4 Foreign owner 1.3 (0.9) 1 1 9 307
4 Family (individual) owner 1.7 (1.3) 1 1 11 158
4 Financial owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 9 365
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 11 382
5 State owner 2.6 (2.0) 1 2 9 46
5 Foreign owner 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 11 338
5 Family (individual) owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 10 162
5 Financial owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 10 416
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 10 374
10 State owner 1.8 (1.0) 1 1 4 9
10 Foreign owner 1.2 (0.7) 1 1 6 333
10 Family (individual) owner 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 8 256
10 Financial owner 1.4 (1.1) 1 1 9 470
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 9 392
The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into ﬁve
types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 1989
1999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms;
Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.31 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples
(1) and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 3.5 (3.1) 1 2 11 19
1 Foreign owner 2.4 (1.6) 1 2 8 31
1 Family (individual) owner 5.0 (3.8) 1 4 11 10
1 Financial owner 2.6 (1.9) 1 2 8 28
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 4.5 (3.3) 1 3 11 63
2 State owner 1.9 (1.2) 1 2 6 24
2 Foreign owner 2.3 (1.9) 1 1 8 37
2 Family (individual) owner 1.6 (0.7) 1 1 3 15
2 Financial owner 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 8 42
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.8 (2.3) 1 2 11 64
3 State owner 1.9 (1.3) 1 1 6 24
3 Foreign owner 1.7 (0.9) 1 1 5 47
3 Family (individual) owner 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 3 24
3 Financial owner 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 8 54
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.2 (1.9) 1 1 11 65
4 State owner 1.6 (0.9) 1 1 5 26
4 Foreign owner 1.6 (0.9) 1 1 4 50
4 Family (individual) owner 1.8 (0.9) 1 1 4 25
4 Financial owner 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 6 61
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.7 (1.1) 1 1 7 65
5 State owner 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 4 24
5 Foreign owner 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 6 52
5 Family (individual) owner 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 4 34
5 Financial owner 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 6 60
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.6 (0.9) 1 1 5 59
10 State owner 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 4 6
10 Foreign owner 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 54
10 Family (individual) owner 1.2 (0.4) 1 1 2 44
10 Financial owner 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 5 64
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 4 60
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 3.0 (2.9) 1 2 11 25
1 Foreign owner 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 8 60
1 Family (individual) owner 5.0 (3.8) 1 4 11 10
1 Financial owner 2.0 (1.6) 1 1 8 47
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.1 (2.9) 1 2 11 119
2 State owner 1.8 (1.1) 1 1 6 30
2 Foreign owner 1.6 (1.4) 1 1 8 94
2 Family (individual) owner 1.5 (0.7) 1 1 3 20
2 Financial owner 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 8 86
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.0 (1.7) 1 1 11 158
3 State owner 1.8 (1.2) 1 1 6 27
3 Foreign owner 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 5 105
3 Family (individual) owner 1.2 (0.4) 1 1 3 31
3 Financial owner 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 8 130
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.6 (1.4) 1 1 11 141
4 State owner 1.6 (0.9) 1 1 5 28
4 Foreign owner 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 4 128
4 Family (individual) owner 1.6 (0.8) 1 1 4 38
4 Financial owner 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 6 150
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 7 139
5 State owner 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 4 26
5 Foreign owner 1.1 (0.5) 1 1 6 142
5 Family (individual) owner 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 4 55
5 Financial owner 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 6 160
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 5 138
10 State owner 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 4 7
10 Foreign owner 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 4 157
10 Family (individual) owner 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 2 89
10 Financial owner 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 5 201
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 135
The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into ﬁve
types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 1989
1999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms;
Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.32 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples
(3) and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 3.1 (2.8) 1 2 11 38
1 Foreign owner 2.0 (1.3) 1 2 8 120
1 Family (individual) owner 2.7 (2.2) 1 2 11 56
1 Financial owner 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 8 90
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.9 (2.4) 1 2 11 230
2 State owner 1.8 (1.1) 1 1 6 53
2 Foreign owner 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 8 142
2 Family (individual) owner 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 5 85
2 Financial owner 1.6 (0.9) 1 1 8 145
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.0 (1.6) 1 2 11 214
3 State owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 6 41
3 Foreign owner 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 5 159
3 Family (individual) owner 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 4 108
3 Financial owner 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 8 179
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 11 211
4 State owner 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 5 45
4 Foreign owner 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 4 157
4 Family (individual) owner 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 4 121
4 Financial owner 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 6 191
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 7 211
5 State owner 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 4 43
5 Foreign owner 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 6 175
5 Family (individual) owner 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 4 122
5 Financial owner 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 6 201
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 5 200
10 State owner 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 4 8
10 Foreign owner 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 167
10 Family (individual) owner 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 153
10 Financial owner 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 5 214
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 220
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 2.8 (2.6) 1 2 11 47
1 Foreign owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 8 197
1 Family (individual) owner 2.6 (2.2) 1 2 11 60
1 Financial owner 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 8 127
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.3 (2.1) 1 1 11 369
2 State owner 1.7 (1.1) 1 1 6 59
2 Foreign owner 1.4 (1.1) 1 1 8 248
2 Family (individual) owner 1.5 (0.8) 1 1 5 98
2 Financial owner 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 8 240
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 11 402
3 State owner 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 6 45
3 Foreign owner 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 5 282
3 Family (individual) owner 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 139
3 Financial owner 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 8 324
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.4 (1.1) 1 1 11 390
4 State owner 1.5 (0.8) 1 1 5 48
4 Foreign owner 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 307
4 Family (individual) owner 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 4 158
4 Financial owner 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 6 365
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 7 382
5 State owner 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 4 46
5 Foreign owner 1.1 (0.5) 1 1 6 338
5 Family (individual) owner 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 4 162
5 Financial owner 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 6 416
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 5 374
10 State owner 1.3 (0.9) 1 1 4 9
10 Foreign owner 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 4 333
10 Family (individual) owner 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 256
10 Financial owner 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 5 470
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 392
The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into ﬁve
types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 1989
1999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms;
Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.33 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples
(1) and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 3.5 (3.1) 1 2 11 19
1 Foreign owner 2.4 (1.6) 1 2 8 31
1 Family (individual) owner 5.0 (3.8) 1 4 11 10
1 Financial owner 2.6 (1.9) 1 2 8 28
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 4.5 (3.3) 1 3 11 63
2 State owner 2.7 (1.9) 1 2 7 24
2 Foreign owner 2.5 (1.9) 1 2 8 37
2 Family (individual) owner 2.0 (2.0) 1 1 9 15
2 Financial owner 2.3 (1.6) 1 2 8 42
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.6 (2.8) 1 2 11 64
3 State owner 3.8 (2.3) 1 3 8 24
3 Foreign owner 2.1 (1.3) 1 2 6 47
3 Family (individual) owner 2.2 (2.6) 1 1 11 24
3 Financial owner 2.3 (1.5) 1 2 8 54
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.4 (3.0) 1 2 11 65
4 State owner 3.3 (2.4) 1 2 8 26
4 Foreign owner 2.1 (1.6) 1 2 9 50
4 Family (individual) owner 2.4 (1.7) 1 2 8 25
4 Financial owner 2.4 (1.7) 1 2 9 61
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.7 (2.4) 1 2 11 65
5 State owner 2.8 (2.2) 1 2 9 24
5 Foreign owner 2.0 (1.7) 1 1 11 52
5 Family (individual) owner 1.9 (1.2) 1 1 5 34
5 Financial owner 2.7 (2.0) 1 2 10 60
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.6 (1.7) 1 2 7 59
10 State owner 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 4 6
10 Foreign owner 1.9 (1.4) 1 1 6 54
10 Family (individual) owner 2.3 (1.9) 1 2 10 44
10 Financial owner 2.6 (1.9) 1 2 9 64
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.7 (2.1) 1 2 9 60
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 3.0 (2.9) 1 2 11 25
1 Foreign owner 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 8 60
1 Family (individual) owner 5.0 (3.8) 1 4 11 10
1 Financial owner 2.0 (1.6) 1 1 8 47
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.1 (2.9) 1 2 11 119
2 State owner 2.5 (1.8) 1 2 7 30
2 Foreign owner 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 8 94
2 Family (individual) owner 1.8 (1.7) 1 1 9 20
2 Financial owner 1.7 (1.3) 1 1 8 86
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.4 (2.2) 1 2 11 158
3 State owner 3.5 (2.3) 1 3 8 27
3 Foreign owner 1.7 (1.1) 1 1 6 105
3 Family (individual) owner 2.0 (2.3) 1 1 11 31
3 Financial owner 1.7 (1.2) 1 1 8 130
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.3 (2.3) 1 1 11 141
4 State owner 3.1 (2.4) 1 2 8 28
4 Foreign owner 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 9 128
4 Family (individual) owner 2.0 (1.5) 1 1 8 38
4 Financial owner 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 9 150
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.1 (2.0) 1 1 11 139
5 State owner 2.7 (2.1) 1 2 9 26
5 Foreign owner 1.5 (1.2) 1 1 11 142
5 Family (individual) owner 1.8 (1.1) 1 1 5 55
5 Financial owner 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 10 160
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 7 138
10 State owner 1.7 (1.2) 1 1 4 7
10 Foreign owner 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 6 157
10 Family (individual) owner 1.9 (1.7) 1 1 10 89
10 Financial owner 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 9 201
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 9 135
The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into ﬁve
types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 1989
1999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms;
Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.34 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples
(3) and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 3.1 (2.8) 1 2 11 38
1 Foreign owner 2.0 (1.3) 1 2 8 120
1 Family (individual) owner 2.7 (2.2) 1 2 11 56
1 Financial owner 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 8 90
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.9 (2.4) 1 2 11 230
2 State owner 2.4 (1.6) 1 2 7 53
2 Foreign owner 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 8 142
2 Family (individual) owner 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 9 85
2 Financial owner 1.8 (1.1) 1 1 8 145
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.5 (2.1) 1 2 11 214
3 State owner 3.0 (2.1) 1 2 8 41
3 Foreign owner 1.7 (1.0) 1 1 6 159
3 Family (individual) owner 1.8 (1.6) 1 1 11 108
3 Financial owner 1.7 (1.1) 1 1 8 179
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.3 (2.1) 1 2 11 211
4 State owner 2.8 (2.1) 1 2 8 45
4 Foreign owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 9 157
4 Family (individual) owner 1.7 (1.2) 1 1 8 121
4 Financial owner 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 9 191
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.1 (1.7) 1 1 11 211
5 State owner 2.6 (2.1) 1 2 9 43
5 Foreign owner 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 11 175
5 Family (individual) owner 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 5 122
5 Financial owner 2.0 (1.5) 1 1 10 201
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.9 (1.2) 1 1 7 200
10 State owner 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 4 8
10 Foreign owner 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 6 167
10 Family (individual) owner 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 10 153
10 Financial owner 1.9 (1.4) 1 1 9 214
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.9 (1.5) 1 1 9 220
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 2.8 (2.6) 1 2 11 47
1 Foreign owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 8 197
1 Family (individual) owner 2.6 (2.2) 1 2 11 60
1 Financial owner 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 8 127
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.3 (2.1) 1 1 11 369
2 State owner 2.3 (1.5) 1 2 7 59
2 Foreign owner 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 8 248
2 Family (individual) owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 9 98
2 Financial owner 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 8 240
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.0 (1.7) 1 1 11 402
3 State owner 2.8 (2.1) 1 2 8 45
3 Foreign owner 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 6 282
3 Family (individual) owner 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 11 139
3 Financial owner 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 8 324
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.8 (1.7) 1 1 11 390
4 State owner 2.7 (2.1) 1 2 8 48
4 Foreign owner 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 9 307
4 Family (individual) owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 8 158
4 Financial owner 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 9 365
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.7 (1.5) 1 1 11 382
5 State owner 2.5 (2.0) 1 2 9 46
5 Foreign owner 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 11 338
5 Family (individual) owner 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 5 162
5 Financial owner 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 10 416
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 7 374
10 State owner 1.8 (1.0) 1 1 4 9
10 Foreign owner 1.3 (0.8) 1 1 6 333
10 Family (individual) owner 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 10 256
10 Financial owner 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 9 470
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 9 392
The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into ﬁve
types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 1989
1999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms;
Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.35 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest.
Samples (1) and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 5.2 (2.9) 1 5 11 19
1 Foreign owner 3.2 (2.2) 1 3 9 31
1 Family (individual) owner 6.1 (3.5) 1 6 11 10
1 Financial owner 4.0 (2.6) 1 3 11 28
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 5.7 (3.3) 1 5 11 63
2 State owner 3.7 (2.2) 1 4 8 24
2 Foreign owner 3.1 (2.3) 1 2 10 37
2 Family (individual) owner 3.2 (2.3) 1 3 9 15
2 Financial owner 3.6 (2.1) 1 3 10 42
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 5.0 (3.3) 1 4 11 64
3 State owner 4.8 (2.1) 1 5 8 24
3 Foreign owner 2.7 (1.8) 1 2 9 47
3 Family (individual) owner 3.2 (2.8) 1 2 11 24
3 Financial owner 3.2 (2.0) 1 3 9 54
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 4.4 (3.3) 1 4 11 65
4 State owner 3.9 (2.7) 1 3 8 26
4 Foreign owner 2.4 (1.6) 1 2 9 50
4 Family (individual) owner 3.0 (2.1) 1 3 10 25
4 Financial owner 2.8 (1.9) 1 2 9 61
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.1 (2.5) 1 2 11 65
5 State owner 2.8 (2.2) 1 2 9 24
5 Foreign owner 2.0 (1.7) 1 1 11 52
5 Family (individual) owner 1.9 (1.2) 1 1 5 34
5 Financial owner 2.7 (2.0) 1 2 10 60
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.6 (1.7) 1 2 7 59
10 State owner 1.0 () 1 1 1 6
10 Foreign owner 1.2 (0.7) 1 1 6 54
10 Family (individual) owner 1.0 (0.3) 1 1 3 44
10 Financial owner 1.4 (1.2) 1 1 9 64
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 4 60
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 4.2 (3.0) 1 3 11 25
1 Foreign owner 2.7 (1.9) 1 2 9 60
1 Family (individual) owner 6.1 (3.5) 1 6 11 10
1 Financial owner 3.1 (2.5) 1 2 11 47
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.9 (3.2) 1 3 11 119
2 State owner 3.5 (2.0) 1 3 8 30
2 Foreign owner 2.2 (1.8) 1 1 10 94
2 Family (individual) owner 2.8 (2.1) 1 2 9 20
2 Financial owner 2.7 (1.9) 1 2 10 86
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.2 (2.8) 1 2 11 158
3 State owner 4.4 (2.2) 1 4 8 27
3 Foreign owner 2.1 (1.5) 1 2 9 105
3 Family (individual) owner 2.7 (2.6) 1 2 11 31
3 Financial owner 2.3 (1.7) 1 2 9 130
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.1 (2.8) 1 2 11 141
4 State owner 3.7 (2.6) 1 3 8 28
4 Foreign owner 1.7 (1.3) 1 1 9 128
4 Family (individual) owner 2.5 (1.9) 1 2 10 38
4 Financial owner 2.0 (1.5) 1 1 9 150
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.3 (2.1) 1 2 11 139
5 State owner 2.7 (2.1) 1 2 9 26
5 Foreign owner 1.5 (1.2) 1 1 11 142
5 Family (individual) owner 1.8 (1.1) 1 1 5 55
5 Financial owner 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 10 160
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 7 138
10 State owner 1.0 () 1 1 1 7
10 Foreign owner 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 6 157
10 Family (individual) owner 1.0 (0.2) 1 1 3 89
10 Financial owner 1.1 (0.7) 1 1 9 201
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 135
The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into ﬁve
types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 1989
1999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms;
Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.36 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest.
Samples (3) and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 4.2 (2.7) 1 3 11 38
1 Foreign owner 2.4 (1.6) 1 2 9 120
1 Family (individual) owner 3.3 (2.2) 1 3 11 56
1 Financial owner 2.6 (2.0) 1 2 11 90
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.5 (2.6) 1 3 11 230
2 State owner 3.0 (1.8) 1 2 8 53
2 Foreign owner 2.2 (1.6) 1 2 10 142
2 Family (individual) owner 2.2 (1.5) 1 2 9 85
2 Financial owner 2.5 (1.6) 1 2 10 145
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 3.2 (2.5) 1 2 11 214
3 State owner 3.6 (2.2) 1 3 8 41
3 Foreign owner 2.0 (1.3) 1 2 9 159
3 Family (individual) owner 2.2 (1.9) 1 2 11 108
3 Financial owner 2.2 (1.5) 1 2 9 179
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.9 (2.4) 1 2 11 211
4 State owner 3.3 (2.4) 1 2 8 45
4 Foreign owner 1.8 (1.2) 1 1 9 157
4 Family (individual) owner 1.9 (1.5) 1 1 10 121
4 Financial owner 2.1 (1.5) 1 2 9 191
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.3 (1.8) 1 2 11 211
5 State owner 2.6 (2.1) 1 2 9 43
5 Foreign owner 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 11 175
5 Family (individual) owner 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 5 122
5 Financial owner 2.0 (1.5) 1 1 10 201
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.9 (1.2) 1 1 7 200
10 State owner 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 2 8
10 Foreign owner 1.1 (0.5) 1 1 6 167
10 Family (individual) owner 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 153
10 Financial owner 1.2 (0.8) 1 1 9 214
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 5 220
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Owner type mean (std) min med max n
1 State owner 3.7 (2.7) 1 3 11 47
1 Foreign owner 2.1 (1.5) 1 2 9 197
1 Family (individual) owner 3.2 (2.2) 1 3 11 60
1 Financial owner 2.3 (1.8) 1 2 11 127
1 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.7 (2.4) 1 2 11 369
2 State owner 3.0 (1.8) 1 3 8 59
2 Foreign owner 1.9 (1.4) 1 1 10 248
2 Family (individual) owner 2.1 (1.5) 1 1 9 98
2 Financial owner 2.1 (1.5) 1 2 10 240
2 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.5 (2.1) 1 2 11 402
3 State owner 3.5 (2.2) 1 3 8 45
3 Foreign owner 1.7 (1.1) 1 1 9 282
3 Family (individual) owner 2.1 (1.7) 1 1 11 139
3 Financial owner 1.9 (1.3) 1 1 9 324
3 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 2.2 (2.0) 1 1 11 390
4 State owner 3.2 (2.4) 1 2 8 48
4 Foreign owner 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 9 307
4 Family (individual) owner 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 10 158
4 Financial owner 1.7 (1.3) 1 1 9 365
4 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.9 (1.5) 1 1 11 382
5 State owner 2.5 (2.0) 1 2 9 46
5 Foreign owner 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 11 338
5 Family (individual) owner 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 5 162
5 Financial owner 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 10 416
5 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 7 374
10 State owner 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 2 9
10 Foreign owner 1.0 (0.3) 1 1 6 333
10 Family (individual) owner 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 4 256
10 Financial owner 1.1 (0.5) 1 1 9 470
10 Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.1 (0.5) 1 1 5 392
The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into ﬁve
types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 1989
1999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms;
Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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4.2.4 Ownership duration grouped by ﬁrm size
Table 4.37 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ﬁrm size. Sample (1)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 3.2 2.9 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.3
2 5.1 4.9 5.6 5.4 4.7 3.6
3 4.9 5.2 5.6 5.4 3.9 4.4
4 4.6 4.1 4.4 5.1 4.6 3.7
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.1 3.7
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 4.3 3.0 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.4
2 6.4 4.8 3.9 2.6 1.9 1.4
3 5.9 3.2 3.3 2.7 2.4 1.9
4 7.2 3.3 3.1 2.7 2.7 1.9
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 5.4 3.9 2.7 2.6 2.5 1.9
Duration: Maintain Rank
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 4.3 4.1 5.3 4.1 3.9 3.5
2 6.4 6.0 6.5 5.1 5.1 4.4
3 5.9 4.4 5.7 4.1 4.1 4.8
4 7.2 4.1 3.4 4.6 4.1 4.0
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 5.4 4.4 3.7 4.1 3.7 4.2
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 7.4 7.1 6.6 4.4 3.9 1.9
2 7.9 7.1 7.1 6.0 5.1 1.5
3 7.1 6.3 6.4 4.6 4.1 2.1
4 8.1 5.2 5.4 5.3 4.1 1.4
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 6.1 5.2 5.0 4.7 3.7 1.3
The table shows ﬁrmsize related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A ﬁrm is assigned into one of ﬁve size
quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Groups 1 and 5 contain the 20% largest and
the 20% smallest ﬁrms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.38 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ﬁrm size. Sample (2)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5
2 2.4 2.3 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.5
3 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
4 2.6 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 1.5
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.8
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1
2 2.9 2.1 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.1
3 2.8 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1
4 3.6 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.1
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2
Duration: Maintain Rank
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6
2 2.9 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.8 1.7
3 2.8 1.9 2.3 1.7 1.6 1.8
4 3.6 2.0 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.6
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.6 2.1 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.9
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 3.4 3.1 2.6 2.1 1.7 1.1
2 3.8 3.3 3.1 2.3 1.8 1.1
3 3.9 2.9 2.9 1.9 1.6 1.1
4 4.0 2.5 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.1
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 3.1 2.5 2.2 2.3 1.8 1.0
The table shows ﬁrmsize related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A ﬁrm is assigned into one of ﬁve size
quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Groups 1 and 5 contain the 20% largest and
the 20% smallest ﬁrms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.39 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ﬁrm size. Sample (3)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.2 2.9 2.4
2 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.6
3 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.0
4 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.1
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.1
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 3.8 2.7 2.4 2.0 1.6 1.3
2 3.7 2.6 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.4
3 2.9 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.2
4 3.5 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.4
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.8 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.4
Duration: Maintain Rank
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 3.8 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.7
2 3.7 3.0 3.2 2.8 2.8 2.8
3 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.1
4 3.5 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.5
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.3
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 5.1 4.6 4.3 3.6 3.0 1.5
2 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.1 2.8 1.5
3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 1.1
4 3.8 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.4 1.3
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.1 1.2
The table shows ﬁrmsize related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A ﬁrm is assigned into one of ﬁve size
quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Groups 1 and 5 contain the 20% largest and
the 20% smallest ﬁrms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
70
Table 4.40 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ﬁrm size. Sample (4)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.4
2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.4
3 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3
4 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.4
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1
2 2.2 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1
3 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
4 2.2 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1
Duration: Maintain Rank
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5
2 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5
3 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4
4 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.6
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Firm size group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (largest ﬁrms) 3.0 2.6 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.1
2 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.1
3 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.0
4 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.1
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.1
The table shows ﬁrmsize related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A ﬁrm is assigned into one of ﬁve size
quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Groups 1 and 5 contain the 20% largest and
the 20% smallest ﬁrms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.41 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm size. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples (1) and
(2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 3.2 (2.2) 1 3 10 14
2 5.1 (2.9) 2 4 11 14
3 4.9 (3.0) 1 4 11 14
4 4.6 (2.8) 1 4 10 14
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 4.2 (2.7) 1 4 11 16
2 1 2.9 (1.2) 1 3 6 14
2 4.9 (1.8) 2 4 9 14
3 5.2 (2.2) 2 4 9 14
4 4.1 (2.6) 2 3 11 14
5 3.9 (2.2) 2 3 10 16
3 1 4.0 (1.8) 1 3 8 14
2 5.6 (2.8) 2 4 11 14
3 5.6 (2.9) 2 6 10 14
4 4.4 (2.7) 2 3 11 14
5 3.6 (1.6) 2 3 7 16
4 1 3.8 (2.4) 1 4 8 14
2 5.4 (2.4) 2 4 9 14
3 5.4 (2.9) 1 6 11 14
4 5.1 (2.9) 1 4 11 14
5 3.6 (1.3) 1 4 6 16
5 1 3.6 (2.2) 1 3 9 14
2 4.2 (1.8) 2 4 9 14
3 4.3 (2.3) 2 4 10 14
4 3.7 (2.5) 1 3 11 14
5 5.1 (2.4) 2 4 10 16
10 1 3.3 (1.7) 1 3 6 14
2 3.6 (2.1) 1 4 9 14
3 4.4 (2.3) 1 4 9 14
4 3.7 (1.8) 2 3 9 14
5 3.7 (1.9) 1 3 8 16
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 1.6 (1.4) 1 1 10 68
2 2.4 (2.4) 1 1 11 50
3 2.4 (2.3) 1 1 11 49
4 2.6 (2.4) 1 2 10 38
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.1 (2.1) 1 1 11 53
2 1 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 6 83
2 2.3 (1.8) 1 2 9 69
3 2.1 (1.9) 1 1 9 83
4 1.9 (1.7) 1 1 11 80
5 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 10 70
3 1 1.7 (1.3) 1 1 8 96
2 2.3 (2.1) 1 1 11 82
3 2.3 (2.2) 1 1 10 80
4 2.0 (1.8) 1 1 11 86
5 1.7 (1.3) 1 1 7 87
4 1 1.6 (1.4) 1 1 8 99
2 1.8 (1.8) 1 1 9 104
3 2.0 (2.0) 1 1 11 95
4 2.1 (2.1) 1 1 11 93
5 1.9 (1.2) 1 1 6 89
5 1 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 9 111
2 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 9 131
3 1.7 (1.5) 1 1 10 111
4 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 11 112
5 2.1 (1.8) 1 1 10 108
10 1 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 6 118
2 1.5 (1.3) 1 1 9 130
3 1.6 (1.4) 1 1 9 122
4 1.5 (1.2) 1 1 9 110
5 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 8 106
The table shows ﬁrmsize related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A ﬁrm is assigned into one of ﬁve size
quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and
the 20% smallest ﬁrms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.42 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm size. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples (3) and
(4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 2.8 (2.3) 1 2 11 65
2 2.9 (2.1) 1 2 11 63
3 2.4 (1.9) 1 2 10 58
4 2.5 (2.2) 1 2 11 60
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.3 (1.4) 1 2 8 60
2 1 2.9 (1.8) 1 3 9 65
2 3.0 (2.1) 1 2 10 63
3 2.3 (2.1) 1 2 11 58
4 2.2 (1.7) 1 2 10 60
5 2.3 (1.2) 1 2 6 60
3 1 3.0 (2.3) 1 2 11 65
2 3.1 (2.2) 1 2 9 63
3 2.1 (1.8) 1 2 11 58
4 2.2 (1.7) 1 2 9 60
5 2.3 (1.4) 1 2 6 60
4 1 3.2 (2.2) 1 3 9 65
2 2.9 (2.1) 1 2 9 63
3 2.2 (1.9) 1 2 11 58
4 2.4 (1.9) 1 2 11 60
5 2.4 (1.4) 1 2 7 60
5 1 2.9 (2.1) 1 2 10 65
2 2.5 (1.5) 1 2 8 63
3 2.1 (1.9) 1 2 11 58
4 2.2 (1.7) 1 2 7 60
5 2.5 (2.0) 1 2 10 60
10 1 2.4 (1.7) 1 2 9 65
2 2.6 (1.8) 1 2 9 63
3 2.0 (1.7) 1 1 9 58
4 2.1 (1.4) 1 2 8 60
5 2.1 (1.3) 1 2 8 60
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 1.7 (1.6) 1 1 11 207
2 1.8 (1.6) 1 1 11 166
3 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 10 147
4 1.8 (1.7) 1 1 11 136
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 1.7 (1.2) 1 1 8 130
2 1 1.7 (1.3) 1 1 9 267
2 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 10 228
3 1.6 (1.4) 1 1 11 182
4 1.5 (1.2) 1 1 10 195
5 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 6 161
3 1 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 11 301
2 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 9 255
3 1.5 (1.3) 1 1 11 202
4 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 9 220
5 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 6 186
4 1 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 9 334
2 1.6 (1.4) 1 1 9 271
3 1.5 (1.3) 1 1 11 219
4 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 11 221
5 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 7 199
5 1 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 10 362
2 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 8 322
3 1.4 (1.1) 1 1 11 244
4 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 7 253
5 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 10 224
10 1 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 9 394
2 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 9 333
3 1.3 (1.0) 1 1 9 243
4 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 8 254
5 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 8 220
The table shows ﬁrmsize related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A ﬁrm is assigned into one of ﬁve size
quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and
the 20% smallest ﬁrms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.43 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm size. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples (1)
and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 4.3 (2.9) 2 3 11 14
2 6.4 (3.1) 2 6 11 14
3 5.9 (3.0) 2 5 11 14
4 7.2 (2.3) 4 7 11 14
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 5.4 (2.9) 1 4 11 16
2 1 3.0 (1.5) 1 3 6 14
2 4.8 (2.6) 2 4 10 14
3 3.2 (2.0) 1 2 8 14
4 3.3 (1.3) 2 3 6 14
5 3.9 (2.7) 1 3 11 16
3 1 2.5 (0.9) 1 2 5 14
2 3.9 (2.8) 1 2 11 14
3 3.3 (1.7) 1 3 7 14
4 3.1 (1.1) 2 3 6 14
5 2.7 (1.5) 1 2 6 16
4 1 2.2 (0.9) 1 2 4 14
2 2.6 (1.2) 1 2 5 14
3 2.7 (1.8) 1 2 7 14
4 2.7 (1.0) 1 3 4 14
5 2.6 (1.1) 1 3 5 16
5 1 2.0 (1.2) 1 2 5 14
2 1.5 (0.6) 1 1 3 14
3 2.1 (1.0) 1 2 4 14
4 1.9 (1.0) 1 2 4 14
5 1.8 (0.7) 1 2 3 16
10 1 1.4 (0.5) 1 1 2 14
2 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 4 14
3 1.9 (1.2) 1 2 5 14
4 1.9 (0.7) 1 2 4 14
5 1.9 (0.7) 1 2 3 16
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 2.0 (1.8) 1 1 11 68
2 2.9 (2.8) 1 2 11 50
3 2.8 (2.6) 1 2 11 49
4 3.6 (3.1) 1 2 11 38
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.6 (2.5) 1 1 11 53
2 1 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 6 83
2 2.1 (1.9) 1 1 10 69
3 1.5 (1.2) 1 1 8 83
4 1.7 (1.1) 1 1 6 80
5 1.9 (1.8) 1 1 11 70
3 1 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 5 96
2 1.7 (1.6) 1 1 11 82
3 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 7 80
4 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 6 86
5 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 6 87
4 1 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 4 99
2 1.3 (0.8) 1 1 5 104
3 1.3 (0.9) 1 1 7 95
4 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 4 93
5 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 5 89
5 1 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 5 111
2 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 3 131
3 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 111
4 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 112
5 1.2 (0.4) 1 1 3 108
10 1 1.1 (0.2) 1 1 2 118
2 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 4 130
3 1.1 (0.5) 1 1 5 122
4 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 110
5 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 3 106
The table shows ﬁrmsize related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A ﬁrm is assigned into one of ﬁve size
quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and
the 20% smallest ﬁrms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.44 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm size. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples (3)
and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 3.8 (2.6) 1 3 11 65
2 3.7 (2.4) 1 3 11 63
3 2.9 (2.0) 1 2 11 58
4 3.5 (2.6) 1 2 11 60
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.8 (1.8) 1 3 11 60
2 1 2.7 (1.9) 1 2 10 65
2 2.6 (1.6) 1 2 7 63
3 2.2 (1.4) 1 2 8 58
4 2.1 (1.4) 1 2 8 60
5 2.2 (1.5) 1 2 11 60
3 1 2.4 (1.7) 1 2 11 65
2 2.1 (1.2) 1 2 7 63
3 1.8 (1.1) 1 1 6 58
4 1.8 (1.0) 1 2 5 60
5 1.9 (1.1) 1 2 6 60
4 1 2.0 (1.0) 1 2 5 65
2 1.9 (1.2) 1 2 7 63
3 1.6 (0.8) 1 1 4 58
4 1.7 (1.0) 1 1 5 60
5 1.6 (0.9) 1 1 4 60
5 1 1.6 (0.8) 1 2 5 65
2 1.5 (0.8) 1 1 4 63
3 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 3 58
4 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 4 60
5 1.4 (0.6) 1 1 3 60
10 1 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 4 65
2 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 5 63
3 1.2 (0.4) 1 1 2 58
4 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 4 60
5 1.4 (0.6) 1 1 3 60
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 2.1 (2.0) 1 1 11 207
2 2.2 (1.9) 1 1 11 166
3 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 11 147
4 2.2 (2.1) 1 1 11 136
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.0 (1.5) 1 1 11 130
2 1 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 10 267
2 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 7 228
3 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 8 182
4 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 8 195
5 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 11 161
3 1 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 11 301
2 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 7 255
3 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 6 202
4 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 5 220
5 1.3 (0.8) 1 1 6 186
4 1 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 5 334
2 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 7 271
3 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 219
4 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 5 221
5 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 4 199
5 1 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 5 362
2 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 322
3 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 3 244
4 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 253
5 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 3 224
10 1 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 4 394
2 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 5 333
3 1.1 (0.2) 1 1 2 243
4 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 254
5 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 3 220
The table shows ﬁrmsize related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A ﬁrm is assigned into one of ﬁve size
quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and
the 20% smallest ﬁrms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.45 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm size. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples (1) and
(2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 4.3 (2.9) 2 3 11 14
2 6.4 (3.1) 2 6 11 14
3 5.9 (3.0) 2 5 11 14
4 7.2 (2.3) 4 7 11 14
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 5.4 (2.9) 1 4 11 16
2 1 4.1 (1.7) 1 4 7 14
2 6.0 (3.0) 2 6 11 14
3 4.4 (2.3) 2 4 9 14
4 4.1 (2.4) 2 4 11 14
5 4.4 (2.8) 1 4 11 16
3 1 5.3 (2.6) 3 5 11 14
2 6.5 (2.9) 3 6 11 14
3 5.7 (2.9) 2 4 11 14
4 3.4 (1.2) 2 3 6 14
5 3.7 (1.9) 1 3 9 16
4 1 4.1 (1.9) 2 4 8 14
2 5.1 (2.7) 1 4 9 14
3 4.1 (2.6) 1 3 9 14
4 4.6 (2.6) 1 4 11 14
5 4.1 (2.0) 2 4 10 16
5 1 3.9 (1.9) 1 4 9 14
2 3.8 (2.0) 2 3 9 14
3 4.5 (2.4) 2 4 10 14
4 3.6 (1.4) 1 3 6 14
5 4.8 (2.5) 2 4 10 16
10 1 3.5 (1.7) 2 3 6 14
2 4.4 (2.2) 2 4 9 14
3 4.8 (2.1) 2 4 9 14
4 4.0 (1.8) 2 4 9 14
5 4.2 (2.3) 1 3 10 16
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 2.0 (1.8) 1 1 11 68
2 2.9 (2.8) 1 2 11 50
3 2.8 (2.6) 1 2 11 49
4 3.6 (3.1) 1 2 11 38
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.6 (2.5) 1 1 11 53
2 1 2.0 (1.5) 1 1 7 83
2 2.5 (2.4) 1 1 11 69
3 1.9 (1.7) 1 1 9 83
4 2.0 (1.6) 1 1 11 80
5 2.1 (2.0) 1 1 11 70
3 1 1.9 (1.8) 1 1 11 96
2 2.5 (2.4) 1 2 11 82
3 2.3 (2.2) 1 1 11 80
4 1.7 (1.1) 1 1 6 86
5 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 9 87
4 1 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 8 99
2 1.9 (1.9) 1 1 9 104
3 1.7 (1.6) 1 1 9 95
4 1.9 (1.8) 1 1 11 93
5 2.1 (1.5) 1 2 10 89
5 1 1.7 (1.3) 1 1 9 111
2 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 9 131
3 1.8 (1.6) 1 1 10 111
4 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 6 112
5 2.0 (1.8) 1 1 10 108
10 1 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 6 118
2 1.7 (1.5) 1 1 9 130
3 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 9 122
4 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 9 110
5 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 10 106
The table shows ﬁrmsize related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A ﬁrm is assigned into one of ﬁve size
quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and
the 20% smallest ﬁrms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.46 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm size. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples (3) and
(4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 3.8 (2.6) 1 3 11 65
2 3.7 (2.4) 1 3 11 63
3 2.9 (2.0) 1 2 11 58
4 3.5 (2.6) 1 2 11 60
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.8 (1.8) 1 3 11 60
2 1 3.5 (2.4) 1 3 11 65
2 3.0 (1.8) 1 2 9 63
3 2.5 (1.9) 1 2 11 58
4 2.3 (1.5) 1 2 8 60
5 2.5 (1.7) 1 2 11 60
3 1 3.6 (2.7) 1 3 11 65
2 3.2 (2.2) 1 2 11 63
3 2.3 (1.6) 1 2 10 58
4 2.3 (1.3) 1 2 6 60
5 2.3 (1.5) 1 2 9 60
4 1 3.3 (2.1) 1 3 9 65
2 2.8 (1.8) 1 2 9 63
3 2.2 (1.7) 1 2 11 58
4 2.5 (1.6) 1 2 8 60
5 2.4 (1.6) 1 2 10 60
5 1 3.0 (2.0) 1 3 10 65
2 2.5 (1.5) 1 2 8 63
3 2.2 (1.7) 1 2 10 58
4 2.3 (1.6) 1 2 7 60
5 2.4 (1.9) 1 2 10 60
10 1 2.7 (1.8) 1 2 9 65
2 2.8 (1.8) 1 2 9 63
3 2.1 (1.7) 1 1 9 58
4 2.5 (1.6) 1 2 8 60
5 2.3 (1.5) 1 2 10 60
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 2.1 (2.0) 1 1 11 207
2 2.2 (1.9) 1 1 11 166
3 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 11 147
4 2.2 (2.1) 1 1 11 136
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.0 (1.5) 1 1 11 130
2 1 2.0 (1.7) 1 1 11 267
2 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 9 228
3 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 11 182
4 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 8 195
5 1.7 (1.3) 1 1 11 161
3 1 1.9 (1.7) 1 1 11 301
2 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 11 255
3 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 10 202
4 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 6 220
5 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 9 186
4 1 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 9 334
2 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 9 271
3 1.5 (1.2) 1 1 11 219
4 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 8 221
5 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 10 199
5 1 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 10 362
2 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 8 322
3 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 10 244
4 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 7 253
5 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 10 224
10 1 1.5 (1.2) 1 1 9 394
2 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 9 333
3 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 9 243
4 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 8 254
5 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 10 220
The table shows ﬁrmsize related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A ﬁrm is assigned into one of ﬁve size
quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and
the 20% smallest ﬁrms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.47 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm size. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Samples
(1) and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 7.4 (2.5) 2 7 11 14
2 7.9 (2.4) 3 8 11 14
3 7.1 (2.5) 4 6 11 14
4 8.1 (2.3) 4 8 11 14
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 6.1 (2.7) 1 6 11 16
2 1 7.1 (2.9) 2 7 11 14
2 7.1 (2.0) 5 6 11 14
3 6.3 (2.5) 3 6 10 14
4 5.2 (2.8) 2 4 11 14
5 5.2 (2.7) 2 5 11 16
3 1 6.6 (2.6) 3 7 11 14
2 7.1 (2.5) 3 7 11 14
3 6.4 (2.7) 3 6 11 14
4 5.4 (2.3) 2 5 11 14
5 5.0 (2.4) 2 4 10 16
4 1 4.4 (1.9) 2 4 8 14
2 6.0 (2.2) 3 6 9 14
3 4.6 (2.4) 2 4 9 14
4 5.3 (2.7) 1 4 11 14
5 4.7 (2.4) 2 4 11 16
5 1 3.9 (1.9) 1 4 9 14
2 1.7 (2.1) 1 1 9 14
3 2.0 (2.0) 1 1 8 14
4 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 2 14
5 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 4 16
10 1 1.9 (1.5) 1 1 6 14
2 1.5 (0.8) 1 1 4 14
3 2.1 (2.2) 1 1 9 14
4 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 4 14
5 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 3 16
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 3.4 (2.7) 1 3 11 68
2 3.8 (3.0) 1 3 11 50
3 3.9 (2.9) 1 3 11 49
4 4.0 (3.5) 1 2 11 38
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 3.1 (2.6) 1 2 11 53
2 1 3.1 (2.5) 1 2 11 83
2 3.3 (2.5) 1 3 11 69
3 2.9 (2.3) 1 2 10 83
4 2.5 (2.1) 1 2 11 80
5 2.5 (2.2) 1 2 11 70
3 1 2.6 (2.3) 1 2 11 96
2 3.1 (2.5) 1 2 11 82
3 2.9 (2.4) 1 2 11 80
4 2.5 (1.9) 1 2 11 86
5 2.2 (1.9) 1 2 10 87
4 1 2.1 (1.5) 1 2 8 99
2 2.3 (2.0) 1 1 9 104
3 1.9 (1.7) 1 1 9 95
4 2.2 (2.0) 1 1 11 93
5 2.3 (1.8) 1 2 11 89
5 1 1.7 (1.3) 1 1 9 111
2 1.1 (0.7) 1 1 9 131
3 1.1 (0.8) 1 1 8 111
4 1.0 (0.1) 1 1 2 112
5 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 4 108
10 1 1.1 (0.6) 1 1 6 118
2 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 4 130
3 1.1 (0.8) 1 1 9 122
4 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 110
5 1.0 (0.3) 1 1 3 106
The table shows ﬁrmsize related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A ﬁrm is assigned into one of ﬁve size
quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and
the 20% smallest ﬁrms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.48 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm size. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Samples
(3) and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 5.1 (3.0) 1 4 11 65
2 4.1 (2.4) 1 4 11 63
3 3.7 (2.4) 1 3 11 58
4 3.8 (2.6) 1 3 11 60
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 3.4 (2.0) 1 3 11 60
2 1 4.6 (3.0) 1 4 11 65
2 3.8 (2.2) 1 3 10 63
3 3.2 (2.3) 1 2 11 58
4 2.8 (1.7) 1 2 10 60
5 3.0 (1.8) 1 3 11 60
3 1 4.3 (2.9) 1 3 11 65
2 3.6 (2.4) 1 3 11 63
3 2.8 (2.0) 1 2 11 58
4 3.0 (2.0) 1 2 10 60
5 2.8 (1.7) 1 2 9 60
4 1 3.6 (2.1) 1 3 9 65
2 3.1 (2.0) 1 2 9 63
3 2.5 (1.7) 1 2 11 58
4 2.8 (2.0) 1 2 10 60
5 2.7 (1.9) 1 2 11 60
5 1 3.0 (2.0) 1 3 10 65
2 1.4 (1.1) 1 1 8 63
3 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 5 58
4 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 60
5 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 60
10 1 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 6 65
2 1.5 (1.3) 1 1 9 63
3 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 3 58
4 1.3 (0.8) 1 1 4 60
5 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 4 60
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Firm size group mean (std) min med max n
1 1 (largest ﬁrms) 3.0 (2.5) 1 2 11 207
2 2.7 (2.1) 1 2 11 166
3 2.4 (2.0) 1 2 11 147
4 2.5 (2.2) 1 2 11 136
5 (smallest ﬁrms) 2.4 (1.8) 1 2 11 130
2 1 2.6 (2.1) 1 2 11 267
2 2.4 (1.8) 1 2 10 228
3 2.2 (1.8) 1 2 11 182
4 1.9 (1.3) 1 1 10 195
5 2.0 (1.5) 1 2 11 161
3 1 2.3 (2.0) 1 2 11 301
2 2.1 (1.8) 1 1 11 255
3 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 11 202
4 1.9 (1.4) 1 1 10 220
5 1.9 (1.4) 1 1 9 186
4 1 1.9 (1.5) 1 1 9 334
2 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 9 271
3 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 11 219
4 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 10 221
5 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 11 199
5 1 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 10 362
2 1.1 (0.5) 1 1 8 322
3 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 5 244
4 1.0 (0.3) 1 1 4 253
5 1.0 (0.3) 1 1 4 224
10 1 1.1 (0.5) 1 1 6 394
2 1.1 (0.6) 1 1 9 333
3 1.0 (0.2) 1 1 3 243
4 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 254
5 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 220
The table shows ﬁrmsize related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A ﬁrm is assigned into one of ﬁve size
quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and
the 20% smallest ﬁrms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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4.2.5 Ownership duration grouped by ﬁrm type
Table 4.49 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ﬁrm type. Sample (1)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 4.3 4.0 4.9 4.9 4.2 4.2
Financial company 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.9 5.3 2.6
Shipping company 4.3 4.4 4.0 3.8 3.2 3.0
IPO company 5.1 4.1 5.3 5.3 3.3 3.4
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 6.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.4 1.6
Financial company 3.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 1.6 1.3
Shipping company 6.4 4.2 3.3 2.3 2.2 1.7
IPO company 5.4 4.0 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.7
Duration: Maintain Rank
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 6.0 4.5 4.9 4.8 4.1 4.6
Financial company 3.3 4.0 3.6 3.7 4.7 2.7
Shipping company 6.4 5.0 5.2 3.6 3.8 3.5
IPO company 5.4 4.0 4.3 4.6 4.4 3.4
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 7.6 6.3 6.2 5.1 4.1 1.9
Financial company 6.1 4.9 4.1 3.9 4.7 2.0
Shipping company 7.2 6.6 6.3 4.5 3.8 1.2
IPO company 6.6 5.1 6.0 5.7 4.4 1.0
The table shows holding size-related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We ﬁrst
ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by ﬁrm type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):
(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.50 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ﬁrm type. Sample (2)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7
Financial company 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.3
Shipping company 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.4
IPO company 2.8 2.0 2.4 2.9 2.1 1.7
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 2.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1
Financial company 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.0
Shipping company 3.2 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.1
IPO company 3.1 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.4
Duration: Maintain Rank
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 2.7 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.8
Financial company 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.4
Shipping company 3.2 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.8 1.5
IPO company 3.1 2.0 2.0 2.6 2.2 1.8
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 3.8 3.0 2.7 2.2 1.7 1.1
Financial company 2.9 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.1
Shipping company 3.8 3.0 2.8 2.1 1.8 1.0
IPO company 3.7 2.4 3.0 3.2 2.2 1.0
The table shows holding size-related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We ﬁrst
ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by ﬁrm type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):
(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.51 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ﬁrm type. Sample (3)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.7
Financial company 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.4 3.0 1.9
Shipping company 3.0 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.4
IPO company 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 3.9 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.4
Financial company 2.3 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3
Shipping company 4.1 3.0 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.4
IPO company 2.6 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.3
Duration: Maintain Rank
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 3.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 2.8 2.9
Financial company 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.8 2.2
Shipping company 4.1 3.4 3.3 2.7 2.7 2.7
IPO company 2.6 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.8
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 4.8 4.0 3.8 3.4 2.8 1.4
Financial company 3.7 3.0 2.9 2.5 2.8 1.4
Shipping company 4.7 4.3 3.9 3.2 2.7 1.4
IPO company 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.1
The table shows holding size-related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We ﬁrst
ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by ﬁrm type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):
(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.52 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ﬁrm type. Sample (4)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5
Financial company 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.3
Shipping company 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4
IPO company 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 2.3 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1
Financial company 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
Shipping company 2.4 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1
IPO company 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1
Duration: Maintain Rank
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.6
Financial company 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4
Shipping company 2.4 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5
IPO company 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Owner rank
Firm type 1 2 3 4 5 10
Manufacturing company 3.0 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.1
Financial company 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.1
Shipping company 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.1
IPO company 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.0
The table shows holding size-related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the ﬁrm. We ﬁrst
ﬁnd all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by ﬁrm type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):
(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.53 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm type. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples (1)
and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 4.3 (3.2) 1 3 11 37
1 Financial company 3.6 (1.9) 2 3 7 7
1 Shipping company 4.3 (2.7) 1 4 11 19
1 IPO company 5.1 (2.5) 1 5 8 7
2 Manufacturing company 4.0 (2.3) 1 3 11 37
2 Financial company 3.4 (1.5) 2 3 6 7
2 Shipping company 4.4 (2.5) 1 4 10 19
2 IPO company 4.1 (2.2) 2 3 8 7
3 Manufacturing company 4.9 (2.8) 1 4 11 37
3 Financial company 3.6 (1.8) 2 3 8 7
3 Shipping company 4.0 (2.6) 1 3 11 19
3 IPO company 5.3 (1.6) 3 5 7 7
4 Manufacturing company 4.9 (3.1) 1 4 11 37
4 Financial company 3.9 (1.8) 1 4 7 7
4 Shipping company 3.8 (2.1) 1 3 9 19
4 IPO company 5.3 (1.8) 3 4 8 7
5 Manufacturing company 4.2 (2.5) 1 3 11 37
5 Financial company 5.3 (2.9) 1 5 9 7
5 Shipping company 3.2 (1.1) 1 3 6 19
5 IPO company 3.3 (1.3) 1 4 5 7
10 Manufacturing company 4.2 (2.3) 1 4 9 37
10 Financial company 2.6 (1.3) 1 2 5 7
10 Shipping company 3.0 (1.4) 1 3 7 19
10 IPO company 3.4 (0.5) 3 3 4 7
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 2.1 (2.2) 1 1 11 131
1 Financial company 1.7 (1.3) 1 1 7 40
1 Shipping company 2.3 (2.2) 1 1 11 56
1 IPO company 2.8 (2.5) 1 1 8 18
2 Manufacturing company 2.0 (1.6) 1 1 11 201
2 Financial company 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 6 48
2 Shipping company 2.0 (1.8) 1 1 10 89
2 IPO company 2.0 (1.8) 1 1 8 26
3 Manufacturing company 2.0 (1.9) 1 1 11 226
3 Financial company 1.7 (1.2) 1 1 8 52
3 Shipping company 2.0 (1.8) 1 1 11 102
3 IPO company 2.4 (2.0) 1 1 7 27
4 Manufacturing company 1.9 (1.9) 1 1 11 256
4 Financial company 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 7 54
4 Shipping company 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 9 123
4 IPO company 2.9 (1.9) 1 2 8 24
5 Manufacturing company 1.8 (1.6) 1 1 11 269
5 Financial company 1.9 (2.0) 1 1 9 60
5 Shipping company 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 6 133
5 IPO company 2.1 (1.2) 1 2 5 31
10 Manufacturing company 1.7 (1.5) 1 1 9 304
10 Financial company 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 5 65
10 Shipping company 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 7 152
10 IPO company 1.7 (1.0) 1 1 4 37
The table shows ﬁrmtype related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms
and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All
Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.54 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm type. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples (3)
and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 3.0 (2.4) 1 2 11 112
1 Financial company 2.2 (1.6) 1 2 7 20
1 Shipping company 3.0 (2.1) 1 2 11 54
1 IPO company 1.9 (1.4) 1 1 8 105
2 Manufacturing company 2.8 (2.1) 1 2 11 112
2 Financial company 2.2 (1.4) 1 2 6 20
2 Shipping company 3.1 (2.1) 1 2 10 54
2 IPO company 1.9 (1.3) 1 2 8 105
3 Manufacturing company 2.9 (2.4) 1 2 11 112
3 Financial company 2.6 (1.7) 1 3 8 20
3 Shipping company 2.8 (2.1) 1 2 11 54
3 IPO company 1.9 (1.4) 1 1 7 105
4 Manufacturing company 3.1 (2.4) 1 2 11 112
4 Financial company 2.4 (1.6) 1 2 7 20
4 Shipping company 2.8 (1.8) 1 2 9 54
4 IPO company 1.9 (1.3) 1 2 8 105
5 Manufacturing company 2.8 (2.1) 1 2 11 112
5 Financial company 3.0 (2.5) 1 2 9 20
5 Shipping company 2.4 (1.2) 1 2 6 54
5 IPO company 1.9 (1.1) 1 2 6 105
10 Manufacturing company 2.7 (2.0) 1 2 9 112
10 Financial company 1.9 (1.1) 1 2 5 20
10 Shipping company 2.4 (1.5) 1 2 7 54
10 IPO company 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 6 105
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 1.9 (1.8) 1 1 11 295
1 Financial company 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 7 74
1 Shipping company 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 11 146
1 IPO company 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 8 219
2 Manufacturing company 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 11 420
2 Financial company 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 6 90
2 Shipping company 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 10 200
2 IPO company 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 8 257
3 Manufacturing company 1.7 (1.5) 1 1 11 471
3 Financial company 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 8 93
3 Shipping company 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 11 237
3 IPO company 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 7 291
4 Manufacturing company 1.7 (1.5) 1 1 11 516
4 Financial company 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 7 96
4 Shipping company 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 9 260
4 IPO company 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 8 299
5 Manufacturing company 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 11 548
5 Financial company 1.7 (1.6) 1 1 9 99
5 Shipping company 1.5 (0.8) 1 1 6 276
5 IPO company 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 6 314
10 Manufacturing company 1.5 (1.2) 1 1 9 593
10 Financial company 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 5 105
10 Shipping company 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 7 310
10 IPO company 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 6 350
The table shows ﬁrmtype related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms
and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All
Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.55 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm type. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples (1)
and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 6.0 (3.3) 1 6 11 37
1 Financial company 3.3 (1.7) 2 3 7 7
1 Shipping company 6.4 (3.1) 1 6 11 19
1 IPO company 5.4 (2.1) 3 5 8 7
2 Manufacturing company 3.5 (2.1) 1 3 10 37
2 Financial company 2.4 (0.9) 1 2 4 7
2 Shipping company 4.2 (2.6) 1 3 11 19
2 IPO company 4.0 (2.3) 2 3 8 7
3 Manufacturing company 3.0 (1.5) 1 3 8 37
3 Financial company 2.3 (0.5) 2 2 3 7
3 Shipping company 3.3 (2.6) 1 2 11 19
3 IPO company 3.6 (1.8) 1 3 7 7
4 Manufacturing company 2.5 (1.3) 1 2 6 37
4 Financial company 2.3 (0.9) 1 2 4 7
4 Shipping company 2.3 (1.0) 1 2 4 19
4 IPO company 3.4 (1.5) 2 3 7 7
5 Manufacturing company 2.4 (1.3) 1 2 6 37
5 Financial company 1.6 (0.5) 1 2 2 7
5 Shipping company 2.2 (0.8) 1 2 4 19
5 IPO company 3.0 (0.9) 2 3 4 7
10 Manufacturing company 1.6 (0.9) 1 1 5 37
10 Financial company 1.3 (0.5) 1 1 2 7
10 Shipping company 1.7 (0.6) 1 2 3 19
10 IPO company 2.7 (0.9) 2 2 4 7
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 2.7 (2.7) 1 2 11 131
1 Financial company 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 7 40
1 Shipping company 3.2 (3.0) 1 2 11 56
1 IPO company 3.1 (2.4) 1 2 8 18
2 Manufacturing company 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 10 201
2 Financial company 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 4 48
2 Shipping company 2.0 (1.8) 1 1 11 89
2 IPO company 2.0 (1.8) 1 1 8 26
3 Manufacturing company 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 8 226
3 Financial company 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 3 52
3 Shipping company 1.6 (1.4) 1 1 11 102
3 IPO company 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 7 27
4 Manufacturing company 1.3 (0.8) 1 1 6 256
4 Financial company 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 4 54
4 Shipping company 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 4 123
4 IPO company 2.0 (1.3) 1 2 7 24
5 Manufacturing company 1.2 (0.7) 1 1 6 269
5 Financial company 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 2 60
5 Shipping company 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 4 133
5 IPO company 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 4 31
10 Manufacturing company 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 5 304
10 Financial company 1.0 (0.2) 1 1 2 65
10 Shipping company 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 3 152
10 IPO company 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 4 37
The table shows ﬁrmtype related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms
and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All
Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.56 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm type. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples (3)
and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 3.9 (2.8) 1 3 11 112
1 Financial company 2.3 (1.5) 1 2 7 20
1 Shipping company 4.1 (2.8) 1 3 11 54
1 IPO company 2.6 (1.5) 1 2 8 105
2 Manufacturing company 2.4 (1.7) 1 2 10 112
2 Financial company 1.6 (0.9) 1 1 4 20
2 Shipping company 3.0 (2.1) 1 2 11 54
2 IPO company 2.0 (1.2) 1 2 8 105
3 Manufacturing company 2.2 (1.3) 1 2 8 112
3 Financial company 1.7 (0.8) 1 2 3 20
3 Shipping company 2.3 (1.8) 1 2 11 54
3 IPO company 1.7 (1.0) 1 2 7 105
4 Manufacturing company 1.9 (1.1) 1 2 6 112
4 Financial company 1.6 (0.8) 1 1 4 20
4 Shipping company 1.9 (1.1) 1 2 5 54
4 IPO company 1.6 (0.9) 1 1 7 105
5 Manufacturing company 1.8 (1.0) 1 2 6 112
5 Financial company 1.4 (0.5) 1 1 2 20
5 Shipping company 1.8 (0.8) 1 2 4 54
5 IPO company 1.6 (0.8) 1 1 4 105
10 Manufacturing company 1.4 (0.7) 1 1 5 112
10 Financial company 1.3 (0.5) 1 1 2 20
10 Shipping company 1.4 (0.6) 1 1 3 54
10 IPO company 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 4 105
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 2.3 (2.2) 1 1 11 295
1 Financial company 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 7 74
1 Shipping company 2.4 (2.2) 1 1 11 146
1 IPO company 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 8 219
2 Manufacturing company 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 10 420
2 Financial company 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 90
2 Shipping company 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 11 200
2 IPO company 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 8 257
3 Manufacturing company 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 8 471
3 Financial company 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 3 93
3 Shipping company 1.4 (1.0) 1 1 11 237
3 IPO company 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 7 291
4 Manufacturing company 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 6 516
4 Financial company 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 96
4 Shipping company 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 5 260
4 IPO company 1.3 (0.6) 1 1 7 299
5 Manufacturing company 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 6 548
5 Financial company 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 2 99
5 Shipping company 1.2 (0.5) 1 1 4 276
5 IPO company 1.2 (0.6) 1 1 4 314
10 Manufacturing company 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 5 593
10 Financial company 1.1 (0.2) 1 1 2 105
10 Shipping company 1.1 (0.3) 1 1 3 310
10 IPO company 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 350
The table shows ﬁrmtype related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms
and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All
Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.57 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm type. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples (1)
and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 6.0 (3.3) 1 6 11 37
1 Financial company 3.3 (1.7) 2 3 7 7
1 Shipping company 6.4 (3.1) 1 6 11 19
1 IPO company 5.4 (2.1) 3 5 8 7
2 Manufacturing company 4.5 (2.4) 1 4 11 37
2 Financial company 4.0 (1.7) 2 4 7 7
2 Shipping company 5.0 (3.2) 1 4 11 19
2 IPO company 4.0 (2.3) 2 3 8 7
3 Manufacturing company 4.9 (2.6) 1 4 11 37
3 Financial company 3.6 (1.8) 2 3 8 7
3 Shipping company 5.2 (3.4) 1 4 11 19
3 IPO company 4.3 (1.4) 3 4 7 7
4 Manufacturing company 4.8 (2.6) 1 4 11 37
4 Financial company 3.7 (1.6) 2 4 7 7
4 Shipping company 3.6 (2.4) 1 3 10 19
4 IPO company 4.6 (2.0) 3 3 8 7
5 Manufacturing company 4.1 (2.2) 1 4 11 37
5 Financial company 4.7 (3.0) 1 4 9 7
5 Shipping company 3.8 (1.7) 1 4 8 19
5 IPO company 4.4 (0.9) 3 4 6 7
10 Manufacturing company 4.6 (2.2) 1 5 9 37
10 Financial company 2.7 (1.2) 2 2 5 7
10 Shipping company 3.5 (1.7) 1 3 7 19
10 IPO company 3.4 (0.5) 3 3 4 7
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 2.7 (2.7) 1 2 11 131
1 Financial company 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 7 40
1 Shipping company 3.2 (3.0) 1 2 11 56
1 IPO company 3.1 (2.4) 1 2 8 18
2 Manufacturing company 2.1 (1.7) 1 1 11 201
2 Financial company 1.7 (1.5) 1 1 7 48
2 Shipping company 2.2 (2.2) 1 1 11 89
2 IPO company 2.0 (1.8) 1 1 8 26
3 Manufacturing company 2.1 (1.8) 1 1 11 226
3 Financial company 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 8 52
3 Shipping company 2.1 (2.2) 1 1 11 102
3 IPO company 2.0 (1.6) 1 1 7 27
4 Manufacturing company 2.0 (1.8) 1 1 11 256
4 Financial company 1.7 (1.2) 1 1 7 54
4 Shipping company 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 10 123
4 IPO company 2.6 (1.8) 1 2 8 24
5 Manufacturing company 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 11 269
5 Financial company 1.6 (1.6) 1 1 9 60
5 Shipping company 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 8 133
5 IPO company 2.2 (1.5) 1 2 6 31
10 Manufacturing company 1.8 (1.6) 1 1 9 304
10 Financial company 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 5 65
10 Shipping company 1.5 (1.1) 1 1 7 152
10 IPO company 1.8 (1.0) 1 1 4 37
The table shows ﬁrmtype related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms
and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All
Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.58 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm type. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples (3)
and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 3.9 (2.8) 1 3 11 112
1 Financial company 2.3 (1.5) 1 2 7 20
1 Shipping company 4.1 (2.8) 1 3 11 54
1 IPO company 2.6 (1.5) 1 2 8 105
2 Manufacturing company 3.0 (2.1) 1 2 11 112
2 Financial company 2.4 (1.6) 1 2 7 20
2 Shipping company 3.4 (2.5) 1 2 11 54
2 IPO company 2.2 (1.3) 1 2 8 105
3 Manufacturing company 3.0 (2.2) 1 2 11 112
3 Financial company 2.5 (1.5) 1 2 8 20
3 Shipping company 3.3 (2.7) 1 2 11 54
3 IPO company 2.1 (1.3) 1 2 7 105
4 Manufacturing company 3.1 (2.2) 1 2 11 112
4 Financial company 2.3 (1.5) 1 2 7 20
4 Shipping company 2.7 (1.9) 1 2 10 54
4 IPO company 2.0 (1.3) 1 2 8 105
5 Manufacturing company 2.8 (1.9) 1 2 11 112
5 Financial company 2.8 (2.4) 1 2 9 20
5 Shipping company 2.7 (1.6) 1 2 8 54
5 IPO company 2.1 (1.2) 1 2 6 105
10 Manufacturing company 2.9 (2.0) 1 2 9 112
10 Financial company 2.2 (1.2) 1 2 5 20
10 Shipping company 2.7 (1.6) 1 2 7 54
10 IPO company 1.8 (1.0) 1 1 6 105
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 2.3 (2.2) 1 1 11 295
1 Financial company 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 7 74
1 Shipping company 2.4 (2.2) 1 1 11 146
1 IPO company 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 8 219
2 Manufacturing company 1.9 (1.5) 1 1 11 420
2 Financial company 1.5 (1.2) 1 1 7 90
2 Shipping company 1.9 (1.7) 1 1 11 200
2 IPO company 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 8 257
3 Manufacturing company 1.7 (1.5) 1 1 11 471
3 Financial company 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 8 93
3 Shipping company 1.7 (1.6) 1 1 11 237
3 IPO company 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 7 291
4 Manufacturing company 1.8 (1.5) 1 1 11 516
4 Financial company 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 7 96
4 Shipping company 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 10 260
4 IPO company 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 8 299
5 Manufacturing company 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 11 548
5 Financial company 1.5 (1.3) 1 1 9 99
5 Shipping company 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 8 276
5 IPO company 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 6 314
10 Manufacturing company 1.6 (1.3) 1 1 9 593
10 Financial company 1.4 (0.8) 1 1 5 105
10 Shipping company 1.5 (1.0) 1 1 7 310
10 IPO company 1.3 (0.7) 1 1 6 350
The table shows ﬁrmtype related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms
and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All
Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.59 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm type. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Samples
(1) and (2).
Sample (1)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 7.6 (2.8) 1 8 11 37
1 Financial company 6.1 (2.4) 2 7 10 7
1 Shipping company 7.2 (2.9) 1 7 11 19
1 IPO company 6.6 (1.8) 3 7 8 7
2 Manufacturing company 6.3 (2.6) 1 6 11 37
2 Financial company 4.9 (2.8) 2 4 11 7
2 Shipping company 6.6 (3.4) 1 6 11 19
2 IPO company 5.1 (2.0) 3 5 8 7
3 Manufacturing company 6.2 (2.7) 1 6 11 37
3 Financial company 4.1 (1.7) 3 3 8 7
3 Shipping company 6.3 (3.2) 1 5 11 19
3 IPO company 6.0 (1.5) 4 7 8 7
4 Manufacturing company 5.1 (2.5) 1 4 11 37
4 Financial company 3.9 (1.6) 2 4 7 7
4 Shipping company 4.5 (2.7) 1 4 11 19
4 IPO company 5.7 (2.1) 3 7 8 7
5 Manufacturing company 4.1 (2.2) 1 4 11 37
5 Financial company 4.7 (3.0) 1 4 9 7
5 Shipping company 3.8 (1.7) 1 4 8 19
5 IPO company 4.4 (0.9) 3 4 6 7
10 Manufacturing company 1.9 (1.7) 1 1 9 37
10 Financial company 2.0 (1.3) 1 1 4 7
10 Shipping company 1.2 (0.4) 1 1 2 19
10 IPO company 1.0 () 1 1 1 7
Sample (2)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 3.8 (3.1) 1 3 11 131
1 Financial company 2.9 (2.2) 1 2 10 40
1 Shipping company 3.8 (3.1) 1 3 11 56
1 IPO company 3.7 (2.8) 1 2 8 18
2 Manufacturing company 3.0 (2.3) 1 2 11 201
2 Financial company 2.2 (1.9) 1 1 11 48
2 Shipping company 3.0 (2.7) 1 2 11 89
2 IPO company 2.4 (2.0) 1 2 8 26
3 Manufacturing company 2.7 (2.3) 1 2 11 226
3 Financial company 1.9 (1.3) 1 2 8 52
3 Shipping company 2.8 (2.4) 1 2 11 102
3 IPO company 3.0 (2.3) 1 2 8 27
4 Manufacturing company 2.2 (1.9) 1 1 11 256
4 Financial company 1.8 (1.2) 1 1 7 54
4 Shipping company 2.1 (1.8) 1 1 11 123
4 IPO company 3.2 (2.2) 1 2 8 24
5 Manufacturing company 1.7 (1.4) 1 1 11 269
5 Financial company 1.6 (1.6) 1 1 9 60
5 Shipping company 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 8 133
5 IPO company 2.2 (1.5) 1 2 6 31
10 Manufacturing company 1.1 (0.7) 1 1 9 304
10 Financial company 1.1 (0.5) 1 1 4 65
10 Shipping company 1.0 (0.2) 1 1 2 152
10 IPO company 1.0 () 1 1 1 37
The table shows ﬁrmtype related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms
and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All
Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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Table 4.60 Detailing ownership duration split by ﬁrm type. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Samples
(3) and (4).
Sample (3)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 4.8 (3.0) 1 4 11 112
1 Financial company 3.7 (2.5) 1 3 10 20
1 Shipping company 4.7 (2.9) 1 4 11 54
1 IPO company 3.0 (1.6) 1 3 8 105
2 Manufacturing company 4.0 (2.6) 1 3 11 112
2 Financial company 3.0 (2.4) 1 2 11 20
2 Shipping company 4.3 (2.9) 1 4 11 54
2 IPO company 2.7 (1.4) 1 2 8 105
3 Manufacturing company 3.8 (2.6) 1 3 11 112
3 Financial company 2.9 (1.7) 1 3 8 20
3 Shipping company 3.9 (2.8) 1 3 11 54
3 IPO company 2.5 (1.6) 1 2 8 105
4 Manufacturing company 3.4 (2.3) 1 3 11 112
4 Financial company 2.5 (1.5) 1 2 7 20
4 Shipping company 3.2 (2.1) 1 3 11 54
4 IPO company 2.3 (1.6) 1 2 8 105
5 Manufacturing company 2.8 (1.9) 1 2 11 112
5 Financial company 2.8 (2.4) 1 2 9 20
5 Shipping company 2.7 (1.6) 1 2 8 54
5 IPO company 2.1 (1.2) 1 2 6 105
10 Manufacturing company 1.4 (1.2) 1 1 9 112
10 Financial company 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 4 20
10 Shipping company 1.4 (0.9) 1 1 5 54
10 IPO company 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 105
Sample (4)
Owner Rank Firm type mean (std) min med max n
1 Manufacturing company 3.0 (2.5) 1 2 11 295
1 Financial company 2.4 (1.8) 1 2 10 74
1 Shipping company 2.7 (2.4) 1 2 11 146
1 IPO company 2.2 (1.5) 1 2 8 219
2 Manufacturing company 2.5 (2.0) 1 2 11 420
2 Financial company 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 11 90
2 Shipping company 2.4 (2.1) 1 2 11 200
2 IPO company 1.9 (1.2) 1 1 8 257
3 Manufacturing company 2.2 (1.9) 1 1 11 471
3 Financial company 1.8 (1.2) 1 1 8 93
3 Shipping company 2.1 (1.9) 1 1 11 237
3 IPO company 1.8 (1.3) 1 1 8 291
4 Manufacturing company 1.9 (1.6) 1 1 11 516
4 Financial company 1.6 (1.0) 1 1 7 96
4 Shipping company 1.8 (1.4) 1 1 11 260
4 IPO company 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 8 299
5 Manufacturing company 1.6 (1.2) 1 1 11 548
5 Financial company 1.5 (1.3) 1 1 9 99
5 Shipping company 1.6 (1.1) 1 1 8 276
5 IPO company 1.5 (0.9) 1 1 6 314
10 Manufacturing company 1.1 (0.5) 1 1 9 593
10 Financial company 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 4 105
10 Shipping company 1.1 (0.4) 1 1 5 310
10 IPO company 1.0 (0.2) 1 1 4 350
The table shows ﬁrmtype related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms
and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All
Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).
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4.2.6 Ownership duration grouped by depreciation over long term assets
Table 4.61 Average ownership duration by level of depreciation over long term assets. Sample (1)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 6.7 5.8 6.7 6.1 5.8 3.9
2 4.0 3.7 4.7 4.2 3.2 4.2
3 3.6 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.1 2.8
4 3.9 4.1 5.4 5.1 4.2 4.2
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 3.4 2.9 3.0 3.7 3.1 3.6
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 6.1 4.3 3.8 2.6 2.7 1.8
2 5.8 4.3 3.4 3.2 2.8 2.1
3 7.1 3.6 3.0 2.2 2.0 1.7
4 5.8 3.8 3.0 2.1 2.3 1.5
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 4.9 2.7 2.5 2.8 1.9 1.7
Duration: Maintain Rank
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 6.1 5.8 6.1 5.1 6.2 4.2
2 5.8 4.6 5.3 5.2 3.8 4.2
3 7.1 5.1 5.2 3.3 3.5 3.5
4 5.8 4.7 5.2 4.4 3.8 4.8
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 4.9 3.0 3.3 4.0 3.4 3.9
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 8.5 8.2 7.8 5.8 6.2 1.2
2 6.8 6.8 6.3 5.7 3.8 1.6
3 7.9 6.8 6.9 4.1 3.5 1.3
4 7.8 6.2 6.2 5.2 3.8 2.3
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 6.3 4.0 4.2 4.6 3.4 1.5
Each table shows ownership duration (using each of the four owner-speciﬁc duration deﬁnitions) across the ﬁve top owner ranks.
A ﬁrm is classiﬁed into ﬁve groups based on its level of depreciation over long term assets.
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Table 4.62 Average ownership duration by level of depreciation over long term assets. Sample (2)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 3.0 2.6 2.9 2.2 2.2 1.6
2 2.4 2.0 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.7
3 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.4
4 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.6
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 2.9 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.1
2 3.1 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.2
3 3.5 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1
4 2.5 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 2.3 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.1
Duration: Maintain Rank
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.1 2.1 1.7
2 3.1 2.2 2.3 2.2 1.8 1.8
3 3.5 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.5
4 2.5 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.7 1.7
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.7
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 4.3 3.8 3.5 2.4 2.1 1.0
2 4.1 3.4 3.1 2.5 1.8 1.1
3 3.9 3.1 2.7 2.0 1.7 1.0
4 3.7 3.0 2.9 2.1 1.7 1.2
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 3.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.5 1.1
Each table shows ownership duration (using each of the four owner-speciﬁc duration deﬁnitions) across the ﬁve top owner ranks.
A ﬁrm is classiﬁed into ﬁve groups based on its level of depreciation over long term assets.
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Table 4.63 Average ownership duration by level of depreciation over long term assets. Sample (3)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.2
2 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.6
3 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.1
4 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 2.1 2.1 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.7
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 3.1 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.3
2 4.1 3.0 2.4 2.2 1.8 1.5
3 3.4 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.4
4 3.7 2.6 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.2
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 3.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3
Duration: Maintain Rank
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.9 2.4
2 4.1 3.1 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.9
3 3.4 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.2
4 3.7 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 3.1 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.0 1.9
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 4.2 3.9 3.6 2.9 2.9 1.3
2 4.7 4.2 3.9 3.5 2.9 1.4
3 4.0 3.3 3.3 2.6 2.2 1.2
4 4.3 3.6 3.5 3.3 2.9 1.4
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.0 1.2
Each table shows ownership duration (using each of the four owner-speciﬁc duration deﬁnitions) across the ﬁve top owner ranks.
A ﬁrm is classiﬁed into ﬁve groups based on its level of depreciation over long term assets.
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Table 4.64 Average ownership duration by level of depreciation over long term assets. Sample (4)
Duration: Maintain Stake
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.3
2 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.5
3 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4
4 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.4
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
2 2.5 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1
3 2.2 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
4 2.2 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 2.0 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1
Duration: Maintain Rank
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4
2 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.6
3 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4
4 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Rank
Group 1 2 3 4 5 10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets) 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.1
2 2.9 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.1
3 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.1
4 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.1
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets) 2.6 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.0
Each table shows ownership duration (using each of the four owner-speciﬁc duration deﬁnitions) across the ﬁve top owner ranks.
A ﬁrm is classiﬁed into ﬁve groups based on its level of depreciation over long term assets.
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4.2.7 Correlation between the ownership duration measures
Table 4.65 Correlations among duration deﬁnitions in sample (1)
Panel A: Correlations
Duration: Maintain Stake Duration: Keep Same Rank Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.54
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.54 1.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.43 0.77 0.77
Panel B: Rank Correlations
Duration: Maintain Stake Duration: Keep Same Rank Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.60
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.60 1.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.47 0.73 0.73
The table shows pairwise correlation coeﬃcients among the four ownership duration deﬁnitions Keep Same Rank, Maintain Rank,
Stay Among 5 Largest, and Maintain Stake. We only consider the largest owner. Notice that for this owner, the deﬁnitions Keep
Same Rank and Maintain Rank are equivalent.
Table 4.66 Correlations among duration deﬁnitions in sample (2)
Panel A: Correlations
Duration: Maintain Stake Duration: Keep Same Rank Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.53
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.53 1.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.33 0.58 0.58
Panel B: Rank Correlations
Duration: Maintain Stake Duration: Keep Same Rank Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.63
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.63 1.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.41 0.55 0.55
The table shows pairwise correlation coeﬃcients among the four ownership duration deﬁnitions Keep Same Rank, Maintain Rank,
Stay Among 5 Largest, and Maintain Stake. We only consider the largest owner. Notice that for this owner, the deﬁnitions Keep
Same Rank and Maintain Rank are equivalent.
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Table 4.67 Correlations among duration deﬁnitions in sample (3)
Panel A: Correlations
Duration: Maintain Stake Duration: Keep Same Rank Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.67
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.67 1.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.64 0.87 0.87
Panel B: Rank Correlations
Duration: Maintain Stake Duration: Keep Same Rank Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.75
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.75 1.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.75 0.90 0.90
The table shows pairwise correlation coeﬃcients among the four ownership duration deﬁnitions Keep Same Rank, Maintain Rank,
Stay Among 5 Largest, and Maintain Stake. We only consider the largest owner. Notice that for this owner, the deﬁnitions Keep
Same Rank and Maintain Rank are equivalent.
Table 4.68 Correlations among duration deﬁnitions in sample (4)
Panel A: Correlations
Duration: Maintain Stake Duration: Keep Same Rank Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.62
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.62 1.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.56 0.75 0.75
Panel B: Rank Correlations
Duration: Maintain Stake Duration: Keep Same Rank Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.73
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.73 1.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.71 0.82 0.82
The table shows pairwise correlation coeﬃcients among the four ownership duration deﬁnitions Keep Same Rank, Maintain Rank,
Stay Among 5 Largest, and Maintain Stake. We only consider the largest owner. Notice that for this owner, the deﬁnitions Keep
Same Rank and Maintain Rank are equivalent.
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4.2.8 Ownership duration split into two subperiods
This section splits the full sample period into the two equally long sub-periods 19891994 and 19941999.
Within each subperiod, we show the descriptive analysis using the ungrouped sample. We do not show
data for subperiods grouped by type etc.
Table 4.69 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Maintain Stake.
Subperiod 19891994.
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.68 (1.6) 1 2 6 102
2 2.47 (1.3) 1 2 6 102
3 2.44 (1.4) 1 2 6 102
4 2.62 (1.4) 1 2 6 102
5 2.45 (1.4) 1 2 6 102
10 2.30 (1.3) 1 2 6 102
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 1.87 (1.3) 1 1 6 228
2 1.60 (1.0) 1 1 6 320
3 1.59 (1.0) 1 1 6 358
4 1.57 (1.1) 1 1 6 385
5 1.53 (1.0) 1 1 6 396
10 1.38 (0.9) 1 1 6 450
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.11 (1.4) 1 2 6 201
2 2.01 (1.2) 1 2 6 201
3 1.99 (1.2) 1 2 6 201
4 2.01 (1.3) 1 2 6 201
5 1.99 (1.2) 1 2 6 201
10 1.86 (1.1) 1 2 6 201
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 1.64 (1.1) 1 1 6 398
2 1.50 (0.9) 1 1 6 509
3 1.48 (0.9) 1 1 6 562
4 1.45 (0.9) 1 1 6 597
5 1.44 (0.9) 1 1 6 611
10 1.32 (0.8) 1 1 6 673
The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration deﬁnitions and sample deﬁnitions. Duration:
Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The sample of Oslo Stock
Exchange ﬁrms and investors underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All
Owners), (3):(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 19891994.
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Table 4.70 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Maintain Stake.
Subperiod 19941999.
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.97 (1.8) 1 2 6 124
2 2.94 (1.6) 1 2 6 124
3 2.97 (1.6) 1 2 6 124
4 2.79 (1.4) 1 3 6 124
5 2.88 (1.4) 1 3 6 124
10 2.73 (1.6) 1 2 6 124
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 1.88 (1.5) 1 1 6 312
2 1.80 (1.3) 1 1 6 398
3 1.69 (1.2) 1 1 6 470
4 1.61 (1.1) 1 1 6 504
5 1.66 (1.1) 1 1 6 551
10 1.49 (1.0) 1 1 6 586
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.29 (1.5) 1 2 6 256
2 2.24 (1.4) 1 2 6 255
3 2.22 (1.4) 1 2 6 255
4 2.20 (1.3) 1 2 6 254
5 2.23 (1.3) 1 2 6 254
10 2.05 (1.4) 1 2 6 254
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 1.67 (1.2) 1 1 6 545
2 1.58 (1.1) 1 1 6 687
3 1.52 (1.0) 1 1 6 778
4 1.49 (1.0) 1 1 6 820
5 1.51 (1.0) 1 1 6 881
10 1.37 (0.9) 1 1 6 945
The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration deﬁnitions and sample deﬁnitions. Duration:
Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The sample of Oslo Stock
Exchange ﬁrms and investors underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All
Owners), (3):(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 19941999.
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Table 4.71 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Keep Same Rank.
Subperiod 19891994.
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 3.36 (1.7) 1 3 6 102
2 2.51 (1.3) 1 2 6 102
3 2.10 (1.1) 1 2 6 102
4 1.75 (0.8) 1 2 4 102
5 1.76 (0.9) 1 2 6 102
10 1.33 (0.5) 1 1 3 102
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.21 (1.6) 1 2 6 228
2 1.55 (1.0) 1 1 6 320
3 1.36 (0.8) 1 1 6 358
4 1.24 (0.6) 1 1 4 385
5 1.22 (0.6) 1 1 6 396
10 1.08 (0.3) 1 1 3 450
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.54 (1.6) 1 2 6 201
2 2.00 (1.2) 1 2 6 201
3 1.73 (1.0) 1 1 6 201
4 1.50 (0.7) 1 1 4 201
5 1.50 (0.8) 1 1 6 201
10 1.25 (0.5) 1 1 3 201
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 1.87 (1.3) 1 1 6 398
2 1.45 (0.9) 1 1 6 509
3 1.29 (0.7) 1 1 6 562
4 1.20 (0.5) 1 1 4 597
5 1.18 (0.5) 1 1 6 611
10 1.08 (0.3) 1 1 3 673
The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration deﬁnitions and sample deﬁnitions. Duration:
Keep Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and
investors underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):(All
Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 19891994.
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Table 4.72 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Keep Same Rank.
Subperiod 19941999.
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 3.67 (1.6) 1 3 6 124
2 2.69 (1.4) 1 2 6 124
3 2.20 (1.3) 1 2 6 124
4 1.90 (1.0) 1 2 6 124
5 1.72 (0.9) 1 2 5 124
10 1.50 (0.8) 1 1 5 124
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.17 (1.6) 1 1 6 312
2 1.62 (1.1) 1 1 6 398
3 1.36 (0.8) 1 1 6 470
4 1.27 (0.6) 1 1 6 504
5 1.18 (0.5) 1 1 5 551
10 1.12 (0.4) 1 1 5 586
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.88 (1.5) 1 3 6 256
2 2.14 (1.2) 1 2 6 255
3 1.84 (1.1) 1 2 6 255
4 1.65 (0.9) 1 1 6 254
5 1.52 (0.8) 1 1 5 254
10 1.31 (0.7) 1 1 5 254
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 1.96 (1.4) 1 1 6 545
2 1.48 (0.9) 1 1 6 687
3 1.30 (0.7) 1 1 6 778
4 1.23 (0.6) 1 1 6 820
5 1.16 (0.5) 1 1 5 881
10 1.09 (0.4) 1 1 5 945
The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration deﬁnitions and sample deﬁnitions. Duration:
Keep Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and
investors underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):(All
Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 19941999.
101
Table 4.73 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Maintain Rank.
Subperiod 19891994.
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 3.36 (1.7) 1 3 6 102
2 2.81 (1.4) 1 2 6 102
3 2.75 (1.4) 1 2 6 102
4 2.71 (1.3) 1 3 6 102
5 2.59 (1.4) 1 2 6 102
10 2.48 (1.3) 1 2 6 102
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.21 (1.6) 1 2 6 228
2 1.73 (1.2) 1 1 6 320
3 1.66 (1.1) 1 1 6 358
4 1.62 (1.1) 1 1 6 385
5 1.53 (1.0) 1 1 6 396
10 1.45 (0.9) 1 1 6 450
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.54 (1.6) 1 2 6 201
2 2.19 (1.3) 1 2 6 201
3 2.15 (1.3) 1 2 6 201
4 2.09 (1.2) 1 2 6 201
5 2.08 (1.2) 1 2 6 201
10 2.00 (1.1) 1 2 6 201
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 1.87 (1.3) 1 1 6 398
2 1.58 (1.0) 1 1 6 509
3 1.52 (1.0) 1 1 6 562
4 1.49 (0.9) 1 1 6 597
5 1.45 (0.9) 1 1 6 611
10 1.39 (0.8) 1 1 6 673
The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration deﬁnitions and sample deﬁnitions. Duration:
Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and
investors underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):(All
Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 19891994.
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Table 4.74 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Maintain Rank.
Subperiod 19941999.
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 3.67 (1.6) 1 3 6 124
2 3.21 (1.5) 1 3 6 124
3 2.97 (1.5) 1 2 6 124
4 2.88 (1.3) 1 3 6 124
5 2.90 (1.4) 1 3 6 124
10 2.99 (1.6) 1 3 6 124
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.17 (1.6) 1 1 6 312
2 1.88 (1.3) 1 1 6 398
3 1.69 (1.2) 1 1 6 470
4 1.61 (1.1) 1 1 6 504
5 1.62 (1.1) 1 1 6 551
10 1.58 (1.1) 1 1 6 586
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.88 (1.5) 1 3 6 256
2 2.47 (1.4) 1 2 6 255
3 2.33 (1.4) 1 2 6 255
4 2.27 (1.3) 1 2 6 254
5 2.24 (1.3) 1 2 6 254
10 2.24 (1.4) 1 2 6 254
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 1.96 (1.4) 1 1 6 545
2 1.67 (1.1) 1 1 6 687
3 1.56 (1.0) 1 1 6 778
4 1.51 (1.0) 1 1 6 820
5 1.49 (0.9) 1 1 6 881
10 1.45 (1.0) 1 1 6 945
The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration deﬁnitions and sample deﬁnitions. Duration:
Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and
investors underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):(All
Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 19941999.
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Table 4.75 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Stay among 5
Largest. Subperiod 19891994.
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 3.86 (1.6) 1 4 6 102
2 3.50 (1.5) 1 3 6 102
3 3.28 (1.5) 1 3 6 102
4 3.02 (1.4) 1 3 6 102
5 2.59 (1.4) 1 2 6 102
10 1.23 (0.7) 1 1 4 102
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.68 (1.7) 1 2 6 228
2 2.16 (1.4) 1 2 6 320
3 2.02 (1.3) 1 2 6 358
4 1.80 (1.1) 1 1 6 385
5 1.53 (1.0) 1 1 6 396
10 1.05 (0.3) 1 1 4 450
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.93 (1.7) 1 3 6 201
2 2.70 (1.6) 1 2 6 201
3 2.55 (1.5) 1 2 6 201
4 2.32 (1.3) 1 2 6 201
5 2.08 (1.2) 1 2 6 201
10 1.15 (0.5) 1 1 4 201
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.22 (1.5) 1 2 6 398
2 1.94 (1.3) 1 2 6 509
3 1.82 (1.2) 1 1 6 562
4 1.65 (1.0) 1 1 6 597
5 1.45 (0.9) 1 1 6 611
10 1.05 (0.3) 1 1 4 673
The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration deﬁnitions and sample deﬁnitions. Duration:
Stay among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank ﬁve. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange
ﬁrms and investors underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners),
(3):(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 19891994.
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Table 4.76 Describing ownership duration for the ﬁrm's largest owners. Duration: Stay among 5
Largest. Subperiod 19941999.
Sample (1)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 4.32 (1.5) 1 4 6 124
2 3.93 (1.5) 1 4 6 124
3 3.71 (1.6) 1 3 6 124
4 3.35 (1.4) 1 3 6 124
5 2.90 (1.4) 1 3 6 124
10 1.40 (0.9) 1 1 6 124
Sample (2)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.68 (1.8) 1 2 6 312
2 2.39 (1.5) 1 2 6 398
3 2.07 (1.5) 1 2 6 470
4 1.82 (1.2) 1 1 6 504
5 1.62 (1.1) 1 1 6 551
10 1.09 (0.5) 1 1 6 586
Sample (3)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 3.35 (1.6) 1 3 6 256
2 3.01 (1.5) 1 3 6 255
3 2.83 (1.6) 1 2 6 255
4 2.57 (1.4) 1 2 6 254
5 2.24 (1.3) 1 2 6 254
10 1.26 (0.7) 1 1 6 254
Sample (4)
Owner rank mean (std) min med max n
1 2.36 (1.5) 1 2 6 545
2 2.08 (1.4) 1 2 6 687
3 1.85 (1.3) 1 1 6 778
4 1.66 (1.1) 1 1 6 820
5 1.49 (0.9) 1 1 6 881
10 1.07 (0.4) 1 1 6 945
The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration deﬁnitions and sample deﬁnitions. Duration:
Stay among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank ﬁve. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange
ﬁrms and investors underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners),
(3):(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 19941999.
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4.3 Describing ownership duration allowing for stake reduction
The stake-based deﬁnitions of ownership duration (deﬁnitions 1 and 5) in chapter 2 count the number
of years until the owner reduces the stake. Thus, any stake reduction below the initial level counts
as a termination, even when the reduction involves as few as one hundred shares. The purpose of the
calculations in this section is to explore the empirical restrictiveness of this deﬁnition by using ownership
duration measures which allow for stake reduction. We do this by counting the number of years until
the stake is reduced by 10%, 20%, and so on.
Table 4.77 Ownership duration until stake is reduced by x percent
Sample (1)
Average number of years before stake reduced by
Initial rank 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 99%
1 4.7 (4) 5.9 (5) 6.8 (7) 7.3 (7) 7.6 (7) 7.6 (7)
2 4.5 (4) 5.4 (5) 6.0 (6) 6.7 (6) 6.8 (6) 6.8 (6)
3 4.9 (4) 5.9 (5) 6.5 (6) 7.0 (7) 7.2 (7) 7.2 (7)
4 4.9 (4) 5.5 (5) 6.0 (6) 6.3 (6) 6.5 (6) 6.5 (6)
5 4.3 (4) 5.4 (5) 5.8 (5) 6.1 (6) 6.3 (6) 6.3 (6)
10 4.1 (3) 4.4 (4) 4.5 (4) 4.5 (4) 4.5 (4) 4.5 (4)
Sample (2)
Average number of years before stake reduced by
Initial rank 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 99%
1 2.3 (1) 2.9 (2) 3.3 (2) 3.6 (2) 3.8 (3) 3.9 (3)
2 2.1 (1) 2.4 (2) 2.7 (2) 3.0 (2) 3.1 (2) 3.2 (2)
3 2.1 (1) 2.5 (2) 2.8 (2) 3.0 (2) 3.1 (2) 3.1 (2)
4 2.0 (1) 2.3 (2) 2.5 (2) 2.7 (2) 2.8 (2) 2.8 (2)
5 1.9 (1) 2.3 (1) 2.5 (2) 2.6 (2) 2.7 (2) 2.7 (2)
10 1.7 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1)
Sample (3)
Average number of years before stake reduced by
Initial rank 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 99%
1 3.1 (2) 3.9 (3) 4.5 (4) 4.8 (4) 5.1 (4) 5.2 (4)
2 3.2 (3) 3.8 (3) 4.2 (3) 4.5 (4) 4.7 (4) 4.8 (4)
3 3.1 (2) 3.8 (3) 4.2 (3) 4.5 (4) 4.8 (4) 4.8 (4)
4 3.2 (3) 3.7 (3) 4.0 (4) 4.3 (4) 4.4 (4) 4.4 (4)
5 3.0 (2) 3.6 (3) 3.9 (3) 4.1 (4) 4.2 (4) 4.2 (4)
10 2.7 (2) 3.0 (2) 3.0 (2) 3.0 (2) 3.0 (2) 3.0 (2)
Sample (4)
Average number of years before stake reduced by
Initial rank 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 99%
1 1.9 (1) 2.3 (2) 2.6 (2) 2.9 (2) 3.0 (2) 3.1 (2)
2 1.8 (1) 2.2 (1) 2.4 (2) 2.6 (2) 2.7 (2) 2.8 (2)
3 1.8 (1) 2.1 (1) 2.3 (2) 2.5 (2) 2.6 (2) 2.6 (2)
4 1.7 (1) 2.0 (1) 2.2 (2) 2.3 (2) 2.4 (2) 2.4 (2)
5 1.7 (1) 1.9 (1) 2.1 (1) 2.2 (2) 2.3 (2) 2.3 (2)
10 1.5 (1) 1.6 (1) 1.6 (1) 1.6 (1) 1.6 (1) 1.6 (1)
For each owner with a given initial rank we count the number of years until the stake has been reduced by 0% (corresponding to
the duration measure Maintain Stake), 10%, 20%, 40%, 60%, and 99%. The table shows the mean (median) of these numbers.
The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). The sample
period is 19891999.
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Table 4.78 Duration of ownership stake duration allowing for stake reduction
Sample (1)
Average number of years before stake reduced by
Initial ownership fraction 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 99%
1-5% 2.2 (1) 2.6 (1) 2.8 (1) 3.0 (1) 3.1 (1) 3.2 (1)
5-10% 2.8 (1) 3.2 (1) 3.5 (1) 3.7 (1) 3.8 (1) 3.9 (1)
10-20% 3.5 (1) 3.8 (1) 4.1 (1) 4.4 (1) 4.4 (1) 4.4 (1)
20-30% 2.9 (1) 3.8 (1) 4.9 (1) 4.9 (1) 4.9 (1) 4.9 (1)
30-40% 4.0 (1) 4.0 (1) 4.0 (1) 4.0 (1) 4.0 (1) 4.0 (1)
40-50% 3.4 (1) 3.5 (1) 3.5 (1) 3.5 (1) 4.0 (1) 4.0 (1)
50-100% 2.9 (1) 2.9 (1) 2.9 (1) 2.9 (1) 2.9 (1) 2.9 (1)
Sample (2)
Average number of years before stake reduced by
Initial ownership fraction 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 99%
1-5% 2.2 (1) 2.6 (1) 2.8 (1) 3.0 (1) 3.1 (1) 3.2 (1)
5-10% 2.8 (1) 3.2 (1) 3.5 (1) 3.7 (1) 3.8 (1) 3.9 (1)
10-20% 3.5 (1) 3.8 (1) 4.1 (1) 4.4 (1) 4.4 (1) 4.4 (1)
20-30% 2.9 (1) 3.8 (1) 4.9 (1) 4.9 (1) 4.9 (1) 4.9 (1)
30-40% 4.0 (1) 4.0 (1) 4.0 (1) 4.0 (1) 4.0 (1) 4.0 (1)
40-50% 3.4 (1) 3.5 (1) 3.5 (1) 3.5 (1) 4.0 (1) 4.0 (1)
50-100% 2.9 (1) 2.9 (1) 2.9 (1) 2.9 (1) 2.9 (1) 2.9 (1)
Sample (3)
Average number of years before stake reduced by
Initial ownership fraction 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 99%
1-5% 1.4 (1) 1.5 (1) 1.5 (1) 1.6 (1) 1.6 (1) 1.6 (1)
5-10% 1.6 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.9 (1) 1.9 (1) 1.9 (1)
10-20% 1.7 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.9 (1) 2.0 (1) 2.0 (1) 2.0 (1)
20-30% 1.7 (1) 2.0 (1) 2.3 (1) 2.3 (1) 2.3 (1) 2.3 (1)
30-40% 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1)
40-50% 2.3 (1) 2.3 (1) 2.3 (1) 2.3 (1) 2.6 (1) 2.6 (1)
50-100% 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1)
Sample (4)
Average number of years before stake reduced by
Initial ownership fraction 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 99%
1-5% 1.4 (1) 1.5 (1) 1.5 (1) 1.6 (1) 1.6 (1) 1.6 (1)
5-10% 1.6 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.9 (1) 1.9 (1) 1.9 (1)
10-20% 1.7 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.9 (1) 2.0 (1) 2.0 (1) 2.0 (1)
20-30% 1.7 (1) 2.0 (1) 2.3 (1) 2.3 (1) 2.3 (1) 2.3 (1)
30-40% 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1)
40-50% 2.3 (1) 2.3 (1) 2.3 (1) 2.3 (1) 2.6 (1) 2.6 (1)
50-100% 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1)
For each owner with a given initial rank we count the number of years until the stake has been reduced by 0% (corresponding to
the duration measure Maintain Stake), 10%, 20%, 40%, 60% and 99%. The table shows the mean (median) of these numbers. The
sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2):




Determinants of ownership duration
5.1 Using duration analysis to describe duration
This chapter uses a statistical technique called duration analysis, which is described and summarized in
Kiefer (1988) and van den Berg (2001). The important added beneﬁt of this type of analysis is that it
addresses the truncation problem, which is caused by the fact that we only observe 11 years of data over
the period 1989-1999. An owner present in the ﬁnal sample year (1999) may remain an owner in the ﬁrm
for many years to come. Correspondingly, owners in the ﬁrst sample year (1989) may have been owners
for several years already. Duration analysis is a technique that handles the resulting underestimation
problem.
The primary focus of duration analysis is the cumulative distribution function F (),
F (t) = P (T < t),
which is the probability that the random variable T (the duration) is less than some value t. Useful
transforms of this function is the survivor function S()
S(t) = 1− F (t) = P (T ≥ t)




where f(t) = ddtF (t), the distribution function corresponding to the cumulative distribution F . The
hazard rate should be thought of as expressing the conditional probability of the duration ending at
the given date. If the hazard function is increasing, the duration is said to have positive duration
dependence. Conversely, if the hazard function is decreasing, the duration is said to have negative
duration dependence.
For estimation purposes, we consider the parametric Weibull distribution
λ(t) = γαtα−1
and a nonparametric Cox formulation.
Estimation of hazard models is carried out by specifying a set of variables which aﬀect the hazard
function
λ(t, x, β, λ0) = φ(x, β)λ0(t)
where λ0(t) is called the baseline hazard. The estimates should be interpreted as the hazard function
for the mean individual. A value of β below (above) one means that an increase in the corresponding x
variable lowers (increases) the hazard function, i.e., the probability of exit, and hence increases (decreases)
expected duration.
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5.1.1 Duration: Maintain Stake

































































0 1000 2000 3000 4000
analysis time
Smoothed hazard estimate
Adjusted for right truncation Not adjusted for right truncation
The ﬁgures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on
the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any
given ﬁrm. Duration: Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake.
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firmsize = 1 firmsize = 2
firmsize = 3 firmsize = 4
firmsize = 5
Kaplan−Meier survival estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1
contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms, and 5 the largest. Duration: Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner
lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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firmsize = 1 firmsize = 2
firmsize = 3 firmsize = 4
firmsize = 5
Smoothed hazard estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner types: 1State owner, 2Foreign owner, 3Family (individual) owner, 4Financial owner, 5Nonﬁnancial (industrial)
owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firm Types: 1Industrial ﬁrm, 2Shipping ﬁrm,
3Financial ﬁrm, 4Small/young ﬁrm. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms,
and 5 the largest. Duration: Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial
stake. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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analysis time
Smoothed hazard estimate
Adjusted for right truncation Not adjusted for right truncation
The ﬁgures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on
the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any
given ﬁrm. Duration: Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake.
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Kaplan−Meier survival estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1
contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms, and 5 the largest. Duration: Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner
lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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Smoothed hazard estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner types: 1State owner, 2Foreign owner, 3Family (individual) owner, 4Financial owner, 5Nonﬁnancial (industrial)
owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firm Types: 1Industrial ﬁrm, 2Shipping ﬁrm,
3Financial ﬁrm, 4Small/young ﬁrm. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms,
and 5 the largest. Duration: Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial
stake. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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Table 5.1 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.423 (0.01) 0.424 (0.00)
Foreign owner 3.249 (0.00) 2.726 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.395 (0.04) 1.628 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.506 (0.00) 1.490 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.395 (0.00) 2.072 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 1.016 (0.31) 0.968 (0.00)
n 1764 4576
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values
in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration:
Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed
for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
Table 5.2 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.366 (0.00) 0.352 (0.00)
Foreign owner 2.859 (0.00) 2.284 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.308 (0.10) 1.470 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.327 (0.03) 1.276 (0.01)
Financial owner 2.292 (0.00) 1.812 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.994 (0.69) 0.953 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.971 (0.79) 0.842 (0.01)
n 1674 4366
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values
in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration:
Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed
for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
Table 5.3 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.355 (0.00) 0.341 (0.00)
Foreign owner 2.867 (0.00) 2.251 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.303 (0.10) 1.430 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.380 (0.01) 1.255 (0.01)
Financial owner 2.344 (0.00) 1.807 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 1.018 (0.34) 0.952 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.585 (0.04) 1.121 (0.38)
n 1658 4264
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values
in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration:
Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed
for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.4 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Owner rank 1 0.803 (0.02) 0.788 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.878 (0.12) 0.859 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 0.876 (0.10) 0.929 (0.14)
Owner rank 4 0.960 (0.59) 0.957 (0.36)
Foreign owner 3.273 (0.00) 2.710 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.403 (0.03) 1.641 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.527 (0.00) 1.495 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.441 (0.00) 2.101 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 1.015 (0.34) 0.967 (0.00)
n 1764 4576
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values
in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration:
Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed
for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
Table 5.5 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Owner rank 1 0.830 (0.06) 0.793 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.922 (0.34) 0.880 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.870 (0.08) 0.921 (0.10)
Owner rank 4 0.947 (0.49) 0.951 (0.31)
Foreign owner 2.880 (0.00) 2.284 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.327 (0.08) 1.499 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.335 (0.02) 1.286 (0.01)
Financial owner 2.348 (0.00) 1.862 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.995 (0.75) 0.954 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.969 (0.78) 0.831 (0.00)
n 1674 4366
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values
in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration:
Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed
for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.6 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Owner rank 1 0.820 (0.04) 0.797 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.921 (0.34) 0.885 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.870 (0.09) 0.928 (0.14)
Owner rank 4 0.945 (0.47) 0.964 (0.46)
Foreign owner 2.891 (0.00) 2.252 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.320 (0.09) 1.457 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.388 (0.01) 1.262 (0.01)
Financial owner 2.402 (0.00) 1.856 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 1.019 (0.30) 0.953 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.607 (0.03) 1.154 (0.27)
n 1658 4264
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values
in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration:
Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed
for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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5.1.2 Duration: Keep Same Rank
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analysis time
Smoothed hazard estimate
Adjusted for right truncation Not adjusted for right truncation
The ﬁgures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on
the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any
given ﬁrm. Duration: Keep Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank.
118





























0 1000 2000 3000 4000
analysis time
ownerrank = 1 ownerrank = 2
ownerrank = 3 ownerrank = 4
ownerrank = 5




























0 1000 2000 3000 4000
analysis time
firmsize = 1 firmsize = 2
firmsize = 3 firmsize = 4
firmsize = 5
Kaplan−Meier survival estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group
1 contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms, and 5 the largest. Duration: Keep Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an
owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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Smoothed hazard estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner types: 1State owner, 2Foreign owner, 3Family (individual) owner, 4Financial owner, 5Nonﬁnancial (industrial)
owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firm Types: 1Industrial ﬁrm, 2Shipping ﬁrm,
3Financial ﬁrm, 4Small/young ﬁrm. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms,
and 5 the largest. Duration: Keep Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is
performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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analysis time
Smoothed hazard estimate
Adjusted for right truncation Not adjusted for right truncation
The ﬁgures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on
the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any
given ﬁrm. Duration: Keep Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank.
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Kaplan−Meier survival estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group
1 contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms, and 5 the largest. Duration: Keep Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an
owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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Smoothed hazard estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner types: 1State owner, 2Foreign owner, 3Family (individual) owner, 4Financial owner, 5Nonﬁnancial (industrial)
owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firm Types: 1Industrial ﬁrm, 2Shipping ﬁrm,
3Financial ﬁrm, 4Small/young ﬁrm. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms,
and 5 the largest. Duration: Keep Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is
performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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Table 5.7 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.002 (0.00) 0.007 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.577 (0.00) 1.619 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.031 (0.83) 1.036 (0.71)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.054 (0.64) 1.083 (0.33)
Financial owner 1.402 (0.00) 1.395 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 1.020 (0.16) 0.986 (0.16)
n 1722 4537
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration: Keep
Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners
of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
Table 5.8 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.002 (0.00) 0.006 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.519 (0.00) 1.516 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.068 (0.66) 1.008 (0.94)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.036 (0.76) 1.036 (0.67)
Financial owner 1.463 (0.00) 1.368 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 1.003 (0.84) 0.972 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.835 (0.08) 0.894 (0.06)
n 1659 4373
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration: Keep
Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners
of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
Table 5.9 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.001 (0.00) 0.005 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.539 (0.00) 1.498 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.076 (0.62) 1.021 (0.83)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.033 (0.78) 1.008 (0.92)
Financial owner 1.486 (0.00) 1.369 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.997 (0.85) 0.959 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.752 (0.21) 0.637 (0.00)
n 1639 4269
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration: Keep
Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners
of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.10 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Owner rank 1 0.211 (0.00) 0.234 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.490 (0.00) 0.511 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 0.717 (0.00) 0.752 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.861 (0.04) 0.889 (0.01)
Foreign owner 1.609 (0.00) 1.615 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.053 (0.72) 1.051 (0.59)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.056 (0.63) 1.103 (0.23)
Financial owner 1.503 (0.00) 1.508 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 1.017 (0.25) 0.984 (0.10)
n 1722 4537
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration: Keep
Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners
of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
Table 5.11 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Owner rank 1 0.218 (0.00) 0.234 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.502 (0.00) 0.516 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 0.722 (0.00) 0.752 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.863 (0.05) 0.883 (0.01)
Foreign owner 1.523 (0.00) 1.542 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.100 (0.52) 1.038 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.017 (0.88) 1.074 (0.39)
Financial owner 1.496 (0.00) 1.482 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 1.009 (0.55) 0.978 (0.03)
Long term debt over total debt 0.770 (0.01) 0.833 (0.00)
n 1659 4373
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration: Keep
Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners
of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.12 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Owner rank 1 0.216 (0.00) 0.231 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.504 (0.00) 0.514 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 0.718 (0.00) 0.746 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.862 (0.05) 0.881 (0.01)
Foreign owner 1.541 (0.00) 1.510 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.094 (0.55) 1.038 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.024 (0.83) 1.040 (0.63)
Financial owner 1.543 (0.00) 1.477 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 1.017 (0.33) 0.970 (0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.098 (0.67) 0.811 (0.11)
n 1639 4269
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration: Keep
Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners
of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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5.1.3 Duration: Maintain Rank
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analysis time
Smoothed hazard estimate
Adjusted for right truncation Not adjusted for right truncation
The ﬁgures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on
the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any
given ﬁrm. Duration: Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank.
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Kaplan−Meier survival estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1
contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms, and 5 the largest. Duration: Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner
lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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Smoothed hazard estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner types: 1State owner, 2Foreign owner, 3Family (individual) owner, 4Financial owner, 5Nonﬁnancial (industrial)
owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firm Types: 1Industrial ﬁrm, 2Shipping ﬁrm,
3Financial ﬁrm, 4Small/young ﬁrm. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms,
and 5 the largest. Duration: Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is
performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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Smoothed hazard estimate
Adjusted for right truncation Not adjusted for right truncation
The ﬁgures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on
the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any
given ﬁrm. Duration: Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank.
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Kaplan−Meier survival estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1
contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms, and 5 the largest. Duration: Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner
lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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Smoothed hazard estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner types: 1State owner, 2Foreign owner, 3Family (individual) owner, 4Financial owner, 5Nonﬁnancial (industrial)
owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firm Types: 1Industrial ﬁrm, 2Shipping ﬁrm,
3Financial ﬁrm, 4Small/young ﬁrm. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms,
and 5 the largest. Duration: Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is
performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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Table 5.13 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.035 (0.00) 0.060 (0.00)
Foreign owner 2.871 (0.00) 2.730 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.683 (0.00) 1.540 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.550 (0.00) 1.583 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.204 (0.00) 2.088 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.978 (0.14) 0.947 (0.00)
n 1755 4621
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration:
Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest
owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
Table 5.14 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.026 (0.00) 0.045 (0.00)
Foreign owner 2.687 (0.00) 2.418 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.612 (0.00) 1.433 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.516 (0.00) 1.442 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.293 (0.00) 1.970 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.948 (0.00) 0.922 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.979 (0.85) 1.015 (0.81)
n 1664 4408
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration:
Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest
owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
Table 5.15 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.024 (0.00) 0.042 (0.00)
Foreign owner 2.678 (0.00) 2.388 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.645 (0.00) 1.419 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.511 (0.00) 1.409 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.302 (0.00) 1.947 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.950 (0.00) 0.914 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.894 (0.64) 0.712 (0.02)
n 1647 4310
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration:
Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest
owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.16 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Owner rank 1 0.584 (0.00) 0.569 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.788 (0.01) 0.779 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 0.902 (0.20) 0.912 (0.06)
Owner rank 4 0.952 (0.52) 0.947 (0.27)
Foreign owner 2.928 (0.00) 2.699 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.695 (0.00) 1.546 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.527 (0.00) 1.561 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.328 (0.00) 2.196 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.978 (0.14) 0.946 (0.00)
n 1755 4621
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration:
Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest
owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
Table 5.17 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Owner rank 1 0.580 (0.00) 0.559 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.813 (0.02) 0.791 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 0.885 (0.13) 0.906 (0.05)
Owner rank 4 0.920 (0.29) 0.928 (0.13)
Foreign owner 2.690 (0.00) 2.397 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.591 (0.00) 1.434 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.439 (0.00) 1.413 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.376 (0.00) 2.082 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.951 (0.00) 0.925 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.956 (0.69) 0.997 (0.96)
n 1664 4408
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration:
Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest
owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.18 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Owner rank 1 0.575 (0.00) 0.558 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.816 (0.02) 0.796 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 0.892 (0.16) 0.912 (0.07)
Owner rank 4 0.926 (0.33) 0.942 (0.23)
Foreign owner 2.678 (0.00) 2.364 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.618 (0.00) 1.411 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.444 (0.00) 1.377 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.397 (0.00) 2.055 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.959 (0.02) 0.919 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.045 (0.85) 0.793 (0.10)
n 1647 4310
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration:
Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest
owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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5.1.4 Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
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Adjusted for right truncation Not adjusted for right truncation
The ﬁgures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on
the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any
given ﬁrm. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank ﬁve.
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Kaplan−Meier survival estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1
contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms, and 5 the largest. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an
owner goes below rank ﬁve. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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Smoothed hazard estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner types: 1State owner, 2Foreign owner, 3Family (individual) owner, 4Financial owner, 5Nonﬁnancial (industrial)
owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firm Types: 1Industrial ﬁrm, 2Shipping ﬁrm,
3Financial ﬁrm, 4Small/young ﬁrm. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms,
and 5 the largest. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank ﬁve. The
analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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Adjusted for right truncation Not adjusted for right truncation
The ﬁgures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on
the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any
given ﬁrm. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank ﬁve.
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Kaplan−Meier survival estimates, by firmsize
By ﬁrm size
The ﬁgures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1
contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms, and 5 the largest. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an
owner goes below rank ﬁve. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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The ﬁgures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days.
Owner types: 1State owner, 2Foreign owner, 3Family (individual) owner, 4Financial owner, 5Nonﬁnancial (industrial)
owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the ﬁfth largest owner. Firm Types: 1Industrial ﬁrm, 2Shipping ﬁrm,
3Financial ﬁrm, 4Small/young ﬁrm. Firms are grouped into ﬁve size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest ﬁrms ﬁrms,
and 5 the largest. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank ﬁve. The
analysis is performed for the ﬁve largest owners of any given ﬁrm.
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Table 5.19 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.024 (0.00) 0.047 (0.00)
Foreign owner 3.456 (0.00) 3.084 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.855 (0.00) 1.589 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.676 (0.00) 1.685 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.307 (0.00) 2.162 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.947 (0.00) 0.926 (0.00)
n 1791 4712
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration: Stay
among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank ﬁve. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve
largest owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
Table 5.20 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.014 (0.00) 0.033 (0.00)
Foreign owner 3.291 (0.00) 2.766 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.766 (0.00) 1.491 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.681 (0.00) 1.566 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.471 (0.00) 2.087 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.912 (0.00) 0.898 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 1.084 (0.49) 1.069 (0.30)
n 1678 4462
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration: Stay
among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank ﬁve. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve
largest owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
Table 5.21 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Fraction owned 0.013 (0.00) 0.030 (0.00)
Foreign owner 3.260 (0.00) 2.695 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.790 (0.00) 1.448 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.677 (0.00) 1.521 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.463 (0.00) 2.036 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.915 (0.00) 0.892 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.949 (0.84) 0.718 (0.03)
n 1665 4374
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration: Stay
among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank ﬁve. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve
largest owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.22 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Owner rank 1 0.306 (0.00) 0.342 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.453 (0.00) 0.470 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 0.543 (0.00) 0.595 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.747 (0.00) 0.767 (0.00)
Foreign owner 3.462 (0.00) 3.034 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.821 (0.00) 1.577 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.700 (0.00) 1.700 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.356 (0.00) 2.186 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.950 (0.00) 0.929 (0.00)
n 1791 4712
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration: Stay
among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank ﬁve. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve
largest owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
Table 5.23 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Owner rank 1 0.306 (0.00) 0.343 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.455 (0.00) 0.472 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 0.535 (0.00) 0.590 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.720 (0.00) 0.755 (0.00)
Foreign owner 3.189 (0.00) 2.706 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.716 (0.00) 1.462 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.627 (0.00) 1.559 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.404 (0.00) 2.090 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.920 (0.00) 0.907 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.972 (0.81) 1.012 (0.85)
n 1678 4462
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration: Stay
among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank ﬁve. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve
largest owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.24 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
haz. ratio pval haz. ratio pval
Owner rank 1 0.304 (0.00) 0.342 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.455 (0.00) 0.472 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 0.537 (0.00) 0.594 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.721 (0.00) 0.765 (0.00)
Foreign owner 3.178 (0.00) 2.633 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.732 (0.00) 1.414 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 1.641 (0.00) 1.509 (0.00)
Financial owner 2.427 (0.00) 2.037 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.932 (0.00) 0.902 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.223 (0.41) 0.826 (0.20)
n 1665 4374
The table shows results from duration estimations where the coeﬃcients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in
parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal to one. Duration: Stay
among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank ﬁve. The analysis is performed for the ﬁve
largest owners of any given ﬁrm. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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5.2 Determinants of ownership duration: OLS models
Figure 5.25 illustrates how the regression functions in this section are estimated. Duration measures
are constructed using data for the whole period. We use the duration for each owner as the dependent
variable. Independent variables are mainly constructed as averages of data over the matching time period.
In addition, they may include properties of the particular owner which remains constant throughout the
period, such as owner type.
Figure 5.25 OLS Regression linking duration and determinants
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Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 7.377 (0.00) 4.745 (0.00) 2.542 (0.01) 3.250 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 0.231 (0.65) 0.382 (0.07) 0.067 (0.80) 0.320 (0.01)
Owner rank 2 0.064 (0.90) 0.023 (0.90) 0.000 (1.00) 0.080 (0.45)
Owner rank 3 0.586 (0.23) 0.347 (0.05) 0.135 (0.61) 0.117 (0.25)
Owner rank 4 0.714 (0.14) 0.140 (0.41) 0.141 (0.58) 0.026 (0.79)
Foreign owner −1.745 (0.00) −1.463 (0.00) −1.754 (0.00) −1.165 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner −0.922 (0.20) −0.414 (0.20) −1.325 (0.00) −0.634 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner −0.167 (0.75) −0.424 (0.07) −0.715 (0.03) −0.441 (0.00)
Financial owner −1.311 (0.03) −1.203 (0.00) −1.286 (0.00) −0.929 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) −0.127 (0.26) −0.101 (0.01) 0.137 (0.02) −0.030 (0.22)
Depreciation over long term assets −3.760 (0.04) −2.614 (0.00) −0.538 (0.55) −1.166 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.878 (0.00) 0.061 (0.45) 0.096 (0.41) −0.030 (0.52)
R¯2 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.06
n 262 1133 690 2311
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.016 (0.00) 2.228 (0.00) 1.575 (0.05) 1.626 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 3.733 (0.00) 2.002 (0.00) 2.011 (0.00) 1.494 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 1.481 (0.00) 0.661 (0.00) 0.873 (0.00) 0.571 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 1.011 (0.02) 0.348 (0.01) 0.457 (0.05) 0.268 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.384 (0.38) 0.157 (0.25) 0.181 (0.44) 0.112 (0.17)
Foreign owner −0.848 (0.11) −0.366 (0.05) −1.043 (0.00) −0.395 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner −0.262 (0.71) 0.128 (0.62) −0.920 (0.01) 0.003 (0.98)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner −0.100 (0.84) 0.143 (0.45) −0.560 (0.07) 0.001 (1.00)
Financial owner −0.643 (0.24) −0.327 (0.09) −0.923 (0.01) −0.354 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) −0.110 (0.23) −0.036 (0.26) 0.108 (0.03) −0.002 (0.92)
Depreciation over long term assets −5.950 (0.02) −2.139 (0.00) −1.411 (0.04) −0.707 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.441 (0.03) 0.069 (0.26) −0.014 (0.90) −0.001 (0.98)
R¯2 0.34 0.18 0.19 0.16
n 250 1112 673 2266
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 3.404 (0.06) 3.049 (0.00) 1.432 (0.13) 2.139 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 1.584 (0.00) 1.208 (0.00) 0.728 (0.00) 0.850 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.355 (0.48) 0.329 (0.08) 0.108 (0.67) 0.287 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 0.906 (0.08) 0.411 (0.03) 0.106 (0.68) 0.193 (0.07)
Owner rank 4 0.341 (0.50) 0.198 (0.27) −0.026 (0.92) 0.085 (0.41)
Foreign owner −1.208 (0.05) −1.236 (0.00) −1.560 (0.00) −1.096 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.068 (0.93) −0.364 (0.28) −1.160 (0.00) −0.516 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.246 (0.65) −0.352 (0.15) −0.734 (0.02) −0.450 (0.00)
Financial owner −0.990 (0.10) −1.109 (0.00) −1.356 (0.00) −0.992 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.128 (0.23) 0.002 (0.96) 0.230 (0.00) 0.043 (0.09)
Depreciation over long term assets −3.565 (0.12) −2.333 (0.01) −1.613 (0.04) −0.843 (0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.820 (0.00) 0.103 (0.22) 0.067 (0.59) −0.004 (0.94)
R¯2 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.07
n 269 1156 759 2382
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.349 (0.42) 2.544 (0.00) 0.069 (0.95) 1.635 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 3.303 (0.00) 2.389 (0.00) 1.394 (0.00) 1.519 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 2.358 (0.00) 1.414 (0.00) 0.985 (0.00) 1.020 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 2.111 (0.00) 1.233 (0.00) 0.778 (0.00) 0.742 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.914 (0.04) 0.596 (0.00) 0.299 (0.27) 0.377 (0.00)
Foreign owner −1.012 (0.08) −1.477 (0.00) −1.664 (0.00) −1.361 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.271 (0.69) −0.096 (0.79) −1.309 (0.00) −0.593 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner −0.010 (0.98) −0.360 (0.18) −0.776 (0.03) −0.564 (0.00)
Financial owner −0.628 (0.26) −1.051 (0.00) −1.251 (0.00) −1.066 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.271 (0.01) 0.047 (0.30) 0.330 (0.00) 0.091 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets −4.436 (0.04) −3.414 (0.00) −1.931 (0.04) −1.319 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 1.004 (0.00) 0.144 (0.15) 0.073 (0.58) −0.001 (0.99)
R¯2 0.31 0.16 0.13 0.11
n 280 1196 817 2511
Each panel table summarizes four multivariate OLS regressions relating ownership duration to potential determinants and controls
across the four samples. Owner Rank i is a dummy variable which is 1 for owner rank i and zero otherwise, and the owner has
rank 5 when all owner rank dummies are zero. The owner types are dummy variables. If all the owner type dummies are zero the
owner is the state. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving
Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All
Firms; All Owners). Probability values are speciﬁed in parentheses. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 7.377 (0.00) 4.745 (0.00) 2.542 (0.01) 3.250 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 0.231 (0.65) 0.382 (0.07) 0.067 (0.80) 0.320 (0.01)
Owner rank 2 0.064 (0.90) 0.023 (0.90) 0.000 (1.00) 0.080 (0.45)
Owner rank 3 0.586 (0.23) 0.347 (0.05) 0.135 (0.61) 0.117 (0.25)
Owner rank 4 0.714 (0.14) 0.140 (0.41) 0.141 (0.58) 0.026 (0.79)
Foreign owner −1.745 (0.00) −1.463 (0.00) −1.754 (0.00) −1.165 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner −0.922 (0.20) −0.414 (0.20) −1.325 (0.00) −0.634 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner −0.167 (0.75) −0.424 (0.07) −0.715 (0.03) −0.441 (0.00)
Financial owner −1.311 (0.03) −1.203 (0.00) −1.286 (0.00) −0.929 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) −0.127 (0.26) −0.101 (0.01) 0.137 (0.02) −0.030 (0.22)
Depreciation over long term assets −3.760 (0.04) −2.614 (0.00) −0.538 (0.55) −1.166 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.878 (0.00) 0.061 (0.45) 0.096 (0.41) −0.030 (0.52)
R¯2 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.06
n 262 1133 690 2311
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.016 (0.00) 2.228 (0.00) 1.575 (0.05) 1.626 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 3.733 (0.00) 2.002 (0.00) 2.011 (0.00) 1.494 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 1.481 (0.00) 0.661 (0.00) 0.873 (0.00) 0.571 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 1.011 (0.02) 0.348 (0.01) 0.457 (0.05) 0.268 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.384 (0.38) 0.157 (0.25) 0.181 (0.44) 0.112 (0.17)
Foreign owner −0.848 (0.11) −0.366 (0.05) −1.043 (0.00) −0.395 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner −0.262 (0.71) 0.128 (0.62) −0.920 (0.01) 0.003 (0.98)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner −0.100 (0.84) 0.143 (0.45) −0.560 (0.07) 0.001 (1.00)
Financial owner −0.643 (0.24) −0.327 (0.09) −0.923 (0.01) −0.354 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) −0.110 (0.23) −0.036 (0.26) 0.108 (0.03) −0.002 (0.92)
Depreciation over long term assets −5.950 (0.02) −2.139 (0.00) −1.411 (0.04) −0.707 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.441 (0.03) 0.069 (0.26) −0.014 (0.90) −0.001 (0.98)
R¯2 0.34 0.18 0.19 0.16
n 250 1112 673 2266
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 3.404 (0.06) 3.049 (0.00) 1.432 (0.13) 2.139 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 1.584 (0.00) 1.208 (0.00) 0.728 (0.00) 0.850 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.355 (0.48) 0.329 (0.08) 0.108 (0.67) 0.287 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 0.906 (0.08) 0.411 (0.03) 0.106 (0.68) 0.193 (0.07)
Owner rank 4 0.341 (0.50) 0.198 (0.27) −0.026 (0.92) 0.085 (0.41)
Foreign owner −1.208 (0.05) −1.236 (0.00) −1.560 (0.00) −1.096 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.068 (0.93) −0.364 (0.28) −1.160 (0.00) −0.516 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.246 (0.65) −0.352 (0.15) −0.734 (0.02) −0.450 (0.00)
Financial owner −0.990 (0.10) −1.109 (0.00) −1.356 (0.00) −0.992 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.128 (0.23) 0.002 (0.96) 0.230 (0.00) 0.043 (0.09)
Depreciation over long term assets −3.565 (0.12) −2.333 (0.01) −1.613 (0.04) −0.843 (0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.820 (0.00) 0.103 (0.22) 0.067 (0.59) −0.004 (0.94)
R¯2 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.07
n 269 1156 759 2382
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.349 (0.42) 2.544 (0.00) 0.069 (0.95) 1.635 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 3.303 (0.00) 2.389 (0.00) 1.394 (0.00) 1.519 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 2.358 (0.00) 1.414 (0.00) 0.985 (0.00) 1.020 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 2.111 (0.00) 1.233 (0.00) 0.778 (0.00) 0.742 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.914 (0.04) 0.596 (0.00) 0.299 (0.27) 0.377 (0.00)
Foreign owner −1.012 (0.08) −1.477 (0.00) −1.664 (0.00) −1.361 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.271 (0.69) −0.096 (0.79) −1.309 (0.00) −0.593 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner −0.010 (0.98) −0.360 (0.18) −0.776 (0.03) −0.564 (0.00)
Financial owner −0.628 (0.26) −1.051 (0.00) −1.251 (0.00) −1.066 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.271 (0.01) 0.047 (0.30) 0.330 (0.00) 0.091 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets −4.436 (0.04) −3.414 (0.00) −1.931 (0.04) −1.319 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 1.004 (0.00) 0.144 (0.15) 0.073 (0.58) −0.001 (0.99)
R¯2 0.31 0.16 0.13 0.11
n 280 1196 817 2511
Each panel table summarizes four multivariate OLS regressions relating ownership duration to potential determinants and controls
across the four samples. Owner Rank i is a dummy variable which is 1 for owner rank i and zero otherwise, and the owner has
rank 5 when all owner rank dummies are zero. The owner types are dummy variables. If all the owner type dummies are zero the
owner is the state. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving
Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All
Firms; All Owners). Probability values are speciﬁed in parentheses. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.27 Duration determinants: OLS regression. Including Debt Maturity and Earnings surprise
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.565 (0.00) 2.978 (0.00) 3.568 (0.00) 2.374 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 0.330 (0.52) 0.419 (0.05) −0.057 (0.81) 0.206 (0.06)
Owner rank 2 0.047 (0.92) 0.075 (0.68) −0.002 (0.99) 0.067 (0.49)
Owner rank 3 0.725 (0.15) 0.337 (0.06) 0.133 (0.57) 0.081 (0.39)
Owner rank 4 0.807 (0.10) 0.127 (0.45) 0.178 (0.45) 0.004 (0.96)
Foreign owner −1.869 (0.00) −1.510 (0.00) −1.564 (0.00) −1.094 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner −0.680 (0.33) −0.408 (0.19) −1.687 (0.00) −0.765 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner −0.113 (0.82) −0.257 (0.27) −0.821 (0.01) −0.420 (0.00)
Financial owner −1.227 (0.04) −1.185 (0.00) −1.342 (0.00) −0.890 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt −1.247 (0.07) −0.029 (0.91) 1.062 (0.00) 0.422 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.016 (0.95) −0.003 (0.97) −0.149 (0.18) −0.082 (0.06)
R¯2 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.05
n 270 1117 829 2565
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 3.009 (0.00) 1.388 (0.00) 2.120 (0.00) 1.434 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 3.410 (0.00) 2.078 (0.00) 2.039 (0.00) 1.397 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 1.406 (0.00) 0.677 (0.00) 0.863 (0.00) 0.507 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 0.801 (0.07) 0.380 (0.01) 0.482 (0.01) 0.264 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.304 (0.48) 0.154 (0.25) 0.184 (0.35) 0.099 (0.18)
Foreign owner −0.890 (0.09) −0.422 (0.03) −0.814 (0.00) −0.458 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner −0.180 (0.78) 0.111 (0.66) −0.798 (0.01) −0.189 (0.15)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner −0.053 (0.91) 0.196 (0.29) −0.451 (0.10) −0.089 (0.43)
Financial owner −0.706 (0.20) −0.336 (0.08) −0.781 (0.01) −0.400 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt −0.144 (0.80) 0.209 (0.28) 0.816 (0.00) 0.252 (0.01)
Earnings surprise −0.283 (0.24) 0.027 (0.67) −0.181 (0.05) −0.043 (0.20)
R¯2 0.31 0.19 0.20 0.15
n 263 1107 830 2533
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.197 (0.00) 2.880 (0.00) 3.844 (0.00) 2.582 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 1.454 (0.01) 1.283 (0.00) 0.772 (0.00) 0.786 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.385 (0.46) 0.341 (0.08) 0.127 (0.60) 0.244 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.815 (0.12) 0.435 (0.02) 0.150 (0.54) 0.189 (0.06)
Owner rank 4 0.160 (0.75) 0.186 (0.30) −0.030 (0.90) 0.065 (0.50)
Foreign owner −1.392 (0.03) −1.380 (0.00) −1.587 (0.00) −1.186 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner −0.277 (0.70) −0.532 (0.10) −1.407 (0.00) −0.825 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner −0.116 (0.83) −0.378 (0.11) −0.912 (0.00) −0.573 (0.00)
Financial owner −1.002 (0.10) −1.222 (0.00) −1.498 (0.00) −1.097 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt −0.306 (0.66) 0.126 (0.62) 0.957 (0.00) 0.268 (0.03)
Earnings surprise −0.284 (0.35) 0.066 (0.45) −0.179 (0.14) −0.058 (0.21)
R¯2 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07
n 278 1143 860 2602
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.550 (0.00) 3.007 (0.00) 3.724 (0.00) 2.642 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 3.140 (0.00) 2.497 (0.00) 1.541 (0.00) 1.497 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 2.164 (0.00) 1.383 (0.00) 1.101 (0.00) 0.950 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 2.005 (0.00) 1.240 (0.00) 0.908 (0.00) 0.734 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.780 (0.11) 0.549 (0.00) 0.382 (0.14) 0.321 (0.00)
Foreign owner −1.339 (0.03) −1.663 (0.00) −1.743 (0.00) −1.442 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner −0.691 (0.32) −0.480 (0.17) −1.665 (0.00) −0.936 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner −0.590 (0.26) −0.440 (0.09) −1.032 (0.00) −0.710 (0.00)
Financial owner −0.894 (0.13) −1.241 (0.00) −1.356 (0.00) −1.186 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt −0.648 (0.33) 0.072 (0.80) 1.273 (0.00) 0.425 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.023 (0.93) 0.034 (0.73) −0.083 (0.52) −0.074 (0.16)
R¯2 0.19 0.17 0.11 0.11
n 287 1189 889 2698
Each panel table summarizes four multivariate OLS regressions relating ownership duration to potential determinants and controls
across the four samples. Owner Rank i is a dummy variable which is 1 for owner rank i and zero otherwise, and the owner has
rank 5 when all owner rank dummies are zero. The owner types are dummy variables. If all the owner type dummies are zero the
owner is the state. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving
Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All
Firms; All Owners). Probability values are speciﬁed in parentheses. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.277 (0.00) 2.925 (0.00) 4.392 (0.00) 2.489 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 0.249 (0.63) 0.375 (0.07) 0.081 (0.76) 0.341 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.086 (0.87) 0.028 (0.88) 0.003 (0.99) 0.088 (0.40)
Owner rank 3 0.631 (0.20) 0.347 (0.05) 0.152 (0.56) 0.122 (0.23)
Owner rank 4 0.751 (0.12) 0.152 (0.37) 0.159 (0.53) 0.035 (0.72)
Foreign owner −1.766 (0.00) −1.449 (0.00) −1.891 (0.00) −1.134 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner −0.934 (0.17) −0.310 (0.31) −1.634 (0.00) −0.588 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.102 (0.83) −0.297 (0.19) −0.918 (0.00) −0.417 (0.00)
Financial owner −1.196 (0.04) −1.143 (0.00) −1.426 (0.00) −0.881 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt −0.530 (0.43) −0.012 (0.96) 0.332 (0.29) 0.288 (0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.822 (0.00) 0.028 (0.73) 0.095 (0.42) −0.035 (0.45)
R¯2 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.05
n 262 1141 693 2344
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 2.584 (0.00) 1.411 (0.00) 2.634 (0.00) 1.448 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 3.691 (0.00) 1.975 (0.00) 2.013 (0.00) 1.488 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 1.457 (0.00) 0.654 (0.00) 0.874 (0.00) 0.565 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 0.984 (0.03) 0.336 (0.02) 0.480 (0.04) 0.260 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.405 (0.36) 0.165 (0.22) 0.203 (0.39) 0.112 (0.16)
Foreign owner −0.825 (0.13) −0.372 (0.05) −1.019 (0.00) −0.411 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner −0.213 (0.76) 0.151 (0.55) −0.964 (0.01) −0.016 (0.91)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.090 (0.86) 0.181 (0.32) −0.612 (0.05) −0.020 (0.86)
Financial owner −0.581 (0.30) −0.313 (0.10) −0.895 (0.01) −0.362 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.322 (0.59) 0.099 (0.60) 0.585 (0.03) 0.154 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.484 (0.02) 0.060 (0.33) −0.010 (0.93) −0.001 (0.97)
R¯2 0.33 0.17 0.18 0.15
n 250 1119 675 2295
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 4.685 (0.00) 2.849 (0.00) 4.257 (0.00) 2.600 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 1.580 (0.00) 1.183 (0.00) 0.727 (0.01) 0.847 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 0.339 (0.51) 0.311 (0.10) 0.116 (0.65) 0.281 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 0.836 (0.10) 0.403 (0.03) 0.117 (0.65) 0.186 (0.08)
Owner rank 4 0.384 (0.45) 0.204 (0.25) 0.005 (0.98) 0.086 (0.41)
Foreign owner −1.365 (0.03) −1.279 (0.00) −1.791 (0.00) −1.117 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner −0.293 (0.69) −0.421 (0.20) −1.532 (0.00) −0.605 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.114 (0.83) −0.363 (0.13) −1.083 (0.00) −0.505 (0.00)
Financial owner −1.184 (0.05) −1.144 (0.00) −1.570 (0.00) −1.018 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.632 (0.36) 0.029 (0.91) 0.953 (0.00) 0.175 (0.18)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.877 (0.00) 0.100 (0.24) 0.081 (0.52) 0.003 (0.95)
R¯2 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.07
n 269 1162 763 2412
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 4.854 (0.00) 2.922 (0.00) 4.085 (0.00) 2.669 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 3.298 (0.00) 2.343 (0.00) 1.416 (0.00) 1.511 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 2.371 (0.00) 1.382 (0.00) 1.001 (0.00) 1.003 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 2.005 (0.00) 1.212 (0.00) 0.779 (0.00) 0.733 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 0.930 (0.05) 0.600 (0.00) 0.321 (0.25) 0.375 (0.00)
Foreign owner −1.275 (0.03) −1.562 (0.00) −1.876 (0.00) −1.415 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner −0.435 (0.52) −0.291 (0.42) −1.710 (0.00) −0.776 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner −0.329 (0.51) −0.439 (0.09) −1.147 (0.00) −0.691 (0.00)
Financial owner −0.957 (0.09) −1.154 (0.00) −1.389 (0.00) −1.139 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.439 (0.49) 0.057 (0.84) 1.287 (0.00) 0.389 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 1.033 (0.00) 0.141 (0.16) 0.088 (0.51) 0.014 (0.81)
R¯2 0.26 0.15 0.10 0.11
n 280 1202 821 2541
Each panel table summarizes four multivariate OLS regressions relating ownership duration to potential determinants and controls
across the four samples. Owner Rank i is a dummy variable which is 1 for owner rank i and zero otherwise, and the owner has
rank 5 when all owner rank dummies are zero. The owner types are dummy variables. If all the owner type dummies are zero the
owner is the state. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving
Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All
Firms; All Owners). Probability values are speciﬁed in parentheses. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.29 Determinants of ownership duration under two alternative sample restrictions. Duration
measures: Averages.
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
(1) (3)
constant 1.501 (0.16) 0.980 (0.06)
ln(Firm value) 0.091 (0.22) 0.082 (0.03)
Depreciation over investment 0.032 (0.49) 0.028 (0.00)
R¯2 0.03 0.09
n 61 245
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
(1) (3)
constant 1.481 (0.11) 1.551 (0.02)
ln(Firm value) 0.023 (0.73) 0.012 (0.80)
Depreciation over investment 0.315 (0.00) 0.239 (0.00)
R¯2 0.27 0.14
n 52 102
Each panel table summarizes four multivariate OLS regressions relating ownership duration to potential determinants and controls
across the four samples. Owner Rank i is a dummy variable which is 1 for owner rank i and zero otherwise, and the owner has
rank 5 when all owner rank dummies are zero. The owner types are dummy variables. If all the owner type dummies are zero the
owner is the state. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving
Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All
Firms; All Owners). Probability values are speciﬁed in parentheses. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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5.3 Determinants of duration: Binary choice analysis
The analysis in this section considers the owner's period-by-period decision: Should he keep his stake
for one more period (keep stake), or should he exit (sell stake). Figure 5.26 illustrates the idea.
Figure 5.26 Using a period by period binary choice model to analyze ownership duration
-

































Should you stay or = f ( Governance variables,
should you go Controls )
5.3.1 Using owner characteristics and earnings surprise as explanatory vari-
ables
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Table 5.30 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.523 (0.33) 0.346 (0.38)
Fraction owned -1.686 (0.00) -1.384 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.152 (0.00) 1.062 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.249 (0.33) 0.429 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.017 (0.93) 0.070 (0.63)
Financial owner 0.715 (0.00) 0.580 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.010 (0.76) -0.037 (0.13)
Earnings surprise 0.096 (0.19) 0.131 (0.01)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.035
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.853 (0.13) 1.691 (0.00)
Fraction owned -8.538 (0.00) -7.607 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.785 (0.00) 0.702 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.000 (1.00) -0.122 (0.51)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.131 (0.50) -0.143 (0.35)
Financial owner 0.279 (0.16) 0.220 (0.16)
ln(Firm Size) -0.003 (0.94) -0.049 (0.06)
Earnings surprise 0.036 (0.63) 0.080 (0.13)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.119
Duration: Maintain Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.251 (0.65) 1.231 (0.00)
Fraction owned -6.621 (0.00) -5.798 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.924 (0.00) 0.898 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.300 (0.26) 0.209 (0.25)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.230 (0.25) 0.181 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.564 (0.01) 0.503 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.027 (0.41) -0.084 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.039 (0.59) 0.088 (0.08)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.076
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.461 (0.43) 1.254 (0.00)
Fraction owned -7.873 (0.00) -6.741 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.091 (0.00) 1.028 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.286 (0.34) 0.112 (0.57)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.294 (0.20) 0.233 (0.17)
Financial owner 0.610 (0.01) 0.468 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.083 (0.02) -0.122 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.019 (0.81) 0.073 (0.17)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.077
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.31 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.798 (0.14) 0.170 (0.67)
Owner rank 1 -0.109 (0.53) -0.242 (0.04)
Owner rank 2 0.066 (0.69) 0.013 (0.91)
Owner rank 3 0.042 (0.80) 0.093 (0.42)
Owner rank 4 0.186 (0.27) 0.084 (0.47)
Foreign owner 1.156 (0.00) 1.056 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.243 (0.34) 0.434 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.060 (0.75) 0.044 (0.76)
Financial owner 0.752 (0.00) 0.603 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.015 (0.64) -0.034 (0.16)
Earnings surprise 0.093 (0.20) 0.131 (0.01)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.033
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.584 (0.31) 1.503 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.907 (0.00) -2.003 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.056 (0.00) -1.116 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.670 (0.00) -0.642 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.317 (0.08) -0.405 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.708 (0.00) 0.600 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.067 (0.80) -0.137 (0.45)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.303 (0.11) -0.257 (0.09)
Financial owner 0.213 (0.29) 0.218 (0.16)
ln(Firm Size) 0.024 (0.49) -0.026 (0.32)
Earnings surprise 0.031 (0.68) 0.088 (0.09)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.103
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.275 (0.62) 0.763 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -0.844 (0.00) -0.936 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.407 (0.02) -0.397 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.156 (0.35) -0.132 (0.25)
Owner rank 4 0.057 (0.73) -0.060 (0.60)
Foreign owner 0.888 (0.00) 0.834 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.271 (0.30) 0.205 (0.25)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.063 (0.75) 0.057 (0.70)
Financial owner 0.586 (0.00) 0.566 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.010 (0.77) -0.068 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.032 (0.66) 0.091 (0.07)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.044
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.557 (0.36) 1.319 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.841 (0.00) -1.762 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.394 (0.00) -1.363 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.045 (0.00) -0.931 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.467 (0.01) -0.503 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.009 (0.00) 0.955 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.158 (0.60) 0.073 (0.72)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.143 (0.54) 0.154 (0.36)
Financial owner 0.495 (0.03) 0.434 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.067 (0.07) -0.106 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.016 (0.84) 0.084 (0.12)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.086
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
153
Table 5.32 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.255 (0.64) 0.022 (0.96)
Fraction owned -1.347 (0.01) -1.515 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.098 (0.00) 1.086 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.401 (0.12) 0.398 (0.04)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.049 (0.80) 0.124 (0.41)
Financial owner 0.835 (0.00) 0.685 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.009 (0.80) -0.018 (0.48)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.071 (0.30) -0.020 (0.71)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.036
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.624 (0.01) 1.473 (0.00)
Fraction owned -8.280 (0.00) -7.401 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.572 (0.01) 0.488 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.018 (0.95) -0.137 (0.50)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.212 (0.28) -0.270 (0.09)
Financial owner 0.329 (0.10) 0.235 (0.15)
ln(Firm Size) -0.045 (0.19) -0.029 (0.29)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.055 (0.44) 0.011 (0.85)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.115
Duration: Maintain Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.944 (0.09) 1.079 (0.01)
Fraction owned -6.059 (0.00) -5.339 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.691 (0.00) 0.655 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.207 (0.44) 0.148 (0.45)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.035 (0.86) 0.004 (0.98)
Financial owner 0.540 (0.01) 0.469 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.064 (0.06) -0.068 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.025 (0.71) 0.028 (0.60)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.068
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.862 (0.14) 0.984 (0.03)
Fraction owned -7.778 (0.00) -6.067 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.858 (0.00) 0.841 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.213 (0.48) 0.052 (0.81)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.241 (0.28) 0.180 (0.30)
Financial owner 0.567 (0.01) 0.480 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.101 (0.01) -0.104 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.023 (0.76) -0.025 (0.65)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.065
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.33 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.495 (0.37) -0.145 (0.73)
Owner rank 1 -0.089 (0.60) -0.220 (0.08)
Owner rank 2 0.085 (0.61) -0.055 (0.66)
Owner rank 3 0.028 (0.86) 0.036 (0.77)
Owner rank 4 0.161 (0.33) 0.049 (0.69)
Foreign owner 1.106 (0.00) 1.089 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.396 (0.12) 0.402 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.023 (0.90) 0.097 (0.52)
Financial owner 0.876 (0.00) 0.725 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.004 (0.90) -0.015 (0.55)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.074 (0.27) -0.020 (0.70)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.032
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.212 (0.04) 1.251 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.854 (0.00) -1.882 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.984 (0.00) -1.074 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.605 (0.00) -0.570 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.145 (0.43) -0.263 (0.06)
Foreign owner 0.532 (0.01) 0.433 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.039 (0.89) -0.158 (0.43)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.358 (0.06) -0.377 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.305 (0.14) 0.257 (0.11)
ln(Firm Size) -0.015 (0.66) -0.008 (0.77)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.065 (0.37) 0.009 (0.87)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.102
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.317 (0.57) 0.596 (0.16)
Owner rank 1 -0.737 (0.00) -0.789 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.299 (0.07) -0.347 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.045 (0.78) -0.020 (0.87)
Owner rank 4 0.173 (0.29) 0.038 (0.75)
Foreign owner 0.686 (0.00) 0.633 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.187 (0.48) 0.144 (0.45)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.088 (0.65) -0.098 (0.52)
Financial owner 0.594 (0.00) 0.551 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.045 (0.18) -0.055 (0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.034 (0.62) 0.024 (0.65)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.042
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.818 (0.18) 1.060 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.822 (0.00) -1.657 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.371 (0.00) -1.364 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.875 (0.00) -0.800 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.381 (0.02) -0.443 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.784 (0.00) 0.789 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.110 (0.72) 0.007 (0.98)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.102 (0.65) 0.109 (0.54)
Financial owner 0.477 (0.04) 0.449 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.081 (0.03) -0.089 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.026 (0.73) -0.025 (0.66)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.078
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.34 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.016 (0.98) 0.230 (0.59)
Fraction owned -1.166 (0.02) -1.355 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.037 (0.00) 1.014 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.503 (0.05) 0.466 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.092 (0.63) 0.137 (0.37)
Financial owner 0.823 (0.00) 0.643 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.009 (0.79) -0.014 (0.60)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.068 (0.32) -0.028 (0.60)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.111 (0.00) -0.116 (0.00)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.044
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.820 (0.00) 1.642 (0.00)
Fraction owned -6.315 (0.00) -6.005 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.512 (0.01) 0.409 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner 0.145 (0.60) -0.093 (0.65)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.131 (0.51) -0.219 (0.18)
Financial owner 0.315 (0.12) 0.199 (0.23)
ln(Firm Size) -0.036 (0.31) -0.016 (0.56)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.046 (0.53) 0.005 (0.93)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.267 (0.00) -0.260 (0.00)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.138 0.132
Duration: Maintain Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.108 (0.05) 1.213 (0.01)
Fraction owned -5.072 (0.00) -4.646 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.600 (0.00) 0.556 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.343 (0.21) 0.212 (0.28)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.108 (0.58) 0.046 (0.77)
Financial owner 0.517 (0.01) 0.420 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.051 (0.14) -0.053 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.009 (0.89) 0.027 (0.61)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.177 (0.00) -0.176 (0.00)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.082
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.209 (0.05) 1.202 (0.01)
Fraction owned -6.448 (0.00) -5.242 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.681 (0.00) 0.651 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.270 (0.38) 0.037 (0.86)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.243 (0.29) 0.156 (0.38)
Financial owner 0.453 (0.04) 0.352 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) -0.090 (0.01) -0.085 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.011 (0.88) -0.037 (0.51)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.179 (0.00) -0.179 (0.00)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.082
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.35 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.357 (0.52) -0.010 (0.98)
Owner rank 1 -0.055 (0.75) -0.176 (0.17)
Owner rank 2 0.106 (0.53) -0.034 (0.78)
Owner rank 3 0.054 (0.75) 0.054 (0.66)
Owner rank 4 0.187 (0.26) 0.072 (0.56)
Foreign owner 1.053 (0.00) 1.021 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.520 (0.05) 0.479 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.094 (0.62) 0.127 (0.40)
Financial owner 0.867 (0.00) 0.683 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.003 (0.92) -0.006 (0.83)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.067 (0.32) -0.027 (0.61)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.111 (0.00) -0.125 (0.00)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.041
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.381 (0.02) 1.416 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.412 (0.00) -1.521 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.796 (0.00) -0.921 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.494 (0.01) -0.483 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.090 (0.62) -0.221 (0.11)
Foreign owner 0.450 (0.03) 0.338 (0.04)
Family (individual) owner 0.128 (0.65) -0.101 (0.62)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.240 (0.22) -0.316 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.281 (0.17) 0.200 (0.22)
ln(Firm Size) -0.000 (0.99) 0.008 (0.77)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.050 (0.49) 0.006 (0.92)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.289 (0.00) -0.284 (0.00)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.122
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.396 (0.48) 0.713 (0.10)
Owner rank 1 -0.572 (0.00) -0.649 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.247 (0.14) -0.302 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 0.017 (0.92) 0.020 (0.87)
Owner rank 4 0.202 (0.22) 0.055 (0.66)
Foreign owner 0.578 (0.00) 0.516 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.391 (0.15) 0.228 (0.25)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.045 (0.82) -0.033 (0.83)
Financial owner 0.566 (0.01) 0.483 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.019 (0.58) -0.032 (0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.010 (0.88) 0.027 (0.62)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.215 (0.00) -0.215 (0.00)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.062
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.939 (0.13) 1.148 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.582 (0.00) -1.469 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.214 (0.00) -1.237 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.733 (0.00) -0.691 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.291 (0.08) -0.366 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.653 (0.01) 0.637 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.196 (0.53) 0.006 (0.98)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.155 (0.50) 0.109 (0.54)
Financial owner 0.402 (0.08) 0.348 (0.05)
ln(Firm Size) -0.061 (0.10) -0.068 (0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.009 (0.90) -0.031 (0.59)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.166 (0.00) -0.166 (0.00)
n 1555 2820
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.092
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.36 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.153 (0.78) 0.610 (0.13)
Fraction owned -1.437 (0.01) -1.182 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.085 (0.00) 0.954 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.348 (0.18) 0.455 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.030 (0.88) 0.072 (0.62)
Financial owner 0.696 (0.00) 0.508 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.006 (0.85) -0.030 (0.23)
Earnings surprise 0.093 (0.20) 0.105 (0.03)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.129 (0.00) -0.159 (0.00)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.049
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.129 (0.05) 1.883 (0.00)
Fraction owned -6.810 (0.00) -6.493 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.740 (0.00) 0.621 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.081 (0.76) -0.130 (0.48)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.061 (0.75) -0.093 (0.55)
Financial owner 0.254 (0.20) 0.168 (0.28)
ln(Firm Size) -0.003 (0.94) -0.039 (0.14)
Earnings surprise 0.050 (0.51) 0.067 (0.21)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.214 (0.00) -0.244 (0.00)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.133
Duration: Maintain Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.444 (0.42) 1.358 (0.00)
Fraction owned -5.712 (0.00) -5.224 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.863 (0.00) 0.804 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.410 (0.13) 0.220 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.307 (0.13) 0.220 (0.15)
Financial owner 0.549 (0.01) 0.445 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.020 (0.54) -0.070 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.039 (0.60) 0.064 (0.21)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.147 (0.00) -0.170 (0.00)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.088
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.912 (0.13) 1.461 (0.00)
Fraction owned -6.324 (0.00) -5.939 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.922 (0.00) 0.829 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.333 (0.28) 0.027 (0.89)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.339 (0.15) 0.214 (0.21)
Financial owner 0.503 (0.03) 0.322 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) -0.076 (0.04) -0.099 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.023 (0.77) 0.041 (0.45)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.206 (0.00) -0.206 (0.00)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.098
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.37 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.654 (0.23) 0.286 (0.47)
Owner rank 1 -0.055 (0.76) -0.187 (0.12)
Owner rank 2 0.095 (0.58) 0.038 (0.74)
Owner rank 3 0.081 (0.63) 0.118 (0.32)
Owner rank 4 0.201 (0.23) 0.099 (0.40)
Foreign owner 1.105 (0.00) 0.964 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.371 (0.15) 0.473 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.025 (0.90) 0.073 (0.62)
Financial owner 0.748 (0.00) 0.543 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.024 (0.47) -0.018 (0.47)
Earnings surprise 0.093 (0.20) 0.106 (0.03)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.126 (0.00) -0.168 (0.00)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.046
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.751 (0.19) 1.622 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.520 (0.00) -1.710 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.891 (0.00) -0.984 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.571 (0.00) -0.565 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.277 (0.13) -0.377 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.650 (0.00) 0.510 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.065 (0.81) -0.139 (0.45)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.181 (0.35) -0.198 (0.20)
Financial owner 0.196 (0.33) 0.156 (0.32)
ln(Firm Size) 0.034 (0.32) -0.008 (0.77)
Earnings surprise 0.049 (0.51) 0.072 (0.17)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.245 (0.00) -0.270 (0.00)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.120
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.233 (0.68) 0.807 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -0.691 (0.00) -0.821 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.356 (0.04) -0.354 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.091 (0.59) -0.092 (0.43)
Owner rank 4 0.072 (0.66) -0.052 (0.65)
Foreign owner 0.815 (0.00) 0.728 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.455 (0.09) 0.223 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.213 (0.28) 0.119 (0.43)
Financial owner 0.577 (0.00) 0.496 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.014 (0.68) -0.042 (0.09)
Earnings surprise 0.037 (0.61) 0.065 (0.19)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.190 (0.00) -0.207 (0.00)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.062
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.650 (0.29) 1.329 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.572 (0.00) -1.582 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.220 (0.00) -1.240 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.892 (0.00) -0.823 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.378 (0.03) -0.432 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.895 (0.00) 0.800 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.252 (0.42) 0.017 (0.93)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.249 (0.29) 0.161 (0.35)
Financial owner 0.445 (0.06) 0.325 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) -0.044 (0.23) -0.076 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.021 (0.79) 0.053 (0.32)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.191 (0.00) -0.192 (0.00)
n 1530 3135
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.102
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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5.3.2 Including Depreciation over assets
Table 5.38 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depre-
ciation over long term assets
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.293 (0.03) -0.445 (0.30)
Fraction owned -1.797 (0.00) -1.399 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.119 (0.00) 1.034 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.224 (0.39) 0.394 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.032 (0.87) 0.108 (0.46)
Financial owner 0.737 (0.00) 0.590 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.053 (0.13) 0.004 (0.88)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.145 (0.02) 1.726 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.080 (0.27) 0.116 (0.02)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.039
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.455 (0.46) 0.944 (0.04)
Fraction owned -9.396 (0.00) -7.839 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.761 (0.00) 0.642 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.055 (0.84) -0.168 (0.36)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.007 (0.97) -0.098 (0.53)
Financial owner 0.298 (0.14) 0.227 (0.15)
ln(Firm Size) 0.059 (0.11) -0.013 (0.65)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.024 (0.00) 2.041 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.006 (0.93) 0.077 (0.14)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.125
Duration: Maintain Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.861 (0.15) 0.772 (0.08)
Fraction owned -7.197 (0.00) -5.903 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.870 (0.00) 0.851 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.264 (0.33) 0.166 (0.36)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.328 (0.10) 0.201 (0.19)
Financial owner 0.565 (0.01) 0.491 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.027 (0.45) -0.061 (0.02)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.161 (0.00) 1.173 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.010 (0.89) 0.082 (0.11)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.078
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.664 (0.30) 0.879 (0.06)
Fraction owned -8.558 (0.00) -6.800 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.029 (0.00) 0.988 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.232 (0.45) 0.064 (0.75)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.387 (0.10) 0.239 (0.16)
Financial owner 0.612 (0.01) 0.460 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.027 (0.49) -0.101 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.029 (0.00) 0.729 (0.07)
Earnings surprise -0.013 (0.88) 0.069 (0.20)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.078
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.39 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depre-
ciation over long term assets
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.545 (0.01) -0.637 (0.14)
Owner rank 1 -0.122 (0.49) -0.239 (0.05)
Owner rank 2 0.067 (0.69) 0.009 (0.94)
Owner rank 3 0.044 (0.79) 0.106 (0.37)
Owner rank 4 0.178 (0.29) 0.105 (0.37)
Foreign owner 1.123 (0.00) 1.032 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.222 (0.39) 0.397 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.016 (0.93) 0.083 (0.56)
Financial owner 0.776 (0.00) 0.613 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.057 (0.10) 0.007 (0.79)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.051 (0.03) 1.774 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.078 (0.28) 0.116 (0.02)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.037
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.818 (0.20) 0.684 (0.14)
Owner rank 1 -1.996 (0.00) -2.026 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.105 (0.00) -1.140 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.697 (0.00) -0.656 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.313 (0.09) -0.398 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.673 (0.00) 0.563 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.094 (0.73) -0.169 (0.36)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.173 (0.38) -0.205 (0.17)
Financial owner 0.243 (0.23) 0.238 (0.13)
ln(Firm Size) 0.089 (0.02) 0.014 (0.61)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.092 (0.00) 2.052 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.000 (1.00) 0.082 (0.12)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.109
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.374 (0.03) 0.289 (0.51)
Owner rank 1 -0.898 (0.00) -0.940 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.424 (0.01) -0.403 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.146 (0.38) -0.117 (0.31)
Owner rank 4 0.063 (0.70) -0.043 (0.71)
Foreign owner 0.835 (0.00) 0.806 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.259 (0.33) 0.168 (0.35)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.149 (0.45) 0.077 (0.61)
Financial owner 0.593 (0.00) 0.560 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.044 (0.22) -0.044 (0.10)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.856 (0.00) 1.085 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.005 (0.95) 0.084 (0.10)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.047
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.595 (0.38) 0.876 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -1.936 (0.00) -1.762 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.426 (0.00) -1.381 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.047 (0.00) -0.928 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.469 (0.01) -0.485 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.948 (0.00) 0.927 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.131 (0.67) 0.027 (0.89)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.225 (0.34) 0.166 (0.33)
Financial owner 0.504 (0.03) 0.430 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.007 (0.85) -0.081 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.546 (0.00) 0.812 (0.03)
Earnings surprise -0.014 (0.86) 0.076 (0.16)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.088
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.40 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets
Duration: Maintain Stake
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.469 (0.01) -0.878 (0.06)
Fraction owned -1.415 (0.00) -1.381 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.063 (0.00) 1.068 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.409 (0.12) 0.389 (0.04)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.135 (0.48) 0.146 (0.33)
Financial owner 0.837 (0.00) 0.693 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.044 (0.20) 0.026 (0.34)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.004 (0.00) 2.037 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.086 (0.20) -0.021 (0.69)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.042
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.963 (0.12) 1.573 (0.00)
Fraction owned -8.521 (0.00) -7.667 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.551 (0.01) 0.444 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.010 (0.97) -0.161 (0.43)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.151 (0.44) -0.264 (0.10)
Financial owner 0.337 (0.10) 0.228 (0.17)
ln(Firm Size) -0.017 (0.65) -0.036 (0.22)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.260 (0.01) 0.106 (0.78)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.072 (0.32) 0.015 (0.79)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.117
Duration: Maintain Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.536 (0.37) 1.124 (0.01)
Fraction owned -6.194 (0.00) -5.437 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.648 (0.00) 0.624 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.220 (0.41) 0.132 (0.50)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.059 (0.76) -0.003 (0.98)
Financial owner 0.529 (0.01) 0.455 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.045 (0.19) -0.072 (0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.365 (0.10) 0.108 (0.77)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.034 (0.63) 0.038 (0.48)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.068
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.356 (0.58) 0.969 (0.04)
Fraction owned -8.150 (0.00) -6.042 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.810 (0.00) 0.824 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.226 (0.45) 0.034 (0.88)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.274 (0.22) 0.172 (0.33)
Financial owner 0.557 (0.01) 0.473 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.077 (0.04) -0.105 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.635 (0.06) 0.140 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.039 (0.60) -0.013 (0.82)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.064
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.41 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.708 (0.01) -1.054 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -0.120 (0.49) -0.198 (0.12)
Owner rank 2 0.073 (0.66) -0.047 (0.71)
Owner rank 3 0.027 (0.87) 0.056 (0.65)
Owner rank 4 0.158 (0.34) 0.065 (0.60)
Foreign owner 1.070 (0.00) 1.074 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.409 (0.12) 0.393 (0.04)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.110 (0.56) 0.124 (0.41)
Financial owner 0.876 (0.00) 0.730 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.049 (0.16) 0.029 (0.28)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.017 (0.00) 2.084 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.090 (0.19) -0.022 (0.68)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.039
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.458 (0.47) 1.206 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.900 (0.00) -1.887 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.010 (0.00) -1.089 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.619 (0.00) -0.579 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.134 (0.47) -0.257 (0.06)
Foreign owner 0.506 (0.01) 0.396 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -0.029 (0.91) -0.181 (0.37)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.287 (0.14) -0.372 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.311 (0.13) 0.256 (0.12)
ln(Firm Size) 0.016 (0.67) -0.009 (0.76)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.804 (0.00) 0.455 (0.25)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.079 (0.27) 0.014 (0.81)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.111 0.103
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.118 (0.84) 0.555 (0.22)
Owner rank 1 -0.762 (0.00) -0.781 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.300 (0.07) -0.342 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.027 (0.87) 0.006 (0.96)
Owner rank 4 0.183 (0.26) 0.052 (0.67)
Foreign owner 0.644 (0.00) 0.611 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.210 (0.42) 0.128 (0.51)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.060 (0.76) -0.106 (0.49)
Financial owner 0.580 (0.00) 0.540 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.026 (0.45) -0.055 (0.04)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.580 (0.06) 0.301 (0.41)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.041 (0.55) 0.034 (0.53)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.042
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.187 (0.78) 0.959 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -1.886 (0.00) -1.650 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.387 (0.00) -1.373 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.865 (0.00) -0.785 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.376 (0.02) -0.436 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.734 (0.00) 0.776 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.136 (0.66) -0.011 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.144 (0.53) 0.104 (0.56)
Financial owner 0.462 (0.04) 0.442 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.054 (0.16) -0.086 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.217 (0.01) 0.393 (0.30)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.040 (0.60) -0.012 (0.83)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.079
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.42 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation
over long term assets and Duration
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.904 (0.13) -0.168 (0.70)
Fraction owned -1.516 (0.00) -1.181 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.053 (0.00) 0.927 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.325 (0.21) 0.425 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.076 (0.69) 0.108 (0.46)
Financial owner 0.721 (0.00) 0.522 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.048 (0.18) 0.011 (0.68)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.046 (0.02) 1.591 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.077 (0.29) 0.092 (0.06)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.127 (0.00) -0.158 (0.00)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.053
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.120 (0.85) 1.153 (0.01)
Fraction owned -7.627 (0.00) -6.649 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.725 (0.00) 0.571 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.013 (0.96) -0.176 (0.35)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.061 (0.76) -0.049 (0.75)
Financial owner 0.282 (0.16) 0.184 (0.24)
ln(Firm Size) 0.056 (0.13) -0.003 (0.91)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.545 (0.00) 1.866 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.020 (0.79) 0.065 (0.22)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.198 (0.00) -0.241 (0.00)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.138
Duration: Maintain Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.640 (0.29) 0.905 (0.04)
Fraction owned -6.168 (0.00) -5.278 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.811 (0.00) 0.760 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.372 (0.18) 0.181 (0.33)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.393 (0.05) 0.238 (0.12)
Financial owner 0.558 (0.01) 0.440 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.033 (0.36) -0.046 (0.09)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.801 (0.00) 1.057 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.011 (0.89) 0.059 (0.25)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.142 (0.00) -0.170 (0.00)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.099 0.090
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.168 (0.80) 1.079 (0.02)
Fraction owned -6.683 (0.00) -5.932 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.864 (0.00) 0.792 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.297 (0.34) -0.009 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.415 (0.08) 0.220 (0.20)
Financial owner 0.522 (0.02) 0.320 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) -0.020 (0.60) -0.078 (0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.356 (0.00) 0.656 (0.07)
Earnings surprise -0.005 (0.95) 0.037 (0.49)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.203 (0.00) -0.206 (0.00)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.098
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.43 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation
over long term assets and Duration
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.345 (0.03) -0.469 (0.29)
Owner rank 1 -0.064 (0.72) -0.181 (0.14)
Owner rank 2 0.097 (0.57) 0.035 (0.77)
Owner rank 3 0.084 (0.62) 0.130 (0.27)
Owner rank 4 0.193 (0.25) 0.118 (0.32)
Foreign owner 1.075 (0.00) 0.943 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.350 (0.18) 0.440 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.061 (0.75) 0.107 (0.47)
Financial owner 0.773 (0.00) 0.556 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.062 (0.08) 0.021 (0.43)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.903 (0.05) 1.558 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.080 (0.28) 0.094 (0.06)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.122 (0.00) -0.163 (0.00)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.050
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.467 (0.47) 0.867 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -1.616 (0.00) -1.730 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.946 (0.00) -1.008 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.604 (0.00) -0.578 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.278 (0.13) -0.373 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.625 (0.00) 0.481 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.016 (0.95) -0.169 (0.36)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.078 (0.69) -0.151 (0.32)
Financial owner 0.228 (0.26) 0.181 (0.25)
ln(Firm Size) 0.091 (0.01) 0.030 (0.29)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.242 (0.00) 1.766 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.020 (0.79) 0.067 (0.20)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.229 (0.00) -0.265 (0.00)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.125
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.194 (0.05) 0.374 (0.40)
Owner rank 1 -0.736 (0.00) -0.821 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.369 (0.03) -0.358 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.083 (0.63) -0.078 (0.51)
Owner rank 4 0.078 (0.64) -0.037 (0.75)
Foreign owner 0.767 (0.00) 0.703 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.437 (0.11) 0.191 (0.29)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.278 (0.16) 0.134 (0.38)
Financial owner 0.588 (0.00) 0.494 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.061 (0.09) -0.020 (0.46)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.213 (0.01) 0.922 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.013 (0.86) 0.059 (0.24)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.184 (0.00) -0.205 (0.00)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.064
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.358 (0.60) 0.926 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -1.656 (0.00) -1.577 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.252 (0.00) -1.257 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.899 (0.00) -0.821 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.383 (0.02) -0.415 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.844 (0.00) 0.778 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.229 (0.47) -0.020 (0.92)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.311 (0.19) 0.171 (0.33)
Financial owner 0.461 (0.05) 0.325 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.009 (0.82) -0.054 (0.06)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.932 (0.01) 0.689 (0.05)
Earnings surprise -0.005 (0.96) 0.047 (0.39)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.185 (0.00) -0.191 (0.00)
n 1520 3085
Pseudo R2 0.124 0.103
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.44 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration
Duration: Maintain Stake
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.125 (0.06) -0.623 (0.18)
Fraction owned -1.229 (0.01) -1.220 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.007 (0.00) 0.999 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.502 (0.06) 0.453 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.162 (0.40) 0.153 (0.32)
Financial owner 0.825 (0.00) 0.654 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.040 (0.25) 0.027 (0.32)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.601 (0.00) 1.865 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.083 (0.23) -0.028 (0.60)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.099 (0.00) -0.107 (0.00)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.049
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.350 (0.03) 1.843 (0.00)
Fraction owned -6.558 (0.00) -6.252 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.502 (0.02) 0.374 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner 0.140 (0.62) -0.112 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.086 (0.67) -0.213 (0.19)
Financial owner 0.327 (0.11) 0.197 (0.24)
ln(Firm Size) -0.016 (0.66) -0.029 (0.33)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.586 (0.09) -0.123 (0.75)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.062 (0.40) 0.008 (0.88)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.257 (0.00) -0.258 (0.00)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.141 0.133
Duration: Maintain Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.850 (0.16) 1.331 (0.00)
Fraction owned -5.162 (0.00) -4.735 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.561 (0.01) 0.527 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.363 (0.19) 0.200 (0.32)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.117 (0.56) 0.035 (0.82)
Financial owner 0.510 (0.01) 0.408 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.038 (0.28) -0.061 (0.03)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.766 (0.36) -0.068 (0.85)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.018 (0.80) 0.038 (0.49)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.175 (0.00) -0.175 (0.00)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.082
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.886 (0.18) 1.275 (0.01)
Fraction owned -6.720 (0.00) -5.215 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.641 (0.01) 0.636 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.296 (0.33) 0.026 (0.91)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.257 (0.26) 0.146 (0.41)
Financial owner 0.452 (0.04) 0.348 (0.05)
ln(Firm Size) -0.074 (0.05) -0.090 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.843 (0.33) -0.095 (0.80)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.025 (0.73) -0.024 (0.68)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.176 (0.00) -0.178 (0.00)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.081
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.45 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.480 (0.01) -0.856 (0.07)
Owner rank 1 -0.081 (0.64) -0.154 (0.23)
Owner rank 2 0.095 (0.57) -0.027 (0.83)
Owner rank 3 0.052 (0.76) 0.072 (0.56)
Owner rank 4 0.181 (0.28) 0.085 (0.49)
Foreign owner 1.022 (0.00) 1.010 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.517 (0.05) 0.465 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.160 (0.41) 0.146 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.867 (0.00) 0.692 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.051 (0.14) 0.035 (0.21)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.608 (0.00) 1.880 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.083 (0.22) -0.027 (0.61)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.098 (0.00) -0.115 (0.00)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.046
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.860 (0.18) 1.505 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.459 (0.00) -1.521 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.826 (0.00) -0.936 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.510 (0.01) -0.491 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.084 (0.65) -0.219 (0.12)
Foreign owner 0.436 (0.04) 0.308 (0.07)
Family (individual) owner 0.127 (0.65) -0.121 (0.55)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.193 (0.33) -0.314 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.291 (0.16) 0.204 (0.22)
ln(Firm Size) 0.020 (0.60) 0.001 (0.99)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.963 (0.04) 0.143 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.064 (0.38) 0.009 (0.87)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.278 (0.00) -0.283 (0.00)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.122
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.159 (0.80) 0.774 (0.09)
Owner rank 1 -0.586 (0.00) -0.640 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.242 (0.15) -0.296 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.037 (0.82) 0.046 (0.71)
Owner rank 4 0.211 (0.20) 0.066 (0.59)
Foreign owner 0.543 (0.01) 0.495 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.415 (0.13) 0.213 (0.28)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.053 (0.79) -0.045 (0.77)
Financial owner 0.556 (0.01) 0.474 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.009 (0.80) -0.037 (0.18)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.836 (0.32) 0.066 (0.86)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.017 (0.81) 0.036 (0.50)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.213 (0.00) -0.213 (0.00)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.062
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.507 (0.45) 1.144 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.638 (0.00) -1.461 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.230 (0.00) -1.248 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.726 (0.00) -0.677 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.288 (0.08) -0.360 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.614 (0.01) 0.627 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.226 (0.47) -0.008 (0.97)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.176 (0.45) 0.101 (0.57)
Financial owner 0.395 (0.09) 0.344 (0.05)
ln(Firm Size) -0.043 (0.26) -0.070 (0.02)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.435 (0.11) 0.159 (0.68)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.023 (0.77) -0.017 (0.77)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.160 (0.00) -0.162 (0.00)
n 1545 2775
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.091
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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5.3.3 Including Debt maturity




Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.531 (0.33) 0.325 (0.41)
Fraction owned -1.687 (0.00) -1.377 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.156 (0.00) 1.033 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.247 (0.33) 0.400 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.017 (0.93) 0.078 (0.59)
Financial owner 0.717 (0.00) 0.560 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.009 (0.78) -0.022 (0.38)
Long term debt over total debt 0.036 (0.87) -0.363 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.098 (0.18) 0.114 (0.02)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.037
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.821 (0.15) 1.663 (0.00)
Fraction owned -8.562 (0.00) -7.591 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.803 (0.00) 0.713 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.006 (0.98) -0.106 (0.56)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.129 (0.51) -0.134 (0.38)
Financial owner 0.290 (0.14) 0.245 (0.12)
ln(Firm Size) -0.006 (0.85) -0.050 (0.07)
Long term debt over total debt 0.160 (0.47) 0.039 (0.79)
Earnings surprise 0.043 (0.57) 0.087 (0.10)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.120
Duration: Maintain Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.165 (0.76) 1.257 (0.00)
Fraction owned -6.689 (0.00) -5.796 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.974 (0.00) 0.900 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.284 (0.29) 0.217 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.237 (0.23) 0.160 (0.30)
Financial owner 0.595 (0.00) 0.509 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.037 (0.27) -0.094 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.414 (0.06) 0.245 (0.08)
Earnings surprise 0.059 (0.43) 0.103 (0.04)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.077
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.378 (0.52) 1.268 (0.00)
Fraction owned -7.949 (0.00) -6.748 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.140 (0.00) 1.046 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.271 (0.37) 0.130 (0.52)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.304 (0.18) 0.224 (0.19)
Financial owner 0.640 (0.01) 0.485 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.092 (0.01) -0.133 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.381 (0.10) 0.274 (0.06)
Earnings surprise 0.037 (0.64) 0.087 (0.11)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.078
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.47 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt
Maturity
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.802 (0.14) 0.146 (0.71)
Owner rank 1 -0.109 (0.53) -0.256 (0.03)
Owner rank 2 0.067 (0.69) 0.025 (0.83)
Owner rank 3 0.042 (0.80) 0.101 (0.39)
Owner rank 4 0.186 (0.27) 0.092 (0.43)
Foreign owner 1.157 (0.00) 1.025 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.242 (0.34) 0.405 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.061 (0.75) 0.054 (0.71)
Financial owner 0.753 (0.00) 0.580 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.015 (0.65) -0.018 (0.46)
Long term debt over total debt 0.015 (0.94) -0.389 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.094 (0.20) 0.114 (0.02)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.035
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.588 (0.31) 1.472 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.908 (0.00) -2.012 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.057 (0.00) -1.118 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.670 (0.00) -0.641 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.317 (0.08) -0.407 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.706 (0.00) 0.604 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.067 (0.80) -0.131 (0.47)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.303 (0.11) -0.238 (0.12)
Financial owner 0.212 (0.29) 0.230 (0.14)
ln(Firm Size) 0.024 (0.49) -0.020 (0.45)
Long term debt over total debt -0.016 (0.94) -0.120 (0.41)
Earnings surprise 0.030 (0.69) 0.090 (0.09)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.104
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.347 (0.53) 0.776 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -0.835 (0.00) -0.929 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.403 (0.02) -0.385 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.153 (0.35) -0.118 (0.31)
Owner rank 4 0.059 (0.72) -0.059 (0.61)
Foreign owner 0.926 (0.00) 0.831 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.256 (0.33) 0.205 (0.25)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.064 (0.74) 0.038 (0.80)
Financial owner 0.609 (0.00) 0.567 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.017 (0.62) -0.074 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.299 (0.16) 0.149 (0.28)
Earnings surprise 0.046 (0.53) 0.103 (0.04)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.045
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.495 (0.42) 1.321 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.835 (0.00) -1.770 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.391 (0.00) -1.349 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.045 (0.00) -0.916 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.466 (0.01) -0.498 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.040 (0.00) 0.967 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.150 (0.62) 0.084 (0.68)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.148 (0.53) 0.149 (0.39)
Financial owner 0.515 (0.03) 0.440 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.072 (0.05) -0.112 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.236 (0.32) 0.160 (0.28)
Earnings surprise 0.027 (0.74) 0.094 (0.08)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.086
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.236 (0.66) 0.019 (0.96)
Fraction owned -1.340 (0.01) -1.507 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.076 (0.00) 1.048 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.412 (0.11) 0.365 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.052 (0.78) 0.115 (0.45)
Financial owner 0.822 (0.00) 0.657 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.002 (0.95) -0.007 (0.79)
Long term debt over total debt -0.200 (0.34) -0.254 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.077 (0.26) -0.027 (0.61)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.037
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.617 (0.01) 1.453 (0.00)
Fraction owned -8.295 (0.00) -7.400 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.581 (0.01) 0.493 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.015 (0.96) -0.130 (0.52)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.213 (0.28) -0.267 (0.10)
Financial owner 0.335 (0.10) 0.253 (0.12)
ln(Firm Size) -0.048 (0.18) -0.030 (0.30)
Long term debt over total debt 0.090 (0.68) 0.046 (0.77)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.053 (0.47) 0.016 (0.78)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.116
Duration: Maintain Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.920 (0.10) 1.117 (0.01)
Fraction owned -6.106 (0.00) -5.355 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.721 (0.00) 0.638 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.197 (0.46) 0.135 (0.49)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.035 (0.86) -0.026 (0.87)
Financial owner 0.561 (0.01) 0.460 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.073 (0.03) -0.075 (0.01)
Long term debt over total debt 0.270 (0.21) 0.166 (0.27)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.017 (0.80) 0.035 (0.52)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.068
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.842 (0.15) 1.011 (0.03)
Fraction owned -7.828 (0.00) -6.066 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.884 (0.00) 0.823 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.206 (0.49) 0.041 (0.85)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.243 (0.28) 0.155 (0.38)
Financial owner 0.585 (0.01) 0.475 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.108 (0.00) -0.109 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.220 (0.34) 0.126 (0.42)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.016 (0.83) -0.022 (0.70)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.065
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.49 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Debt Maturity
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.471 (0.39) -0.151 (0.72)
Owner rank 1 -0.096 (0.57) -0.230 (0.07)
Owner rank 2 0.081 (0.63) -0.048 (0.70)
Owner rank 3 0.026 (0.87) 0.039 (0.75)
Owner rank 4 0.161 (0.33) 0.049 (0.69)
Foreign owner 1.083 (0.00) 1.050 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.409 (0.11) 0.370 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.028 (0.88) 0.092 (0.54)
Financial owner 0.861 (0.00) 0.695 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.003 (0.93) -0.003 (0.90)
Long term debt over total debt -0.218 (0.30) -0.281 (0.06)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.081 (0.23) -0.028 (0.59)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.033
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.225 (0.04) 1.210 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.858 (0.00) -1.888 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.986 (0.00) -1.082 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.606 (0.00) -0.567 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.145 (0.43) -0.264 (0.06)
Foreign owner 0.519 (0.01) 0.433 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.032 (0.91) -0.156 (0.43)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.355 (0.07) -0.358 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.296 (0.15) 0.265 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) -0.011 (0.75) -0.000 (0.99)
Long term debt over total debt -0.120 (0.59) -0.149 (0.34)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.068 (0.34) 0.010 (0.85)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.103
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.300 (0.59) 0.616 (0.15)
Owner rank 1 -0.732 (0.00) -0.782 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.296 (0.07) -0.341 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.044 (0.79) -0.005 (0.97)
Owner rank 4 0.174 (0.29) 0.038 (0.75)
Foreign owner 0.703 (0.00) 0.613 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.179 (0.50) 0.127 (0.51)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.091 (0.64) -0.123 (0.42)
Financial owner 0.606 (0.00) 0.539 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.050 (0.14) -0.057 (0.03)
Long term debt over total debt 0.152 (0.47) 0.060 (0.69)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.030 (0.66) 0.029 (0.59)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.042
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.813 (0.18) 1.066 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.820 (0.00) -1.661 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.371 (0.00) -1.356 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.874 (0.00) -0.790 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.381 (0.02) -0.446 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.789 (0.00) 0.768 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.109 (0.72) -0.008 (0.97)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.102 (0.65) 0.094 (0.59)
Financial owner 0.481 (0.04) 0.436 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.082 (0.03) -0.088 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.041 (0.86) -0.021 (0.90)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.025 (0.75) -0.025 (0.67)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.078
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.162 (0.77) 0.598 (0.14)
Fraction owned -1.439 (0.01) -1.175 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.090 (0.00) 0.924 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.346 (0.18) 0.424 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.030 (0.88) 0.078 (0.60)
Financial owner 0.699 (0.00) 0.486 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.005 (0.88) -0.016 (0.53)
Long term debt over total debt 0.043 (0.84) -0.351 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.095 (0.20) 0.089 (0.08)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.129 (0.00) -0.159 (0.00)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.051
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.106 (0.05) 1.857 (0.00)
Fraction owned -6.834 (0.00) -6.474 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.753 (0.00) 0.630 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.077 (0.78) -0.117 (0.53)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.060 (0.76) -0.085 (0.59)
Financial owner 0.261 (0.19) 0.190 (0.23)
ln(Firm Size) -0.005 (0.88) -0.039 (0.16)
Long term debt over total debt 0.105 (0.64) 0.025 (0.86)
Earnings surprise 0.055 (0.47) 0.073 (0.17)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.214 (0.00) -0.246 (0.00)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.134
Duration: Maintain Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.365 (0.51) 1.386 (0.00)
Fraction owned -5.793 (0.00) -5.227 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.906 (0.00) 0.802 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.394 (0.15) 0.226 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.310 (0.12) 0.196 (0.21)
Financial owner 0.575 (0.00) 0.448 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.029 (0.39) -0.080 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.368 (0.10) 0.248 (0.08)
Earnings surprise 0.057 (0.45) 0.080 (0.12)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.146 (0.00) -0.172 (0.00)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.089
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.831 (0.17) 1.489 (0.00)
Fraction owned -6.440 (0.00) -5.963 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.967 (0.00) 0.842 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.313 (0.31) 0.042 (0.83)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.344 (0.14) 0.197 (0.25)
Financial owner 0.529 (0.02) 0.331 (0.05)
ln(Firm Size) -0.085 (0.02) -0.111 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.399 (0.10) 0.315 (0.03)
Earnings surprise 0.043 (0.59) 0.056 (0.30)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.206 (0.00) -0.208 (0.00)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.100
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
172
Table 5.51 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt Ma-
turity and Duration
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.654 (0.24) 0.272 (0.50)
Owner rank 1 -0.055 (0.76) -0.200 (0.10)
Owner rank 2 0.095 (0.58) 0.051 (0.67)
Owner rank 3 0.081 (0.63) 0.126 (0.29)
Owner rank 4 0.201 (0.23) 0.107 (0.36)
Foreign owner 1.105 (0.00) 0.932 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.371 (0.15) 0.441 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.025 (0.90) 0.080 (0.58)
Financial owner 0.748 (0.00) 0.517 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.024 (0.48) -0.003 (0.91)
Long term debt over total debt -0.000 (1.00) -0.378 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.093 (0.20) 0.089 (0.07)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.126 (0.00) -0.168 (0.00)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.048
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.762 (0.19) 1.595 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.521 (0.00) -1.718 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.892 (0.00) -0.985 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.571 (0.00) -0.563 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.277 (0.13) -0.380 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.645 (0.00) 0.513 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.067 (0.81) -0.134 (0.47)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.181 (0.35) -0.182 (0.24)
Financial owner 0.193 (0.34) 0.166 (0.29)
ln(Firm Size) 0.035 (0.31) -0.003 (0.92)
Long term debt over total debt -0.041 (0.85) -0.107 (0.47)
Earnings surprise 0.047 (0.53) 0.073 (0.16)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.245 (0.00) -0.271 (0.00)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.121
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.291 (0.60) 0.822 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -0.686 (0.00) -0.815 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.353 (0.04) -0.341 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.090 (0.59) -0.078 (0.50)
Owner rank 4 0.073 (0.66) -0.051 (0.66)
Foreign owner 0.844 (0.00) 0.721 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.443 (0.10) 0.221 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.211 (0.29) 0.095 (0.53)
Financial owner 0.594 (0.00) 0.492 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.008 (0.80) -0.048 (0.06)
Long term debt over total debt 0.231 (0.29) 0.156 (0.26)
Earnings surprise 0.048 (0.51) 0.077 (0.13)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.188 (0.00) -0.207 (0.00)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.063
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.594 (0.34) 1.335 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.570 (0.00) -1.588 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.216 (0.00) -1.224 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.891 (0.00) -0.806 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.378 (0.03) -0.426 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.921 (0.00) 0.809 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.245 (0.43) 0.026 (0.90)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.251 (0.29) 0.151 (0.39)
Financial owner 0.461 (0.05) 0.327 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) -0.048 (0.19) -0.083 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.207 (0.39) 0.187 (0.21)
Earnings surprise 0.031 (0.70) 0.064 (0.24)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.191 (0.00) -0.194 (0.00)
n 1530 3115
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.103
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.035 (0.95) 0.232 (0.58)
Fraction owned -1.157 (0.02) -1.346 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.016 (0.00) 0.975 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.514 (0.05) 0.432 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.095 (0.62) 0.125 (0.41)
Financial owner 0.811 (0.00) 0.613 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.002 (0.94) -0.003 (0.91)
Long term debt over total debt -0.196 (0.35) -0.250 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.074 (0.28) -0.036 (0.50)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.111 (0.00) -0.116 (0.00)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.045
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.821 (0.00) 1.621 (0.00)
Fraction owned -6.312 (0.00) -5.991 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.510 (0.01) 0.410 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner 0.146 (0.60) -0.089 (0.66)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.131 (0.51) -0.214 (0.19)
Financial owner 0.314 (0.13) 0.214 (0.20)
ln(Firm Size) -0.035 (0.33) -0.015 (0.60)
Long term debt over total debt -0.012 (0.96) 0.005 (0.97)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.047 (0.52) 0.008 (0.89)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.267 (0.00) -0.262 (0.00)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.138 0.133
Duration: Maintain Rank
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.092 (0.05) 1.254 (0.00)
Fraction owned -5.121 (0.00) -4.661 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.622 (0.00) 0.534 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.334 (0.23) 0.196 (0.33)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.106 (0.59) 0.013 (0.94)
Financial owner 0.532 (0.01) 0.406 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.057 (0.10) -0.059 (0.03)
Long term debt over total debt 0.203 (0.35) 0.148 (0.33)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.003 (0.96) 0.033 (0.54)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.175 (0.00) -0.177 (0.00)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.083
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(2) (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.195 (0.05) 1.236 (0.01)
Fraction owned -6.513 (0.00) -5.249 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.704 (0.00) 0.629 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.259 (0.40) 0.023 (0.92)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.242 (0.29) 0.127 (0.47)
Financial owner 0.468 (0.04) 0.342 (0.05)
ln(Firm Size) -0.097 (0.01) -0.090 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.206 (0.38) 0.129 (0.42)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.005 (0.95) -0.034 (0.55)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.179 (0.00) -0.180 (0.00)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.083
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 5.53 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Debt
Maturity and Duration
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.331 (0.55) -0.011 (0.98)
Owner rank 1 -0.062 (0.72) -0.185 (0.15)
Owner rank 2 0.101 (0.55) -0.027 (0.83)
Owner rank 3 0.052 (0.76) 0.057 (0.65)
Owner rank 4 0.186 (0.26) 0.072 (0.56)
Foreign owner 1.029 (0.00) 0.981 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.534 (0.04) 0.444 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.099 (0.60) 0.119 (0.43)
Financial owner 0.851 (0.00) 0.651 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.010 (0.76) 0.006 (0.82)
Long term debt over total debt -0.227 (0.28) -0.277 (0.06)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.074 (0.28) -0.035 (0.51)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.112 (0.00) -0.125 (0.00)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.042
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.401 (0.02) 1.379 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.416 (0.00) -1.522 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.799 (0.00) -0.929 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.496 (0.01) -0.478 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.090 (0.63) -0.222 (0.11)
Foreign owner 0.430 (0.04) 0.334 (0.05)
Family (individual) owner 0.138 (0.62) -0.103 (0.62)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.236 (0.23) -0.299 (0.06)
Financial owner 0.268 (0.20) 0.206 (0.21)
ln(Firm Size) 0.005 (0.88) 0.016 (0.58)
Long term debt over total debt -0.173 (0.45) -0.146 (0.36)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.055 (0.45) 0.006 (0.92)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.290 (0.00) -0.287 (0.00)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.123
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.388 (0.49) 0.736 (0.09)
Owner rank 1 -0.571 (0.00) -0.643 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.245 (0.15) -0.296 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.017 (0.92) 0.034 (0.78)
Owner rank 4 0.201 (0.22) 0.054 (0.66)
Foreign owner 0.587 (0.00) 0.491 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.387 (0.16) 0.207 (0.29)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.043 (0.83) -0.060 (0.70)
Financial owner 0.572 (0.00) 0.465 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.021 (0.54) -0.034 (0.22)
Long term debt over total debt 0.074 (0.73) 0.050 (0.74)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.008 (0.91) 0.030 (0.57)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.214 (0.00) -0.217 (0.00)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.062
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.937 (0.13) 1.158 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.582 (0.00) -1.470 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.214 (0.00) -1.228 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.733 (0.00) -0.680 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.291 (0.08) -0.368 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.654 (0.01) 0.612 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.196 (0.53) -0.011 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.155 (0.50) 0.092 (0.60)
Financial owner 0.403 (0.08) 0.332 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) -0.062 (0.10) -0.067 (0.02)
Long term debt over total debt 0.011 (0.96) -0.016 (0.92)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.009 (0.91) -0.031 (0.59)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.166 (0.00) -0.167 (0.00)
n 1555 2805
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.091
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to
stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving
Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since
conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest
duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year.
Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Chapter 6
Ownership duration and ﬁrm
performance
6.1 Performance measures used
This chapter measures performance in seven alternative ways:
1. Tobin's Q
2. Q relative to the average Q in the ﬁrm's industry
3. RoA: Book return on assets
4. RoS: Stock return
5. Marginal Q
6. Market model residual
7. Fama French residual
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6.2 Contemporaneous regressions
Figure 6.1 illustrates the logic of the contemporaneous regression models in this section. The owner's
observed ownership duration is matched with the ﬁrm's average performance, governance mechanisms
(such as ownership concentration) and controls over the same period.




1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Owner 1- Owner 2- Owner 3 -
︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ { Duration measure
Governance variables
Controls
? ? ?︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Performance
Performance = f ( Ownership duration
(average) Governance variables (average)
Controls (average) )
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6.2.1 Performance measure: Q




Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.296 (0.00) 1.367 (0.00) 1.836 (0.00) 1.681 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake −0.033 (0.23) −0.047 (0.03) −0.121 (0.00) −0.099 (0.00)
R¯2 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02
n 66 214 276 627
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.274 (0.00) 1.319 (0.00) 1.691 (0.00) 1.530 (0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −0.014 (0.63) −0.020 (0.24) −0.050 (0.10) −0.028 (0.19)
R¯2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
n 65 213 276 629
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.274 (0.00) 1.319 (0.00) 1.691 (0.00) 1.530 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank −0.014 (0.63) −0.020 (0.24) −0.050 (0.10) −0.028 (0.19)
R¯2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
n 65 213 276 629
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.903 (0.00) 1.278 (0.00) 1.717 (0.00) 1.501 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.027 (0.34) −0.011 (0.51) −0.055 (0.03) −0.022 (0.23)
R¯2 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
n 68 219 281 642
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 0.983 (0.00) 1.519 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% 0.032 (0.06) −0.028 (0.19)
R¯2 0.01 0.00
n 360 1445
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 1.433 (0.00) 1.300 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest −0.042 (0.27) −0.011 (0.70)
R¯2 0.00 0.00
n 265 535
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange
ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms;
All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in
appendix A.
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Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.289 (0.00) 1.298 (0.00) 1.838 (0.00) 1.650 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake −0.022 (0.45) −0.033 (0.15) −0.128 (0.00) −0.094 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.427 (0.39) −0.411 (0.29) −0.296 (0.48) −0.337 (0.27)
Primary insiders 1.845 (0.49) 3.857 (0.00) 5.743 (0.00) 3.888 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −2.150 (0.59) −3.797 (0.00) −6.824 (0.00) −4.194 (0.00)
R¯2 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.04
n 66 214 276 627
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.168 (0.00) 1.291 (0.00) 1.747 (0.00) 1.515 (0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −0.019 (0.50) −0.019 (0.29) −0.069 (0.02) −0.028 (0.19)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.209 (0.68) −0.531 (0.17) −0.739 (0.07) −0.512 (0.08)
Primary insiders 10.815 (0.00) 3.452 (0.00) 8.155 (0.00) 4.211 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −15.339 (0.00) −3.402 (0.01) −8.885 (0.00) −4.412 (0.00)
R¯2 0.27 0.08 0.11 0.04
n 65 213 276 629
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.168 (0.00) 1.291 (0.00) 1.747 (0.00) 1.515 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank −0.019 (0.50) −0.019 (0.29) −0.069 (0.02) −0.028 (0.19)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.209 (0.68) −0.531 (0.17) −0.739 (0.07) −0.512 (0.08)
Primary insiders 10.815 (0.00) 3.452 (0.00) 8.155 (0.00) 4.211 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −15.339 (0.00) −3.402 (0.01) −8.885 (0.00) −4.412 (0.00)
R¯2 0.27 0.08 0.11 0.04
n 65 213 276 629
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.845 (0.00) 1.251 (0.00) 1.781 (0.00) 1.479 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.020 (0.44) −0.008 (0.60) −0.074 (0.00) −0.023 (0.20)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.156 (0.71) −0.644 (0.11) −0.713 (0.07) −0.523 (0.07)
Primary insiders 8.318 (0.00) 3.741 (0.00) 7.216 (0.00) 4.580 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −11.316 (0.00) −3.738 (0.00) −7.718 (0.00) −4.899 (0.00)
R¯2 0.24 0.08 0.11 0.05
n 68 219 281 642
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 0.866 (0.00) 1.566 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% 0.023 (0.15) −0.051 (0.01)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.044 (0.84) −0.684 (0.00)
Primary insiders 6.977 (0.00) 6.923 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −7.883 (0.00) −7.514 (0.00)
R¯2 0.14 0.08
n 360 1445
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 1.458 (0.00) 1.382 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest 0.002 (0.96) −0.028 (0.31)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −1.191 (0.00) −0.454 (0.00)
Primary insiders 3.963 (0.00) 6.534 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −0.714 (0.67) −6.486 (0.00)
R¯2 0.24 0.09
n 265 530
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner,and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings
by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1):
(Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and
(4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.3 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing ﬁrm
size and fraction held. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.432 (0.01) 2.238 (0.00) 3.134 (0.00) 3.444 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake 0.012 (0.67) −0.012 (0.59) −0.081 (0.02) −0.061 (0.03)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.916 (0.40) −0.607 (0.45) −0.329 (0.74) 0.152 (0.83)
Primary insiders 1.556 (0.52) 3.056 (0.00) 5.150 (0.00) 3.526 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −1.098 (0.76) −2.986 (0.01) −6.301 (0.00) −3.991 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −0.114 (0.91) −0.570 (0.37) −0.525 (0.55) −0.956 (0.09)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.007 (0.84) −0.053 (0.01) −0.092 (0.01) −0.123 (0.00)
R¯2 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.10
n 58 186 245 554
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.802 (0.13) 2.223 (0.00) 3.253 (0.00) 3.160 (0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −0.023 (0.39) −0.010 (0.55) −0.050 (0.10) −0.009 (0.68)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.430 (0.68) −0.489 (0.51) −0.652 (0.47) −0.307 (0.63)
Primary insiders 10.860 (0.00) 2.627 (0.01) 7.227 (0.00) 3.528 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −14.448 (0.00) −2.609 (0.03) −8.073 (0.00) −3.888 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −0.661 (0.49) −0.688 (0.25) −0.587 (0.46) −0.694 (0.17)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.040 (0.28) −0.051 (0.02) −0.100 (0.01) −0.110 (0.00)
R¯2 0.38 0.14 0.15 0.10
n 59 186 247 555
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.802 (0.13) 2.223 (0.00) 3.253 (0.00) 3.160 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank −0.023 (0.39) −0.010 (0.55) −0.050 (0.10) −0.009 (0.68)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.430 (0.68) −0.489 (0.51) −0.652 (0.47) −0.307 (0.63)
Primary insiders 10.860 (0.00) 2.627 (0.01) 7.227 (0.00) 3.528 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −14.448 (0.00) −2.609 (0.03) −8.073 (0.00) −3.888 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −0.661 (0.49) −0.688 (0.25) −0.587 (0.46) −0.694 (0.17)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.040 (0.28) −0.051 (0.02) −0.100 (0.01) −0.110 (0.00)
R¯2 0.38 0.14 0.15 0.10
n 59 186 247 555
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.018 (0.02) 2.079 (0.00) 3.144 (0.00) 3.127 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.016 (0.48) −0.000 (0.99) −0.052 (0.04) −0.001 (0.97)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.263 (0.73) −0.686 (0.36) −1.281 (0.11) −0.794 (0.19)
Primary insiders 7.902 (0.00) 2.642 (0.01) 5.837 (0.00) 3.574 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −10.524 (0.00) −2.689 (0.03) −6.473 (0.00) −4.060 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −0.736 (0.25) −0.625 (0.28) −0.070 (0.92) −0.360 (0.45)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.008 (0.78) −0.041 (0.06) −0.092 (0.01) −0.111 (0.00)
R¯2 0.38 0.12 0.16 0.10
n 58 187 248 559
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow
for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo
Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2):
(Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.4 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.138 (0.00) 1.312 (0.00) 1.750 (0.00) 1.657 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) 0.128 (0.05) 0.058 (0.33) −0.169 (0.03) −0.119 (0.06)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) 0.056 (0.30) 0.063 (0.30) −0.019 (0.80) 0.054 (0.42)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.000 (0.99) −0.035 (0.15) −0.082 (0.03) −0.085 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −0.135 (0.02) −0.124 (0.03) −0.220 (0.02) −0.200 (0.00)
R¯2 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.02
n 66 214 276 627
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.117 (0.00) 1.281 (0.00) 1.632 (0.00) 1.522 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) 0.116 (0.06) 0.065 (0.17) −0.056 (0.37) −0.023 (0.63)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) 0.053 (0.18) 0.049 (0.17) 0.088 (0.10) 0.121 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.003 (0.92) −0.022 (0.25) −0.045 (0.15) −0.038 (0.11)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.078 (0.18) −0.084 (0.08) −0.157 (0.04) −0.131 (0.03)
R¯2 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.03
n 65 213 276 629
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.117 (0.00) 1.281 (0.00) 1.632 (0.00) 1.522 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) 0.116 (0.06) 0.065 (0.17) −0.056 (0.37) −0.023 (0.63)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) 0.053 (0.18) 0.049 (0.17) 0.088 (0.10) 0.121 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.003 (0.92) −0.022 (0.25) −0.045 (0.15) −0.038 (0.11)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.078 (0.18) −0.084 (0.08) −0.157 (0.04) −0.131 (0.03)
R¯2 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.03
n 65 213 276 629
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.792 (0.00) 1.176 (0.00) 1.551 (0.00) 1.437 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) 0.144 (0.00) 0.119 (0.00) 0.001 (0.98) 0.037 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) 0.079 (0.01) 0.058 (0.08) 0.086 (0.06) 0.129 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.041 (0.05) −0.009 (0.61) −0.031 (0.23) −0.024 (0.23)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) −0.002 (0.94) −0.028 (0.35) −0.108 (0.03) −0.069 (0.07)
R¯2 0.25 0.09 0.05 0.03
n 68 219 281 642
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.5 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.235 (0.00) 1.294 (0.00) 1.798 (0.00) 1.650 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) 0.158 (0.01) 0.077 (0.19) −0.173 (0.03) −0.119 (0.06)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) 0.082 (0.12) 0.085 (0.15) −0.034 (0.65) 0.048 (0.47)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.012 (0.63) −0.019 (0.42) −0.090 (0.02) −0.080 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −0.167 (0.00) −0.132 (0.01) −0.258 (0.00) −0.202 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −1.104 (0.01) −0.817 (0.03) −0.503 (0.24) −0.453 (0.14)
Primary insiders 1.386 (0.56) 3.714 (0.00) 5.708 (0.00) 3.822 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −0.454 (0.90) −3.568 (0.00) −6.795 (0.00) −4.171 (0.00)
R¯2 0.29 0.14 0.08 0.05
n 66 214 276 627
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.104 (0.00) 1.290 (0.00) 1.738 (0.00) 1.527 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) 0.086 (0.12) 0.070 (0.13) −0.074 (0.22) −0.023 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.021 (0.61) 0.032 (0.37) 0.010 (0.85) 0.094 (0.03)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.001 (0.98) −0.019 (0.31) −0.063 (0.04) −0.037 (0.12)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.101 (0.06) −0.091 (0.05) −0.183 (0.02) −0.131 (0.03)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.477 (0.32) −0.761 (0.04) −0.826 (0.04) −0.552 (0.06)
Primary insiders 10.680 (0.00) 2.999 (0.00) 7.413 (0.00) 3.729 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −14.998 (0.00) −2.852 (0.03) −8.134 (0.00) −3.941 (0.00)
R¯2 0.37 0.12 0.12 0.06
n 65 213 276 629
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.104 (0.00) 1.290 (0.00) 1.738 (0.00) 1.527 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) 0.086 (0.12) 0.070 (0.13) −0.074 (0.22) −0.023 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.021 (0.61) 0.032 (0.37) 0.010 (0.85) 0.094 (0.03)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.001 (0.98) −0.019 (0.31) −0.063 (0.04) −0.037 (0.12)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.101 (0.06) −0.091 (0.05) −0.183 (0.02) −0.131 (0.03)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.477 (0.32) −0.761 (0.04) −0.826 (0.04) −0.552 (0.06)
Primary insiders 10.680 (0.00) 2.999 (0.00) 7.413 (0.00) 3.729 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −14.998 (0.00) −2.852 (0.03) −8.134 (0.00) −3.941 (0.00)
R¯2 0.37 0.12 0.12 0.06
n 65 213 276 629
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.801 (0.00) 1.194 (0.00) 1.682 (0.00) 1.442 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) 0.113 (0.00) 0.111 (0.00) −0.022 (0.63) 0.028 (0.43)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) 0.035 (0.28) 0.042 (0.20) 0.015 (0.74) 0.101 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.036 (0.07) −0.007 (0.67) −0.051 (0.05) −0.024 (0.22)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) −0.009 (0.77) −0.030 (0.31) −0.130 (0.01) −0.069 (0.06)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.239 (0.57) −0.769 (0.05) −0.829 (0.04) −0.545 (0.06)
Primary insiders 6.555 (0.01) 2.927 (0.01) 6.268 (0.00) 4.002 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −9.041 (0.01) −2.765 (0.04) −6.742 (0.00) −4.325 (0.00)
R¯2 0.37 0.15 0.12 0.07
n 68 219 281 642
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.6 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration, orthogonalizing ﬁrm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.344 (0.00) 1.406 (0.00) 1.850 (0.00) 1.678 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) 0.135 (0.04) 0.090 (0.13) −0.154 (0.04) −0.091 (0.15)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) 0.069 (0.17) 0.065 (0.23) 0.016 (0.84) 0.078 (0.26)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.007 (0.82) −0.043 (0.10) −0.104 (0.01) −0.111 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −0.080 (0.44) −0.042 (0.58) −0.154 (0.25) −0.154 (0.09)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −1.001 (0.28) −0.670 (0.34) −0.391 (0.69) 0.105 (0.87)
Primary insiders 0.944 (0.69) 2.854 (0.00) 5.062 (0.01) 3.415 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −0.219 (0.95) −2.738 (0.02) −6.285 (0.00) −3.922 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −0.368 (0.70) −0.752 (0.21) −0.542 (0.54) −0.974 (0.08)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.026 (0.46) −0.069 (0.00) −0.095 (0.01) −0.124 (0.00)
R¯2 0.26 0.19 0.12 0.11
n 58 186 245 554
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.132 (0.00) 1.383 (0.00) 1.828 (0.00) 1.606 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) 0.052 (0.32) 0.076 (0.09) −0.059 (0.33) −0.000 (1.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.036 (0.34) 0.019 (0.55) 0.011 (0.83) 0.087 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.017 (0.53) −0.039 (0.04) −0.087 (0.01) −0.063 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) 0.014 (0.83) 0.002 (0.97) −0.065 (0.51) −0.057 (0.43)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.013 (0.99) −0.486 (0.48) −0.573 (0.52) −0.215 (0.73)
Primary insiders 11.084 (0.00) 2.236 (0.02) 6.473 (0.00) 3.084 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −14.912 (0.00) −2.090 (0.07) −7.276 (0.00) −3.413 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −0.506 (0.63) −0.903 (0.12) −0.731 (0.36) −0.781 (0.12)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.017 (0.64) −0.068 (0.00) −0.103 (0.01) −0.109 (0.00)
R¯2 0.41 0.18 0.17 0.12
n 59 186 247 555
Duration: Maintain Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.132 (0.00) 1.383 (0.00) 1.828 (0.00) 1.606 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) 0.052 (0.32) 0.076 (0.09) −0.059 (0.33) −0.000 (1.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.036 (0.34) 0.019 (0.55) 0.011 (0.83) 0.087 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.017 (0.53) −0.039 (0.04) −0.087 (0.01) −0.063 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) 0.014 (0.83) 0.002 (0.97) −0.065 (0.51) −0.057 (0.43)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.013 (0.99) −0.486 (0.48) −0.573 (0.52) −0.215 (0.73)
Primary insiders 11.084 (0.00) 2.236 (0.02) 6.473 (0.00) 3.084 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −14.912 (0.00) −2.090 (0.07) −7.276 (0.00) −3.413 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −0.506 (0.63) −0.903 (0.12) −0.731 (0.36) −0.781 (0.12)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.017 (0.64) −0.068 (0.00) −0.103 (0.01) −0.109 (0.00)
R¯2 0.41 0.18 0.17 0.12
n 59 186 247 555
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.046 (0.00) 1.367 (0.00) 1.904 (0.00) 1.614 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) 0.072 (0.03) 0.095 (0.00) −0.021 (0.66) 0.034 (0.34)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) 0.008 (0.77) 0.028 (0.36) 0.009 (0.85) 0.097 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.006 (0.75) −0.021 (0.19) −0.071 (0.01) −0.041 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) 0.009 (0.75) −0.003 (0.92) −0.087 (0.10) −0.033 (0.42)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.160 (0.84) −0.730 (0.30) −1.096 (0.18) −0.663 (0.27)
Primary insiders 6.680 (0.00) 2.019 (0.04) 5.054 (0.00) 3.039 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −8.876 (0.00) −1.911 (0.11) −5.604 (0.00) −3.484 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −0.434 (0.51) −0.682 (0.23) −0.320 (0.64) −0.457 (0.34)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.009 (0.77) −0.058 (0.01) −0.094 (0.01) −0.109 (0.00)
R¯2 0.44 0.20 0.17 0.13
n 58 187 248 559
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership ownership
concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and
the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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6.2.2 Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Table 6.7 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Only ownership duration.
Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.036 (0.85) −0.045 (0.53) 0.187 (0.08) 0.091 (0.16)
Duration: Maintain Stake −0.038 (0.22) −0.028 (0.16) −0.064 (0.04) −0.048 (0.05)
R¯2 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01
n 44 137 241 510
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.002 (0.99) −0.098 (0.19) 0.107 (0.31) −0.030 (0.61)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −0.023 (0.51) −0.012 (0.45) −0.021 (0.39) −0.001 (0.95)
R¯2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 53 148 255 527
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.002 (0.99) −0.098 (0.19) 0.107 (0.31) −0.030 (0.61)
Duration: Maintain Rank −0.023 (0.51) −0.012 (0.45) −0.021 (0.39) −0.001 (0.95)
R¯2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 53 148 255 527
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.057 (0.80) −0.124 (0.15) 0.080 (0.42) −0.017 (0.78)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest −0.016 (0.57) −0.004 (0.81) −0.021 (0.29) −0.006 (0.69)
R¯2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 62 169 267 561
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant −0.201 (0.00) −0.027 (0.53)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% 0.004 (0.77) −0.003 (0.85)
R¯2 0.00 0.00
n 360 1435
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 0.069 (0.72) −0.079 (0.49)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest −0.005 (0.97) 0.057 (0.47)
R¯2 0.00 0.00
n 45 260
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange
ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms;
All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in
appendix A.
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Table 6.8 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Basic regression. Per-
formance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.051 (0.76) −0.056 (0.50) 0.189 (0.13) 0.059 (0.42)
Duration: Maintain Stake −0.041 (0.11) −0.022 (0.30) −0.068 (0.02) −0.047 (0.06)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.087 (0.83) −0.239 (0.52) −0.298 (0.43) −0.113 (0.68)
Primary insiders 15.957 (0.00) 1.849 (0.10) 5.286 (0.00) 2.669 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) −25.140 (0.00) −2.734 (0.05) −6.323 (0.00) −3.063 (0.01)
R¯2 0.45 0.05 0.06 0.02
n 44 137 241 510
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.087 (0.72) −0.114 (0.17) 0.149 (0.21) −0.044 (0.51)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −0.027 (0.44) −0.009 (0.58) −0.034 (0.17) −0.002 (0.91)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.225 (0.70) −0.310 (0.41) −0.563 (0.10) −0.286 (0.27)
Primary insiders 8.748 (0.00) 2.253 (0.03) 5.500 (0.00) 2.753 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −12.097 (0.01) −3.052 (0.03) −5.831 (0.00) −2.992 (0.01)
R¯2 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.02
n 53 148 255 527
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.087 (0.72) −0.114 (0.17) 0.149 (0.21) −0.044 (0.51)
Duration: Maintain Rank −0.027 (0.44) −0.009 (0.58) −0.034 (0.17) −0.002 (0.91)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.225 (0.70) −0.310 (0.41) −0.563 (0.10) −0.286 (0.27)
Primary insiders 8.748 (0.00) 2.253 (0.03) 5.500 (0.00) 2.753 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −12.097 (0.01) −3.052 (0.03) −5.831 (0.00) −2.992 (0.01)
R¯2 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.02
n 53 148 255 527
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.042 (0.85) −0.151 (0.12) 0.109 (0.34) −0.035 (0.60)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest −0.021 (0.44) −0.000 (0.99) −0.034 (0.09) −0.006 (0.67)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.456 (0.27) −0.421 (0.28) −0.422 (0.19) −0.283 (0.25)
Primary insiders 5.610 (0.01) 3.011 (0.01) 4.846 (0.00) 2.800 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −7.676 (0.01) −4.003 (0.00) −5.072 (0.00) −3.111 (0.00)
R¯2 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.03
n 62 169 267 561
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant −0.243 (0.00) −0.017 (0.74)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% 0.004 (0.79) −0.017 (0.30)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.361 (0.05) −0.356 (0.01)
Primary insiders 6.540 (0.00) 4.451 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −8.672 (0.00) −4.768 (0.00)
R¯2 0.14 0.05
n 360 1435
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 0.316 (0.11) −0.076 (0.51)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest −0.285 (0.05) 0.017 (0.84)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.833 (0.11) 0.269 (0.10)
Primary insiders 14.040 (0.76) −42.121 (0.25)
Squared (Primary insiders) 3441.702 (0.27) 4855.413 (0.15)
R¯2 0.28 0.02
n 45 260
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner,and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings
by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1):
(Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and
(4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.9 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing ﬁrm
size and fraction held. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.111 (0.84) 0.992 (0.01) 1.375 (0.00) 1.677 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake −0.027 (0.35) −0.019 (0.43) −0.034 (0.26) −0.026 (0.32)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.491 (0.68) −0.485 (0.57) −0.562 (0.52) −0.020 (0.97)
Primary insiders 17.170 (0.00) 1.421 (0.22) 5.469 (0.00) 2.999 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −26.003 (0.00) −2.230 (0.13) −6.538 (0.00) −3.505 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 0.238 (0.83) −0.283 (0.70) 0.079 (0.92) −0.290 (0.58)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.019 (0.65) −0.068 (0.01) −0.099 (0.00) −0.124 (0.00)
R¯2 0.51 0.12 0.11 0.09
n 37 115 212 447
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.244 (0.73) 0.916 (0.02) 1.283 (0.00) 1.447 (0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −0.021 (0.60) −0.007 (0.70) −0.021 (0.42) 0.008 (0.69)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −1.016 (0.48) −0.621 (0.45) −1.050 (0.19) −0.712 (0.22)
Primary insiders 8.961 (0.01) 1.880 (0.09) 5.275 (0.00) 2.751 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −12.483 (0.01) −2.658 (0.06) −5.689 (0.00) −3.098 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 0.652 (0.63) −0.164 (0.82) 0.345 (0.62) 0.212 (0.66)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.032 (0.54) −0.068 (0.01) −0.092 (0.01) −0.115 (0.00)
R¯2 0.23 0.10 0.11 0.09
n 48 127 227 462
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.244 (0.73) 0.916 (0.02) 1.283 (0.00) 1.447 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank −0.021 (0.60) −0.007 (0.70) −0.021 (0.42) 0.008 (0.69)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −1.016 (0.48) −0.621 (0.45) −1.050 (0.19) −0.712 (0.22)
Primary insiders 8.961 (0.01) 1.880 (0.09) 5.275 (0.00) 2.751 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −12.483 (0.01) −2.658 (0.06) −5.689 (0.00) −3.098 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 0.652 (0.63) −0.164 (0.82) 0.345 (0.62) 0.212 (0.66)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.032 (0.54) −0.068 (0.01) −0.092 (0.01) −0.115 (0.00)
R¯2 0.23 0.10 0.11 0.09
n 48 127 227 462
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.491 (0.37) 0.831 (0.04) 1.179 (0.00) 1.434 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest −0.009 (0.78) 0.005 (0.77) −0.015 (0.47) 0.011 (0.50)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.950 (0.35) −0.856 (0.32) −1.099 (0.11) −0.781 (0.15)
Primary insiders 5.084 (0.03) 2.516 (0.03) 4.311 (0.00) 2.635 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −7.200 (0.03) −3.469 (0.02) −4.626 (0.01) −3.054 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 0.141 (0.87) −0.109 (0.87) 0.457 (0.43) 0.210 (0.63)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.040 (0.31) −0.065 (0.02) −0.088 (0.00) −0.114 (0.00)
R¯2 0.21 0.10 0.11 0.09
n 53 141 235 485
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow
for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo
Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2):
(Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.10 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.058 (0.72) −0.067 (0.36) 0.127 (0.22) 0.060 (0.36)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) −0.026 (0.74) −0.010 (0.88) −0.100 (0.16) −0.061 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) 0.041 (0.49) 0.034 (0.53) −0.006 (0.93) 0.034 (0.57)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.027 (0.37) −0.028 (0.21) −0.041 (0.21) −0.036 (0.19)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −0.058 (0.38) −0.039 (0.48) −0.056 (0.49) −0.045 (0.49)
R¯2 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
n 44 137 241 510
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.125 (0.56) −0.141 (0.06) 0.035 (0.74) −0.067 (0.26)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) 0.054 (0.46) 0.049 (0.31) 0.015 (0.78) 0.038 (0.36)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) 0.035 (0.44) 0.032 (0.34) 0.066 (0.14) 0.084 (0.02)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.019 (0.56) −0.016 (0.39) −0.018 (0.48) −0.004 (0.86)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.013 (0.84) −0.009 (0.85) −0.029 (0.66) −0.006 (0.90)
R¯2 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01
n 53 148 255 527
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.125 (0.56) −0.141 (0.06) 0.035 (0.74) −0.067 (0.26)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) 0.054 (0.46) 0.049 (0.31) 0.015 (0.78) 0.038 (0.36)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) 0.035 (0.44) 0.032 (0.34) 0.066 (0.14) 0.084 (0.02)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.019 (0.56) −0.016 (0.39) −0.018 (0.48) −0.004 (0.86)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.013 (0.84) −0.009 (0.85) −0.029 (0.66) −0.006 (0.90)
R¯2 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01
n 53 148 255 527
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.214 (0.15) −0.227 (0.00) −0.025 (0.79) −0.084 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) 0.081 (0.04) 0.119 (0.00) 0.028 (0.48) 0.062 (0.05)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) 0.022 (0.47) 0.020 (0.52) 0.048 (0.18) 0.067 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.004 (0.84) −0.005 (0.74) −0.006 (0.76) −0.004 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) −0.014 (0.65) 0.004 (0.88) −0.033 (0.39) −0.007 (0.84)
R¯2 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.02
n 62 169 267 561
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.11 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.037 (0.79) −0.057 (0.50) 0.150 (0.23) 0.039 (0.61)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) −0.055 (0.34) −0.004 (0.95) −0.105 (0.14) −0.065 (0.26)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) 0.048 (0.26) 0.044 (0.42) −0.018 (0.78) 0.034 (0.57)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.047 (0.04) −0.023 (0.31) −0.047 (0.16) −0.035 (0.21)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −0.107 (0.04) −0.043 (0.43) −0.088 (0.27) −0.046 (0.48)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.338 (0.39) −0.365 (0.31) −0.363 (0.35) −0.154 (0.58)
Primary insiders 17.600 (0.00) 1.897 (0.09) 5.260 (0.00) 2.694 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) −27.130 (0.00) −2.760 (0.05) −6.354 (0.00) −3.133 (0.01)
R¯2 0.54 0.06 0.06 0.02
n 44 137 241 510
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.119 (0.62) −0.135 (0.12) 0.113 (0.34) −0.070 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) 0.023 (0.74) 0.048 (0.31) −0.002 (0.97) 0.035 (0.41)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.026 (0.60) 0.024 (0.48) 0.010 (0.82) 0.067 (0.07)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.023 (0.45) −0.012 (0.49) −0.031 (0.22) −0.004 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.038 (0.57) −0.011 (0.82) −0.048 (0.45) −0.005 (0.93)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.385 (0.52) −0.393 (0.29) −0.604 (0.08) −0.291 (0.25)
Primary insiders 8.602 (0.02) 1.995 (0.06) 5.086 (0.00) 2.486 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) −11.764 (0.03) −2.707 (0.05) −5.378 (0.01) −2.703 (0.01)
R¯2 0.21 0.06 0.08 0.03
n 53 148 255 527
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.119 (0.62) −0.135 (0.12) 0.113 (0.34) −0.070 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) 0.023 (0.74) 0.048 (0.31) −0.002 (0.97) 0.035 (0.41)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.026 (0.60) 0.024 (0.48) 0.010 (0.82) 0.067 (0.07)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.023 (0.45) −0.012 (0.49) −0.031 (0.22) −0.004 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.038 (0.57) −0.011 (0.82) −0.048 (0.45) −0.005 (0.93)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.385 (0.52) −0.393 (0.29) −0.604 (0.08) −0.291 (0.25)
Primary insiders 8.602 (0.02) 1.995 (0.06) 5.086 (0.00) 2.486 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) −11.764 (0.03) −2.707 (0.05) −5.378 (0.01) −2.703 (0.01)
R¯2 0.21 0.06 0.08 0.03
n 53 148 255 527
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.104 (0.55) −0.229 (0.01) 0.043 (0.70) −0.090 (0.19)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) 0.054 (0.16) 0.111 (0.00) 0.009 (0.82) 0.055 (0.08)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) −0.012 (0.71) 0.009 (0.78) −0.002 (0.95) 0.051 (0.11)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.012 (0.54) −0.003 (0.85) −0.020 (0.32) −0.004 (0.80)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) −0.028 (0.37) 0.004 (0.88) −0.047 (0.22) −0.005 (0.87)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.609 (0.16) −0.385 (0.30) −0.473 (0.15) −0.276 (0.26)
Primary insiders 4.598 (0.06) 2.604 (0.02) 4.473 (0.00) 2.491 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −6.213 (0.07) −3.425 (0.01) −4.649 (0.01) −2.755 (0.01)
R¯2 0.23 0.14 0.07 0.04
n 62 169 267 561
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.12 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration, orthogonalizing ﬁrm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Q relative
to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.130 (0.54) 0.013 (0.90) 0.185 (0.32) 0.037 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) −0.113 (0.11) 0.016 (0.82) −0.083 (0.25) −0.019 (0.75)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) 0.038 (0.40) 0.033 (0.56) 0.007 (0.92) 0.044 (0.49)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.071 (0.03) −0.041 (0.16) −0.043 (0.20) −0.044 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −0.073 (0.57) 0.001 (1.00) 0.016 (0.91) 0.034 (0.72)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.574 (0.58) −0.376 (0.62) −0.692 (0.43) −0.170 (0.78)
Primary insiders 19.038 (0.00) 1.413 (0.23) 5.404 (0.00) 3.019 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −29.426 (0.00) −2.214 (0.13) −6.522 (0.00) −3.528 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −1.084 (0.34) −0.520 (0.46) 0.211 (0.79) −0.157 (0.76)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.032 (0.43) −0.078 (0.00) −0.101 (0.00) −0.125 (0.00)
R¯2 0.62 0.14 0.11 0.10
n 37 115 212 447
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.089 (0.78) −0.079 (0.48) 0.199 (0.25) −0.005 (0.96)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) 0.016 (0.83) 0.064 (0.22) 0.018 (0.75) 0.068 (0.13)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.033 (0.53) 0.016 (0.64) 0.007 (0.88) 0.057 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.021 (0.58) −0.024 (0.26) −0.040 (0.14) −0.013 (0.54)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) 0.032 (0.74) 0.037 (0.59) 0.040 (0.65) 0.060 (0.39)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.740 (0.62) −0.467 (0.54) −0.963 (0.23) −0.621 (0.27)
Primary insiders 9.504 (0.01) 1.673 (0.13) 4.962 (0.00) 2.566 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −13.022 (0.02) −2.337 (0.10) −5.282 (0.01) −2.840 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 0.269 (0.86) −0.445 (0.52) 0.227 (0.75) 0.140 (0.77)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.043 (0.42) −0.080 (0.00) −0.096 (0.01) −0.117 (0.00)
R¯2 0.25 0.14 0.12 0.10
n 48 127 227 462
Duration: Maintain Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.089 (0.78) −0.079 (0.48) 0.199 (0.25) −0.005 (0.96)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) 0.016 (0.83) 0.064 (0.22) 0.018 (0.75) 0.068 (0.13)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.033 (0.53) 0.016 (0.64) 0.007 (0.88) 0.057 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.021 (0.58) −0.024 (0.26) −0.040 (0.14) −0.013 (0.54)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) 0.032 (0.74) 0.037 (0.59) 0.040 (0.65) 0.060 (0.39)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.740 (0.62) −0.467 (0.54) −0.963 (0.23) −0.621 (0.27)
Primary insiders 9.504 (0.01) 1.673 (0.13) 4.962 (0.00) 2.566 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −13.022 (0.02) −2.337 (0.10) −5.282 (0.01) −2.840 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 0.269 (0.86) −0.445 (0.52) 0.227 (0.75) 0.140 (0.77)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.043 (0.42) −0.080 (0.00) −0.096 (0.01) −0.117 (0.00)
R¯2 0.25 0.14 0.12 0.10
n 48 127 227 462
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.196 (0.49) −0.120 (0.33) 0.195 (0.24) 0.018 (0.85)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) 0.051 (0.24) 0.115 (0.00) 0.016 (0.69) 0.070 (0.03)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) −0.026 (0.48) 0.002 (0.96) −0.010 (0.80) 0.037 (0.27)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.026 (0.29) −0.007 (0.70) −0.028 (0.19) −0.012 (0.50)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) −0.022 (0.56) 0.012 (0.74) −0.013 (0.77) 0.021 (0.57)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −1.567 (0.14) −0.891 (0.27) −1.065 (0.13) −0.758 (0.16)
Primary insiders 3.784 (0.16) 2.138 (0.06) 4.083 (0.00) 2.405 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) −5.451 (0.14) −2.905 (0.05) −4.309 (0.02) −2.736 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 0.475 (0.59) −0.076 (0.91) 0.394 (0.50) 0.219 (0.62)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.070 (0.10) −0.082 (0.00) −0.092 (0.00) −0.117 (0.00)
R¯2 0.29 0.18 0.11 0.11
n 53 141 235 485
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership ownership
concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and
the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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6.2.3 Performance measure: RoA
Table 6.13 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Only ownership dura-
tion. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 36.928 (0.00) 46.650 (0.00) 26.001 (0.53) 37.010 (0.01)
Duration: Maintain Stake −1.785 (0.45) −3.757 (0.20) 4.834 (0.67) 1.735 (0.76)
R¯2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
n 69 241 220 591
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 22.630 (0.01) 43.612 (0.00) 31.098 (0.40) 35.397 (0.01)
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.183 (0.89) −2.584 (0.25) 2.425 (0.77) 1.442 (0.75)
R¯2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
n 70 242 266 628
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 22.630 (0.01) 43.612 (0.00) 31.098 (0.40) 35.397 (0.01)
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.183 (0.89) −2.584 (0.25) 2.425 (0.77) 1.442 (0.75)
R¯2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
n 70 242 266 628
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 24.692 (0.01) 37.747 (0.00) 42.658 (0.25) 36.333 (0.01)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.247 (0.85) −1.611 (0.36) −0.193 (0.98) 0.021 (1.00)
R¯2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 70 244 275 655
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 36.932 (0.00) 44.107 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% −2.342 (0.00) −2.229 (0.65)
R¯2 0.03 0.00
n 350 1400
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 103.294 (0.00) 67.032 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest −20.089 (0.00) −9.154 (0.02)
R¯2 0.06 0.01
n 290 575
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange
ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms;
All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in
appendix A.
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Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 30.446 (0.03) 40.305 (0.00) 16.366 (0.73) 31.554 (0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake −3.592 (0.15) −6.615 (0.04) 4.196 (0.71) 0.471 (0.94)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 83.674 (0.04) 125.043 (0.02) 78.188 (0.54) 57.297 (0.35)
Primary insiders 179.389 (0.43) 6.486 (0.96) −144.505 (0.80) 49.287 (0.82)
Squared (Primary insiders) −325.801 (0.33) −64.029 (0.72) 130.010 (0.85) −93.226 (0.72)
R¯2 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00
n 69 241 220 591
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 16.389 (0.06) 33.572 (0.00) 27.113 (0.51) 29.748 (0.06)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −1.553 (0.27) −4.658 (0.05) 2.912 (0.74) 0.796 (0.86)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 71.923 (0.01) 134.388 (0.01) 33.048 (0.76) 50.676 (0.40)
Primary insiders 330.888 (0.01) 116.789 (0.41) −165.169 (0.75) 56.792 (0.78)
Squared (Primary insiders) −414.851 (0.03) −143.499 (0.40) 145.611 (0.81) −94.888 (0.71)
R¯2 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.00
n 70 242 266 628
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 16.389 (0.06) 33.572 (0.00) 27.113 (0.51) 29.748 (0.06)
Duration: Maintain Rank −1.553 (0.27) −4.658 (0.05) 2.912 (0.74) 0.796 (0.86)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 71.923 (0.01) 134.388 (0.01) 33.048 (0.76) 50.676 (0.40)
Primary insiders 330.888 (0.01) 116.789 (0.41) −165.169 (0.75) 56.792 (0.78)
Squared (Primary insiders) −414.851 (0.03) −143.499 (0.40) 145.611 (0.81) −94.888 (0.71)
R¯2 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.00
n 70 242 266 628
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 14.995 (0.11) 28.598 (0.00) 36.880 (0.40) 29.843 (0.06)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest −0.410 (0.73) −2.495 (0.16) 0.427 (0.96) −0.170 (0.96)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 60.710 (0.00) 105.044 (0.01) 40.654 (0.72) 51.139 (0.37)
Primary insiders 308.694 (0.00) 90.962 (0.45) −153.221 (0.75) 51.761 (0.79)
Squared (Primary insiders) −402.732 (0.00) −114.278 (0.44) 127.648 (0.82) −89.567 (0.70)
R¯2 0.21 0.03 0.00 0.00
n 70 244 275 655
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 29.532 (0.00) 45.206 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% −2.928 (0.00) −1.614 (0.74)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 42.842 (0.00) 6.403 (0.86)
Primary insiders 87.430 (0.11) −150.942 (0.40)
Squared (Primary insiders) −51.872 (0.50) 135.619 (0.54)
R¯2 0.09 0.00
n 350 1400
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 113.172 (0.00) 74.761 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest −17.186 (0.00) −8.684 (0.03)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −114.004 (0.00) −54.747 (0.00)
Primary insiders 91.603 (0.58) 89.866 (0.58)
Squared (Primary insiders) −369.698 (0.10) −71.662 (0.67)
R¯2 0.13 0.03
n 290 570
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner,and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings
by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1):
(Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and
(4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.15 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing ﬁrm
size and fraction held. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 61.334 (0.15) 145.674 (0.00) 228.676 (0.30) 150.483 (0.07)
Duration: Maintain Stake −2.254 (0.31) −4.486 (0.17) 5.119 (0.71) 0.692 (0.92)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −38.062 (0.65) 112.401 (0.33) 523.219 (0.17) 306.411 (0.09)
Primary insiders 78.695 (0.68) −28.600 (0.84) −157.659 (0.81) 44.459 (0.86)
Squared (Primary insiders) −175.589 (0.53) −23.984 (0.89) 126.718 (0.87) −97.900 (0.75)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 69.087 (0.38) −94.633 (0.30) −475.297 (0.17) −243.165 (0.09)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −2.667 (0.36) −6.580 (0.04) −11.851 (0.46) −6.937 (0.25)
R¯2 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.01
n 56 182 175 452
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 23.783 (0.39) 138.506 (0.00) 282.675 (0.13) 165.726 (0.04)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −3.225 (0.03) −1.755 (0.45) 6.620 (0.52) 3.768 (0.50)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 9.113 (0.87) 58.251 (0.57) 532.402 (0.09) 355.610 (0.04)
Primary insiders 269.927 (0.02) 84.729 (0.52) −205.377 (0.72) 42.098 (0.86)
Squared (Primary insiders) −342.871 (0.06) −109.293 (0.49) 185.302 (0.78) −88.344 (0.77)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 63.667 (0.21) −45.215 (0.58) −491.722 (0.07) −285.140 (0.03)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.084 (0.97) −7.206 (0.02) −15.071 (0.28) −8.289 (0.16)
R¯2 0.22 0.05 0.02 0.02
n 58 183 218 488
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 23.783 (0.39) 138.506 (0.00) 282.675 (0.13) 165.726 (0.04)
Duration: Maintain Rank −3.225 (0.03) −1.755 (0.45) 6.620 (0.52) 3.768 (0.50)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 9.113 (0.87) 58.251 (0.57) 532.402 (0.09) 355.610 (0.04)
Primary insiders 269.927 (0.02) 84.729 (0.52) −205.377 (0.72) 42.098 (0.86)
Squared (Primary insiders) −342.871 (0.06) −109.293 (0.49) 185.302 (0.78) −88.344 (0.77)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 63.667 (0.21) −45.215 (0.58) −491.722 (0.07) −285.140 (0.03)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.084 (0.97) −7.206 (0.02) −15.071 (0.28) −8.289 (0.16)
R¯2 0.22 0.05 0.02 0.02
n 58 183 218 488
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 52.706 (0.03) 108.420 (0.01) 274.146 (0.12) 137.951 (0.07)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.784 (0.53) −1.903 (0.32) 2.668 (0.77) 0.705 (0.88)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 70.982 (0.09) 65.625 (0.49) 460.306 (0.12) 285.311 (0.06)
Primary insiders 317.908 (0.00) 35.341 (0.78) −207.838 (0.71) 14.572 (0.95)
Squared (Primary insiders) −432.170 (0.00) −59.141 (0.69) 185.912 (0.77) −58.901 (0.83)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −19.624 (0.57) −44.226 (0.54) −407.904 (0.09) −215.954 (0.07)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −3.380 (0.04) −4.761 (0.09) −14.523 (0.29) −6.296 (0.26)
R¯2 0.35 0.03 0.02 0.01
n 57 184 222 508
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow
for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo
Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2):
(Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.16 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 39.718 (0.00) 47.149 (0.00) 31.337 (0.43) 39.690 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) −4.970 (0.39) −5.233 (0.52) −4.498 (0.85) −5.137 (0.68)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) 0.352 (0.94) −0.791 (0.93) −3.022 (0.89) −2.930 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −3.057 (0.20) −4.516 (0.17) 7.470 (0.52) 4.163 (0.51)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −1.800 (0.73) −4.996 (0.48) −1.895 (0.94) −4.522 (0.73)
R¯2 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
n 69 241 220 591
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 28.809 (0.00) 45.370 (0.00) 36.611 (0.31) 39.004 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −2.899 (0.34) −5.116 (0.40) −6.262 (0.72) −5.339 (0.59)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) 1.138 (0.57) 0.603 (0.90) 5.819 (0.69) 5.960 (0.51)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.011 (0.44) −3.324 (0.19) 3.076 (0.73) 1.857 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.839 (0.76) −5.247 (0.37) −6.075 (0.76) −5.359 (0.65)
R¯2 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
n 70 242 266 628
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 28.809 (0.00) 45.370 (0.00) 36.611 (0.31) 39.004 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −2.899 (0.34) −5.116 (0.40) −6.262 (0.72) −5.339 (0.59)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) 1.138 (0.57) 0.603 (0.90) 5.819 (0.69) 5.960 (0.51)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.011 (0.44) −3.324 (0.19) 3.076 (0.73) 1.857 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.839 (0.76) −5.247 (0.37) −6.075 (0.76) −5.359 (0.65)
R¯2 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
n 70 242 266 628
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 31.179 (0.00) 37.771 (0.00) 43.017 (0.22) 38.206 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) −1.493 (0.44) −2.114 (0.58) −5.998 (0.67) −4.924 (0.51)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) 0.511 (0.74) 0.498 (0.90) 3.597 (0.78) 4.674 (0.55)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.025 (0.32) −1.985 (0.30) 0.971 (0.90) 0.744 (0.86)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) 0.154 (0.92) −2.029 (0.55) −3.927 (0.77) −3.662 (0.63)
R¯2 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
n 70 244 275 655
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.17 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 28.755 (0.03) 39.004 (0.00) 19.376 (0.69) 34.004 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) −7.601 (0.19) −8.783 (0.28) −6.254 (0.79) −7.086 (0.58)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) −1.156 (0.82) −3.480 (0.68) −2.163 (0.92) −3.215 (0.81)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −4.011 (0.09) −6.371 (0.06) 7.262 (0.54) 3.069 (0.64)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −0.075 (0.99) −3.934 (0.58) 1.258 (0.96) −4.259 (0.75)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 81.491 (0.04) 112.271 (0.03) 82.462 (0.53) 55.008 (0.38)
Primary insiders 217.837 (0.35) 15.479 (0.92) −158.945 (0.79) 45.820 (0.83)
Squared (Primary insiders) −395.423 (0.25) −72.396 (0.69) 145.126 (0.83) −92.103 (0.72)
R¯2 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00
n 69 241 220 591
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 16.771 (0.05) 33.948 (0.00) 31.433 (0.46) 33.162 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −4.541 (0.12) −7.142 (0.24) −5.502 (0.75) −6.218 (0.53)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −2.123 (0.33) −1.136 (0.82) 9.083 (0.56) 5.984 (0.52)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.560 (0.23) −4.495 (0.08) 3.954 (0.66) 1.421 (0.78)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.619 (0.81) −4.325 (0.46) −4.935 (0.81) −5.044 (0.67)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 70.708 (0.01) 120.241 (0.02) 36.271 (0.74) 51.665 (0.39)
Primary insiders 374.964 (0.01) 101.248 (0.48) −249.457 (0.64) 32.374 (0.88)
Squared (Primary insiders) −481.932 (0.03) −126.420 (0.47) 228.203 (0.71) −74.180 (0.77)
R¯2 0.19 0.04 0.00 0.00
n 70 242 266 628
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 16.771 (0.05) 33.948 (0.00) 31.433 (0.46) 33.162 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −4.541 (0.12) −7.142 (0.24) −5.502 (0.75) −6.218 (0.53)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −2.123 (0.33) −1.136 (0.82) 9.083 (0.56) 5.984 (0.52)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.560 (0.23) −4.495 (0.08) 3.954 (0.66) 1.421 (0.78)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.619 (0.81) −4.325 (0.46) −4.935 (0.81) −5.044 (0.67)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 70.708 (0.01) 120.241 (0.02) 36.271 (0.74) 51.665 (0.39)
Primary insiders 374.964 (0.01) 101.248 (0.48) −249.457 (0.64) 32.374 (0.88)
Squared (Primary insiders) −481.932 (0.03) −126.420 (0.47) 228.203 (0.71) −74.180 (0.77)
R¯2 0.19 0.04 0.00 0.00
n 70 242 266 628
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 14.791 (0.05) 27.053 (0.00) 36.008 (0.40) 31.888 (0.05)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) −2.941 (0.10) −2.561 (0.50) −4.909 (0.73) −5.089 (0.49)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) −2.425 (0.12) −0.715 (0.85) 6.760 (0.63) 4.935 (0.53)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.932 (0.32) −2.492 (0.20) 2.039 (0.80) 0.642 (0.88)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) 1.087 (0.44) −1.323 (0.70) −2.821 (0.84) −3.297 (0.66)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 70.120 (0.00) 99.501 (0.02) 41.752 (0.71) 49.798 (0.38)
Primary insiders 417.210 (0.00) 86.489 (0.49) −235.989 (0.64) 33.339 (0.86)
Squared (Primary insiders) −539.350 (0.00) −107.515 (0.48) 211.167 (0.72) −75.653 (0.75)
R¯2 0.29 0.03 0.00 0.00
n 70 244 275 655
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.18 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration, orthogonalizing ﬁrm size and fraction held. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 36.362 (0.01) 41.992 (0.00) −42.896 (0.61) 14.531 (0.58)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) 0.295 (0.96) −3.734 (0.67) −10.177 (0.73) −10.731 (0.51)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) 0.774 (0.85) −2.996 (0.71) −6.686 (0.81) −7.510 (0.66)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.938 (0.49) −6.780 (0.09) 0.437 (0.98) −2.173 (0.79)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) 2.783 (0.75) −12.086 (0.29) −14.715 (0.77) −16.930 (0.45)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −22.597 (0.77) 91.358 (0.38) 516.356 (0.18) 285.129 (0.10)
Primary insiders 99.056 (0.62) −40.554 (0.78) −165.508 (0.81) 35.879 (0.89)
Squared (Primary insiders) −211.688 (0.46) −11.556 (0.95) 135.876 (0.86) −91.711 (0.77)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 45.364 (0.59) −99.831 (0.27) −473.273 (0.18) −235.289 (0.10)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −3.616 (0.25) −7.683 (0.02) −11.362 (0.49) −6.858 (0.26)
R¯2 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.01
n 56 182 175 452
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 32.582 (0.00) 34.792 (0.00) −35.963 (0.61) 6.000 (0.82)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −3.034 (0.28) −0.913 (0.88) −6.986 (0.73) −7.551 (0.54)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −1.942 (0.34) −0.240 (0.96) 5.317 (0.77) 2.562 (0.81)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.041 (0.48) −3.415 (0.21) −1.674 (0.87) −3.106 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −2.853 (0.42) −6.390 (0.42) −14.524 (0.66) −13.822 (0.46)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −16.758 (0.75) 54.163 (0.57) 534.799 (0.09) 339.017 (0.04)
Primary insiders 306.070 (0.03) 63.053 (0.64) −292.915 (0.63) 9.490 (0.97)
Squared (Primary insiders) −403.993 (0.06) −84.217 (0.61) 274.636 (0.69) −58.350 (0.85)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 87.166 (0.12) −53.517 (0.51) −495.414 (0.07) −276.142 (0.04)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.354 (0.86) −7.801 (0.01) −13.987 (0.33) −7.913 (0.19)
R¯2 0.23 0.05 0.03 0.02
n 58 183 218 488
Duration: Maintain Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 32.582 (0.00) 34.792 (0.00) −35.963 (0.61) 6.000 (0.82)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −3.034 (0.28) −0.913 (0.88) −6.986 (0.73) −7.551 (0.54)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −1.942 (0.34) −0.240 (0.96) 5.317 (0.77) 2.562 (0.81)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.041 (0.48) −3.415 (0.21) −1.674 (0.87) −3.106 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −2.853 (0.42) −6.390 (0.42) −14.524 (0.66) −13.822 (0.46)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −16.758 (0.75) 54.163 (0.57) 534.799 (0.09) 339.017 (0.04)
Primary insiders 306.070 (0.03) 63.053 (0.64) −292.915 (0.63) 9.490 (0.97)
Squared (Primary insiders) −403.993 (0.06) −84.217 (0.61) 274.636 (0.69) −58.350 (0.85)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 87.166 (0.12) −53.517 (0.51) −495.414 (0.07) −276.142 (0.04)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.354 (0.86) −7.801 (0.01) −13.987 (0.33) −7.913 (0.19)
R¯2 0.23 0.05 0.03 0.02
n 58 183 218 488
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 12.604 (0.27) 35.951 (0.01) −31.399 (0.67) 9.052 (0.73)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) −1.874 (0.30) −1.068 (0.79) −5.334 (0.76) −5.883 (0.52)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) −2.158 (0.16) −0.714 (0.85) 6.143 (0.71) 3.442 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.828 (0.43) −2.782 (0.19) 1.111 (0.91) −0.978 (0.85)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) 0.882 (0.57) −3.283 (0.42) −9.016 (0.63) −8.885 (0.39)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 69.021 (0.11) 58.923 (0.52) 483.359 (0.11) 293.772 (0.06)
Primary insiders 405.161 (0.00) 18.097 (0.89) −297.706 (0.61) −13.945 (0.95)
Squared (Primary insiders) −534.376 (0.00) −38.640 (0.80) 279.820 (0.68) −34.271 (0.90)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −11.935 (0.74) −47.658 (0.52) −432.761 (0.08) −229.124 (0.06)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −3.409 (0.05) −5.319 (0.07) −12.962 (0.35) −5.576 (0.33)
R¯2 0.40 0.03 0.02 0.01
n 57 184 222 508
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership ownership
concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and
the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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6.2.4 Performance measure: RoS
Table 6.19 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Only ownership dura-
tion. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 8.592 (0.00) 6.873 (0.00) 5.882 (0.00) 5.239 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake −0.324 (0.44) −0.040 (0.91) −0.047 (0.93) 0.129 (0.76)
R¯2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 66 209 257 588
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.819 (0.02) 6.348 (0.00) 3.712 (0.02) 4.573 (0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.164 (0.64) 0.144 (0.60) 0.449 (0.22) 0.359 (0.27)
R¯2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
n 65 208 261 588
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.819 (0.02) 6.348 (0.00) 3.712 (0.02) 4.573 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.164 (0.64) 0.144 (0.60) 0.449 (0.22) 0.359 (0.27)
R¯2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
n 65 208 261 588
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 3.124 (0.21) 4.100 (0.00) 2.771 (0.10) 2.891 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.516 (0.11) 0.518 (0.04) 0.551 (0.10) 0.622 (0.02)
R¯2 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
n 67 212 264 606
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 4.005 (0.00) 2.273 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% 0.693 (0.00) 1.147 (0.00)
R¯2 0.04 0.01
n 355 1370
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 15.648 (0.00) 11.356 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest −1.975 (0.00) −0.881 (0.18)
R¯2 0.04 0.00
n 255 510
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange
ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms;
All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in
appendix A.
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Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 8.885 (0.00) 7.480 (0.00) 4.650 (0.02) 4.463 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake −0.112 (0.80) 0.219 (0.57) −0.163 (0.75) 0.065 (0.88)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −9.829 (0.20) −12.033 (0.07) 5.302 (0.37) 3.422 (0.45)
Primary insiders 24.142 (0.56) 6.948 (0.70) 44.056 (0.11) 19.260 (0.23)
Squared (Primary insiders) −29.935 (0.62) −5.299 (0.80) −51.430 (0.11) −18.797 (0.33)
R¯2 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00
n 66 209 257 588
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 6.035 (0.02) 7.378 (0.00) 2.402 (0.19) 4.160 (0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.335 (0.39) 0.330 (0.26) 0.370 (0.32) 0.325 (0.33)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −9.241 (0.20) −12.955 (0.04) 7.082 (0.18) 2.003 (0.66)
Primary insiders 22.743 (0.51) −2.348 (0.89) 33.681 (0.14) 14.181 (0.35)
Squared (Primary insiders) −41.441 (0.44) −0.258 (0.99) −46.341 (0.08) −18.310 (0.31)
R¯2 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00
n 65 208 261 588
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 6.035 (0.02) 7.378 (0.00) 2.402 (0.19) 4.160 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.335 (0.39) 0.330 (0.26) 0.370 (0.32) 0.325 (0.33)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −9.241 (0.20) −12.955 (0.04) 7.082 (0.18) 2.003 (0.66)
Primary insiders 22.743 (0.51) −2.348 (0.89) 33.681 (0.14) 14.181 (0.35)
Squared (Primary insiders) −41.441 (0.44) −0.258 (0.99) −46.341 (0.08) −18.310 (0.31)
R¯2 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00
n 65 208 261 588
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 3.821 (0.16) 5.062 (0.00) 1.186 (0.55) 2.052 (0.09)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.537 (0.11) 0.591 (0.02) 0.509 (0.13) 0.605 (0.03)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −6.268 (0.27) −11.562 (0.07) 6.982 (0.19) 3.452 (0.42)
Primary insiders 16.374 (0.55) 3.722 (0.83) 33.397 (0.13) 27.777 (0.05)
Squared (Primary insiders) −27.432 (0.50) −5.225 (0.80) −39.280 (0.13) −36.917 (0.03)
R¯2 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02
n 67 212 264 606
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 4.731 (0.00) −0.190 (0.83)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% 0.778 (0.00) 1.128 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −10.652 (0.00) 9.374 (0.00)
Primary insiders 41.388 (0.00) 48.697 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −57.844 (0.00) −59.361 (0.00)
R¯2 0.12 0.04
n 355 1370
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 17.817 (0.00) 12.762 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest −1.332 (0.01) −0.822 (0.20)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −26.332 (0.00) −11.151 (0.00)
Primary insiders 49.113 (0.01) 57.852 (0.03)
Squared (Primary insiders) −65.514 (0.01) −38.673 (0.15)
R¯2 0.26 0.08
n 255 505
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner,and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings
by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1):
(Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and
(4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.21 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing ﬁrm
size and fraction held. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.013 (0.87) −1.225 (0.82) −25.074 (0.00) −28.184 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake −0.066 (0.85) 0.327 (0.41) −0.428 (0.41) −0.071 (0.87)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −24.900 (0.07) 6.316 (0.65) −5.124 (0.73) 6.641 (0.52)
Primary insiders 7.927 (0.79) 2.114 (0.90) 32.229 (0.24) 6.288 (0.69)
Squared (Primary insiders) −3.427 (0.94) 0.050 (1.00) −36.837 (0.25) −3.031 (0.87)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 11.985 (0.33) −18.265 (0.10) 9.025 (0.50) −2.410 (0.78)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.657 (0.14) 0.833 (0.03) 2.395 (0.00) 2.625 (0.00)
R¯2 0.22 0.08 0.08 0.10
n 59 187 234 536
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.409 (0.93) −1.246 (0.81) −25.380 (0.00) −28.680 (0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.004 (0.99) 0.499 (0.08) 0.012 (0.97) 0.227 (0.49)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −8.586 (0.40) 18.118 (0.15) 4.670 (0.68) 14.850 (0.12)
Primary insiders 9.775 (0.66) −6.535 (0.69) 28.148 (0.20) 4.306 (0.77)
Squared (Primary insiders) −15.117 (0.65) 4.915 (0.80) −37.730 (0.14) −4.930 (0.78)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −0.370 (0.97) −29.156 (0.00) 0.539 (0.96) −11.021 (0.16)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.676 (0.06) 0.878 (0.01) 2.346 (0.00) 2.693 (0.00)
R¯2 0.20 0.12 0.11 0.12
n 60 187 241 539
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.409 (0.93) −1.246 (0.81) −25.380 (0.00) −28.680 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.004 (0.99) 0.499 (0.08) 0.012 (0.97) 0.227 (0.49)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −8.586 (0.40) 18.118 (0.15) 4.670 (0.68) 14.850 (0.12)
Primary insiders 9.775 (0.66) −6.535 (0.69) 28.148 (0.20) 4.306 (0.77)
Squared (Primary insiders) −15.117 (0.65) 4.915 (0.80) −37.730 (0.14) −4.930 (0.78)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −0.370 (0.97) −29.156 (0.00) 0.539 (0.96) −11.021 (0.16)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.676 (0.06) 0.878 (0.01) 2.346 (0.00) 2.693 (0.00)
R¯2 0.20 0.12 0.11 0.12
n 60 187 241 539
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 2.036 (0.70) −3.605 (0.48) −29.158 (0.00) −31.567 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.199 (0.49) 0.588 (0.02) 0.036 (0.92) 0.346 (0.21)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −9.883 (0.32) 7.793 (0.51) 4.162 (0.71) 8.958 (0.31)
Primary insiders 5.418 (0.81) −3.859 (0.81) 30.027 (0.17) 15.950 (0.25)
Squared (Primary insiders) −10.605 (0.74) 2.874 (0.88) −32.518 (0.20) −21.631 (0.19)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 0.774 (0.93) −18.444 (0.05) 0.444 (0.96) −4.729 (0.50)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.448 (0.24) 0.867 (0.01) 2.600 (0.00) 2.753 (0.00)
R¯2 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.14
n 59 188 240 547
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow
for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo
Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2):
(Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.22 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 7.614 (0.00) 6.844 (0.00) 5.940 (0.00) 5.668 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) −0.816 (0.44) −0.526 (0.59) −0.893 (0.42) −1.440 (0.13)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) 0.258 (0.77) 0.178 (0.86) −0.268 (0.80) −0.298 (0.76)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.056 (0.90) 0.153 (0.70) 0.146 (0.78) 0.310 (0.51)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −0.868 (0.37) −0.294 (0.75) 0.016 (0.99) 0.415 (0.70)
R¯2 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01
n 66 209 257 588
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.569 (0.01) 6.386 (0.00) 4.043 (0.01) 4.922 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −0.068 (0.93) −0.196 (0.80) 0.350 (0.66) −0.506 (0.49)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) 0.249 (0.63) 0.120 (0.84) 0.001 (1.00) −0.227 (0.73)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.320 (0.35) 0.227 (0.46) 0.501 (0.20) 0.479 (0.18)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.029 (0.97) 0.248 (0.75) 0.323 (0.75) 0.811 (0.39)
R¯2 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01
n 65 208 261 588
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.569 (0.01) 6.386 (0.00) 4.043 (0.01) 4.922 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −0.068 (0.93) −0.196 (0.80) 0.350 (0.66) −0.506 (0.49)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) 0.249 (0.63) 0.120 (0.84) 0.001 (1.00) −0.227 (0.73)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.320 (0.35) 0.227 (0.46) 0.501 (0.20) 0.479 (0.18)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.029 (0.97) 0.248 (0.75) 0.323 (0.75) 0.811 (0.39)
R¯2 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01
n 65 208 261 588
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 3.605 (0.06) 4.382 (0.00) 3.229 (0.04) 3.355 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) 0.454 (0.37) 0.431 (0.42) 0.465 (0.48) 0.163 (0.77)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) 0.375 (0.35) 0.356 (0.50) 0.065 (0.91) −0.115 (0.84)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.565 (0.04) 0.539 (0.05) 0.561 (0.11) 0.663 (0.03)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) 0.377 (0.37) 0.529 (0.29) 0.682 (0.31) 0.973 (0.10)
R¯2 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01
n 67 212 264 606
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.23 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 8.822 (0.00) 7.694 (0.00) 4.672 (0.02) 4.832 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) −0.516 (0.63) −0.141 (0.89) −1.002 (0.37) −1.527 (0.11)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) 0.567 (0.53) 0.477 (0.64) −0.303 (0.77) −0.364 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.185 (0.67) 0.356 (0.39) 0.033 (0.95) 0.234 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −1.221 (0.21) −0.414 (0.65) −0.056 (0.97) 0.480 (0.66)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −13.106 (0.09) −12.534 (0.06) 5.190 (0.39) 3.675 (0.42)
Primary insiders 26.524 (0.53) 7.069 (0.69) 43.061 (0.12) 20.272 (0.21)
Squared (Primary insiders) −27.794 (0.65) −5.450 (0.80) −50.380 (0.12) −20.256 (0.29)
R¯2 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.01
n 66 209 257 588
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 6.341 (0.01) 7.554 (0.00) 2.505 (0.18) 4.382 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −0.093 (0.91) −0.013 (0.99) 0.321 (0.68) −0.563 (0.45)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) 0.111 (0.85) 0.234 (0.69) −0.182 (0.79) −0.326 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.379 (0.29) 0.339 (0.28) 0.458 (0.25) 0.448 (0.22)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.087 (0.91) 0.178 (0.82) 0.348 (0.73) 0.840 (0.38)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −7.570 (0.28) −11.833 (0.06) 7.327 (0.17) 2.545 (0.57)
Primary insiders 32.048 (0.43) −1.628 (0.93) 38.529 (0.10) 16.890 (0.27)
Squared (Primary insiders) −55.311 (0.37) −1.398 (0.95) −51.419 (0.06) −21.249 (0.24)
R¯2 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01
n 65 208 261 588
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 6.341 (0.01) 7.554 (0.00) 2.505 (0.18) 4.382 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −0.093 (0.91) −0.013 (0.99) 0.321 (0.68) −0.563 (0.45)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) 0.111 (0.85) 0.234 (0.69) −0.182 (0.79) −0.326 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.379 (0.29) 0.339 (0.28) 0.458 (0.25) 0.448 (0.22)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.087 (0.91) 0.178 (0.82) 0.348 (0.73) 0.840 (0.38)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −7.570 (0.28) −11.833 (0.06) 7.327 (0.17) 2.545 (0.57)
Primary insiders 32.048 (0.43) −1.628 (0.93) 38.529 (0.10) 16.890 (0.27)
Squared (Primary insiders) −55.311 (0.37) −1.398 (0.95) −51.419 (0.06) −21.249 (0.24)
R¯2 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01
n 65 208 261 588
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 4.296 (0.07) 5.418 (0.00) 1.512 (0.44) 2.421 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) 0.335 (0.53) 0.423 (0.44) 0.421 (0.52) 0.106 (0.85)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) 0.250 (0.59) 0.393 (0.47) −0.172 (0.79) −0.248 (0.66)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.553 (0.05) 0.576 (0.04) 0.524 (0.14) 0.654 (0.03)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) 0.322 (0.46) 0.471 (0.35) 0.725 (0.28) 1.016 (0.09)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −4.251 (0.48) −10.163 (0.11) 7.374 (0.17) 3.767 (0.38)
Primary insiders 23.760 (0.47) 4.298 (0.81) 39.941 (0.08) 31.314 (0.03)
Squared (Primary insiders) −38.534 (0.41) −6.327 (0.77) −46.455 (0.09) −40.612 (0.02)
R¯2 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.02
n 67 212 264 606
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.24 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration, orthogonalizing ﬁrm size and fraction held. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 11.500 (0.00) 6.824 (0.00) 6.894 (0.03) 5.069 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) 1.024 (0.24) −0.112 (0.92) −0.605 (0.60) −1.504 (0.12)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) 0.622 (0.35) 0.362 (0.71) 0.298 (0.79) 0.400 (0.70)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.450 (0.30) 0.063 (0.90) 0.355 (0.52) 0.510 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −0.142 (0.92) −0.078 (0.95) 1.044 (0.60) 1.142 (0.40)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −29.796 (0.02) 3.689 (0.77) −7.471 (0.61) 3.332 (0.74)
Primary insiders 1.194 (0.97) 2.321 (0.89) 30.537 (0.27) 7.192 (0.65)
Squared (Primary insiders) 9.451 (0.84) −0.038 (1.00) −34.839 (0.28) −4.270 (0.82)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 16.765 (0.20) −16.410 (0.13) 11.839 (0.38) 0.982 (0.91)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.703 (0.13) 0.846 (0.03) 2.460 (0.00) 2.724 (0.00)
R¯2 0.26 0.08 0.09 0.11
n 59 187 234 536
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 8.236 (0.00) 5.505 (0.00) 3.614 (0.15) 3.494 (0.02)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) 0.380 (0.47) −0.072 (0.92) 0.223 (0.77) −0.720 (0.32)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) 0.119 (0.76) 0.160 (0.78) 0.119 (0.86) 0.142 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.240 (0.37) −0.013 (0.97) 0.589 (0.13) 0.557 (0.13)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) 0.596 (0.36) 0.792 (0.42) 0.780 (0.53) 1.142 (0.30)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −10.711 (0.28) 16.746 (0.16) 3.308 (0.77) 11.987 (0.20)
Primary insiders 11.756 (0.66) −6.718 (0.69) 30.312 (0.19) 5.483 (0.71)
Squared (Primary insiders) −19.686 (0.62) 5.392 (0.79) −40.182 (0.13) −6.388 (0.71)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 2.103 (0.84) −28.016 (0.01) 2.352 (0.82) −7.949 (0.31)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.678 (0.06) 0.874 (0.02) 2.400 (0.00) 2.775 (0.00)
R¯2 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.13
n 60 187 241 539
Duration: Maintain Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 8.236 (0.00) 5.505 (0.00) 3.614 (0.15) 3.494 (0.02)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) 0.380 (0.47) −0.072 (0.92) 0.223 (0.77) −0.720 (0.32)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) 0.119 (0.76) 0.160 (0.78) 0.119 (0.86) 0.142 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.240 (0.37) −0.013 (0.97) 0.589 (0.13) 0.557 (0.13)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) 0.596 (0.36) 0.792 (0.42) 0.780 (0.53) 1.142 (0.30)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −10.711 (0.28) 16.746 (0.16) 3.308 (0.77) 11.987 (0.20)
Primary insiders 11.756 (0.66) −6.718 (0.69) 30.312 (0.19) 5.483 (0.71)
Squared (Primary insiders) −19.686 (0.62) 5.392 (0.79) −40.182 (0.13) −6.388 (0.71)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 2.103 (0.84) −28.016 (0.01) 2.352 (0.82) −7.949 (0.31)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.678 (0.06) 0.874 (0.02) 2.400 (0.00) 2.775 (0.00)
R¯2 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.13
n 60 187 241 539
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 7.449 (0.01) 4.315 (0.01) 2.755 (0.32) 2.289 (0.15)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) 0.526 (0.24) 0.603 (0.25) 0.281 (0.67) 0.110 (0.84)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) 0.158 (0.68) 0.482 (0.33) 0.038 (0.95) 0.307 (0.58)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.353 (0.16) 0.486 (0.07) 0.605 (0.09) 0.838 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) 0.336 (0.38) 0.295 (0.57) 0.738 (0.31) 1.013 (0.10)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −10.510 (0.32) 10.408 (0.37) 2.889 (0.80) 7.566 (0.39)
Primary insiders 7.253 (0.79) −5.602 (0.73) 34.581 (0.13) 17.744 (0.20)
Squared (Primary insiders) −13.123 (0.73) 4.560 (0.82) −37.764 (0.16) −23.782 (0.15)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 2.959 (0.74) −19.808 (0.04) 2.284 (0.81) −3.148 (0.66)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.487 (0.24) 0.928 (0.01) 2.625 (0.00) 2.826 (0.00)
R¯2 0.17 0.12 0.13 0.15
n 59 188 240 547
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership ownership
concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and
the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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6.2.5 Performance measure: Marginal Q
Table 6.25 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Only ownership dura-
tion. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.597 (0.12) 1.476 (0.00) 1.008 (0.00) 1.452 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake 0.054 (0.43) −0.079 (0.14) 0.007 (0.92) −0.086 (0.10)
R¯2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
n 58 201 192 487
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.185 (0.00) 1.452 (0.00) 0.820 (0.00) 1.316 (0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −0.011 (0.85) −0.053 (0.19) 0.039 (0.48) −0.049 (0.23)
R¯2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
n 63 202 235 523
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.185 (0.00) 1.452 (0.00) 0.820 (0.00) 1.316 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank −0.011 (0.85) −0.053 (0.19) 0.039 (0.48) −0.049 (0.23)
R¯2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
n 63 202 235 523
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.333 (0.43) 1.466 (0.00) 0.943 (0.00) 1.267 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.090 (0.10) −0.039 (0.23) 0.025 (0.55) −0.026 (0.45)
R¯2 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
n 65 207 244 558
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 1.108 (0.00) 1.126 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% 0.006 (0.83) −0.015 (0.66)
R¯2 0.00 0.00
n 345 1300
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 1.039 (0.00) 1.537 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest 0.364 (0.02) 0.141 (0.20)
R¯2 0.03 0.00
n 215 435
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange
ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms;
All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in
appendix A.
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Table 6.26 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Basic regression. Per-
formance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.709 (0.10) 1.523 (0.00) 1.047 (0.00) 1.474 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake 0.079 (0.29) −0.062 (0.28) 0.005 (0.94) −0.065 (0.22)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −1.317 (0.28) −0.876 (0.37) −0.191 (0.83) −0.936 (0.13)
Primary insiders −1.047 (0.89) 2.162 (0.41) 1.268 (0.71) 4.020 (0.04)
Squared (Primary insiders) 1.754 (0.88) −3.760 (0.24) −2.103 (0.60) −5.452 (0.02)
R¯2 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02
n 58 201 192 487
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.064 (0.01) 1.439 (0.00) 0.807 (0.00) 1.295 (0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.013 (0.83) −0.046 (0.28) 0.033 (0.56) −0.037 (0.37)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −1.135 (0.29) −0.696 (0.45) −0.064 (0.93) −0.715 (0.23)
Primary insiders 12.272 (0.02) 4.328 (0.08) 5.609 (0.08) 5.506 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −19.653 (0.02) −5.654 (0.06) −8.093 (0.03) −7.360 (0.00)
R¯2 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.03
n 63 202 235 523
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.064 (0.01) 1.439 (0.00) 0.807 (0.00) 1.295 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.013 (0.83) −0.046 (0.28) 0.033 (0.56) −0.037 (0.37)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −1.135 (0.29) −0.696 (0.45) −0.064 (0.93) −0.715 (0.23)
Primary insiders 12.272 (0.02) 4.328 (0.08) 5.609 (0.08) 5.506 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −19.653 (0.02) −5.654 (0.06) −8.093 (0.03) −7.360 (0.00)
R¯2 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.03
n 63 202 235 523
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.242 (0.56) 1.511 (0.00) 0.904 (0.00) 1.250 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.095 (0.06) −0.034 (0.30) 0.021 (0.63) −0.019 (0.56)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.545 (0.50) −0.934 (0.25) 0.190 (0.78) −0.678 (0.21)
Primary insiders 11.700 (0.00) 2.943 (0.18) 4.919 (0.07) 6.392 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −18.330 (0.00) −4.285 (0.11) −7.588 (0.02) −9.002 (0.00)
R¯2 0.21 0.03 0.03 0.04
n 65 207 244 558
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 1.018 (0.00) 0.972 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% 0.001 (0.96) −0.014 (0.67)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.090 (0.81) 0.363 (0.18)
Primary insiders 4.593 (0.02) 8.641 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −5.318 (0.05) −12.488 (0.00)
R¯2 0.02 0.06
n 345 1300
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 1.256 (0.00) 1.655 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest 0.447 (0.00) 0.148 (0.17)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −3.760 (0.00) −1.146 (0.03)
Primary insiders 23.928 (0.01) 12.073 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −45.325 (0.04) −9.062 (0.03)
R¯2 0.16 0.07
n 215 430
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner,and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings
by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1):
(Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and
(4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.27 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing ﬁrm
size and fraction held. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.225 (0.89) 2.455 (0.01) 1.307 (0.29) 1.556 (0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake 0.066 (0.43) −0.066 (0.29) 0.002 (0.98) −0.059 (0.31)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.499 (0.66) 0.180 (0.93) −0.085 (0.97) −2.528 (0.08)
Primary insiders 1.030 (0.91) 1.087 (0.68) 0.687 (0.85) 3.135 (0.13)
Squared (Primary insiders) −2.611 (0.85) −2.688 (0.40) −1.564 (0.72) −4.567 (0.07)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −2.540 (0.42) −1.778 (0.30) −0.275 (0.89) 1.111 (0.34)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.091 (0.43) −0.041 (0.49) −0.009 (0.92) −0.005 (0.92)
R¯2 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.03
n 52 177 168 431
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.442 (0.73) 2.070 (0.01) −0.971 (0.38) 0.894 (0.17)
Duration: Keep Same Rank 0.011 (0.87) −0.041 (0.34) 0.012 (0.84) −0.046 (0.31)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.823 (0.47) −0.228 (0.90) 0.643 (0.73) −1.383 (0.32)
Primary insiders 12.911 (0.02) 3.455 (0.16) 5.631 (0.10) 4.874 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) −18.858 (0.02) −4.745 (0.11) −7.874 (0.05) −6.692 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −2.685 (0.25) −1.260 (0.41) −0.649 (0.68) 0.366 (0.74)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.133 (0.14) −0.025 (0.66) 0.152 (0.07) 0.037 (0.43)
R¯2 0.20 0.05 0.04 0.03
n 57 178 212 468
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −0.442 (0.73) 2.070 (0.01) −0.971 (0.38) 0.894 (0.17)
Duration: Maintain Rank 0.011 (0.87) −0.041 (0.34) 0.012 (0.84) −0.046 (0.31)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.823 (0.47) −0.228 (0.90) 0.643 (0.73) −1.383 (0.32)
Primary insiders 12.911 (0.02) 3.455 (0.16) 5.631 (0.10) 4.874 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) −18.858 (0.02) −4.745 (0.11) −7.874 (0.05) −6.692 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −2.685 (0.25) −1.260 (0.41) −0.649 (0.68) 0.366 (0.74)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.133 (0.14) −0.025 (0.66) 0.152 (0.07) 0.037 (0.43)
R¯2 0.20 0.05 0.04 0.03
n 57 178 212 468
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.004 (1.00) 1.873 (0.01) 0.562 (0.53) 0.770 (0.19)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.082 (0.12) −0.029 (0.41) 0.009 (0.85) −0.026 (0.48)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.396 (0.42) −0.046 (0.98) 0.814 (0.58) −2.014 (0.09)
Primary insiders 12.182 (0.00) 2.098 (0.36) 4.544 (0.11) 5.614 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −18.420 (0.00) −3.409 (0.22) −7.135 (0.03) −8.216 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −2.065 (0.15) −1.529 (0.25) −0.760 (0.53) 0.935 (0.32)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.045 (0.50) −0.004 (0.93) 0.045 (0.51) 0.040 (0.35)
R¯2 0.27 0.05 0.04 0.05
n 57 182 217 493
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow
for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo
Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2):
(Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.28 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.775 (0.03) 1.489 (0.00) 1.040 (0.00) 1.448 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) 0.070 (0.67) −0.092 (0.53) 0.113 (0.42) −0.050 (0.66)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) −0.031 (0.82) −0.069 (0.64) −0.111 (0.40) −0.139 (0.25)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.017 (0.80) −0.097 (0.11) −0.018 (0.80) −0.115 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) 0.012 (0.94) −0.102 (0.45) 0.037 (0.82) −0.028 (0.82)
R¯2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
n 58 201 192 487
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.503 (0.00) 1.503 (0.00) 0.867 (0.00) 1.294 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −0.164 (0.18) −0.108 (0.33) 0.168 (0.13) 0.053 (0.57)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) 0.020 (0.80) 0.008 (0.92) −0.023 (0.81) −0.086 (0.29)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.064 (0.24) −0.081 (0.07) 0.018 (0.75) −0.073 (0.10)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.116 (0.32) −0.087 (0.44) −0.082 (0.56) −0.021 (0.86)
R¯2 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
n 63 202 235 523
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.503 (0.00) 1.503 (0.00) 0.867 (0.00) 1.294 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −0.164 (0.18) −0.108 (0.33) 0.168 (0.13) 0.053 (0.57)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) 0.020 (0.80) 0.008 (0.92) −0.023 (0.81) −0.086 (0.29)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.064 (0.24) −0.081 (0.07) 0.018 (0.75) −0.073 (0.10)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.116 (0.32) −0.087 (0.44) −0.082 (0.56) −0.021 (0.86)
R¯2 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
n 63 202 235 523
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.898 (0.01) 1.460 (0.00) 0.966 (0.00) 1.252 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) 0.013 (0.87) −0.024 (0.73) 0.131 (0.10) 0.050 (0.45)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) 0.065 (0.30) −0.005 (0.94) 0.012 (0.87) −0.055 (0.41)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.002 (0.97) −0.068 (0.06) −0.004 (0.93) −0.054 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) 0.050 (0.45) 0.011 (0.86) 0.031 (0.70) 0.024 (0.73)
R¯2 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
n 65 207 244 558
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.29 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.955 (0.03) 1.564 (0.00) 1.078 (0.00) 1.481 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) 0.096 (0.58) −0.074 (0.62) 0.112 (0.44) −0.033 (0.77)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) −0.015 (0.92) −0.049 (0.74) −0.112 (0.40) −0.130 (0.28)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.026 (0.73) −0.083 (0.18) −0.021 (0.77) −0.098 (0.09)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −0.014 (0.93) −0.115 (0.40) 0.024 (0.88) −0.028 (0.82)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −1.108 (0.39) −0.984 (0.31) −0.205 (0.81) −0.909 (0.14)
Primary insiders −1.935 (0.81) 2.184 (0.41) 1.526 (0.66) 4.130 (0.04)
Squared (Primary insiders) 2.979 (0.81) −3.792 (0.23) −2.302 (0.57) −5.520 (0.02)
R¯2 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03
n 58 201 192 487
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.509 (0.00) 1.514 (0.00) 0.854 (0.00) 1.282 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −0.196 (0.10) −0.110 (0.32) 0.166 (0.14) 0.064 (0.48)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.065 (0.46) −0.014 (0.87) −0.067 (0.49) −0.113 (0.17)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.056 (0.30) −0.075 (0.10) 0.012 (0.84) −0.061 (0.18)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.135 (0.24) −0.095 (0.40) −0.094 (0.50) −0.015 (0.89)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.956 (0.36) −0.754 (0.40) −0.097 (0.90) −0.748 (0.21)
Primary insiders 14.045 (0.02) 4.237 (0.09) 6.721 (0.04) 5.826 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −21.359 (0.02) −5.526 (0.07) −9.256 (0.02) −7.616 (0.00)
R¯2 0.18 0.04 0.04 0.04
n 63 202 235 523
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.509 (0.00) 1.514 (0.00) 0.854 (0.00) 1.282 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −0.196 (0.10) −0.110 (0.32) 0.166 (0.14) 0.064 (0.48)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.065 (0.46) −0.014 (0.87) −0.067 (0.49) −0.113 (0.17)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.056 (0.30) −0.075 (0.10) 0.012 (0.84) −0.061 (0.18)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.135 (0.24) −0.095 (0.40) −0.094 (0.50) −0.015 (0.89)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.956 (0.36) −0.754 (0.40) −0.097 (0.90) −0.748 (0.21)
Primary insiders 14.045 (0.02) 4.237 (0.09) 6.721 (0.04) 5.826 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −21.359 (0.02) −5.526 (0.07) −9.256 (0.02) −7.616 (0.00)
R¯2 0.18 0.04 0.04 0.04
n 63 202 235 523
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.845 (0.02) 1.527 (0.00) 0.921 (0.00) 1.241 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) −0.044 (0.57) −0.034 (0.62) 0.129 (0.10) 0.043 (0.50)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) −0.012 (0.86) −0.015 (0.82) −0.023 (0.77) −0.083 (0.21)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.004 (0.93) −0.063 (0.08) −0.007 (0.88) −0.046 (0.20)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) 0.047 (0.47) 0.006 (0.93) 0.026 (0.74) 0.024 (0.73)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −0.266 (0.76) −0.918 (0.26) 0.204 (0.77) −0.639 (0.24)
Primary insiders 13.480 (0.01) 2.882 (0.20) 5.550 (0.05) 6.687 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −20.170 (0.00) −4.137 (0.14) −8.235 (0.01) −9.217 (0.00)
R¯2 0.18 0.04 0.05 0.05
n 65 207 244 558
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.30 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration, orthogonalizing ﬁrm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.710 (0.23) 1.626 (0.00) 1.108 (0.02) 1.691 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) −0.006 (0.98) −0.048 (0.77) 0.164 (0.31) 0.045 (0.73)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) −0.050 (0.75) −0.080 (0.59) −0.100 (0.52) −0.073 (0.59)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.053 (0.62) −0.143 (0.06) −0.035 (0.67) −0.080 (0.23)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −0.187 (0.57) −0.245 (0.25) 0.075 (0.78) 0.047 (0.79)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 2.316 (0.48) 0.267 (0.89) −0.036 (0.99) −2.288 (0.09)
Primary insiders 0.804 (0.93) 0.771 (0.78) 1.090 (0.77) 3.303 (0.11)
Squared (Primary insiders) −3.110 (0.84) −2.374 (0.46) −1.919 (0.66) −4.689 (0.06)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −3.659 (0.28) −2.285 (0.17) −0.403 (0.84) 0.928 (0.42)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.076 (0.53) −0.065 (0.29) −0.033 (0.72) −0.016 (0.75)
R¯2 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.04
n 52 177 168 431
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.154 (0.02) 1.566 (0.00) 0.729 (0.08) 1.380 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −0.221 (0.08) −0.089 (0.44) 0.181 (0.13) 0.097 (0.32)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.062 (0.50) −0.022 (0.80) −0.045 (0.66) −0.101 (0.25)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.088 (0.19) −0.102 (0.05) 0.010 (0.86) −0.058 (0.25)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.097 (0.54) −0.105 (0.48) −0.155 (0.43) 0.025 (0.87)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 2.069 (0.39) −0.033 (0.99) 0.750 (0.68) −1.159 (0.39)
Primary insiders 13.293 (0.04) 3.146 (0.22) 6.199 (0.08) 5.227 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) −19.241 (0.05) −4.357 (0.16) −8.545 (0.04) −6.996 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −3.092 (0.22) −1.629 (0.28) −0.859 (0.59) 0.099 (0.93)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.131 (0.15) −0.035 (0.54) 0.130 (0.13) 0.019 (0.70)
R¯2 0.25 0.07 0.06 0.04
n 57 178 212 468
Duration: Maintain Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.154 (0.02) 1.566 (0.00) 0.729 (0.08) 1.380 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −0.221 (0.08) −0.089 (0.44) 0.181 (0.13) 0.097 (0.32)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.062 (0.50) −0.022 (0.80) −0.045 (0.66) −0.101 (0.25)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.088 (0.19) −0.102 (0.05) 0.010 (0.86) −0.058 (0.25)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.097 (0.54) −0.105 (0.48) −0.155 (0.43) 0.025 (0.87)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 2.069 (0.39) −0.033 (0.99) 0.750 (0.68) −1.159 (0.39)
Primary insiders 13.293 (0.04) 3.146 (0.22) 6.199 (0.08) 5.227 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) −19.241 (0.05) −4.357 (0.16) −8.545 (0.04) −6.996 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −3.092 (0.22) −1.629 (0.28) −0.859 (0.59) 0.099 (0.93)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.131 (0.15) −0.035 (0.54) 0.130 (0.13) 0.019 (0.70)
R¯2 0.25 0.07 0.06 0.04
n 57 178 212 468
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.539 (0.29) 1.531 (0.00) 0.856 (0.02) 1.472 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) −0.013 (0.87) −0.008 (0.91) 0.168 (0.05) 0.069 (0.33)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) 0.008 (0.90) −0.012 (0.86) −0.011 (0.89) −0.065 (0.37)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.008 (0.86) −0.068 (0.08) −0.007 (0.89) −0.038 (0.33)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) 0.057 (0.41) 0.004 (0.96) 0.022 (0.81) 0.059 (0.46)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.413 (0.46) −0.207 (0.90) 0.791 (0.59) −2.047 (0.09)
Primary insiders 13.028 (0.01) 1.906 (0.42) 5.008 (0.09) 5.959 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) −19.022 (0.01) −3.087 (0.28) −7.647 (0.03) −8.490 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −1.894 (0.23) −1.467 (0.28) −0.756 (0.54) 1.013 (0.29)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.054 (0.47) −0.020 (0.71) 0.026 (0.71) 0.024 (0.58)
R¯2 0.25 0.06 0.06 0.06
n 57 182 217 493
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership ownership
concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and
the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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6.2.6 Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Table 6.31 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Only ownership dura-
tion. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 9.296 (0.10) 0.273 (0.94) 1.525 (0.66) 0.119 (0.96)
Duration: Maintain Stake −2.043 (0.06) −0.749 (0.53) −0.907 (0.36) −0.709 (0.49)
R¯2 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 70 243 252 652
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.886 (0.87) −1.483 (0.68) 2.387 (0.45) −1.032 (0.66)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −0.764 (0.34) −0.326 (0.73) −1.170 (0.12) −0.477 (0.55)
R¯2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
n 70 243 277 670
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.886 (0.87) −1.483 (0.68) 2.387 (0.45) −1.032 (0.66)
Duration: Maintain Rank −0.764 (0.34) −0.326 (0.73) −1.170 (0.12) −0.477 (0.55)
R¯2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
n 70 243 277 670
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 7.668 (0.06) −4.996 (0.11) 2.349 (0.45) −0.471 (0.83)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest −1.363 (0.01) 0.231 (0.73) −0.987 (0.12) −0.565 (0.36)
R¯2 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.00
n 70 245 282 687
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant −0.002 (1.00) 0.600 (0.66)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% −1.071 (0.00) −0.794 (0.14)
R¯2 0.03 0.00
n 355 1440
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 32.533 (0.00) 17.632 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest −10.430 (0.00) −6.558 (0.00)
R¯2 0.06 0.01
n 300 590
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange
ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms;
All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in
appendix A.
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Table 6.32 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Basic regression. Per-
formance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 9.622 (0.12) 0.068 (0.99) −2.155 (0.59) −3.270 (0.24)
Duration: Maintain Stake −2.463 (0.04) −0.921 (0.48) −1.039 (0.29) −1.154 (0.26)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 18.612 (0.37) 9.093 (0.69) 22.729 (0.05) 25.654 (0.01)
Primary insiders −112.054 (0.29) −45.858 (0.44) −29.804 (0.56) 13.370 (0.71)
Squared (Primary insiders) 147.966 (0.34) 71.533 (0.32) 48.069 (0.43) −0.352 (0.99)
R¯2 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.01
n 70 243 252 652
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.646 (0.91) −2.443 (0.54) −0.150 (0.97) −4.872 (0.07)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −1.136 (0.23) −0.510 (0.62) −1.246 (0.10) −0.899 (0.26)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 13.997 (0.45) 8.966 (0.69) 15.446 (0.12) 27.974 (0.00)
Primary insiders 13.283 (0.87) −6.644 (0.91) −19.665 (0.67) 27.194 (0.44)
Squared (Primary insiders) −1.920 (0.99) 37.549 (0.60) 38.048 (0.48) −13.800 (0.74)
R¯2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
n 70 243 277 670
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.646 (0.91) −2.443 (0.54) −0.150 (0.97) −4.872 (0.07)
Duration: Maintain Rank −1.136 (0.23) −0.510 (0.62) −1.246 (0.10) −0.899 (0.26)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 13.997 (0.45) 8.966 (0.69) 15.446 (0.12) 27.974 (0.00)
Primary insiders 13.283 (0.87) −6.644 (0.91) −19.665 (0.67) 27.194 (0.44)
Squared (Primary insiders) −1.920 (0.99) 37.549 (0.60) 38.048 (0.48) −13.800 (0.74)
R¯2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
n 70 243 277 670
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 7.343 (0.08) −5.237 (0.14) −0.737 (0.84) −4.248 (0.10)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest −1.474 (0.01) 0.240 (0.72) −0.924 (0.15) −0.637 (0.30)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 4.302 (0.66) −0.710 (0.97) 16.405 (0.09) 24.707 (0.00)
Primary insiders 22.020 (0.60) −25.891 (0.57) −18.476 (0.66) 4.598 (0.88)
Squared (Primary insiders) −22.270 (0.72) 60.540 (0.28) 33.872 (0.49) 12.593 (0.73)
R¯2 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.02
n 70 245 282 687
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 0.416 (0.76) −1.130 (0.50)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% −1.058 (0.00) −0.737 (0.18)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −7.411 (0.10) 8.512 (0.03)
Primary insiders 5.120 (0.83) −29.611 (0.13)
Squared (Primary insiders) 12.977 (0.69) 51.233 (0.04)
R¯2 0.06 0.01
n 355 1440
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 34.559 (0.00) 23.151 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest −8.223 (0.00) −6.539 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −56.679 (0.00) −37.158 (0.00)
Primary insiders 54.969 (0.51) 129.189 (0.15)
Squared (Primary insiders) −12.891 (0.91) −121.403 (0.19)
R¯2 0.12 0.05
n 300 585
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner,and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings
by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1):
(Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and
(4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.33 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing ﬁrm
size and fraction held. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 50.940 (0.03) 33.005 (0.11) 20.690 (0.19) 6.056 (0.64)
Duration: Maintain Stake −1.984 (0.10) −0.527 (0.72) −0.673 (0.52) −0.787 (0.49)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −35.344 (0.42) 22.599 (0.66) −26.125 (0.36) −3.923 (0.89)
Primary insiders −127.014 (0.20) −69.687 (0.26) −12.390 (0.81) 12.278 (0.76)
Squared (Primary insiders) 185.265 (0.20) 99.243 (0.18) 29.021 (0.63) 7.116 (0.88)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 32.446 (0.44) −30.666 (0.45) 49.141 (0.06) 33.506 (0.13)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −3.289 (0.05) −2.186 (0.13) −2.429 (0.04) −1.261 (0.18)
R¯2 0.16 0.03 0.07 0.03
n 56 180 202 484
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.861 (0.92) 16.393 (0.44) 17.633 (0.21) 1.461 (0.91)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −2.096 (0.03) 0.433 (0.70) −1.131 (0.15) −0.707 (0.42)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −16.902 (0.63) −2.803 (0.95) −12.072 (0.62) −6.699 (0.80)
Primary insiders 7.124 (0.92) −21.399 (0.73) −10.308 (0.82) 31.240 (0.42)
Squared (Primary insiders) 15.467 (0.89) 57.234 (0.44) 23.832 (0.65) −13.064 (0.78)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 34.364 (0.29) −9.013 (0.82) 34.158 (0.10) 40.641 (0.06)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.079 (0.95) −1.526 (0.29) −1.923 (0.07) −1.156 (0.21)
R¯2 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.03
n 57 180 226 502
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.861 (0.92) 16.393 (0.44) 17.633 (0.21) 1.461 (0.91)
Duration: Maintain Rank −2.096 (0.03) 0.433 (0.70) −1.131 (0.15) −0.707 (0.42)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −16.902 (0.63) −2.803 (0.95) −12.072 (0.62) −6.699 (0.80)
Primary insiders 7.124 (0.92) −21.399 (0.73) −10.308 (0.82) 31.240 (0.42)
Squared (Primary insiders) 15.467 (0.89) 57.234 (0.44) 23.832 (0.65) −13.064 (0.78)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 34.364 (0.29) −9.013 (0.82) 34.158 (0.10) 40.641 (0.06)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.079 (0.95) −1.526 (0.29) −1.923 (0.07) −1.156 (0.21)
R¯2 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.03
n 57 180 226 502
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 2.857 (0.80) −4.674 (0.79) 11.784 (0.38) −6.982 (0.53)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest −1.392 (0.02) 0.437 (0.58) −0.674 (0.34) −0.507 (0.46)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −18.003 (0.34) −25.166 (0.52) 0.224 (0.99) 0.979 (0.97)
Primary insiders 40.788 (0.33) −50.893 (0.31) −4.982 (0.91) −1.414 (0.97)
Squared (Primary insiders) −40.722 (0.49) 90.476 (0.14) 17.161 (0.73) 24.333 (0.55)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 22.315 (0.15) 11.384 (0.70) 21.933 (0.24) 29.631 (0.09)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.007 (0.99) −0.103 (0.93) −1.457 (0.16) −0.270 (0.74)
R¯2 0.15 0.02 0.05 0.03
n 56 181 227 515
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow
for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo
Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2):
(Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.34 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 8.202 (0.10) 0.144 (0.97) 0.807 (0.81) −0.343 (0.89)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) −2.694 (0.31) 1.181 (0.72) 1.157 (0.59) 0.906 (0.69)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) −0.414 (0.86) 1.068 (0.75) −0.384 (0.85) 0.658 (0.79)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −2.200 (0.04) −1.571 (0.24) −1.220 (0.24) −1.121 (0.32)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −2.471 (0.29) −0.767 (0.79) −1.528 (0.51) −0.877 (0.70)
R¯2 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00
n 70 243 252 652
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 3.097 (0.52) −1.257 (0.73) 2.078 (0.51) −1.087 (0.65)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −2.700 (0.13) 0.683 (0.79) −1.513 (0.33) −0.096 (0.96)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.224 (0.85) 0.739 (0.72) 0.439 (0.74) 1.232 (0.45)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.279 (0.10) −1.019 (0.34) −1.433 (0.07) −0.908 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.864 (0.58) −0.370 (0.88) −1.443 (0.42) −0.777 (0.71)
R¯2 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00
n 70 243 277 670
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 3.097 (0.52) −1.257 (0.73) 2.078 (0.51) −1.087 (0.65)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −2.700 (0.13) 0.683 (0.79) −1.513 (0.33) −0.096 (0.96)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.224 (0.85) 0.739 (0.72) 0.439 (0.74) 1.232 (0.45)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.279 (0.10) −1.019 (0.34) −1.433 (0.07) −0.908 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.864 (0.58) −0.370 (0.88) −1.443 (0.42) −0.777 (0.71)
R¯2 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00
n 70 243 277 670
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 3.093 (0.29) −4.656 (0.12) 1.650 (0.58) −0.575 (0.79)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) −1.115 (0.16) 1.100 (0.44) −1.515 (0.22) −0.754 (0.54)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) −0.323 (0.60) 0.678 (0.64) 0.049 (0.97) 0.521 (0.68)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.008 (0.02) −0.300 (0.68) −1.104 (0.10) −0.744 (0.28)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) −0.354 (0.58) 0.296 (0.82) −0.133 (0.91) −0.503 (0.69)
R¯2 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.00
n 70 245 282 687
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.35 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 7.979 (0.18) −0.065 (0.99) −3.030 (0.45) −3.967 (0.17)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) −2.687 (0.33) 1.266 (0.71) 0.856 (0.69) 0.232 (0.92)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) −0.647 (0.79) 0.995 (0.77) −0.312 (0.88) 0.428 (0.86)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −2.165 (0.06) −1.617 (0.24) −1.259 (0.23) −1.553 (0.17)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −2.107 (0.39) −0.675 (0.81) −0.756 (0.75) −0.405 (0.86)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 7.557 (0.72) 5.712 (0.80) 21.271 (0.07) 25.328 (0.01)
Primary insiders −97.955 (0.37) −47.819 (0.42) −28.386 (0.59) 13.788 (0.71)
Squared (Primary insiders) 131.938 (0.42) 74.554 (0.30) 47.212 (0.44) −0.202 (1.00)
R¯2 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.02
n 70 243 252 652
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 2.282 (0.68) −2.342 (0.58) −0.541 (0.88) −5.229 (0.06)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −2.833 (0.13) 0.704 (0.79) −1.574 (0.31) −0.654 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.337 (0.81) 0.686 (0.74) 0.801 (0.57) 0.982 (0.55)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.401 (0.09) −1.181 (0.28) −1.412 (0.08) −1.296 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.880 (0.59) −0.249 (0.92) −1.182 (0.51) −0.307 (0.88)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 8.709 (0.62) 7.805 (0.73) 14.923 (0.13) 28.278 (0.00)
Primary insiders −6.402 (0.95) −13.685 (0.82) −38.268 (0.42) 23.302 (0.51)
Squared (Primary insiders) 24.837 (0.86) 47.627 (0.52) 57.344 (0.30) −9.320 (0.83)
R¯2 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02
n 70 243 277 670
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 2.282 (0.68) −2.342 (0.58) −0.541 (0.88) −5.229 (0.06)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −2.833 (0.13) 0.704 (0.79) −1.574 (0.31) −0.654 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.337 (0.81) 0.686 (0.74) 0.801 (0.57) 0.982 (0.55)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.401 (0.09) −1.181 (0.28) −1.412 (0.08) −1.296 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.880 (0.59) −0.249 (0.92) −1.182 (0.51) −0.307 (0.88)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 8.709 (0.62) 7.805 (0.73) 14.923 (0.13) 28.278 (0.00)
Primary insiders −6.402 (0.95) −13.685 (0.82) −38.268 (0.42) 23.302 (0.51)
Squared (Primary insiders) 24.837 (0.86) 47.627 (0.52) 57.344 (0.30) −9.320 (0.83)
R¯2 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02
n 70 243 277 670
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 3.396 (0.34) −5.045 (0.16) −1.896 (0.60) −4.609 (0.07)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) −1.197 (0.16) 1.291 (0.37) −1.416 (0.25) −0.766 (0.53)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) −0.457 (0.54) 0.804 (0.59) 0.476 (0.69) 0.577 (0.65)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.053 (0.02) −0.352 (0.63) −0.993 (0.14) −0.866 (0.21)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) −0.404 (0.54) 0.373 (0.77) 0.242 (0.84) −0.096 (0.94)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −2.037 (0.84) 1.140 (0.95) 17.478 (0.07) 25.324 (0.00)
Primary insiders 13.875 (0.79) −34.194 (0.46) −28.786 (0.51) 2.712 (0.93)
Squared (Primary insiders) −12.903 (0.86) 71.430 (0.21) 45.976 (0.37) 14.878 (0.69)
R¯2 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.02
n 70 245 282 687
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.36 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration, orthogonalizing ﬁrm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Market
Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 10.151 (0.13) −2.263 (0.69) 3.020 (0.61) −3.786 (0.37)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) −0.015 (1.00) 3.642 (0.34) 0.659 (0.77) 1.583 (0.53)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) 0.099 (0.96) 1.004 (0.77) 0.480 (0.83) 1.899 (0.48)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.206 (0.41) −1.602 (0.35) −0.380 (0.73) −0.212 (0.87)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) 0.730 (0.87) −2.843 (0.56) 0.898 (0.82) 1.199 (0.73)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −39.000 (0.32) 16.158 (0.73) −28.345 (0.32) −6.538 (0.81)
Primary insiders −120.217 (0.24) −79.583 (0.20) −12.785 (0.80) 11.018 (0.79)
Squared (Primary insiders) 177.213 (0.24) 110.874 (0.13) 29.652 (0.62) 8.653 (0.86)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 28.579 (0.51) −36.004 (0.35) 50.812 (0.05) 35.560 (0.11)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −3.875 (0.03) −2.854 (0.05) −2.502 (0.04) −1.305 (0.17)
R¯2 0.17 0.05 0.07 0.03
n 56 180 202 484
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 6.204 (0.30) −7.018 (0.22) 3.055 (0.56) −5.645 (0.16)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −2.302 (0.20) 3.603 (0.22) −2.165 (0.17) 0.396 (0.84)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.321 (0.80) 1.296 (0.54) 1.086 (0.44) 2.126 (0.22)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.964 (0.32) −0.467 (0.71) −1.032 (0.20) −0.059 (0.95)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −0.262 (0.91) 0.155 (0.97) −0.426 (0.87) 1.399 (0.63)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −24.655 (0.44) 6.407 (0.89) −12.520 (0.60) −5.943 (0.82)
Primary insiders −5.248 (0.95) −34.574 (0.59) −30.449 (0.51) 25.274 (0.52)
Squared (Primary insiders) 27.018 (0.84) 74.369 (0.33) 45.023 (0.40) −6.696 (0.89)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 35.711 (0.32) −21.445 (0.57) 34.322 (0.11) 40.990 (0.05)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.084 (0.95) −1.957 (0.19) −1.770 (0.10) −1.068 (0.25)
R¯2 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.04
n 57 180 226 502
Duration: Maintain Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 6.204 (0.30) −7.018 (0.22) 3.055 (0.56) −5.645 (0.16)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −2.302 (0.20) 3.603 (0.22) −2.165 (0.17) 0.396 (0.84)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.321 (0.80) 1.296 (0.54) 1.086 (0.44) 2.126 (0.22)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.964 (0.32) −0.467 (0.71) −1.032 (0.20) −0.059 (0.95)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −0.262 (0.91) 0.155 (0.97) −0.426 (0.87) 1.399 (0.63)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −24.655 (0.44) 6.407 (0.89) −12.520 (0.60) −5.943 (0.82)
Primary insiders −5.248 (0.95) −34.574 (0.59) −30.449 (0.51) 25.274 (0.52)
Squared (Primary insiders) 27.018 (0.84) 74.369 (0.33) 45.023 (0.40) −6.696 (0.89)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 35.711 (0.32) −21.445 (0.57) 34.322 (0.11) 40.990 (0.05)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.084 (0.95) −1.957 (0.19) −1.770 (0.10) −1.068 (0.25)
R¯2 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.04
n 57 180 226 502
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 2.162 (0.65) −4.412 (0.39) 0.104 (0.98) −3.809 (0.33)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) −0.774 (0.36) 2.279 (0.17) −1.832 (0.16) −0.294 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) −0.498 (0.48) 1.221 (0.44) 0.477 (0.70) 1.113 (0.42)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.524 (0.28) 0.048 (0.96) −0.870 (0.22) −0.395 (0.60)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) 0.781 (0.29) 0.452 (0.78) 1.160 (0.41) 0.694 (0.65)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −26.802 (0.17) −20.179 (0.60) −1.868 (0.93) −1.075 (0.96)
Primary insiders 57.018 (0.27) −64.614 (0.21) −13.447 (0.76) −4.898 (0.89)
Squared (Primary insiders) −63.117 (0.37) 107.062 (0.09) 27.447 (0.60) 28.244 (0.49)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 30.253 (0.07) 7.175 (0.81) 25.073 (0.18) 32.193 (0.07)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.275 (0.74) −0.335 (0.78) −1.466 (0.16) −0.212 (0.80)
R¯2 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.03
n 56 181 227 515
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership ownership
concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and
the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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6.2.7 Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Table 6.37 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Only ownership dura-
tion. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.741 (0.49) 2.769 (0.54) −3.463 (0.54) −4.275 (0.24)
Duration: Maintain Stake −1.174 (0.45) −0.902 (0.53) −0.339 (0.81) −0.337 (0.81)
R¯2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 65 232 188 518
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.423 (0.87) 1.858 (0.65) −6.901 (0.24) −6.292 (0.06)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −0.595 (0.64) −0.602 (0.57) −0.129 (0.92) −0.104 (0.92)
R¯2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 67 236 235 567
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1.423 (0.87) 1.858 (0.65) −6.901 (0.24) −6.292 (0.06)
Duration: Maintain Rank −0.595 (0.64) −0.602 (0.57) −0.129 (0.92) −0.104 (0.92)
R¯2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 67 236 235 567
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −10.958 (0.29) −2.160 (0.59) −13.982 (0.03) −9.192 (0.01)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 1.051 (0.42) 0.154 (0.85) 0.749 (0.54) 0.184 (0.84)
R¯2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 68 238 250 599
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 0.607 (0.81) −11.460 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% −0.720 (0.29) 1.091 (0.30)
R¯2 0.00 0.00
n 345 1340
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 33.734 (0.00) 8.806 (0.07)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest −7.843 (0.01) −1.289 (0.63)
R¯2 0.02 0.00
n 270 545
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange
ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms;
All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in
appendix A.
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Table 6.38 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Basic regression. Per-
formance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.974 (0.51) 5.458 (0.27) −6.219 (0.33) −6.182 (0.13)
Duration: Maintain Stake −1.541 (0.38) −1.655 (0.29) −0.614 (0.67) −1.162 (0.40)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 16.362 (0.60) 25.933 (0.36) 21.317 (0.21) 40.767 (0.00)
Primary insiders −107.036 (0.47) −191.341 (0.01) 9.551 (0.90) −95.894 (0.06)
Squared (Primary insiders) 161.908 (0.46) 200.937 (0.02) −22.952 (0.80) 90.493 (0.13)
R¯2 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03
n 65 232 188 518
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.344 (0.97) 2.644 (0.56) −9.182 (0.16) −8.821 (0.02)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −0.989 (0.52) −0.683 (0.55) −0.224 (0.86) −0.392 (0.72)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 18.019 (0.55) 17.828 (0.51) 14.039 (0.42) 36.041 (0.01)
Primary insiders 74.288 (0.55) −127.570 (0.05) 48.192 (0.55) −70.972 (0.14)
Squared (Primary insiders) −111.949 (0.56) 145.840 (0.07) −76.756 (0.41) 64.093 (0.27)
R¯2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
n 67 236 235 567
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.344 (0.97) 2.644 (0.56) −9.182 (0.16) −8.821 (0.02)
Duration: Maintain Rank −0.989 (0.52) −0.683 (0.55) −0.224 (0.86) −0.392 (0.72)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 18.019 (0.55) 17.828 (0.51) 14.039 (0.42) 36.041 (0.01)
Primary insiders 74.288 (0.55) −127.570 (0.05) 48.192 (0.55) −70.972 (0.14)
Squared (Primary insiders) −111.949 (0.56) 145.840 (0.07) −76.756 (0.41) 64.093 (0.27)
R¯2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
n 67 236 235 567
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −11.946 (0.27) −1.317 (0.77) −15.749 (0.03) −11.329 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 1.208 (0.39) 0.069 (0.94) 1.055 (0.40) 0.151 (0.87)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.156 (0.96) 19.088 (0.40) 14.460 (0.43) 34.734 (0.01)
Primary insiders 30.448 (0.76) −127.624 (0.02) −73.013 (0.36) −96.840 (0.03)
Squared (Primary insiders) −76.023 (0.61) 145.540 (0.04) 54.007 (0.56) 87.229 (0.11)
R¯2 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
n 68 238 250 599
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 0.954 (0.74) −12.519 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1% −0.725 (0.30) 1.616 (0.12)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.253 (0.98) 14.369 (0.07)
Primary insiders −35.284 (0.47) −113.164 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) 52.941 (0.45) 101.333 (0.03)
R¯2 0.01 0.02
n 345 1340
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (2) (4)
constant 33.620 (0.00) 15.155 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest −2.133 (0.47) −0.090 (0.97)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −84.814 (0.00) −49.739 (0.00)
Primary insiders −323.110 (0.00) −56.526 (0.60)
Squared (Primary insiders) 652.008 (0.00) 87.333 (0.43)
R¯2 0.16 0.04
n 270 540
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner,and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings
by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1):
(Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and
(4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.39 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing ﬁrm
size and fraction held. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 44.344 (0.20) 81.884 (0.00) −19.141 (0.47) −21.865 (0.25)
Duration: Maintain Stake −1.961 (0.26) −1.565 (0.34) −0.787 (0.61) −0.853 (0.57)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −53.212 (0.39) 58.689 (0.32) −20.702 (0.63) −3.180 (0.93)
Primary insiders −166.713 (0.24) −254.053 (0.00) 29.698 (0.70) −113.304 (0.04)
Squared (Primary insiders) 248.735 (0.23) 262.324 (0.00) −44.230 (0.62) 109.933 (0.09)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 59.953 (0.31) −55.593 (0.23) 56.509 (0.16) 44.727 (0.15)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −2.667 (0.26) −4.751 (0.00) 0.297 (0.88) 0.724 (0.60)
R¯2 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.03
n 54 175 147 385
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 29.311 (0.27) 72.169 (0.00) 12.532 (0.64) −11.391 (0.53)
Duration: Keep Same Rank −2.305 (0.09) −0.015 (0.99) 0.039 (0.98) 0.126 (0.92)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 18.502 (0.70) 19.904 (0.70) 14.814 (0.74) 11.485 (0.76)
Primary insiders 17.734 (0.86) −184.252 (0.00) 63.396 (0.44) −74.850 (0.16)
Squared (Primary insiders) −24.961 (0.87) 201.177 (0.01) −95.820 (0.32) 68.166 (0.29)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −11.556 (0.80) −31.004 (0.44) 5.768 (0.88) 21.881 (0.46)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.884 (0.63) −4.533 (0.00) −1.931 (0.35) −0.200 (0.88)
R¯2 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.02
n 56 178 192 430
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 29.311 (0.27) 72.169 (0.00) 12.532 (0.64) −11.391 (0.53)
Duration: Maintain Rank −2.305 (0.09) −0.015 (0.99) 0.039 (0.98) 0.126 (0.92)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 18.502 (0.70) 19.904 (0.70) 14.814 (0.74) 11.485 (0.76)
Primary insiders 17.734 (0.86) −184.252 (0.00) 63.396 (0.44) −74.850 (0.16)
Squared (Primary insiders) −24.961 (0.87) 201.177 (0.01) −95.820 (0.32) 68.166 (0.29)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −11.556 (0.80) −31.004 (0.44) 5.768 (0.88) 21.881 (0.46)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −0.884 (0.63) −4.533 (0.00) −1.931 (0.35) −0.200 (0.88)
R¯2 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.02
n 56 178 192 430
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 33.464 (0.21) 53.189 (0.01) −18.075 (0.52) −37.262 (0.03)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest 0.610 (0.66) 0.431 (0.63) 1.774 (0.22) 0.573 (0.57)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 40.431 (0.35) 14.406 (0.75) 46.660 (0.30) 17.102 (0.61)
Primary insiders 3.320 (0.97) −195.506 (0.00) −46.957 (0.58) −116.252 (0.02)
Squared (Primary insiders) −44.578 (0.74) 211.981 (0.00) 27.413 (0.78) 108.148 (0.07)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −49.958 (0.16) −22.521 (0.50) −11.405 (0.76) 18.514 (0.48)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −2.175 (0.22) −3.304 (0.01) −0.365 (0.87) 1.690 (0.18)
R¯2 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.03
n 55 179 201 456
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the
largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow
for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo
Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2):
(Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.40 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 4.927 (0.49) 2.699 (0.55) −1.650 (0.76) −3.119 (0.39)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) −4.078 (0.27) −1.849 (0.64) −3.005 (0.32) −2.961 (0.34)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) −0.625 (0.84) 0.582 (0.89) 2.512 (0.39) 3.359 (0.32)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.877 (0.57) −1.233 (0.45) −1.037 (0.49) −1.101 (0.47)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −0.883 (0.79) 0.237 (0.95) −0.725 (0.82) 0.310 (0.92)
R¯2 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01
n 65 232 188 518
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 8.066 (0.30) 2.799 (0.50) −5.031 (0.38) −5.301 (0.12)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −4.010 (0.15) −1.833 (0.52) −0.423 (0.87) −1.091 (0.65)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.940 (0.60) 1.036 (0.65) 0.638 (0.77) 1.651 (0.46)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.446 (0.24) −1.131 (0.34) −0.733 (0.58) −0.770 (0.52)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −3.223 (0.19) −1.062 (0.70) −2.694 (0.37) −0.443 (0.88)
R¯2 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00
n 67 236 235 567
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 8.066 (0.30) 2.799 (0.50) −5.031 (0.38) −5.301 (0.12)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −4.010 (0.15) −1.833 (0.52) −0.423 (0.87) −1.091 (0.65)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −0.940 (0.60) 1.036 (0.65) 0.638 (0.77) 1.651 (0.46)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.446 (0.24) −1.131 (0.34) −0.733 (0.58) −0.770 (0.52)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −3.223 (0.19) −1.062 (0.70) −2.694 (0.37) −0.443 (0.88)
R¯2 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00
n 67 236 235 567
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −1.808 (0.80) −1.468 (0.70) −10.889 (0.07) −7.892 (0.02)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) −0.912 (0.63) 0.116 (0.95) −0.077 (0.97) −1.094 (0.54)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) −0.240 (0.87) 0.751 (0.68) −0.051 (0.98) 0.212 (0.91)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.160 (0.88) −0.294 (0.75) −0.021 (0.99) −0.281 (0.78)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) 0.100 (0.95) 0.253 (0.87) 0.852 (0.70) 0.591 (0.75)
R¯2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 68 238 250 599
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.41 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type
with ownership duration. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 3.768 (0.66) 4.577 (0.38) −5.235 (0.40) −5.835 (0.16)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) −4.085 (0.30) −2.021 (0.62) −3.580 (0.24) −4.252 (0.17)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) −0.921 (0.78) −0.056 (0.99) 2.571 (0.38) 3.168 (0.35)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.860 (0.59) −1.650 (0.32) −1.211 (0.42) −1.768 (0.25)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) −0.503 (0.88) 0.212 (0.95) −0.059 (0.99) 0.373 (0.91)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 12.658 (0.68) 22.823 (0.42) 23.859 (0.17) 43.048 (0.00)
Primary insiders −93.967 (0.54) −187.827 (0.01) 7.774 (0.92) −92.265 (0.07)
Squared (Primary insiders) 143.375 (0.53) 197.814 (0.02) −24.590 (0.78) 84.595 (0.16)
R¯2 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
n 65 232 188 518
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.640 (0.52) 3.586 (0.45) −7.428 (0.26) −8.263 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −4.431 (0.13) −1.603 (0.58) −0.424 (0.87) −1.619 (0.49)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −1.740 (0.42) 1.926 (0.41) 0.647 (0.78) 2.276 (0.31)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.525 (0.24) −1.152 (0.34) −0.690 (0.61) −0.967 (0.42)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −3.181 (0.22) −0.994 (0.72) −2.520 (0.41) −0.213 (0.94)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 14.232 (0.61) 15.076 (0.56) 12.759 (0.46) 37.355 (0.01)
Primary insiders 101.748 (0.48) −141.112 (0.04) 38.838 (0.64) −77.474 (0.11)
Squared (Primary insiders) −145.853 (0.50) 161.429 (0.05) −67.093 (0.48) 70.873 (0.23)
R¯2 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02
n 67 236 235 567
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 5.640 (0.52) 3.586 (0.45) −7.428 (0.26) −8.263 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −4.431 (0.13) −1.603 (0.58) −0.424 (0.87) −1.619 (0.49)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −1.740 (0.42) 1.926 (0.41) 0.647 (0.78) 2.276 (0.31)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −1.525 (0.24) −1.152 (0.34) −0.690 (0.61) −0.967 (0.42)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −3.181 (0.22) −0.994 (0.72) −2.520 (0.41) −0.213 (0.94)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 14.232 (0.61) 15.076 (0.56) 12.759 (0.46) 37.355 (0.01)
Primary insiders 101.748 (0.48) −141.112 (0.04) 38.838 (0.64) −77.474 (0.11)
Squared (Primary insiders) −145.853 (0.50) 161.429 (0.05) −67.093 (0.48) 70.873 (0.23)
R¯2 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02
n 67 236 235 567
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant −4.155 (0.64) −1.124 (0.80) −13.580 (0.06) −10.651 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) −1.144 (0.57) 0.565 (0.75) 0.331 (0.89) −0.947 (0.60)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) −0.569 (0.75) 1.538 (0.40) 1.058 (0.64) 1.084 (0.57)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.026 (0.98) −0.344 (0.71) 0.396 (0.76) −0.256 (0.80)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) 0.290 (0.86) 0.242 (0.88) 1.262 (0.57) 0.702 (0.70)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 9.571 (0.70) 19.081 (0.40) 15.810 (0.40) 35.788 (0.01)
Primary insiders 74.875 (0.54) −139.556 (0.02) −74.576 (0.37) −98.048 (0.03)
Squared (Primary insiders) −127.607 (0.47) 159.708 (0.03) 56.378 (0.56) 88.562 (0.11)
R¯2 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
n 68 238 250 599
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of
Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners)
(2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable
deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.42 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner
type with ownership duration, orthogonalizing ﬁrm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Fama
French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 13.362 (0.17) 6.127 (0.34) −0.516 (0.96) −2.762 (0.63)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner) 1.578 (0.69) 2.641 (0.54) −1.849 (0.57) −2.500 (0.47)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner) −0.911 (0.76) −1.254 (0.75) 1.771 (0.57) 3.040 (0.40)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −0.258 (0.90) −3.037 (0.12) −0.285 (0.86) −0.314 (0.86)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner) 9.294 (0.15) 1.704 (0.76) 5.078 (0.35) 3.374 (0.47)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) −54.900 (0.32) 46.254 (0.38) −21.520 (0.62) −2.207 (0.95)
Primary insiders −149.023 (0.30) −255.280 (0.00) 28.765 (0.71) −110.015 (0.05)
Squared (Primary insiders) 231.210 (0.27) 266.399 (0.00) −44.566 (0.62) 105.305 (0.11)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 68.963 (0.26) −54.700 (0.22) 61.067 (0.14) 47.108 (0.13)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −3.390 (0.17) −5.632 (0.00) 0.247 (0.90) 0.877 (0.53)
R¯2 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.04
n 54 175 147 385
Duration: Keep Same Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 19.849 (0.02) 4.530 (0.44) −8.163 (0.42) −9.103 (0.11)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner) −2.868 (0.23) 2.819 (0.35) 0.197 (0.94) −0.017 (0.99)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner) −2.266 (0.20) 1.692 (0.44) −0.437 (0.86) 2.488 (0.29)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −3.135 (0.02) −1.894 (0.15) −0.917 (0.53) −0.152 (0.91)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner) −5.375 (0.07) −0.627 (0.87) −5.278 (0.24) −0.075 (0.99)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 5.460 (0.90) 32.953 (0.48) 20.343 (0.65) 18.691 (0.61)
Primary insiders −12.086 (0.92) −205.417 (0.00) 61.192 (0.48) −82.688 (0.13)
Squared (Primary insiders) 15.840 (0.93) 228.405 (0.00) −93.822 (0.34) 76.622 (0.24)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −16.705 (0.73) −50.607 (0.20) −1.900 (0.96) 17.255 (0.56)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −1.860 (0.30) −5.117 (0.00) −2.042 (0.33) −0.061 (0.96)
R¯2 0.17 0.12 0.02 0.02
n 56 178 192 430
Duration: Maintain Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 19.849 (0.02) 4.530 (0.44) −8.163 (0.42) −9.103 (0.11)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner) −2.868 (0.23) 2.819 (0.35) 0.197 (0.94) −0.017 (0.99)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner) −2.266 (0.20) 1.692 (0.44) −0.437 (0.86) 2.488 (0.29)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −3.135 (0.02) −1.894 (0.15) −0.917 (0.53) −0.152 (0.91)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner) −5.375 (0.07) −0.627 (0.87) −5.278 (0.24) −0.075 (0.99)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 5.460 (0.90) 32.953 (0.48) 20.343 (0.65) 18.691 (0.61)
Primary insiders −12.086 (0.92) −205.417 (0.00) 61.192 (0.48) −82.688 (0.13)
Squared (Primary insiders) 15.840 (0.93) 228.405 (0.00) −93.822 (0.34) 76.622 (0.24)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −16.705 (0.73) −50.607 (0.20) −1.900 (0.96) 17.255 (0.56)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −1.860 (0.30) −5.117 (0.00) −2.042 (0.33) −0.061 (0.96)
R¯2 0.17 0.12 0.02 0.02
n 56 178 192 430
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 10.578 (0.33) 4.052 (0.48) −20.174 (0.08) −10.445 (0.08)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner) −1.429 (0.44) 2.998 (0.11) 0.571 (0.83) 0.282 (0.88)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner) −1.735 (0.26) 1.270 (0.47) 0.918 (0.71) 1.531 (0.45)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) −2.399 (0.03) −0.969 (0.32) 0.632 (0.66) 0.345 (0.75)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner) −1.191 (0.46) −0.213 (0.91) 2.444 (0.38) 1.540 (0.49)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 36.855 (0.39) 23.671 (0.58) 38.764 (0.40) 18.212 (0.59)
Primary insiders −11.034 (0.92) −218.491 (0.00) −42.173 (0.64) −118.857 (0.02)
Squared (Primary insiders) −10.031 (0.95) 240.234 (0.00) 22.614 (0.83) 111.283 (0.06)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) −54.845 (0.13) −32.271 (0.34) −2.190 (0.95) 19.543 (0.47)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) −2.993 (0.11) −3.843 (0.00) −0.381 (0.86) 1.807 (0.16)
R¯2 0.19 0.13 0.02 0.03
n 55 179 201 456
The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership ownership
concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of ﬁrm size and
the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999 underlying (1)(4) are
(1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners),
and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
219
6.3 Sequential regressions
The idea underlying the regressions in this section is that performance is a result of ownership duration
in earlier periods. Thus, duration and performance are not contemporaneous in these models. Figure 6.2
illustrates the idea. At the end of 1994 we observe corporate performance, for example measured by the
estimated Q. This performance measure is related to ownership duration in the period 1989-1993
Figure 6.2 Illustrating the sequential regressions










Figure 6.3 Sequential regressions
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 ...
→ → → → Q
→ → → → Q
→ → → → Q
. . .
The method is also illustrated by ﬁgure 6.3. We start with the four year period 19891993. Taking
the largest owner at the end of 1993, we relate this owner's duration over the previous four years to
next period's performance, measured for example using Q at the end of 1994. We then move one year
forward, calculate the duration for the largest owner in 1994 over the period 19901994, and relate this
to performance in 1995, and so on.
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6.3.1 Performance measure: Q
Table 6.43 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.348 (0.00) 1.700 (0.00)
Duration -0.039 (0.21) -0.101 (0.00)
n 404 968
R2 0.00 0.01
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.442 (0.00) 1.732 (0.00)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.442 (0.00) 1.732 (0.00)
Duration -0.068 (0.03) -0.107 (0.00)
n 404 968
R2 0.01 0.01
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.488 (0.00) 1.796 (0.00)
Duration -0.073 (0.04) -0.119 (0.00)
n 404 968
R2 0.01 0.01
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.44 Regression relating current duration, ownership concentration, and insider holdings to next
period performance. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.306 (0.00) 1.600 (0.00)
Duration -0.042 (0.18) -0.095 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.169 (0.54) -0.313 (0.24)
Primary insiders 2.829 (0.00) 3.171 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -3.512 (0.00) -3.137 (0.00)
n 404 942
R2 0.05 0.04
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.371 (0.00) 1.619 (0.00)
Duration -0.067 (0.04) -0.102 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.053 (0.85) -0.225 (0.41)
Primary insiders 2.852 (0.00) 3.208 (0.00)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.371 (0.00) 1.619 (0.00)
Duration -0.067 (0.04) -0.102 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.053 (0.85) -0.225 (0.41)
Primary insiders 2.852 (0.00) 3.208 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -3.503 (0.00) -3.125 (0.00)
n 404 942
R2 0.06 0.04
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.429 (0.00) 1.699 (0.00)
Duration -0.071 (0.05) -0.114 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.157 (0.56) -0.345 (0.19)
Primary insiders 2.805 (0.00) 3.194 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -3.448 (0.00) -3.104 (0.00)
n 404 942
R2 0.06 0.05
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.45 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized
owner size and ﬁrm size. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.689 (0.00) 3.570 (0.00)
Duration -0.016 (0.63) -0.045 (0.17)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.346 (0.16) 2.254 (0.02)
Primary insiders 2.546 (0.00) 2.592 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -3.262 (0.00) -2.596 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -1.677 (0.03) -2.639 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.007 (0.72) -0.118 (0.00)
n 359 831
R2 0.08 0.11
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.751 (0.00) 3.587 (0.00)
Duration -0.043 (0.21) -0.059 (0.07)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.139 (0.24) 2.063 (0.03)
Primary insiders 2.566 (0.00) 2.606 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -3.273 (0.00) -2.579 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -1.422 (0.08) -2.431 (0.00)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.751 (0.00) 3.587 (0.00)
Duration -0.043 (0.21) -0.059 (0.07)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.139 (0.24) 2.063 (0.03)
Primary insiders 2.566 (0.00) 2.606 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -3.273 (0.00) -2.579 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -1.422 (0.08) -2.431 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.009 (0.66) -0.119 (0.00)
n 359 831
R2 0.08 0.11
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.746 (0.00) 3.580 (0.00)
Duration -0.033 (0.36) -0.053 (0.10)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.346 (0.16) 2.231 (0.02)
Primary insiders 2.543 (0.00) 2.608 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -3.231 (0.00) -2.579 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -1.661 (0.03) -2.630 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.007 (0.74) -0.116 (0.00)
n 359 831
R2 0.08 0.11
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.46 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.171 (0.00) 1.544 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.416 (0.00) 0.062 (0.30)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.162 (0.00) 0.127 (0.01)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.015 (0.59) -0.075 (0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.138 (0.01) -0.180 (0.01)
n 404 968
R2 0.17 0.03
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.214 (0.00) 1.569 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.329 (0.00) 0.026 (0.66)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.139 (0.00) 0.106 (0.02)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.024 (0.38) -0.072 (0.02)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.214 (0.00) 1.569 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.329 (0.00) 0.026 (0.66)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.139 (0.00) 0.106 (0.02)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.024 (0.38) -0.072 (0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.160 (0.00) -0.180 (0.01)
n 404 968
R2 0.14 0.03
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.203 (0.00) 1.562 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.256 (0.00) 0.047 (0.36)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.149 (0.00) 0.119 (0.01)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.021 (0.42) -0.072 (0.01)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.123 (0.01) -0.141 (0.01)
n 404 968
R2 0.15 0.03
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.47 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.198 (0.00) 1.513 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.405 (0.00) 0.080 (0.17)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.121 (0.01) 0.082 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.017 (0.55) -0.074 (0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.146 (0.00) -0.213 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.419 (0.09) -0.505 (0.06)
Primary insiders 1.881 (0.00) 2.589 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.362 (0.00) -2.497 (0.00)
n 404 942
R2 0.20 0.06
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.239 (0.00) 1.528 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.344 (0.00) 0.051 (0.37)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.107 (0.02) 0.061 (0.19)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.016 (0.54) -0.070 (0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.162 (0.00) -0.211 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.573 (0.03) -0.489 (0.07)
Primary insiders 1.897 (0.00) 2.658 (0.00)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.239 (0.00) 1.528 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.344 (0.00) 0.051 (0.37)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.107 (0.02) 0.061 (0.19)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.016 (0.54) -0.070 (0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.162 (0.00) -0.211 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.573 (0.03) -0.489 (0.07)
Primary insiders 1.897 (0.00) 2.658 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.388 (0.00) -2.532 (0.00)
n 404 942
R2 0.18 0.06
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.247 (0.00) 1.540 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.249 (0.00) 0.058 (0.25)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.112 (0.01) 0.073 (0.11)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.024 (0.38) -0.075 (0.01)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.132 (0.00) -0.165 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.485 (0.06) -0.514 (0.05)
Primary insiders 1.751 (0.01) 2.577 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.234 (0.01) -2.453 (0.00)
n 404 942
R2 0.18 0.06
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.48 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Including orthogonalized ﬁrm size and owner size. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.968 (0.00) 3.630 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.367 (0.00) 0.116 (0.05)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.106 (0.02) 0.081 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.030 (0.30) -0.074 (0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.035 (0.56) -0.116 (0.12)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.259 (0.78) 1.824 (0.06)
Primary insiders 1.602 (0.02) 2.065 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.176 (0.01) -2.025 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -0.921 (0.22) -2.347 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.038 (0.05) -0.127 (0.00)
n 359 831
R2 0.20 0.13
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 2.113 (0.00) 3.677 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.314 (0.00) 0.102 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.083 (0.06) 0.062 (0.19)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.041 (0.15) -0.075 (0.01)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.051 (0.41) -0.097 (0.21)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.285 (0.77) 1.561 (0.11)
Primary insiders 1.586 (0.02) 2.122 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.153 (0.01) -2.024 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -0.600 (0.45) -2.132 (0.01)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 2.113 (0.00) 3.677 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.314 (0.00) 0.102 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.083 (0.06) 0.062 (0.19)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.041 (0.15) -0.075 (0.01)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.051 (0.41) -0.097 (0.21)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.285 (0.77) 1.561 (0.11)
Primary insiders 1.586 (0.02) 2.122 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.153 (0.01) -2.024 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -0.600 (0.45) -2.132 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.046 (0.02) -0.131 (0.00)
n 359 831
R2 0.18 0.13
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 2.009 (0.00) 3.636 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.232 (0.00) 0.101 (0.04)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.097 (0.03) 0.087 (0.06)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.030 (0.29) -0.068 (0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.020 (0.70) -0.057 (0.38)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.017 (0.99) 1.562 (0.11)
Primary insiders 1.531 (0.03) 2.031 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.081 (0.02) -1.941 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -0.733 (0.35) -2.135 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.040 (0.05) -0.129 (0.00)
n 359 831
R2 0.18 0.13
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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6.3.2 Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Table 6.49 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: Q
relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.308 (0.00) 1.171 (0.00)
Duration -0.057 (0.49) -0.012 (0.86)
n 367 845
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.584 (0.00) 1.356 (0.00)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.584 (0.00) 1.356 (0.00)
Duration -0.150 (0.07) -0.091 (0.18)
n 367 845
R2 0.01 0.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.280 (0.00) 1.140 (0.00)
Duration -0.034 (0.72) 0.002 (0.97)
n 367 845
R2 0.00 0.00
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.50 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: Q
relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.247 (0.00) 1.172 (0.00)
Duration -0.057 (0.50) -0.004 (0.95)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.228 (0.76) -0.672 (0.26)
Primary insiders 3.520 (0.05) 3.624 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) -4.251 (0.05) -4.687 (0.00)
n 367 845
R2 0.01 0.01
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.477 (0.00) 1.310 (0.00)
Duration -0.153 (0.09) -0.074 (0.28)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.107 (0.89) -0.523 (0.38)
Primary insiders 3.615 (0.04) 3.716 (0.01)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.477 (0.00) 1.310 (0.00)
Duration -0.153 (0.09) -0.074 (0.28)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.107 (0.89) -0.523 (0.38)
Primary insiders 3.615 (0.04) 3.716 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) -4.262 (0.05) -4.734 (0.00)
n 367 845
R2 0.02 0.01
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.198 (0.00) 1.139 (0.00)
Duration -0.023 (0.81) 0.010 (0.88)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.307 (0.67) -0.685 (0.24)
Primary insiders 3.431 (0.06) 3.608 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) -4.160 (0.06) -4.678 (0.00)
n 367 845
R2 0.01 0.01
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.51 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized
owner size and ﬁrm size. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.906 (0.02) 0.931 (0.15)
Duration -0.034 (0.71) -0.018 (0.81)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.951 (0.47) -0.223 (0.92)
Primary insiders 3.640 (0.07) 3.610 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) -4.200 (0.09) -4.649 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -2.160 (0.32) -0.620 (0.72)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.029 (0.60) 0.032 (0.48)
n 335 765
R2 0.02 0.02
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 2.070 (0.02) 0.987 (0.13)
Duration -0.109 (0.27) -0.082 (0.28)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.410 (0.61) -0.563 (0.80)
Primary insiders 3.680 (0.06) 3.656 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) -4.210 (0.09) -4.655 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -1.491 (0.51) -0.218 (0.90)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 2.070 (0.02) 0.987 (0.13)
Duration -0.109 (0.27) -0.082 (0.28)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.410 (0.61) -0.563 (0.80)
Primary insiders 3.680 (0.06) 3.656 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) -4.210 (0.09) -4.655 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -1.491 (0.51) -0.218 (0.90)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.034 (0.55) 0.035 (0.45)
n 335 765
R2 0.02 0.02
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.706 (0.05) 0.912 (0.16)
Duration 0.060 (0.56) 0.009 (0.91)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.930 (0.48) -0.180 (0.93)
Primary insiders 3.548 (0.07) 3.589 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) -4.123 (0.10) -4.631 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -2.286 (0.29) -0.683 (0.69)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.032 (0.57) 0.030 (0.52)
n 335 765
R2 0.02 0.02
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.52 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.301 (0.00) 1.140 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.041 (0.83) 0.157 (0.22)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.249 (0.05) 0.111 (0.28)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.128 (0.11) -0.062 (0.37)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.079 (0.59) -0.005 (0.97)
n 367 845
R2 0.03 0.01
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.518 (0.00) 1.300 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.132 (0.46) 0.043 (0.74)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.135 (0.28) 0.031 (0.76)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.182 (0.02) -0.123 (0.06)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.518 (0.00) 1.300 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.132 (0.46) 0.043 (0.74)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.135 (0.28) 0.031 (0.76)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.182 (0.02) -0.123 (0.06)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.168 (0.25) -0.078 (0.59)
n 367 845
R2 0.03 0.01
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.343 (0.00) 1.157 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.021 (0.88) 0.103 (0.36)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.206 (0.10) 0.068 (0.49)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.103 (0.17) -0.049 (0.43)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.073 (0.58) 0.019 (0.88)
n 367 845
R2 0.02 0.00
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.53 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.319 (0.00) 1.178 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.031 (0.87) 0.145 (0.26)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.206 (0.13) 0.059 (0.58)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.129 (0.11) -0.059 (0.39)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.083 (0.57) -0.019 (0.90)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.458 (0.52) -0.659 (0.26)
Primary insiders 2.323 (0.22) 3.400 (0.02)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.833 (0.21) -4.387 (0.01)
n 367 845
R2 0.03 0.02
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.487 (0.00) 1.306 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.128 (0.48) 0.047 (0.71)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.089 (0.50) -0.023 (0.83)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.178 (0.02) -0.114 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.165 (0.26) -0.083 (0.57)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.254 (0.73) -0.610 (0.30)
Primary insiders 2.592 (0.17) 3.600 (0.01)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.487 (0.00) 1.306 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.128 (0.48) 0.047 (0.71)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.089 (0.50) -0.023 (0.83)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.178 (0.02) -0.114 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.165 (0.26) -0.083 (0.57)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.254 (0.73) -0.610 (0.30)
Primary insiders 2.592 (0.17) 3.600 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) -3.056 (0.18) -4.513 (0.01)
n 367 845
R2 0.04 0.02
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.367 (0.00) 1.197 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.027 (0.85) 0.089 (0.42)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.162 (0.22) 0.012 (0.91)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.105 (0.17) -0.050 (0.43)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.077 (0.56) 0.005 (0.97)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.475 (0.51) -0.657 (0.27)
Primary insiders 2.291 (0.23) 3.563 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.788 (0.22) -4.533 (0.01)
n 367 845
R2 0.03 0.02
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.54 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Including orthogonalized ﬁrm size and owner size. Performance measure: Q relative to
industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 2.179 (0.01) 0.972 (0.14)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.003 (0.99) 0.110 (0.42)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.216 (0.13) 0.080 (0.47)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.110 (0.21) -0.067 (0.37)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.013 (0.94) 0.022 (0.90)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.560 (0.58) -0.784 (0.73)
Primary insiders 2.337 (0.26) 3.271 (0.03)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.747 (0.29) -4.262 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -2.022 (0.37) -0.150 (0.93)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.044 (0.45) 0.025 (0.59)
n 335 765
R2 0.04 0.02
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 2.380 (0.01) 1.097 (0.10)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.117 (0.54) 0.030 (0.82)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.098 (0.48) 0.001 (0.99)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.154 (0.07) -0.116 (0.10)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.088 (0.62) -0.015 (0.93)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.725 (0.80) -1.261 (0.58)
Primary insiders 2.561 (0.22) 3.434 (0.02)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.934 (0.26) -4.342 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -1.187 (0.61) 0.283 (0.87)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 2.380 (0.01) 1.097 (0.10)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.117 (0.54) 0.030 (0.82)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.098 (0.48) 0.001 (0.99)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.154 (0.07) -0.116 (0.10)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.088 (0.62) -0.015 (0.93)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.725 (0.80) -1.261 (0.58)
Primary insiders 2.561 (0.22) 3.434 (0.02)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.934 (0.26) -4.342 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -1.187 (0.61) 0.283 (0.87)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.054 (0.37) 0.021 (0.66)
n 335 765
R2 0.04 0.02
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 2.039 (0.03) 0.964 (0.15)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.009 (0.95) 0.075 (0.52)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.197 (0.16) 0.044 (0.69)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.052 (0.54) -0.044 (0.51)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.017 (0.91) 0.060 (0.68)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 1.724 (0.55) -0.871 (0.70)
Primary insiders 2.333 (0.27) 3.433 (0.02)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.695 (0.30) -4.394 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -2.149 (0.35) -0.076 (0.97)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.037 (0.53) 0.024 (0.61)
n 335 765
R2 0.03 0.02
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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6.3.3 Performance measure: RoA
Table 6.55 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure:
RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.162 (0.05) 0.070 (0.28)
Duration 0.002 (0.96) -0.047 (0.07)
n 401 960
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.018 (0.85) 0.080 (0.24)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.018 (0.85) 0.080 (0.24)
Duration -0.051 (0.09) -0.048 (0.06)
n 401 960
R2 0.01 0.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.132 (0.26) 0.086 (0.25)
Duration -0.008 (0.80) -0.045 (0.08)
n 401 960
R2 0.00 0.00
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.56 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure:
RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.153 (0.07) 0.022 (0.75)
Duration 0.011 (0.72) -0.044 (0.08)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.596 (0.02) -0.401 (0.07)
Primary insiders 1.895 (0.00) 2.300 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.342 (0.00) -2.059 (0.00)
n 401 935
R2 0.04 0.04
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.054 (0.56) 0.027 (0.70)
Duration -0.034 (0.29) -0.046 (0.07)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.475 (0.08) -0.363 (0.10)
Primary insiders 1.983 (0.00) 2.315 (0.00)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.054 (0.56) 0.027 (0.70)
Duration -0.034 (0.29) -0.046 (0.07)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.475 (0.08) -0.363 (0.10)
Primary insiders 1.983 (0.00) 2.315 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.406 (0.00) -2.053 (0.00)
n 401 935
R2 0.05 0.04
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.141 (0.23) 0.051 (0.52)
Duration 0.003 (0.92) -0.046 (0.07)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.580 (0.03) -0.421 (0.05)
Primary insiders 1.916 (0.00) 2.302 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.363 (0.00) -2.040 (0.00)
n 401 935
R2 0.04 0.04
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
234
Table 6.57 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized
owner size and ﬁrm size. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.640 (0.04) 1.424 (0.00)
Duration 0.031 (0.36) -0.007 (0.80)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.410 (0.68) 0.446 (0.59)
Primary insiders 1.710 (0.02) 2.266 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.220 (0.02) -2.017 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -1.141 (0.16) -0.890 (0.17)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.047 (0.02) -0.100 (0.00)
n 356 824
R2 0.07 0.09
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.719 (0.02) 1.430 (0.00)
Duration -0.019 (0.61) -0.014 (0.63)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.354 (0.73) 0.398 (0.63)
Primary insiders 1.816 (0.01) 2.273 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.347 (0.01) -2.017 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -0.985 (0.24) -0.835 (0.21)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.719 (0.02) 1.430 (0.00)
Duration -0.019 (0.61) -0.014 (0.63)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.354 (0.73) 0.398 (0.63)
Primary insiders 1.816 (0.01) 2.273 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.347 (0.01) -2.017 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -0.985 (0.24) -0.835 (0.21)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.046 (0.03) -0.100 (0.00)
n 356 824
R2 0.07 0.09
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.597 (0.06) 1.418 (0.00)
Duration 0.036 (0.34) 0.002 (0.93)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.416 (0.68) 0.458 (0.58)
Primary insiders 1.747 (0.02) 2.256 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.297 (0.01) -2.008 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -1.137 (0.16) -0.911 (0.16)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.047 (0.02) -0.101 (0.00)
n 356 824
R2 0.07 0.09
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.58 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.230 (0.00) -0.021 (0.72)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.271 (0.00) 0.078 (0.12)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.098 (0.02) 0.053 (0.18)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.013 (0.63) -0.043 (0.11)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.006 (0.90) -0.001 (0.99)
n 401 960
R2 0.06 0.01
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.124 (0.11) -0.014 (0.82)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.115 (0.07) 0.047 (0.34)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.068 (0.11) 0.048 (0.22)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.046 (0.09) -0.038 (0.14)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.124 (0.11) -0.014 (0.82)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.115 (0.07) 0.047 (0.34)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.068 (0.11) 0.048 (0.22)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.046 (0.09) -0.038 (0.14)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.028 (0.59) 0.015 (0.78)
n 401 960
R2 0.04 0.01
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.213 (0.01) -0.041 (0.52)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.157 (0.00) 0.070 (0.10)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.094 (0.02) 0.064 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.015 (0.57) -0.029 (0.23)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.007 (0.87) 0.026 (0.59)
n 401 960
R2 0.05 0.01
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.59 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.169 (0.03) -0.031 (0.63)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.263 (0.00) 0.084 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.066 (0.15) 0.016 (0.68)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.015 (0.60) -0.049 (0.06)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.006 (0.91) -0.036 (0.49)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.623 (0.01) -0.451 (0.04)
Primary insiders 1.496 (0.02) 2.135 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -1.825 (0.02) -1.842 (0.00)
n 401 935
R2 0.10 0.05
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.084 (0.30) -0.027 (0.68)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.134 (0.04) 0.058 (0.23)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.044 (0.33) 0.010 (0.79)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.039 (0.15) -0.044 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.032 (0.53) -0.019 (0.72)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.660 (0.01) -0.440 (0.05)
Primary insiders 1.547 (0.02) 2.171 (0.00)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.084 (0.30) -0.027 (0.68)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.134 (0.04) 0.058 (0.23)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.044 (0.33) 0.010 (0.79)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.039 (0.15) -0.044 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.032 (0.53) -0.019 (0.72)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.660 (0.01) -0.440 (0.05)
Primary insiders 1.547 (0.02) 2.171 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -1.872 (0.02) -1.863 (0.00)
n 401 935
R2 0.07 0.04
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.141 (0.12) -0.039 (0.59)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.151 (0.00) 0.069 (0.09)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.061 (0.17) 0.024 (0.52)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.018 (0.49) -0.039 (0.09)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.006 (0.89) -0.003 (0.95)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.648 (0.01) -0.444 (0.04)
Primary insiders 1.454 (0.03) 2.121 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -1.781 (0.03) -1.813 (0.00)
n 401 935
R2 0.08 0.05
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.60 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Including orthogonalized ﬁrm size and owner size. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.906 (0.00) 1.486 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.281 (0.00) 0.132 (0.01)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.058 (0.23) 0.011 (0.79)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.029 (0.36) -0.046 (0.10)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.037 (0.57) 0.031 (0.63)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.458 (0.65) 0.002 (1.00)
Primary insiders 1.316 (0.08) 2.178 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -1.751 (0.06) -1.868 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -0.419 (0.60) -0.506 (0.44)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.070 (0.00) -0.109 (0.00)
n 356 824
R2 0.13 0.10
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.067 (0.00) 1.499 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.158 (0.02) 0.110 (0.03)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.027 (0.58) 0.004 (0.92)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.063 (0.05) -0.046 (0.09)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.009 (0.89) 0.060 (0.37)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.877 (0.41) -0.172 (0.84)
Primary insiders 1.326 (0.08) 2.214 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -1.752 (0.07) -1.872 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -0.120 (0.89) -0.372 (0.58)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.067 (0.00) 1.499 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.158 (0.02) 0.110 (0.03)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.027 (0.58) 0.004 (0.92)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.063 (0.05) -0.046 (0.09)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.009 (0.89) 0.060 (0.37)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.877 (0.41) -0.172 (0.84)
Primary insiders 1.326 (0.08) 2.214 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -1.752 (0.07) -1.872 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -0.120 (0.89) -0.372 (0.58)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.075 (0.00) -0.110 (0.00)
n 356 824
R2 0.11 0.10
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.949 (0.00) 1.476 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.172 (0.00) 0.122 (0.01)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.050 (0.30) 0.024 (0.54)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.030 (0.32) -0.033 (0.19)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.038 (0.51) 0.078 (0.16)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.726 (0.48) -0.232 (0.78)
Primary insiders 1.292 (0.09) 2.166 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders) -1.702 (0.07) -1.827 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -0.222 (0.79) -0.308 (0.64)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -0.072 (0.00) -0.111 (0.00)
n 356 824
R2 0.12 0.11
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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6.3.4 Performance measure: RoS
Table 6.61 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure:
RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.859 (0.00) 4.897 (0.00)
Duration 0.150 (0.70) 0.305 (0.49)
n 391 934
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.224 (0.00) 4.034 (0.00)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.224 (0.00) 4.034 (0.00)
Duration 0.362 (0.36) 0.655 (0.13)
n 391 934
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 5.241 (0.00) 3.406 (0.01)
Duration 0.620 (0.16) 0.818 (0.06)
n 391 934
R2 0.00 0.00
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.62 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure:
RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.764 (0.00) 4.313 (0.00)
Duration 0.140 (0.73) 0.149 (0.74)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.043 (0.99) 5.423 (0.15)
Primary insiders 5.099 (0.55) 13.028 (0.13)
Squared (Primary insiders) -6.524 (0.53) -15.772 (0.12)
n 391 908
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.134 (0.00) 3.659 (0.00)
Duration 0.403 (0.34) 0.473 (0.28)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.930 (0.80) 4.686 (0.22)
Primary insiders 4.760 (0.57) 12.500 (0.15)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.134 (0.00) 3.659 (0.00)
Duration 0.403 (0.34) 0.473 (0.28)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.930 (0.80) 4.686 (0.22)
Primary insiders 4.760 (0.57) 12.500 (0.15)
Squared (Primary insiders) -6.391 (0.53) -15.498 (0.13)
n 391 908
R2 0.00 0.01
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 5.160 (0.00) 2.905 (0.03)
Duration 0.642 (0.16) 0.685 (0.11)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -0.624 (0.86) 5.096 (0.17)
Primary insiders 4.737 (0.57) 12.291 (0.15)
Squared (Primary insiders) -6.581 (0.52) -15.422 (0.13)
n 391 908
R2 0.01 0.01
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.63 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized
owner size and ﬁrm size. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.155 (0.09) -15.359 (0.00)
Duration 0.130 (0.74) -0.317 (0.48)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 12.376 (0.29) 3.934 (0.77)
Primary insiders 1.375 (0.87) 11.325 (0.19)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.967 (0.78) -13.879 (0.17)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -12.010 (0.20) 0.337 (0.97)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.222 (0.36) 1.619 (0.00)
n 358 828
R2 0.01 0.04
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 5.392 (0.14) -15.641 (0.00)
Duration 0.492 (0.25) 0.078 (0.86)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 14.674 (0.22) 4.633 (0.73)
Primary insiders 1.030 (0.90) 10.935 (0.20)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.703 (0.80) -13.479 (0.18)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -14.943 (0.13) -0.753 (0.94)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 5.392 (0.14) -15.641 (0.00)
Duration 0.492 (0.25) 0.078 (0.86)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 14.674 (0.22) 4.633 (0.73)
Primary insiders 1.030 (0.90) 10.935 (0.20)
Squared (Primary insiders) -2.703 (0.80) -13.479 (0.18)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -14.943 (0.13) -0.753 (0.94)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.238 (0.33) 1.592 (0.00)
n 358 828
R2 0.01 0.04
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 5.122 (0.17) -15.615 (0.00)
Duration 0.512 (0.25) 0.050 (0.91)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 12.316 (0.29) 4.389 (0.74)
Primary insiders 1.137 (0.89) 10.953 (0.20)
Squared (Primary insiders) -3.085 (0.77) -13.490 (0.18)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -12.427 (0.19) -0.457 (0.96)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.211 (0.39) 1.590 (0.00)
n 358 828
R2 0.01 0.04
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.64 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.876 (0.00) 5.664 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.433 (0.61) -0.504 (0.54)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.335 (0.56) -0.866 (0.18)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.246 (0.52) 0.314 (0.49)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.015 (0.98) -0.361 (0.71)
n 391 934
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.691 (0.00) 5.223 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.270 (0.75) -0.125 (0.88)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.321 (0.57) -0.794 (0.21)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.341 (0.34) 0.544 (0.19)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.691 (0.00) 5.223 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.270 (0.75) -0.125 (0.88)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.321 (0.57) -0.794 (0.21)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.341 (0.34) 0.544 (0.19)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.053 (0.94) -0.642 (0.51)
n 391 934
R2 0.01 0.01
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.413 (0.00) 5.029 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.569 (0.38) 0.219 (0.76)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.350 (0.53) -0.945 (0.12)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.407 (0.25) 0.571 (0.15)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.157 (0.81) -0.356 (0.67)
n 391 934
R2 0.01 0.01
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.65 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.659 (0.00) 4.804 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.380 (0.66) -0.732 (0.37)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.539 (0.38) -0.996 (0.13)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.230 (0.55) 0.169 (0.71)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.009 (0.99) 0.127 (0.89)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.499 (0.88) 5.551 (0.14)
Primary insiders 8.689 (0.34) 16.978 (0.06)
Squared (Primary insiders) -10.508 (0.34) -19.966 (0.05)
n 391 908
R2 0.01 0.01
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.489 (0.00) 4.489 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.232 (0.79) -0.410 (0.61)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.508 (0.40) -0.965 (0.14)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.338 (0.35) 0.389 (0.35)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.040 (0.96) -0.201 (0.83)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.214 (0.95) 5.238 (0.16)
Primary insiders 8.986 (0.32) 17.012 (0.06)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.489 (0.00) 4.489 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.232 (0.79) -0.410 (0.61)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.508 (0.40) -0.965 (0.14)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.338 (0.35) 0.389 (0.35)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.040 (0.96) -0.201 (0.83)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.214 (0.95) 5.238 (0.16)
Primary insiders 8.986 (0.32) 17.012 (0.06)
Squared (Primary insiders) -11.076 (0.31) -20.333 (0.05)
n 391 908
R2 0.01 0.01
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 6.203 (0.00) 4.239 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.524 (0.42) 0.014 (0.98)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.571 (0.34) -1.124 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.394 (0.28) 0.436 (0.28)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -0.144 (0.82) 0.000 (1.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 0.413 (0.90) 5.216 (0.16)
Primary insiders 9.773 (0.28) 17.955 (0.04)
Squared (Primary insiders) -11.982 (0.27) -21.058 (0.04)
n 391 908
R2 0.01 0.01
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.66 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Including orthogonalized ﬁrm size and owner size. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 5.329 (0.16) -15.385 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.143 (0.86) -1.124 (0.17)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.542 (0.36) -1.192 (0.07)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.292 (0.44) 0.159 (0.72)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.496 (0.52) 0.452 (0.67)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 12.858 (0.29) 6.880 (0.61)
Primary insiders 6.177 (0.50) 16.074 (0.07)
Squared (Primary insiders) -8.184 (0.47) -18.773 (0.07)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -11.731 (0.23) -2.348 (0.82)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.258 (0.31) 1.618 (0.00)
n 358 828
R2 0.02 0.05
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 4.224 (0.28) -15.878 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.044 (0.96) -0.800 (0.32)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.453 (0.43) -1.146 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.467 (0.21) 0.451 (0.29)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.603 (0.44) 0.220 (0.84)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 17.338 (0.17) 9.896 (0.47)
Primary insiders 6.985 (0.44) 16.392 (0.07)
Squared (Primary insiders) -9.337 (0.41) -19.537 (0.06)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -15.460 (0.13) -4.925 (0.65)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 4.224 (0.28) -15.878 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.044 (0.96) -0.800 (0.32)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.453 (0.43) -1.146 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.467 (0.21) 0.451 (0.29)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.603 (0.44) 0.220 (0.84)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 17.338 (0.17) 9.896 (0.47)
Primary insiders 6.985 (0.44) 16.392 (0.07)
Squared (Primary insiders) -9.337 (0.41) -19.537 (0.06)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -15.460 (0.13) -4.925 (0.65)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.339 (0.20) 1.640 (0.00)
n 358 828
R2 0.02 0.05
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 4.544 (0.25) -15.276 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.199 (0.75) -0.531 (0.45)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.581 (0.31) -1.396 (0.03)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.439 (0.23) 0.360 (0.37)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.187 (0.79) 0.053 (0.95)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 14.720 (0.24) 9.218 (0.50)
Primary insiders 7.561 (0.41) 17.456 (0.05)
Squared (Primary insiders) -10.223 (0.37) -20.293 (0.05)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -13.166 (0.19) -4.471 (0.67)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 0.295 (0.26) 1.600 (0.00)
n 358 828
R2 0.02 0.05
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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6.3.5 Performance measure: Marginal Q
Table 6.67 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure:
Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 27.008 (0.00) 17.951 (0.01)
Duration -0.909 (0.76) 2.505 (0.38)
n 436 987
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 30.568 (0.00) 19.259 (0.01)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 30.568 (0.00) 19.259 (0.01)
Duration -2.138 (0.47) 1.746 (0.53)
n 436 987
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 30.868 (0.01) 15.828 (0.05)
Duration -1.921 (0.56) 2.843 (0.31)
n 436 987
R2 0.00 0.00
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.68 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure:
Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 18.789 (0.02) 15.152 (0.05)
Duration -3.031 (0.31) 2.158 (0.45)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 89.216 (0.00) 19.723 (0.42)
Primary insiders 73.466 (0.25) 42.283 (0.45)
Squared (Primary insiders) -104.525 (0.18) -57.232 (0.39)
n 436 987
R2 0.03 0.00
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 25.738 (0.00) 16.875 (0.03)
Duration -6.026 (0.05) 1.244 (0.67)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 101.560 (0.00) 19.601 (0.43)
Primary insiders 79.361 (0.21) 43.079 (0.44)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 25.738 (0.00) 16.875 (0.03)
Duration -6.026 (0.05) 1.244 (0.67)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 101.560 (0.00) 19.601 (0.43)
Primary insiders 79.361 (0.21) 43.079 (0.44)
Squared (Primary insiders) -107.326 (0.17) -58.383 (0.38)
n 436 987
R2 0.04 0.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 23.278 (0.04) 12.839 (0.14)
Duration -3.710 (0.27) 2.655 (0.34)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 88.721 (0.00) 19.920 (0.41)
Primary insiders 70.825 (0.26) 41.341 (0.46)
Squared (Primary insiders) -99.920 (0.20) -57.517 (0.38)
n 436 987
R2 0.03 0.00
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.69 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized
owner size and ﬁrm size. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 94.011 (0.00) 94.519 (0.00)
Duration -1.010 (0.75) 4.557 (0.16)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 292.749 (0.00) 243.586 (0.01)
Primary insiders 89.243 (0.20) 58.089 (0.35)
Squared (Primary insiders) -123.226 (0.16) -74.869 (0.30)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -182.423 (0.02) -184.258 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -4.494 (0.02) -4.939 (0.02)
n 361 839
R2 0.06 0.02
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 96.430 (0.00) 94.215 (0.00)
Duration -1.944 (0.58) 4.639 (0.16)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 283.305 (0.00) 255.509 (0.01)
Primary insiders 89.191 (0.19) 57.516 (0.35)
Squared (Primary insiders) -122.491 (0.16) -76.622 (0.29)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -171.552 (0.03) -197.028 (0.01)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 96.430 (0.00) 94.215 (0.00)
Duration -1.944 (0.58) 4.639 (0.16)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 283.305 (0.00) 255.509 (0.01)
Primary insiders 89.191 (0.19) 57.516 (0.35)
Squared (Primary insiders) -122.491 (0.16) -76.622 (0.29)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -171.552 (0.03) -197.028 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -4.582 (0.02) -4.848 (0.02)
n 361 839
R2 0.06 0.02
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 92.354 (0.00) 93.420 (0.00)
Duration 0.028 (0.99) 5.551 (0.09)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 292.098 (0.00) 244.347 (0.01)
Primary insiders 87.052 (0.20) 56.414 (0.36)
Squared (Primary insiders) -120.387 (0.17) -76.370 (0.29)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -183.774 (0.02) -184.239 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -4.522 (0.02) -5.229 (0.01)
n 361 839
R2 0.06 0.02
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.70 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 27.871 (0.00) 20.839 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 4.166 (0.52) -0.617 (0.91)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 4.939 (0.27) 17.366 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -3.314 (0.25) -2.089 (0.47)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -3.623 (0.45) -0.726 (0.89)
n 436 987
R2 0.01 0.02
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 31.231 (0.00) 21.596 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 1.669 (0.79) 0.552 (0.92)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 3.045 (0.48) 15.973 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -3.927 (0.14) -2.273 (0.39)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 31.231 (0.00) 21.596 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 1.669 (0.79) 0.552 (0.92)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 3.045 (0.48) 15.973 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -3.927 (0.14) -2.273 (0.39)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -5.884 (0.23) -1.792 (0.75)
n 436 987
R2 0.01 0.02
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 30.004 (0.00) 19.269 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.620 (0.90) 0.960 (0.84)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 3.958 (0.35) 15.743 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -2.934 (0.26) -0.940 (0.71)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -4.294 (0.32) 0.158 (0.97)
n 436 987
R2 0.01 0.02
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.71 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 16.408 (0.04) 18.154 (0.01)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 4.125 (0.52) -0.652 (0.90)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 3.824 (0.42) 18.207 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -3.441 (0.23) -1.942 (0.50)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -1.984 (0.68) 0.011 (1.00)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 82.098 (0.00) 24.527 (0.31)
Primary insiders 41.461 (0.54) -18.401 (0.75)
Squared (Primary insiders) -66.297 (0.42) 3.292 (0.96)
n 436 987
R2 0.04 0.02
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 21.493 (0.01) 19.127 (0.01)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -1.179 (0.85) 0.145 (0.98)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 1.105 (0.81) 16.591 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -4.869 (0.07) -2.267 (0.40)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -5.114 (0.29) -1.253 (0.82)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 84.828 (0.00) 24.318 (0.32)
Primary insiders 51.464 (0.44) -16.460 (0.77)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 21.493 (0.01) 19.127 (0.01)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -1.179 (0.85) 0.145 (0.98)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 1.105 (0.81) 16.591 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -4.869 (0.07) -2.267 (0.40)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -5.114 (0.29) -1.253 (0.82)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 84.828 (0.00) 24.318 (0.32)
Primary insiders 51.464 (0.44) -16.460 (0.77)
Squared (Primary insiders) -74.986 (0.36) 4.168 (0.95)
n 436 987
R2 0.04 0.02
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 18.186 (0.04) 16.135 (0.04)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.434 (0.93) 1.076 (0.82)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 3.294 (0.47) 16.757 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -2.763 (0.30) -0.608 (0.81)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -2.503 (0.56) 0.880 (0.85)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 80.429 (0.00) 24.700 (0.31)
Primary insiders 39.071 (0.57) -18.975 (0.74)
Squared (Primary insiders) -63.760 (0.44) 3.416 (0.96)
n 436 987
R2 0.03 0.02
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.72 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Including orthogonalized ﬁrm size and owner size. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 104.603 (0.00) 84.534 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 1.326 (0.84) -1.046 (0.86)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 4.487 (0.35) 18.231 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -3.251 (0.29) -1.031 (0.75)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -4.067 (0.52) -1.814 (0.81)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 276.718 (0.01) 223.272 (0.02)
Primary insiders 47.597 (0.52) -4.982 (0.94)
Squared (Primary insiders) -77.589 (0.40) -14.599 (0.84)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -174.790 (0.03) -161.713 (0.03)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -5.080 (0.01) -3.827 (0.06)
n 361 839
R2 0.07 0.04
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 108.838 (0.00) 86.812 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -2.667 (0.69) 0.719 (0.90)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 2.011 (0.67) 16.985 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -4.088 (0.18) -0.844 (0.79)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -6.280 (0.33) -2.448 (0.75)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 259.430 (0.01) 221.972 (0.02)
Primary insiders 53.902 (0.47) -4.741 (0.94)
Squared (Primary insiders) -83.201 (0.37) -12.683 (0.86)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -157.483 (0.06) -161.298 (0.04)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 108.838 (0.00) 86.812 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -2.667 (0.69) 0.719 (0.90)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 2.011 (0.67) 16.985 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -4.088 (0.18) -0.844 (0.79)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -6.280 (0.33) -2.448 (0.75)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 259.430 (0.01) 221.972 (0.02)
Primary insiders 53.902 (0.47) -4.741 (0.94)
Squared (Primary insiders) -83.201 (0.37) -12.683 (0.86)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -157.483 (0.06) -161.298 (0.04)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -5.250 (0.02) -4.016 (0.05)
n 361 839
R2 0.07 0.03
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 103.609 (0.00) 82.430 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.842 (0.87) 1.005 (0.85)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 4.169 (0.38) 16.831 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -2.253 (0.45) 0.337 (0.91)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -5.251 (0.36) -0.886 (0.89)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 286.677 (0.01) 228.313 (0.02)
Primary insiders 42.082 (0.57) -5.952 (0.93)
Squared (Primary insiders) -70.183 (0.45) -14.256 (0.85)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -184.192 (0.03) -165.880 (0.03)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -4.857 (0.02) -3.815 (0.07)
n 361 839
R2 0.07 0.03
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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6.3.6 Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Table 6.73 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure:
Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -7.421 (0.07) -3.826 (0.14)
Duration -0.488 (0.74) -0.842 (0.43)
n 435 1004
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -7.912 (0.07) -3.746 (0.17)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -7.912 (0.07) -3.746 (0.17)
Duration -0.251 (0.87) -0.816 (0.44)
n 435 1004
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -11.052 (0.05) -5.357 (0.07)
Duration 0.787 (0.64) -0.092 (0.93)
n 435 1004
R2 0.00 0.00
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.74 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure:
Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -8.014 (0.06) -5.135 (0.08)
Duration -0.637 (0.68) -1.130 (0.31)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 5.481 (0.69) 11.650 (0.21)
Primary insiders -0.224 (0.99) 2.794 (0.90)
Squared (Primary insiders) 6.355 (0.87) 6.006 (0.81)
n 434 984
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -8.181 (0.07) -4.618 (0.12)
Duration -0.522 (0.74) -1.388 (0.21)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 5.900 (0.68) 13.175 (0.16)
Primary insiders -0.726 (0.98) 3.472 (0.87)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -8.181 (0.07) -4.618 (0.12)
Duration -0.522 (0.74) -1.388 (0.21)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 5.900 (0.68) 13.175 (0.16)
Primary insiders -0.726 (0.98) 3.472 (0.87)
Squared (Primary insiders) 7.023 (0.86) 6.029 (0.81)
n 434 984
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -11.195 (0.05) -6.288 (0.06)
Duration 0.654 (0.70) -0.420 (0.70)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 3.427 (0.80) 10.861 (0.24)
Primary insiders -2.934 (0.93) 1.661 (0.94)
Squared (Primary insiders) 8.401 (0.83) 7.259 (0.77)
n 434 984
R2 0.00 0.00
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.75 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized
owner size and ﬁrm size. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -42.508 (0.01) -18.354 (0.09)
Duration 0.143 (0.93) -0.856 (0.49)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -34.059 (0.52) -16.932 (0.64)
Primary insiders 26.320 (0.48) 15.333 (0.51)
Squared (Primary insiders) -20.306 (0.67) -3.991 (0.88)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 32.916 (0.44) 22.436 (0.42)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 1.865 (0.09) 0.606 (0.44)
n 359 835
R2 0.01 0.01
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -43.855 (0.01) -18.020 (0.10)
Duration 0.742 (0.70) -1.232 (0.33)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -30.560 (0.57) -20.814 (0.56)
Primary insiders 25.839 (0.49) 15.509 (0.50)
Squared (Primary insiders) -19.926 (0.67) -3.523 (0.90)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 28.402 (0.52) 26.773 (0.35)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -43.855 (0.01) -18.020 (0.10)
Duration 0.742 (0.70) -1.232 (0.33)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -30.560 (0.57) -20.814 (0.56)
Primary insiders 25.839 (0.49) 15.509 (0.50)
Squared (Primary insiders) -19.926 (0.67) -3.523 (0.90)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 28.402 (0.52) 26.773 (0.35)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 1.895 (0.08) 0.608 (0.44)
n 359 835
R2 0.01 0.01
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -46.458 (0.01) -18.686 (0.08)
Duration 1.649 (0.41) -0.343 (0.78)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -34.372 (0.52) -15.896 (0.66)
Primary insiders 25.282 (0.49) 14.929 (0.52)
Squared (Primary insiders) -20.271 (0.67) -3.284 (0.90)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 31.266 (0.46) 20.977 (0.45)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 1.834 (0.09) 0.581 (0.46)
n 359 835
R2 0.01 0.01
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.76 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -7.280 (0.03) -5.161 (0.03)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.629 (0.85) -0.663 (0.75)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -1.118 (0.62) 0.428 (0.79)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.921 (0.53) -0.557 (0.61)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 1.139 (0.64) 1.240 (0.54)
n 435 1004
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -6.930 (0.06) -4.868 (0.04)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.101 (0.97) 0.062 (0.98)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -1.133 (0.60) 0.015 (0.99)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.904 (0.50) -0.708 (0.49)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -6.930 (0.06) -4.868 (0.04)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.101 (0.97) 0.062 (0.98)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -1.133 (0.60) 0.015 (0.99)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.904 (0.50) -0.708 (0.49)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.257 (0.92) 0.715 (0.73)
n 435 1004
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -7.952 (0.05) -5.555 (0.03)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.557 (0.82) -0.375 (0.83)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.831 (0.70) 0.171 (0.91)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.224 (0.87) -0.131 (0.89)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.543 (0.80) 0.920 (0.60)
n 435 1004
R2 0.00 0.00
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.77 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -8.310 (0.04) -6.805 (0.01)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.634 (0.85) -0.760 (0.71)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -1.338 (0.58) 0.484 (0.77)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -1.011 (0.49) -0.721 (0.52)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 1.171 (0.64) 1.297 (0.54)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 6.240 (0.64) 11.757 (0.20)
Primary insiders 4.231 (0.90) -0.439 (0.98)
Squared (Primary insiders) 1.913 (0.96) 9.331 (0.72)
n 434 984
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -7.760 (0.06) -6.154 (0.03)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.331 (0.92) -0.326 (0.87)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -1.403 (0.55) -0.120 (0.94)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -1.068 (0.44) -1.077 (0.31)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.207 (0.93) 0.536 (0.80)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 6.350 (0.64) 11.888 (0.20)
Primary insiders 4.047 (0.91) 1.059 (0.96)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -7.760 (0.06) -6.154 (0.03)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.331 (0.92) -0.326 (0.87)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -1.403 (0.55) -0.120 (0.94)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -1.068 (0.44) -1.077 (0.31)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.207 (0.93) 0.536 (0.80)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 6.350 (0.64) 11.888 (0.20)
Primary insiders 4.047 (0.91) 1.059 (0.96)
Squared (Primary insiders) 2.724 (0.95) 8.878 (0.73)
n 434 984
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -8.804 (0.05) -7.019 (0.02)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.628 (0.80) -0.549 (0.76)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -1.056 (0.65) 0.116 (0.94)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.326 (0.81) -0.349 (0.73)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 0.563 (0.80) 0.933 (0.61)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 5.694 (0.67) 11.485 (0.21)
Primary insiders 4.351 (0.90) 1.121 (0.96)
Squared (Primary insiders) 1.389 (0.97) 7.807 (0.76)
n 434 984
R2 0.00 0.00
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.78 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Including orthogonalized ﬁrm size and owner size. Performance measure: Market Model
Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -44.366 (0.01) -20.502 (0.06)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.170 (0.96) -0.773 (0.73)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.686 (0.79) 1.028 (0.56)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.066 (0.97) -0.622 (0.62)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 5.022 (0.15) 4.000 (0.17)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -36.456 (0.51) -22.273 (0.54)
Primary insiders 37.027 (0.35) 13.498 (0.57)
Squared (Primary insiders) -30.996 (0.54) -1.646 (0.95)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 36.695 (0.40) 27.465 (0.34)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 1.910 (0.09) 0.592 (0.45)
n 359 835
R2 0.02 0.01
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -44.305 (0.01) -19.382 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.656 (0.86) -0.288 (0.90)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.310 (0.90) 0.411 (0.82)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.212 (0.90) -1.013 (0.39)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 4.478 (0.20) 3.723 (0.21)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -35.569 (0.53) -27.885 (0.45)
Primary insiders 34.394 (0.39) 14.316 (0.55)
Squared (Primary insiders) -28.289 (0.57) -1.373 (0.96)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 35.029 (0.44) 32.057 (0.27)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -44.305 (0.01) -19.382 (0.08)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.656 (0.86) -0.288 (0.90)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.310 (0.90) 0.411 (0.82)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.212 (0.90) -1.013 (0.39)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 4.478 (0.20) 3.723 (0.21)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -35.569 (0.53) -27.885 (0.45)
Primary insiders 34.394 (0.39) 14.316 (0.55)
Squared (Primary insiders) -28.289 (0.57) -1.373 (0.96)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 35.029 (0.44) 32.057 (0.27)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) 1.886 (0.11) 0.521 (0.51)
n 359 835
R2 0.02 0.01
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -47.596 (0.01) -20.110 (0.07)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.055 (0.98) -0.572 (0.77)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.063 (0.98) 0.546 (0.75)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.830 (0.61) -0.361 (0.75)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) 3.180 (0.30) 2.676 (0.28)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) -29.144 (0.60) -21.907 (0.55)
Primary insiders 35.359 (0.38) 14.712 (0.54)
Squared (Primary insiders) -30.465 (0.55) -2.722 (0.92)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) 30.795 (0.49) 26.814 (0.35)




6.3.7 Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Table 6.79 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure:
Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -7.155 (0.14) -14.128 (0.00)
Duration 0.066 (0.97) 0.870 (0.56)
n 428 864
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -8.268 (0.12) -14.887 (0.00)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -8.268 (0.12) -14.887 (0.00)
Duration 0.474 (0.79) 1.113 (0.45)
n 428 864
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -15.444 (0.02) -21.480 (0.00)
Duration 2.688 (0.18) 3.332 (0.03)
n 428 864
R2 0.00 0.01
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.80 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure:
Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -6.508 (0.21) -15.979 (0.00)
Duration 0.287 (0.87) 0.604 (0.68)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 10.685 (0.53) 23.780 (0.07)
Primary insiders -75.314 (0.05) -26.786 (0.34)
Squared (Primary insiders) 76.860 (0.11) 31.478 (0.34)
n 428 864
R2 0.01 0.01
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -6.871 (0.21) -15.765 (0.00)
Duration 0.440 (0.82) 0.496 (0.74)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 9.790 (0.58) 23.340 (0.08)
Primary insiders -75.581 (0.05) -26.786 (0.34)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -6.871 (0.21) -15.765 (0.00)
Duration 0.440 (0.82) 0.496 (0.74)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 9.790 (0.58) 23.340 (0.08)
Primary insiders -75.581 (0.05) -26.786 (0.34)
Squared (Primary insiders) 76.922 (0.10) 31.254 (0.34)
n 428 864
R2 0.01 0.01
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -14.413 (0.04) -23.020 (0.00)
Duration 2.943 (0.15) 3.158 (0.04)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 7.078 (0.67) 21.856 (0.10)
Primary insiders -78.764 (0.04) -29.170 (0.30)
Squared (Primary insiders) 78.196 (0.10) 32.238 (0.33)
n 428 864
R2 0.02 0.01
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
258
Table 6.81 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized
owner size and ﬁrm size. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 43.942 (0.02) -15.753 (0.29)
Duration 0.262 (0.90) 0.922 (0.58)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 136.272 (0.04) 57.813 (0.24)
Primary insiders -83.917 (0.05) -11.582 (0.70)
Squared (Primary insiders) 82.094 (0.14) 15.924 (0.65)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -105.197 (0.04) -22.428 (0.56)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -2.803 (0.03) -0.126 (0.91)
n 356 741
R2 0.04 0.01
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 42.214 (0.03) -16.501 (0.27)
Duration 1.040 (0.64) 1.478 (0.39)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 141.146 (0.03) 63.098 (0.20)
Primary insiders -84.519 (0.05) -11.722 (0.70)
Squared (Primary insiders) 82.510 (0.13) 15.347 (0.67)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -111.370 (0.04) -28.403 (0.47)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 42.214 (0.03) -16.501 (0.27)
Duration 1.040 (0.64) 1.478 (0.39)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 141.146 (0.03) 63.098 (0.20)
Primary insiders -84.519 (0.05) -11.722 (0.70)
Squared (Primary insiders) 82.510 (0.13) 15.347 (0.67)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -111.370 (0.04) -28.403 (0.47)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -2.763 (0.03) -0.117 (0.91)
n 356 741
R2 0.04 0.01
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 37.135 (0.06) -19.731 (0.19)
Duration 2.913 (0.21) 4.060 (0.02)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 135.288 (0.04) 63.755 (0.19)
Primary insiders -85.878 (0.05) -12.646 (0.68)
Squared (Primary insiders) 82.262 (0.13) 15.071 (0.67)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -107.718 (0.03) -29.082 (0.44)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -2.871 (0.03) -0.448 (0.68)
n 356 741
R2 0.04 0.02
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.82 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.423 (0.56) -9.953 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.796 (0.84) -1.848 (0.50)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -1.753 (0.52) 0.304 (0.89)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -2.442 (0.16) -1.342 (0.36)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -2.797 (0.34) -0.852 (0.75)
n 428 864
R2 0.01 0.00
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -3.143 (0.48) -10.706 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -1.418 (0.71) -0.498 (0.85)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -1.662 (0.52) -0.142 (0.95)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -1.401 (0.39) -0.749 (0.59)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -3.143 (0.48) -10.706 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -1.418 (0.71) -0.498 (0.85)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -1.662 (0.52) -0.142 (0.95)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -1.401 (0.39) -0.749 (0.59)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -3.177 (0.28) -1.348 (0.63)
n 428 864
R2 0.00 0.00
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -5.554 (0.25) -13.382 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.295 (0.92) 0.549 (0.82)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -1.087 (0.67) 0.671 (0.75)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -0.357 (0.82) 0.442 (0.74)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -1.764 (0.50) 0.441 (0.85)
n 428 864
R2 0.00 0.00
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.83 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.412 (0.61) -12.754 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.261 (0.95) -1.830 (0.50)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.232 (0.94) 0.961 (0.67)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -2.134 (0.22) -1.370 (0.36)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -2.137 (0.46) -0.188 (0.95)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 10.318 (0.54) 25.274 (0.06)
Primary insiders -78.358 (0.06) -30.687 (0.29)
Squared (Primary insiders) 82.705 (0.10) 35.557 (0.29)
n 428 864
R2 0.02 0.01
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.890 (0.55) -12.959 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -1.377 (0.72) -1.022 (0.70)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.049 (0.99) 0.244 (0.91)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -1.283 (0.44) -1.059 (0.45)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -2.648 (0.37) -1.003 (0.72)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 11.406 (0.51) 25.483 (0.06)
Primary insiders -76.929 (0.06) -28.203 (0.34)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.890 (0.55) -12.959 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -1.377 (0.72) -1.022 (0.70)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.049 (0.99) 0.244 (0.91)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -1.283 (0.44) -1.059 (0.45)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -2.648 (0.37) -1.003 (0.72)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 11.406 (0.51) 25.483 (0.06)
Primary insiders -76.929 (0.06) -28.203 (0.34)
Squared (Primary insiders) 80.502 (0.11) 33.803 (0.32)
n 428 864
R2 0.02 0.01
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -5.682 (0.29) -16.241 (0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) 0.810 (0.79) 0.584 (0.80)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 1.052 (0.70) 1.387 (0.53)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) 0.054 (0.97) 0.486 (0.72)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -1.182 (0.65) 0.997 (0.68)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 8.951 (0.60) 24.805 (0.06)
Primary insiders -81.864 (0.05) -30.666 (0.30)
Squared (Primary insiders) 84.328 (0.09) 34.900 (0.31)
n 428 864
R2 0.01 0.01
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Table 6.84 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with
owner type. Including orthogonalized ﬁrm size and owner size. Performance measure: Fama French
Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 56.225 (0.01) -13.090 (0.39)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.685 (0.87) -1.724 (0.56)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.037 (0.99) 0.578 (0.81)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -3.416 (0.08) -1.468 (0.37)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -5.259 (0.19) -2.212 (0.55)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 117.836 (0.08) 50.978 (0.31)
Primary insiders -96.981 (0.04) -16.970 (0.59)
Squared (Primary insiders) 95.444 (0.10) 20.743 (0.57)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -91.377 (0.08) -15.928 (0.68)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -3.284 (0.01) -0.030 (0.98)
n 356 741
R2 0.05 0.01
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 54.241 (0.01) -12.909 (0.40)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -2.239 (0.60) -0.682 (0.82)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.348 (0.91) 0.105 (0.96)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -2.359 (0.22) -0.731 (0.64)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -5.991 (0.14) -2.808 (0.46)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 120.297 (0.09) 53.492 (0.29)
Primary insiders -95.623 (0.04) -14.985 (0.64)
Squared (Primary insiders) 94.742 (0.10) 19.255 (0.60)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -90.897 (0.10) -17.807 (0.65)




Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 54.241 (0.01) -12.909 (0.40)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -2.239 (0.60) -0.682 (0.82)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) -0.348 (0.91) 0.105 (0.96)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -2.359 (0.22) -0.731 (0.64)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -5.991 (0.14) -2.808 (0.46)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 120.297 (0.09) 53.492 (0.29)
Primary insiders -95.623 (0.04) -14.985 (0.64)
Squared (Primary insiders) 94.742 (0.10) 19.255 (0.60)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -90.897 (0.10) -17.807 (0.65)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -3.186 (0.02) -0.102 (0.93)
n 356 741
R2 0.05 0.01
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 52.778 (0.01) -16.269 (0.29)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner) -0.407 (0.90) 0.749 (0.77)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner) 0.285 (0.92) 1.052 (0.65)
interaction(Duration,Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner) -1.388 (0.46) 0.573 (0.70)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner) -5.119 (0.15) -0.591 (0.85)
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest) 131.499 (0.06) 59.099 (0.24)
Primary insiders -98.604 (0.04) -15.509 (0.63)
Squared (Primary insiders) 98.374 (0.09) 19.045 (0.60)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned) -103.361 (0.06) -23.079 (0.56)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income)) -3.079 (0.03) -0.027 (0.98)
n 356 741
R2 0.05 0.01
The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling
for contemporary eﬀects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors
in 19891999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Variable deﬁnitions
are found in appendix A.
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Chapter 7
Does ﬁrm performance aﬀect ownership
duration?
This chapter explores whether there is reverse causation between ownership duration and ﬁrm perfor-
mance, i.e., if duration is driven by performance. We analyze this question by exploring whether there
is a link from the ﬁrm's performance to an owner's subsequent decision to leave or stay. Estimating a
binary choice model, we consider the ﬁrm's largest owner in section 7.1. Section 7.2 includes owners with
ranks 15 as well.
7.1 The ﬁrm's largest owner
7.1.1 Performance measure: Q
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Table 7.1 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreci-
ation over long term assets. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.971 (0.20) -2.130 (0.05)
Foreign owner 0.789 (0.09) 1.154 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.144 (0.79) 0.237 (0.57)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.287 (0.49) -0.023 (0.94)
Financial owner 0.988 (0.09) 1.233 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.047 (0.58) 0.067 (0.31)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.520 (0.11) 2.204 (0.07)
Earnings surprise 0.111 (0.53) 0.240 (0.06)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.280 (0.20) 0.149 (0.12)
n 299 542
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.075
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.834 (0.08) -1.730 (0.14)
Foreign owner 0.392 (0.41) 0.554 (0.12)
Family (individual) owner -1.314 (0.05) -0.619 (0.18)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.677 (0.12) -0.390 (0.24)
Financial owner 0.385 (0.51) 0.892 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.098 (0.30) 0.034 (0.63)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.912 (0.12) 1.007 (0.20)
Earnings surprise 0.212 (0.31) 0.193 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.370 (0.10) 0.173 (0.06)
n 299 542
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.058
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.834 (0.08) -1.730 (0.14)
Foreign owner 0.392 (0.41) 0.554 (0.12)
Family (individual) owner -1.314 (0.05) -0.619 (0.18)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.677 (0.12) -0.390 (0.24)
Financial owner 0.385 (0.51) 0.892 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.098 (0.30) 0.034 (0.63)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.912 (0.12) 1.007 (0.20)
Earnings surprise 0.212 (0.31) 0.193 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.370 (0.10) 0.173 (0.06)
n 299 542
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.058
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.055 (0.34) -0.596 (0.67)
Foreign owner 0.108 (0.86) 0.627 (0.15)
Family (individual) owner -2.035 (0.08) -0.385 (0.50)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.542 (0.34) -0.208 (0.62)
Financial owner -0.688 (0.44) 0.173 (0.75)
ln(Firm Size) -0.018 (0.89) -0.089 (0.29)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.736 (0.15) 0.837 (0.31)
Earnings surprise 0.117 (0.66) 0.173 (0.30)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.239 (0.33) 0.097 (0.34)
n 299 542
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.030
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.2 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.086 (0.43) -0.948 (0.36)
Foreign owner 1.126 (0.02) 1.317 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.787 (0.15) 0.619 (0.13)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.091 (0.83) 0.149 (0.64)
Financial owner 0.924 (0.10) 1.319 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.000 (1.00) -0.012 (0.85)
Investment over depreciation 0.076 (0.04) 0.041 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.037 (0.82) -0.073 (0.56)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.168 (0.38) 0.148 (0.12)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.059
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.912 (0.54) -0.398 (0.72)
Foreign owner 0.471 (0.31) 0.561 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -1.078 (0.10) -0.464 (0.30)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.814 (0.07) -0.501 (0.13)
Financial owner 0.557 (0.32) 1.025 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.011 (0.90) -0.048 (0.49)
Investment over depreciation 0.039 (0.13) 0.031 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.052 (0.77) 0.114 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.243 (0.20) 0.118 (0.22)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.059
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.912 (0.54) -0.398 (0.72)
Foreign owner 0.471 (0.31) 0.561 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -1.078 (0.10) -0.464 (0.30)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.814 (0.07) -0.501 (0.13)
Financial owner 0.557 (0.32) 1.025 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.011 (0.90) -0.048 (0.49)
Investment over depreciation 0.039 (0.13) 0.031 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.052 (0.77) 0.114 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.243 (0.20) 0.118 (0.22)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.059
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.109 (0.95) 0.054 (0.97)
Foreign owner 0.174 (0.78) 0.716 (0.13)
Family (individual) owner -1.312 (0.17) -0.029 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.560 (0.34) 0.076 (0.87)
Financial owner -0.861 (0.34) 0.585 (0.30)
ln(Firm Size) -0.134 (0.26) -0.153 (0.07)
Investment over depreciation 0.059 (0.05) 0.034 (0.07)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.175 (0.40) -0.008 (0.96)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.218 (0.33) 0.097 (0.37)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.029
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.3 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation
over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.196 (0.16) -2.084 (0.06)
Foreign owner 0.600 (0.21) 0.972 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.308 (0.58) 0.324 (0.44)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.242 (0.57) -0.058 (0.86)
Financial owner 0.891 (0.13) 1.078 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.081 (0.36) 0.091 (0.18)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.696 (0.10) 2.353 (0.06)
Earnings surprise 0.120 (0.50) 0.247 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.304 (0.17) 0.129 (0.18)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.106 (0.06) -0.120 (0.01)
n 299 542
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.084
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.980 (0.07) -1.522 (0.20)
Foreign owner 0.164 (0.73) 0.308 (0.40)
Family (individual) owner -0.864 (0.22) -0.408 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.426 (0.34) -0.327 (0.33)
Financial owner 0.250 (0.67) 0.665 (0.13)
ln(Firm Size) 0.150 (0.12) 0.065 (0.37)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.939 (0.11) 1.062 (0.18)
Earnings surprise 0.229 (0.27) 0.191 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.349 (0.11) 0.142 (0.12)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.218 (0.00) -0.212 (0.00)
n 299 542
Pseudo R2 0.126 0.083
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.980 (0.07) -1.522 (0.20)
Foreign owner 0.164 (0.73) 0.308 (0.40)
Family (individual) owner -0.864 (0.22) -0.408 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.426 (0.34) -0.327 (0.33)
Financial owner 0.250 (0.67) 0.665 (0.13)
ln(Firm Size) 0.150 (0.12) 0.065 (0.37)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.939 (0.11) 1.062 (0.18)
Earnings surprise 0.229 (0.27) 0.191 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.349 (0.11) 0.142 (0.12)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.218 (0.00) -0.212 (0.00)
n 299 542
Pseudo R2 0.126 0.083
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.290 (0.29) -0.592 (0.67)
Foreign owner -0.145 (0.82) 0.404 (0.36)
Family (individual) owner -1.864 (0.11) -0.301 (0.60)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.366 (0.52) -0.151 (0.72)
Financial owner -0.850 (0.34) -0.014 (0.98)
ln(Firm Size) 0.033 (0.80) -0.051 (0.56)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.959 (0.14) 0.900 (0.28)
Earnings surprise 0.136 (0.60) 0.179 (0.28)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.258 (0.29) 0.076 (0.46)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.147 (0.07) -0.149 (0.01)
n 299 542
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.044
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.4 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.235 (0.38) -0.924 (0.38)
Foreign owner 0.869 (0.07) 1.172 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.013 (0.07) 0.702 (0.09)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.069 (0.87) 0.127 (0.69)
Financial owner 0.780 (0.17) 1.206 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.037 (0.66) 0.010 (0.88)
Investment over depreciation 0.082 (0.03) 0.040 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.013 (0.94) -0.064 (0.61)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.203 (0.29) 0.138 (0.14)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.151 (0.01) -0.107 (0.03)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.066
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.961 (0.53) -0.234 (0.84)
Foreign owner 0.224 (0.64) 0.351 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.424 (0.54) -0.175 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.568 (0.21) -0.406 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.411 (0.47) 0.845 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.039 (0.67) -0.013 (0.85)
Investment over depreciation 0.039 (0.17) 0.026 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.028 (0.88) 0.118 (0.42)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.224 (0.23) 0.090 (0.34)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.246 (0.00) -0.221 (0.00)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.085
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.961 (0.53) -0.234 (0.84)
Foreign owner 0.224 (0.64) 0.351 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.424 (0.54) -0.175 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.568 (0.21) -0.406 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.411 (0.47) 0.845 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.039 (0.67) -0.013 (0.85)
Investment over depreciation 0.039 (0.17) 0.026 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.028 (0.88) 0.118 (0.42)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.224 (0.23) 0.090 (0.34)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.246 (0.00) -0.221 (0.00)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.085
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.395 (0.84) -0.056 (0.97)
Foreign owner -0.091 (0.89) 0.535 (0.27)
Family (individual) owner -0.875 (0.36) 0.136 (0.82)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.365 (0.54) 0.163 (0.72)
Financial owner -1.019 (0.26) 0.463 (0.41)
ln(Firm Size) -0.072 (0.56) -0.107 (0.22)
Investment over depreciation 0.062 (0.07) 0.031 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.117 (0.58) 0.013 (0.94)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.241 (0.27) 0.085 (0.43)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.183 (0.03) -0.160 (0.01)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.044
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.5 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Invest-
ments over depreciation. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.674 (0.63) -0.892 (0.41)
Foreign owner 0.782 (0.10) 1.131 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.083 (0.88) 0.171 (0.68)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.506 (0.22) -0.153 (0.63)
Financial owner 0.868 (0.14) 1.025 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.018 (0.83) -0.005 (0.94)
Investment over depreciation 0.028 (0.40) 0.008 (0.70)
Earnings surprise 0.085 (0.64) 0.226 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.350 (0.12) 0.205 (0.03)
n 291 514
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.066
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.313 (0.14) -1.619 (0.16)
Foreign owner 0.385 (0.42) 0.638 (0.08)
Family (individual) owner -1.338 (0.05) -0.570 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.874 (0.05) -0.404 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.316 (0.59) 0.844 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.071 (0.45) 0.028 (0.70)
Investment over depreciation 0.035 (0.33) 0.008 (0.72)
Earnings surprise 0.168 (0.42) 0.214 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.416 (0.07) 0.197 (0.03)
n 291 514
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.058
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.313 (0.14) -1.619 (0.16)
Foreign owner 0.385 (0.42) 0.638 (0.08)
Family (individual) owner -1.338 (0.05) -0.570 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.874 (0.05) -0.404 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.316 (0.59) 0.844 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.071 (0.45) 0.028 (0.70)
Investment over depreciation 0.035 (0.33) 0.008 (0.72)
Earnings surprise 0.168 (0.42) 0.214 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.416 (0.07) 0.197 (0.03)
n 291 514
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.058
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.878 (0.66) -0.647 (0.64)
Foreign owner 0.202 (0.74) 0.745 (0.10)
Family (individual) owner -1.950 (0.09) -0.276 (0.64)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.672 (0.23) -0.128 (0.77)
Financial owner -0.764 (0.39) 0.250 (0.67)
ln(Firm Size) -0.067 (0.58) -0.091 (0.29)
Investment over depreciation 0.009 (0.86) 0.014 (0.56)
Earnings surprise 0.137 (0.61) 0.253 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.244 (0.32) 0.117 (0.26)
n 291 514
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.030
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.6 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.086 (0.43) -0.948 (0.36)
Foreign owner 1.126 (0.02) 1.317 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.787 (0.15) 0.619 (0.13)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.091 (0.83) 0.149 (0.64)
Financial owner 0.924 (0.10) 1.319 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.000 (1.00) -0.012 (0.85)
Investment over depreciation 0.076 (0.04) 0.041 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.037 (0.82) -0.073 (0.56)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.168 (0.38) 0.148 (0.12)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.059
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.912 (0.54) -0.398 (0.72)
Foreign owner 0.471 (0.31) 0.561 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -1.078 (0.10) -0.464 (0.30)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.814 (0.07) -0.501 (0.13)
Financial owner 0.557 (0.32) 1.025 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.011 (0.90) -0.048 (0.49)
Investment over depreciation 0.039 (0.13) 0.031 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.052 (0.77) 0.114 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.243 (0.20) 0.118 (0.22)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.059
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.912 (0.54) -0.398 (0.72)
Foreign owner 0.471 (0.31) 0.561 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -1.078 (0.10) -0.464 (0.30)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.814 (0.07) -0.501 (0.13)
Financial owner 0.557 (0.32) 1.025 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.011 (0.90) -0.048 (0.49)
Investment over depreciation 0.039 (0.13) 0.031 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.052 (0.77) 0.114 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.243 (0.20) 0.118 (0.22)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.059
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.109 (0.95) 0.054 (0.97)
Foreign owner 0.174 (0.78) 0.716 (0.13)
Family (individual) owner -1.312 (0.17) -0.029 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.560 (0.34) 0.076 (0.87)
Financial owner -0.861 (0.34) 0.585 (0.30)
ln(Firm Size) -0.134 (0.26) -0.153 (0.07)
Investment over depreciation 0.059 (0.05) 0.034 (0.07)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.175 (0.40) -0.008 (0.96)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.218 (0.33) 0.097 (0.37)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.029
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.7 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments
over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.841 (0.55) -0.831 (0.44)
Foreign owner 0.589 (0.22) 0.952 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.266 (0.63) 0.261 (0.54)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.464 (0.27) -0.186 (0.56)
Financial owner 0.766 (0.19) 0.874 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.014 (0.87) 0.018 (0.79)
Investment over depreciation 0.029 (0.38) 0.006 (0.79)
Earnings surprise 0.093 (0.60) 0.235 (0.07)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.370 (0.10) 0.188 (0.04)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.112 (0.05) -0.116 (0.02)
n 291 514
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.074
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.543 (0.11) -1.490 (0.21)
Foreign owner 0.141 (0.77) 0.379 (0.31)
Family (individual) owner -0.768 (0.28) -0.319 (0.51)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.607 (0.18) -0.326 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.183 (0.76) 0.616 (0.18)
ln(Firm Size) 0.131 (0.17) 0.068 (0.36)
Investment over depreciation 0.049 (0.20) 0.004 (0.85)
Earnings surprise 0.191 (0.36) 0.218 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.381 (0.09) 0.164 (0.07)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.240 (0.00) -0.228 (0.00)
n 291 514
Pseudo R2 0.131 0.087
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.543 (0.11) -1.490 (0.21)
Foreign owner 0.141 (0.77) 0.379 (0.31)
Family (individual) owner -0.768 (0.28) -0.319 (0.51)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.607 (0.18) -0.326 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.183 (0.76) 0.616 (0.18)
ln(Firm Size) 0.131 (0.17) 0.068 (0.36)
Investment over depreciation 0.049 (0.20) 0.004 (0.85)
Earnings surprise 0.191 (0.36) 0.218 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.381 (0.09) 0.164 (0.07)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.240 (0.00) -0.228 (0.00)
n 291 514
Pseudo R2 0.131 0.087
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.047 (0.60) -0.723 (0.61)
Foreign owner -0.019 (0.98) 0.519 (0.27)
Family (individual) owner -1.709 (0.14) -0.167 (0.78)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.503 (0.38) -0.063 (0.88)
Financial owner -0.908 (0.31) 0.076 (0.90)
ln(Firm Size) -0.021 (0.87) -0.045 (0.62)
Investment over depreciation 0.004 (0.94) 0.010 (0.70)
Earnings surprise 0.161 (0.53) 0.262 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.257 (0.29) 0.096 (0.35)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.138 (0.09) -0.155 (0.01)
n 291 514
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.045
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.8 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.235 (0.38) -0.924 (0.38)
Foreign owner 0.869 (0.07) 1.172 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.013 (0.07) 0.702 (0.09)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.069 (0.87) 0.127 (0.69)
Financial owner 0.780 (0.17) 1.206 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.037 (0.66) 0.010 (0.88)
Investment over depreciation 0.082 (0.03) 0.040 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.013 (0.94) -0.064 (0.61)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.203 (0.29) 0.138 (0.14)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.151 (0.01) -0.107 (0.03)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.066
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.961 (0.53) -0.234 (0.84)
Foreign owner 0.224 (0.64) 0.351 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.424 (0.54) -0.175 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.568 (0.21) -0.406 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.411 (0.47) 0.845 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.039 (0.67) -0.013 (0.85)
Investment over depreciation 0.039 (0.17) 0.026 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.028 (0.88) 0.118 (0.42)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.224 (0.23) 0.090 (0.34)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.246 (0.00) -0.221 (0.00)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.085
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.961 (0.53) -0.234 (0.84)
Foreign owner 0.224 (0.64) 0.351 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.424 (0.54) -0.175 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.568 (0.21) -0.406 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.411 (0.47) 0.845 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.039 (0.67) -0.013 (0.85)
Investment over depreciation 0.039 (0.17) 0.026 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.028 (0.88) 0.118 (0.42)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.224 (0.23) 0.090 (0.34)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.246 (0.00) -0.221 (0.00)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.085
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.395 (0.84) -0.056 (0.97)
Foreign owner -0.091 (0.89) 0.535 (0.27)
Family (individual) owner -0.875 (0.36) 0.136 (0.82)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.365 (0.54) 0.163 (0.72)
Financial owner -1.019 (0.26) 0.463 (0.41)
ln(Firm Size) -0.072 (0.56) -0.107 (0.22)
Investment over depreciation 0.062 (0.07) 0.031 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.117 (0.58) 0.013 (0.94)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.241 (0.27) 0.085 (0.43)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.183 (0.03) -0.160 (0.01)
n 304 529
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.044
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.1.2 Performance measure: Marginal Q
Table 7.9 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreci-
ation over long term assets. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.527 (0.35) -2.457 (0.05)
Foreign owner 0.884 (0.06) 1.285 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.154 (0.79) 0.340 (0.47)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.376 (0.40) 0.010 (0.98)
Financial owner 1.159 (0.06) 1.687 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.051 (0.58) 0.100 (0.18)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.501 (0.12) 2.543 (0.08)
Earnings surprise 0.214 (0.27) 0.201 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.061 (0.30) -0.071 (0.13)
n 272 432
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.087
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.494 (0.15) -1.834 (0.17)
Foreign owner 0.540 (0.26) 0.699 (0.07)
Family (individual) owner -1.070 (0.12) -0.548 (0.31)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.745 (0.11) -0.330 (0.37)
Financial owner 0.561 (0.35) 1.094 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) 0.102 (0.31) 0.049 (0.54)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.079 (0.15) 1.409 (0.14)
Earnings surprise 0.334 (0.15) 0.174 (0.26)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.027 (0.69) 0.001 (0.98)
n 272 432
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.060
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.494 (0.15) -1.834 (0.17)
Foreign owner 0.540 (0.26) 0.699 (0.07)
Family (individual) owner -1.070 (0.12) -0.548 (0.31)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.745 (0.11) -0.330 (0.37)
Financial owner 0.561 (0.35) 1.094 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) 0.102 (0.31) 0.049 (0.54)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.079 (0.15) 1.409 (0.14)
Earnings surprise 0.334 (0.15) 0.174 (0.26)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.027 (0.69) 0.001 (0.98)
n 272 432
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.060
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.246 (0.34) -0.725 (0.65)
Foreign owner 0.358 (0.56) 0.569 (0.22)
Family (individual) owner -1.692 (0.15) -0.877 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.404 (0.52) -0.308 (0.50)
Financial owner -0.423 (0.64) 0.228 (0.71)
ln(Firm Size) 0.000 (1.00) -0.075 (0.45)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.969 (0.14) 1.186 (0.21)
Earnings surprise 0.056 (0.84) 0.027 (0.88)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.046 (0.61) 0.031 (0.62)
n 272 432
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.035
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.10 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.773 (0.59) -1.061 (0.35)
Foreign owner 1.088 (0.02) 1.364 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.750 (0.20) 0.856 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.269 (0.54) 0.139 (0.69)
Financial owner 0.869 (0.13) 1.484 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.000 (1.00) 0.004 (0.95)
Investment over depreciation 0.086 (0.03) 0.045 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.072 (0.66) -0.079 (0.56)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.007 (0.92) -0.014 (0.78)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.062
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.570 (0.72) 0.090 (0.94)
Foreign owner 0.475 (0.30) 0.639 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -1.166 (0.09) -0.434 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.942 (0.04) -0.527 (0.14)
Financial owner 0.515 (0.37) 1.003 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.013 (0.89) -0.071 (0.34)
Investment over depreciation 0.045 (0.09) 0.029 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.072 (0.69) 0.067 (0.66)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.049 (0.51) 0.035 (0.54)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.058
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.570 (0.72) 0.090 (0.94)
Foreign owner 0.475 (0.30) 0.639 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -1.166 (0.09) -0.434 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.942 (0.04) -0.527 (0.14)
Financial owner 0.515 (0.37) 1.003 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.013 (0.89) -0.071 (0.34)
Investment over depreciation 0.045 (0.09) 0.029 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.072 (0.69) 0.067 (0.66)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.049 (0.51) 0.035 (0.54)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.058
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.093 (0.96) 0.788 (0.60)
Foreign owner 0.197 (0.75) 0.633 (0.20)
Family (individual) owner -1.918 (0.11) -0.525 (0.45)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.642 (0.29) -0.144 (0.76)
Financial owner -0.763 (0.40) 0.473 (0.43)
ln(Firm Size) -0.131 (0.30) -0.193 (0.04)
Investment over depreciation 0.070 (0.04) 0.039 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.144 (0.50) -0.066 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.055 (0.56) 0.087 (0.21)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.040
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.11 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation
over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.671 (0.31) -2.403 (0.06)
Foreign owner 0.767 (0.11) 1.144 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.296 (0.61) 0.429 (0.37)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.315 (0.48) -0.004 (0.99)
Financial owner 1.100 (0.07) 1.576 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.075 (0.42) 0.115 (0.13)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.589 (0.12) 2.593 (0.08)
Earnings surprise 0.215 (0.26) 0.205 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.061 (0.31) -0.072 (0.14)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.082 (0.15) -0.089 (0.08)
n 272 432
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.092
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.605 (0.14) -1.577 (0.24)
Foreign owner 0.363 (0.45) 0.458 (0.25)
Family (individual) owner -0.650 (0.37) -0.273 (0.62)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.462 (0.34) -0.234 (0.53)
Financial owner 0.470 (0.44) 0.882 (0.07)
ln(Firm Size) 0.145 (0.16) 0.073 (0.37)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.063 (0.14) 1.394 (0.14)
Earnings surprise 0.343 (0.14) 0.178 (0.24)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.029 (0.67) 0.006 (0.90)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.202 (0.01) -0.205 (0.00)
n 272 432
Pseudo R2 0.126 0.086
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.605 (0.14) -1.577 (0.24)
Foreign owner 0.363 (0.45) 0.458 (0.25)
Family (individual) owner -0.650 (0.37) -0.273 (0.62)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.462 (0.34) -0.234 (0.53)
Financial owner 0.470 (0.44) 0.882 (0.07)
ln(Firm Size) 0.145 (0.16) 0.073 (0.37)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.063 (0.14) 1.394 (0.14)
Earnings surprise 0.343 (0.14) 0.178 (0.24)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.029 (0.67) 0.006 (0.90)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.202 (0.01) -0.205 (0.00)
n 272 432
Pseudo R2 0.126 0.086
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.319 (0.33) -0.682 (0.67)
Foreign owner 0.174 (0.78) 0.381 (0.43)
Family (individual) owner -1.572 (0.18) -0.782 (0.29)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.244 (0.70) -0.241 (0.60)
Financial owner -0.542 (0.55) 0.080 (0.90)
ln(Firm Size) 0.034 (0.81) -0.048 (0.63)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.116 (0.13) 1.212 (0.20)
Earnings surprise 0.078 (0.77) 0.038 (0.83)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.048 (0.61) 0.036 (0.57)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.115 (0.17) -0.113 (0.08)
n 272 432
Pseudo R2 0.081 0.043
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.12 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.906 (0.54) -1.031 (0.37)
Foreign owner 0.873 (0.07) 1.219 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.052 (0.08) 0.988 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.192 (0.67) 0.134 (0.70)
Financial owner 0.760 (0.19) 1.371 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.036 (0.68) 0.023 (0.75)
Investment over depreciation 0.092 (0.02) 0.044 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.036 (0.83) -0.062 (0.65)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.006 (0.93) -0.009 (0.86)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.157 (0.01) -0.103 (0.05)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.069
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.657 (0.68) 0.347 (0.78)
Foreign owner 0.254 (0.59) 0.404 (0.30)
Family (individual) owner -0.512 (0.49) -0.038 (0.94)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.625 (0.19) -0.397 (0.28)
Financial owner 0.400 (0.49) 0.789 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.036 (0.71) -0.043 (0.58)
Investment over depreciation 0.045 (0.13) 0.024 (0.22)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.040 (0.82) 0.092 (0.55)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.061 (0.41) 0.045 (0.42)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.257 (0.00) -0.238 (0.00)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.089
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.657 (0.68) 0.347 (0.78)
Foreign owner 0.254 (0.59) 0.404 (0.30)
Family (individual) owner -0.512 (0.49) -0.038 (0.94)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.625 (0.19) -0.397 (0.28)
Financial owner 0.400 (0.49) 0.789 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.036 (0.71) -0.043 (0.58)
Investment over depreciation 0.045 (0.13) 0.024 (0.22)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.040 (0.82) 0.092 (0.55)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.061 (0.41) 0.045 (0.42)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.257 (0.00) -0.238 (0.00)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.089
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.086 (0.97) 0.773 (0.61)
Foreign owner -0.073 (0.91) 0.418 (0.40)
Family (individual) owner -1.433 (0.23) -0.292 (0.68)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.380 (0.54) -0.036 (0.94)
Financial owner -0.920 (0.31) 0.321 (0.60)
ln(Firm Size) -0.071 (0.58) -0.153 (0.12)
Investment over depreciation 0.073 (0.07) 0.034 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.070 (0.75) -0.022 (0.90)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.062 (0.53) 0.098 (0.17)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.208 (0.02) -0.167 (0.02)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.056
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.13 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Invest-
ments over depreciation. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.145 (0.92) -1.106 (0.36)
Foreign owner 0.853 (0.07) 1.248 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.086 (0.88) 0.316 (0.51)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.668 (0.13) -0.094 (0.79)
Financial owner 1.019 (0.09) 1.524 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.025 (0.78) 0.023 (0.76)
Investment over depreciation 0.111 (0.02) 0.032 (0.24)
Earnings surprise 0.197 (0.31) 0.223 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.051 (0.41) -0.074 (0.14)
n 264 412
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.073
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.840 (0.27) -1.457 (0.26)
Foreign owner 0.555 (0.24) 0.862 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner -1.048 (0.13) -0.469 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.931 (0.05) -0.317 (0.40)
Financial owner 0.497 (0.41) 1.095 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) 0.071 (0.47) 0.031 (0.70)
Investment over depreciation 0.034 (0.50) 0.001 (0.97)
Earnings surprise 0.302 (0.20) 0.230 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.035 (0.61) -0.010 (0.86)
n 264 412
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.059
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.840 (0.27) -1.457 (0.26)
Foreign owner 0.555 (0.24) 0.862 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner -1.048 (0.13) -0.469 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.931 (0.05) -0.317 (0.40)
Financial owner 0.497 (0.41) 1.095 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) 0.071 (0.47) 0.031 (0.70)
Investment over depreciation 0.034 (0.50) 0.001 (0.97)
Earnings surprise 0.302 (0.20) 0.230 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.035 (0.61) -0.010 (0.86)
n 264 412
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.059
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.913 (0.67) -0.305 (0.85)
Foreign owner 0.422 (0.48) 0.706 (0.15)
Family (individual) owner -1.646 (0.16) -0.790 (0.29)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.595 (0.34) -0.217 (0.65)
Financial owner -0.539 (0.55) 0.256 (0.69)
ln(Firm Size) -0.061 (0.64) -0.104 (0.30)
Investment over depreciation 0.050 (0.39) 0.028 (0.28)
Earnings surprise 0.083 (0.76) 0.156 (0.42)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.042 (0.65) 0.008 (0.91)
n 264 412
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.032
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
276
Table 7.14 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.773 (0.59) -1.061 (0.35)
Foreign owner 1.088 (0.02) 1.364 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.750 (0.20) 0.856 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.269 (0.54) 0.139 (0.69)
Financial owner 0.869 (0.13) 1.484 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.000 (1.00) 0.004 (0.95)
Investment over depreciation 0.086 (0.03) 0.045 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.072 (0.66) -0.079 (0.56)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.007 (0.92) -0.014 (0.78)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.062
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.570 (0.72) 0.090 (0.94)
Foreign owner 0.475 (0.30) 0.639 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -1.166 (0.09) -0.434 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.942 (0.04) -0.527 (0.14)
Financial owner 0.515 (0.37) 1.003 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.013 (0.89) -0.071 (0.34)
Investment over depreciation 0.045 (0.09) 0.029 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.072 (0.69) 0.067 (0.66)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.049 (0.51) 0.035 (0.54)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.058
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.570 (0.72) 0.090 (0.94)
Foreign owner 0.475 (0.30) 0.639 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -1.166 (0.09) -0.434 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.942 (0.04) -0.527 (0.14)
Financial owner 0.515 (0.37) 1.003 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.013 (0.89) -0.071 (0.34)
Investment over depreciation 0.045 (0.09) 0.029 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.072 (0.69) 0.067 (0.66)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.049 (0.51) 0.035 (0.54)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.058
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.093 (0.96) 0.788 (0.60)
Foreign owner 0.197 (0.75) 0.633 (0.20)
Family (individual) owner -1.918 (0.11) -0.525 (0.45)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.642 (0.29) -0.144 (0.76)
Financial owner -0.763 (0.40) 0.473 (0.43)
ln(Firm Size) -0.131 (0.30) -0.193 (0.04)
Investment over depreciation 0.070 (0.04) 0.039 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.144 (0.50) -0.066 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.055 (0.56) 0.087 (0.21)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.040
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.15 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments
over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.268 (0.86) -1.050 (0.39)
Foreign owner 0.737 (0.12) 1.104 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.250 (0.67) 0.417 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.602 (0.18) -0.104 (0.77)
Financial owner 0.960 (0.12) 1.408 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.000 (1.00) 0.040 (0.60)
Investment over depreciation 0.108 (0.03) 0.027 (0.31)
Earnings surprise 0.198 (0.30) 0.227 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.050 (0.41) -0.074 (0.13)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.087 (0.14) -0.089 (0.09)
n 264 412
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.078
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.061 (0.22) -1.262 (0.34)
Foreign owner 0.364 (0.46) 0.605 (0.14)
Family (individual) owner -0.515 (0.48) -0.147 (0.79)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.622 (0.20) -0.203 (0.59)
Financial owner 0.408 (0.50) 0.874 (0.09)
ln(Firm Size) 0.122 (0.23) 0.063 (0.45)
Investment over depreciation 0.044 (0.43) -0.006 (0.80)
Earnings surprise 0.315 (0.17) 0.234 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.036 (0.61) -0.007 (0.89)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.220 (0.00) -0.216 (0.00)
n 264 412
Pseudo R2 0.127 0.088
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.061 (0.22) -1.262 (0.34)
Foreign owner 0.364 (0.46) 0.605 (0.14)
Family (individual) owner -0.515 (0.48) -0.147 (0.79)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.622 (0.20) -0.203 (0.59)
Financial owner 0.408 (0.50) 0.874 (0.09)
ln(Firm Size) 0.122 (0.23) 0.063 (0.45)
Investment over depreciation 0.044 (0.43) -0.006 (0.80)
Earnings surprise 0.315 (0.17) 0.234 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.036 (0.61) -0.007 (0.89)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.220 (0.00) -0.216 (0.00)
n 264 412
Pseudo R2 0.127 0.088
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.955 (0.66) -0.296 (0.85)
Foreign owner 0.262 (0.67) 0.534 (0.29)
Family (individual) owner -1.466 (0.21) -0.684 (0.36)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.448 (0.47) -0.151 (0.75)
Financial owner -0.639 (0.48) 0.129 (0.84)
ln(Firm Size) -0.031 (0.81) -0.077 (0.45)
Investment over depreciation 0.047 (0.45) 0.024 (0.37)
Earnings surprise 0.106 (0.69) 0.166 (0.39)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.043 (0.64) 0.013 (0.85)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.103 (0.21) -0.104 (0.12)
n 264 412
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.039
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.16 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.906 (0.54) -1.031 (0.37)
Foreign owner 0.873 (0.07) 1.219 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.052 (0.08) 0.988 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.192 (0.67) 0.134 (0.70)
Financial owner 0.760 (0.19) 1.371 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.036 (0.68) 0.023 (0.75)
Investment over depreciation 0.092 (0.02) 0.044 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.036 (0.83) -0.062 (0.65)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.006 (0.93) -0.009 (0.86)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.157 (0.01) -0.103 (0.05)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.069
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.657 (0.68) 0.347 (0.78)
Foreign owner 0.254 (0.59) 0.404 (0.30)
Family (individual) owner -0.512 (0.49) -0.038 (0.94)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.625 (0.19) -0.397 (0.28)
Financial owner 0.400 (0.49) 0.789 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.036 (0.71) -0.043 (0.58)
Investment over depreciation 0.045 (0.13) 0.024 (0.22)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.040 (0.82) 0.092 (0.55)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.061 (0.41) 0.045 (0.42)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.257 (0.00) -0.238 (0.00)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.089
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.657 (0.68) 0.347 (0.78)
Foreign owner 0.254 (0.59) 0.404 (0.30)
Family (individual) owner -0.512 (0.49) -0.038 (0.94)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.625 (0.19) -0.397 (0.28)
Financial owner 0.400 (0.49) 0.789 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.036 (0.71) -0.043 (0.58)
Investment over depreciation 0.045 (0.13) 0.024 (0.22)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.040 (0.82) 0.092 (0.55)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.061 (0.41) 0.045 (0.42)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.257 (0.00) -0.238 (0.00)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.089
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.086 (0.97) 0.773 (0.61)
Foreign owner -0.073 (0.91) 0.418 (0.40)
Family (individual) owner -1.433 (0.23) -0.292 (0.68)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.380 (0.54) -0.036 (0.94)
Financial owner -0.920 (0.31) 0.321 (0.60)
ln(Firm Size) -0.071 (0.58) -0.153 (0.12)
Investment over depreciation 0.073 (0.07) 0.034 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.070 (0.75) -0.022 (0.90)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.062 (0.53) 0.098 (0.17)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.208 (0.02) -0.167 (0.02)
n 278 440
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.056
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.1.3 Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Table 7.17 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depre-
ciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.608 (0.45) -1.384 (0.30)
Foreign owner 0.702 (0.24) 0.992 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -0.143 (0.85) -0.070 (0.89)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.546 (0.35) -0.179 (0.65)
Financial owner 1.125 (0.21) 1.058 (0.07)
ln(Firm Size) 0.047 (0.69) 0.034 (0.67)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.544 (0.08) 3.206 (0.03)
Earnings surprise 0.001 (0.99) 0.218 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.031 (0.89) 0.025 (0.82)
n 192 391
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.073
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -5.574 (0.02) -1.875 (0.19)
Foreign owner 0.614 (0.32) 0.459 (0.29)
Family (individual) owner -0.538 (0.53) -0.367 (0.51)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.343 (0.58) -0.312 (0.46)
Financial owner 0.499 (0.59) 0.936 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.274 (0.04) 0.052 (0.54)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.909 (0.12) 1.908 (0.09)
Earnings surprise 0.333 (0.28) 0.185 (0.28)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.017 (0.94) 0.010 (0.93)
n 192 391
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.047
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -5.574 (0.02) -1.875 (0.19)
Foreign owner 0.614 (0.32) 0.459 (0.29)
Family (individual) owner -0.538 (0.53) -0.367 (0.51)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.343 (0.58) -0.312 (0.46)
Financial owner 0.499 (0.59) 0.936 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.274 (0.04) 0.052 (0.54)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.909 (0.12) 1.908 (0.09)
Earnings surprise 0.333 (0.28) 0.185 (0.28)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.017 (0.94) 0.010 (0.93)
n 192 391
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.047
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -5.447 (0.09) -0.495 (0.77)
Foreign owner -0.353 (0.65) 0.358 (0.50)
Family (individual) owner -1.436 (0.28) -0.285 (0.67)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.636 (0.42) -0.368 (0.48)
Financial owner -0.239 (0.85) -0.104 (0.89)
ln(Firm Size) 0.197 (0.26) -0.083 (0.42)
Depreciation over long term assets 6.995 (0.03) 1.506 (0.16)
Earnings surprise -0.279 (0.42) 0.022 (0.91)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.557 (0.21) -0.052 (0.72)
n 192 391
Pseudo R2 0.126 0.027
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.18 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.105 (0.95) 0.546 (0.65)
Foreign owner 1.167 (0.05) 1.102 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.420 (0.56) 0.137 (0.78)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.225 (0.69) -0.042 (0.91)
Financial owner 0.712 (0.39) 1.132 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) -0.048 (0.64) -0.083 (0.26)
Investment over depreciation 0.063 (0.07) 0.032 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.136 (0.56) -0.153 (0.34)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.155 (0.42) 0.040 (0.72)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.047
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.047 (0.30) -0.062 (0.96)
Foreign owner 0.574 (0.33) 0.322 (0.44)
Family (individual) owner -0.498 (0.53) -0.418 (0.42)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.717 (0.22) -0.563 (0.15)
Financial owner 0.522 (0.54) 0.912 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.075 (0.52) -0.050 (0.54)
Investment over depreciation 0.036 (0.16) 0.020 (0.26)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.062 (0.81) 0.142 (0.44)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.091 (0.65) -0.042 (0.73)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.042
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.047 (0.30) -0.062 (0.96)
Foreign owner 0.574 (0.33) 0.322 (0.44)
Family (individual) owner -0.498 (0.53) -0.418 (0.42)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.717 (0.22) -0.563 (0.15)
Financial owner 0.522 (0.54) 0.912 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.075 (0.52) -0.050 (0.54)
Investment over depreciation 0.036 (0.16) 0.020 (0.26)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.062 (0.81) 0.142 (0.44)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.091 (0.65) -0.042 (0.73)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.042
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.089 (0.42) 0.221 (0.89)
Foreign owner -0.233 (0.76) 0.221 (0.68)
Family (individual) owner -0.466 (0.66) -0.120 (0.85)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.603 (0.42) -0.156 (0.76)
Financial owner -0.269 (0.83) 0.668 (0.31)
ln(Firm Size) 0.010 (0.95) -0.134 (0.17)
Investment over depreciation 0.058 (0.06) 0.026 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.169 (0.60) -0.042 (0.84)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.680 (0.06) -0.034 (0.82)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.019
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.19 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation
over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.958 (0.36) -1.380 (0.31)
Foreign owner 0.446 (0.47) 0.768 (0.08)
Family (individual) owner 0.047 (0.95) -0.035 (0.95)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.503 (0.39) -0.257 (0.52)
Financial owner 1.070 (0.23) 0.892 (0.13)
ln(Firm Size) 0.094 (0.44) 0.062 (0.45)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.776 (0.07) 3.254 (0.03)
Earnings surprise -0.019 (0.94) 0.213 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.012 (0.96) 0.020 (0.86)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.107 (0.10) -0.114 (0.03)
n 192 391
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.083
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -5.876 (0.01) -1.748 (0.23)
Foreign owner 0.172 (0.79) 0.117 (0.80)
Family (individual) owner 0.024 (0.98) -0.239 (0.67)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.127 (0.84) -0.314 (0.46)
Financial owner 0.367 (0.69) 0.648 (0.27)
ln(Firm Size) 0.355 (0.01) 0.094 (0.28)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.631 (0.13) 1.862 (0.08)
Earnings surprise 0.278 (0.36) 0.149 (0.38)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.027 (0.91) -0.001 (0.99)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.264 (0.00) -0.220 (0.00)
n 192 391
Pseudo R2 0.169 0.079
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -5.876 (0.01) -1.748 (0.23)
Foreign owner 0.172 (0.79) 0.117 (0.80)
Family (individual) owner 0.024 (0.98) -0.239 (0.67)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.127 (0.84) -0.314 (0.46)
Financial owner 0.367 (0.69) 0.648 (0.27)
ln(Firm Size) 0.355 (0.01) 0.094 (0.28)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.631 (0.13) 1.862 (0.08)
Earnings surprise 0.278 (0.36) 0.149 (0.38)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.027 (0.91) -0.001 (0.99)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.264 (0.00) -0.220 (0.00)
n 192 391
Pseudo R2 0.169 0.079
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -6.331 (0.05) -0.634 (0.71)
Foreign owner -1.208 (0.16) 0.007 (0.99)
Family (individual) owner -1.865 (0.20) -0.307 (0.65)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.479 (0.53) -0.363 (0.48)
Financial owner -0.433 (0.74) -0.352 (0.64)
ln(Firm Size) 0.335 (0.07) -0.028 (0.79)
Depreciation over long term assets 7.672 (0.02) 1.557 (0.14)
Earnings surprise -0.232 (0.50) 0.021 (0.91)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.711 (0.17) -0.070 (0.62)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.254 (0.02) -0.155 (0.02)
n 192 391
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.044
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
282
Table 7.20 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.210 (0.91) 0.501 (0.68)
Foreign owner 0.765 (0.21) 0.918 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner 0.695 (0.35) 0.209 (0.67)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.259 (0.65) -0.091 (0.81)
Financial owner 0.524 (0.54) 1.003 (0.07)
ln(Firm Size) -0.002 (0.99) -0.055 (0.47)
Investment over depreciation 0.067 (0.06) 0.031 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.117 (0.62) -0.149 (0.35)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.111 (0.57) 0.039 (0.73)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.160 (0.01) -0.108 (0.04)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.056
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.333 (0.25) -0.062 (0.96)
Foreign owner 0.078 (0.90) 0.027 (0.95)
Family (individual) owner 0.352 (0.68) -0.185 (0.73)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.495 (0.42) -0.508 (0.21)
Financial owner 0.316 (0.72) 0.673 (0.23)
ln(Firm Size) 0.159 (0.19) 0.000 (1.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.032 (0.24) 0.014 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.087 (0.74) 0.129 (0.48)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.092 (0.66) -0.049 (0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.284 (0.00) -0.224 (0.00)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.075
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.333 (0.25) -0.062 (0.96)
Foreign owner 0.078 (0.90) 0.027 (0.95)
Family (individual) owner 0.352 (0.68) -0.185 (0.73)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.495 (0.42) -0.508 (0.21)
Financial owner 0.316 (0.72) 0.673 (0.23)
ln(Firm Size) 0.159 (0.19) 0.000 (1.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.032 (0.24) 0.014 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.087 (0.74) 0.129 (0.48)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.092 (0.66) -0.049 (0.69)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.284 (0.00) -0.224 (0.00)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.075
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.954 (0.26) -0.156 (0.92)
Foreign owner -1.103 (0.20) -0.081 (0.89)
Family (individual) owner -0.111 (0.92) -0.004 (0.99)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.434 (0.58) -0.095 (0.85)
Financial owner -0.514 (0.69) 0.507 (0.45)
ln(Firm Size) 0.160 (0.33) -0.062 (0.55)
Investment over depreciation 0.058 (0.11) 0.022 (0.27)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.103 (0.76) -0.030 (0.89)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.678 (0.10) -0.051 (0.73)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.283 (0.01) -0.172 (0.01)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.039
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.21 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Invest-
ments over depreciation. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.739 (0.70) 0.624 (0.63)
Foreign owner 0.649 (0.28) 0.868 (0.04)
Family (individual) owner -0.412 (0.58) -0.263 (0.60)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.993 (0.09) -0.444 (0.26)
Financial owner 0.820 (0.36) 0.745 (0.20)
ln(Firm Size) -0.074 (0.52) -0.071 (0.37)
Investment over depreciation 0.083 (0.08) 0.012 (0.62)
Earnings surprise -0.023 (0.92) 0.190 (0.23)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.051 (0.81) 0.109 (0.32)
n 186 370
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.055
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -3.957 (0.07) -1.299 (0.35)
Foreign owner 0.669 (0.27) 0.521 (0.24)
Family (individual) owner -0.575 (0.51) -0.371 (0.50)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.653 (0.29) -0.394 (0.35)
Financial owner 0.356 (0.70) 0.744 (0.21)
ln(Firm Size) 0.202 (0.11) 0.031 (0.71)
Investment over depreciation 0.004 (0.95) -0.014 (0.61)
Earnings surprise 0.321 (0.30) 0.190 (0.29)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.060 (0.79) 0.060 (0.60)
n 186 370
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.037
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -3.957 (0.07) -1.299 (0.35)
Foreign owner 0.669 (0.27) 0.521 (0.24)
Family (individual) owner -0.575 (0.51) -0.371 (0.50)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.653 (0.29) -0.394 (0.35)
Financial owner 0.356 (0.70) 0.744 (0.21)
ln(Firm Size) 0.202 (0.11) 0.031 (0.71)
Investment over depreciation 0.004 (0.95) -0.014 (0.61)
Earnings surprise 0.321 (0.30) 0.190 (0.29)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.060 (0.79) 0.060 (0.60)
n 186 370
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.037
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.579 (0.36) -0.400 (0.81)
Foreign owner -0.173 (0.82) 0.379 (0.48)
Family (individual) owner -1.293 (0.30) -0.268 (0.69)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.992 (0.20) -0.387 (0.46)
Financial owner -0.471 (0.71) 0.037 (0.96)
ln(Firm Size) 0.065 (0.70) -0.079 (0.45)
Investment over depreciation 0.034 (0.63) 0.007 (0.81)
Earnings surprise -0.154 (0.65) 0.063 (0.76)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.695 (0.12) -0.020 (0.89)
n 186 370
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.015
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.22 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.105 (0.95) 0.546 (0.65)
Foreign owner 1.167 (0.05) 1.102 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.420 (0.56) 0.137 (0.78)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.225 (0.69) -0.042 (0.91)
Financial owner 0.712 (0.39) 1.132 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) -0.048 (0.64) -0.083 (0.26)
Investment over depreciation 0.063 (0.07) 0.032 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.136 (0.56) -0.153 (0.34)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.155 (0.42) 0.040 (0.72)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.047
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.047 (0.30) -0.062 (0.96)
Foreign owner 0.574 (0.33) 0.322 (0.44)
Family (individual) owner -0.498 (0.53) -0.418 (0.42)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.717 (0.22) -0.563 (0.15)
Financial owner 0.522 (0.54) 0.912 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.075 (0.52) -0.050 (0.54)
Investment over depreciation 0.036 (0.16) 0.020 (0.26)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.062 (0.81) 0.142 (0.44)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.091 (0.65) -0.042 (0.73)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.042
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.047 (0.30) -0.062 (0.96)
Foreign owner 0.574 (0.33) 0.322 (0.44)
Family (individual) owner -0.498 (0.53) -0.418 (0.42)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.717 (0.22) -0.563 (0.15)
Financial owner 0.522 (0.54) 0.912 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.075 (0.52) -0.050 (0.54)
Investment over depreciation 0.036 (0.16) 0.020 (0.26)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.062 (0.81) 0.142 (0.44)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.091 (0.65) -0.042 (0.73)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.042
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.089 (0.42) 0.221 (0.89)
Foreign owner -0.233 (0.76) 0.221 (0.68)
Family (individual) owner -0.466 (0.66) -0.120 (0.85)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.603 (0.42) -0.156 (0.76)
Financial owner -0.269 (0.83) 0.668 (0.31)
ln(Firm Size) 0.010 (0.95) -0.134 (0.17)
Investment over depreciation 0.058 (0.06) 0.026 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.169 (0.60) -0.042 (0.84)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.680 (0.06) -0.034 (0.82)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.019
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.23 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments
over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.529 (0.79) 0.606 (0.64)
Foreign owner 0.428 (0.49) 0.669 (0.13)
Family (individual) owner -0.234 (0.76) -0.214 (0.67)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.953 (0.11) -0.500 (0.21)
Financial owner 0.776 (0.39) 0.606 (0.30)
ln(Firm Size) -0.036 (0.76) -0.043 (0.60)
Investment over depreciation 0.079 (0.10) 0.007 (0.77)
Earnings surprise -0.043 (0.86) 0.185 (0.24)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.011 (0.96) 0.104 (0.34)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.098 (0.13) -0.105 (0.05)
n 186 370
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.064
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -4.525 (0.04) -1.366 (0.34)
Foreign owner 0.208 (0.75) 0.164 (0.72)
Family (individual) owner 0.142 (0.88) -0.180 (0.75)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.391 (0.53) -0.365 (0.40)
Financial owner 0.244 (0.80) 0.463 (0.44)
ln(Firm Size) 0.300 (0.03) 0.092 (0.30)
Investment over depreciation 0.007 (0.92) -0.025 (0.39)
Earnings surprise 0.267 (0.39) 0.152 (0.40)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.071 (0.76) 0.046 (0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.283 (0.00) -0.242 (0.00)
n 186 370
Pseudo R2 0.160 0.076
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -4.525 (0.04) -1.366 (0.34)
Foreign owner 0.208 (0.75) 0.164 (0.72)
Family (individual) owner 0.142 (0.88) -0.180 (0.75)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.391 (0.53) -0.365 (0.40)
Financial owner 0.244 (0.80) 0.463 (0.44)
ln(Firm Size) 0.300 (0.03) 0.092 (0.30)
Investment over depreciation 0.007 (0.92) -0.025 (0.39)
Earnings surprise 0.267 (0.39) 0.152 (0.40)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.071 (0.76) 0.046 (0.69)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.283 (0.00) -0.242 (0.00)
n 186 370
Pseudo R2 0.160 0.076
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -3.132 (0.26) -0.713 (0.67)
Foreign owner -0.873 (0.29) 0.023 (0.97)
Family (individual) owner -1.284 (0.32) -0.246 (0.71)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.804 (0.29) -0.365 (0.48)
Financial owner -0.605 (0.64) -0.186 (0.80)
ln(Firm Size) 0.176 (0.30) -0.009 (0.94)
Investment over depreciation 0.016 (0.85) -0.002 (0.96)
Earnings surprise -0.094 (0.78) 0.068 (0.74)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.827 (0.10) -0.040 (0.78)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.224 (0.03) -0.163 (0.02)
n 186 370
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.034
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.24 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.210 (0.91) 0.501 (0.68)
Foreign owner 0.765 (0.21) 0.918 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner 0.695 (0.35) 0.209 (0.67)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.259 (0.65) -0.091 (0.81)
Financial owner 0.524 (0.54) 1.003 (0.07)
ln(Firm Size) -0.002 (0.99) -0.055 (0.47)
Investment over depreciation 0.067 (0.06) 0.031 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.117 (0.62) -0.149 (0.35)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.111 (0.57) 0.039 (0.73)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.160 (0.01) -0.108 (0.04)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.056
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.333 (0.25) -0.062 (0.96)
Foreign owner 0.078 (0.90) 0.027 (0.95)
Family (individual) owner 0.352 (0.68) -0.185 (0.73)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.495 (0.42) -0.508 (0.21)
Financial owner 0.316 (0.72) 0.673 (0.23)
ln(Firm Size) 0.159 (0.19) 0.000 (1.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.032 (0.24) 0.014 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.087 (0.74) 0.129 (0.48)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.092 (0.66) -0.049 (0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.284 (0.00) -0.224 (0.00)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.075
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.333 (0.25) -0.062 (0.96)
Foreign owner 0.078 (0.90) 0.027 (0.95)
Family (individual) owner 0.352 (0.68) -0.185 (0.73)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.495 (0.42) -0.508 (0.21)
Financial owner 0.316 (0.72) 0.673 (0.23)
ln(Firm Size) 0.159 (0.19) 0.000 (1.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.032 (0.24) 0.014 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.087 (0.74) 0.129 (0.48)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.092 (0.66) -0.049 (0.69)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.284 (0.00) -0.224 (0.00)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.075
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.954 (0.26) -0.156 (0.92)
Foreign owner -1.103 (0.20) -0.081 (0.89)
Family (individual) owner -0.111 (0.92) -0.004 (0.99)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.434 (0.58) -0.095 (0.85)
Financial owner -0.514 (0.69) 0.507 (0.45)
ln(Firm Size) 0.160 (0.33) -0.062 (0.55)
Investment over depreciation 0.058 (0.11) 0.022 (0.27)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.103 (0.76) -0.030 (0.89)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.678 (0.10) -0.051 (0.73)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.283 (0.01) -0.172 (0.01)
n 200 388
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.039
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.1.4 Performance measure: RoA
Table 7.25 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depre-
ciation over long term assets. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.039 (0.19) -2.316 (0.04)
Foreign owner 0.770 (0.10) 1.110 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.079 (0.88) 0.170 (0.68)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.424 (0.32) -0.029 (0.93)
Financial owner 0.938 (0.11) 1.145 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.032 (0.71) 0.071 (0.29)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.405 (0.22) 1.715 (0.13)
Earnings surprise 0.268 (0.17) 0.292 (0.03)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.075 (0.01) 0.035 (0.01)
n 297 523
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.078
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.274 (0.16) -1.636 (0.17)
Foreign owner 0.560 (0.23) 0.578 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -1.198 (0.07) -0.651 (0.17)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.710 (0.11) -0.385 (0.25)
Financial owner 0.459 (0.43) 0.906 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.083 (0.38) 0.030 (0.67)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.887 (0.16) 0.819 (0.30)
Earnings surprise 0.234 (0.28) 0.215 (0.14)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.011 (0.69) 0.019 (0.13)
n 297 523
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.056
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.274 (0.16) -1.636 (0.17)
Foreign owner 0.560 (0.23) 0.578 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -1.198 (0.07) -0.651 (0.17)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.710 (0.11) -0.385 (0.25)
Financial owner 0.459 (0.43) 0.906 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.083 (0.38) 0.030 (0.67)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.887 (0.16) 0.819 (0.30)
Earnings surprise 0.234 (0.28) 0.215 (0.14)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.011 (0.69) 0.019 (0.13)
n 297 523
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.056
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.904 (0.38) -0.655 (0.65)
Foreign owner 0.350 (0.55) 0.637 (0.15)
Family (individual) owner -1.804 (0.12) -0.422 (0.47)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.421 (0.46) -0.156 (0.71)
Financial owner -0.525 (0.56) 0.004 (0.99)
ln(Firm Size) 0.002 (0.99) -0.077 (0.38)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.267 (0.13) 0.799 (0.34)
Earnings surprise 0.086 (0.75) 0.157 (0.36)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.025 (0.48) -0.001 (0.97)
n 297 523
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.024
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.26 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.335 (0.10) -1.545 (0.15)
Foreign owner 1.158 (0.01) 1.304 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.863 (0.12) 0.650 (0.11)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.096 (0.82) 0.159 (0.61)
Financial owner 0.918 (0.10) 1.377 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.033 (0.69) 0.010 (0.88)
Investment over depreciation 0.067 (0.05) 0.040 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.247 (0.15) -0.176 (0.18)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.084 (0.00) 0.039 (0.00)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.069
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.446 (0.34) -0.712 (0.53)
Foreign owner 0.549 (0.23) 0.563 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -0.987 (0.12) -0.491 (0.27)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.823 (0.07) -0.496 (0.13)
Financial owner 0.584 (0.29) 1.070 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.005 (0.95) -0.036 (0.61)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.12) 0.031 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.161 (0.39) 0.049 (0.74)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.050 (0.05) 0.024 (0.06)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.064
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.446 (0.34) -0.712 (0.53)
Foreign owner 0.549 (0.23) 0.563 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -0.987 (0.12) -0.491 (0.27)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.823 (0.07) -0.496 (0.13)
Financial owner 0.584 (0.29) 1.070 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.005 (0.95) -0.036 (0.61)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.12) 0.031 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.161 (0.39) 0.049 (0.74)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.050 (0.05) 0.024 (0.06)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.064
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.799 (0.69) -0.158 (0.91)
Foreign owner 0.255 (0.67) 0.705 (0.14)
Family (individual) owner -1.201 (0.20) -0.012 (0.98)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.569 (0.34) 0.094 (0.83)
Financial owner -0.826 (0.36) 0.645 (0.25)
ln(Firm Size) -0.109 (0.36) -0.140 (0.10)
Investment over depreciation 0.060 (0.04) 0.035 (0.06)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.292 (0.19) -0.043 (0.81)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.049 (0.11) 0.012 (0.41)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.028
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.27 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation
over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.235 (0.15) -2.267 (0.05)
Foreign owner 0.607 (0.20) 0.921 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.244 (0.66) 0.261 (0.54)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.375 (0.38) -0.058 (0.86)
Financial owner 0.857 (0.15) 0.985 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) 0.065 (0.47) 0.095 (0.17)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.536 (0.21) 1.881 (0.11)
Earnings surprise 0.276 (0.15) 0.292 (0.03)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.075 (0.01) 0.032 (0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.101 (0.08) -0.123 (0.01)
n 297 523
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.087
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.373 (0.15) -1.426 (0.24)
Foreign owner 0.352 (0.46) 0.324 (0.38)
Family (individual) owner -0.722 (0.30) -0.426 (0.38)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.433 (0.34) -0.302 (0.37)
Financial owner 0.346 (0.56) 0.671 (0.14)
ln(Firm Size) 0.138 (0.15) 0.063 (0.39)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.940 (0.14) 0.903 (0.26)
Earnings surprise 0.233 (0.27) 0.207 (0.15)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.000 (1.00) 0.015 (0.24)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.221 (0.00) -0.220 (0.00)
n 297 523
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.083
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.373 (0.15) -1.426 (0.24)
Foreign owner 0.352 (0.46) 0.324 (0.38)
Family (individual) owner -0.722 (0.30) -0.426 (0.38)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.433 (0.34) -0.302 (0.37)
Financial owner 0.346 (0.56) 0.671 (0.14)
ln(Firm Size) 0.138 (0.15) 0.063 (0.39)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.940 (0.14) 0.903 (0.26)
Earnings surprise 0.233 (0.27) 0.207 (0.15)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.000 (1.00) 0.015 (0.24)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.221 (0.00) -0.220 (0.00)
n 297 523
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.083
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.099 (0.33) -0.646 (0.65)
Foreign owner 0.111 (0.85) 0.407 (0.37)
Family (individual) owner -1.640 (0.16) -0.326 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.232 (0.69) -0.085 (0.84)
Financial owner -0.672 (0.45) -0.185 (0.75)
ln(Firm Size) 0.054 (0.68) -0.038 (0.67)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.544 (0.11) 0.885 (0.30)
Earnings surprise 0.105 (0.69) 0.159 (0.35)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.029 (0.42) -0.004 (0.81)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.147 (0.07) -0.152 (0.01)
n 297 523
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.039
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.28 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.445 (0.10) -1.494 (0.17)
Foreign owner 0.925 (0.05) 1.168 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.094 (0.06) 0.726 (0.08)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.070 (0.87) 0.137 (0.67)
Financial owner 0.786 (0.17) 1.267 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.068 (0.42) 0.029 (0.66)
Investment over depreciation 0.071 (0.04) 0.039 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.219 (0.21) -0.161 (0.22)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.085 (0.00) 0.037 (0.01)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.144 (0.01) -0.100 (0.04)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.075
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.405 (0.37) -0.513 (0.66)
Foreign owner 0.306 (0.51) 0.354 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.348 (0.61) -0.224 (0.62)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.576 (0.21) -0.403 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.444 (0.43) 0.882 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.052 (0.57) -0.003 (0.96)
Investment over depreciation 0.039 (0.16) 0.027 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.117 (0.54) 0.061 (0.69)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.043 (0.10) 0.020 (0.12)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.239 (0.00) -0.218 (0.00)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.089
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.405 (0.37) -0.513 (0.66)
Foreign owner 0.306 (0.51) 0.354 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.348 (0.61) -0.224 (0.62)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.576 (0.21) -0.403 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.444 (0.43) 0.882 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.052 (0.57) -0.003 (0.96)
Investment over depreciation 0.039 (0.16) 0.027 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.117 (0.54) 0.061 (0.69)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.043 (0.10) 0.020 (0.12)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.239 (0.00) -0.218 (0.00)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.089
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.901 (0.66) -0.193 (0.89)
Foreign owner 0.036 (0.95) 0.530 (0.27)
Family (individual) owner -0.780 (0.41) 0.143 (0.81)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.377 (0.53) 0.178 (0.69)
Financial owner -0.951 (0.29) 0.516 (0.36)
ln(Firm Size) -0.055 (0.65) -0.098 (0.26)
Investment over depreciation 0.062 (0.06) 0.032 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.215 (0.34) -0.011 (0.95)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.041 (0.20) 0.009 (0.55)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.165 (0.05) -0.157 (0.01)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.042
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.29 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Invest-
ments over depreciation. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.245 (0.39) -1.341 (0.23)
Foreign owner 0.758 (0.10) 1.101 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.022 (0.97) 0.115 (0.78)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.569 (0.18) -0.124 (0.70)
Financial owner 0.866 (0.14) 1.029 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.012 (0.89) 0.013 (0.85)
Investment over depreciation 0.032 (0.34) 0.010 (0.65)
Earnings surprise 0.304 (0.12) 0.299 (0.03)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.086 (0.00) 0.041 (0.00)
n 291 503
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.072
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.932 (0.21) -1.801 (0.13)
Foreign owner 0.558 (0.23) 0.660 (0.07)
Family (individual) owner -1.219 (0.07) -0.586 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.863 (0.05) -0.362 (0.29)
Financial owner 0.410 (0.48) 0.864 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.066 (0.47) 0.040 (0.58)
Investment over depreciation 0.036 (0.32) 0.010 (0.65)
Earnings surprise 0.239 (0.28) 0.236 (0.12)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.019 (0.51) 0.022 (0.08)
n 291 503
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.054
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.932 (0.21) -1.801 (0.13)
Foreign owner 0.558 (0.23) 0.660 (0.07)
Family (individual) owner -1.219 (0.07) -0.586 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.863 (0.05) -0.362 (0.29)
Financial owner 0.410 (0.48) 0.864 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.066 (0.47) 0.040 (0.58)
Investment over depreciation 0.036 (0.32) 0.010 (0.65)
Earnings surprise 0.239 (0.28) 0.236 (0.12)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.019 (0.51) 0.022 (0.08)
n 291 503
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.054
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.538 (0.78) -0.810 (0.57)
Foreign owner 0.417 (0.47) 0.768 (0.10)
Family (individual) owner -1.803 (0.11) -0.305 (0.61)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.619 (0.27) -0.076 (0.86)
Financial owner -0.633 (0.47) 0.199 (0.74)
ln(Firm Size) -0.063 (0.60) -0.072 (0.41)
Investment over depreciation 0.009 (0.85) 0.017 (0.48)
Earnings surprise 0.126 (0.65) 0.209 (0.26)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.013 (0.71) 0.001 (0.94)
n 291 503
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.024
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.30 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.335 (0.10) -1.545 (0.15)
Foreign owner 1.158 (0.01) 1.304 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.863 (0.12) 0.650 (0.11)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.096 (0.82) 0.159 (0.61)
Financial owner 0.918 (0.10) 1.377 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.033 (0.69) 0.010 (0.88)
Investment over depreciation 0.067 (0.05) 0.040 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.247 (0.15) -0.176 (0.18)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.084 (0.00) 0.039 (0.00)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.069
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.446 (0.34) -0.712 (0.53)
Foreign owner 0.549 (0.23) 0.563 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -0.987 (0.12) -0.491 (0.27)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.823 (0.07) -0.496 (0.13)
Financial owner 0.584 (0.29) 1.070 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.005 (0.95) -0.036 (0.61)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.12) 0.031 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.161 (0.39) 0.049 (0.74)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.050 (0.05) 0.024 (0.06)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.064
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.446 (0.34) -0.712 (0.53)
Foreign owner 0.549 (0.23) 0.563 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -0.987 (0.12) -0.491 (0.27)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.823 (0.07) -0.496 (0.13)
Financial owner 0.584 (0.29) 1.070 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.005 (0.95) -0.036 (0.61)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.12) 0.031 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.161 (0.39) 0.049 (0.74)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.050 (0.05) 0.024 (0.06)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.064
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.799 (0.69) -0.158 (0.91)
Foreign owner 0.255 (0.67) 0.705 (0.14)
Family (individual) owner -1.201 (0.20) -0.012 (0.98)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.569 (0.34) 0.094 (0.83)
Financial owner -0.826 (0.36) 0.645 (0.25)
ln(Firm Size) -0.109 (0.36) -0.140 (0.10)
Investment over depreciation 0.060 (0.04) 0.035 (0.06)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.292 (0.19) -0.043 (0.81)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.049 (0.11) 0.012 (0.41)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.028
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.31 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments
over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.389 (0.34) -1.267 (0.26)
Foreign owner 0.593 (0.21) 0.928 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.201 (0.72) 0.206 (0.63)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.526 (0.22) -0.150 (0.64)
Financial owner 0.780 (0.19) 0.881 (0.05)
ln(Firm Size) 0.018 (0.83) 0.035 (0.61)
Investment over depreciation 0.034 (0.32) 0.007 (0.73)
Earnings surprise 0.310 (0.12) 0.299 (0.03)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.087 (0.00) 0.038 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.105 (0.07) -0.113 (0.02)
n 291 503
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.080
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.075 (0.19) -1.649 (0.17)
Foreign owner 0.331 (0.49) 0.396 (0.30)
Family (individual) owner -0.633 (0.37) -0.325 (0.51)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.581 (0.20) -0.269 (0.44)
Financial owner 0.292 (0.62) 0.624 (0.18)
ln(Firm Size) 0.126 (0.19) 0.081 (0.28)
Investment over depreciation 0.049 (0.20) 0.006 (0.80)
Earnings surprise 0.237 (0.27) 0.231 (0.12)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.007 (0.82) 0.018 (0.16)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.242 (0.00) -0.233 (0.00)
n 291 503
Pseudo R2 0.122 0.085
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.075 (0.19) -1.649 (0.17)
Foreign owner 0.331 (0.49) 0.396 (0.30)
Family (individual) owner -0.633 (0.37) -0.325 (0.51)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.581 (0.20) -0.269 (0.44)
Financial owner 0.292 (0.62) 0.624 (0.18)
ln(Firm Size) 0.126 (0.19) 0.081 (0.28)
Investment over depreciation 0.049 (0.20) 0.006 (0.80)
Earnings surprise 0.237 (0.27) 0.231 (0.12)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.007 (0.82) 0.018 (0.16)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.242 (0.00) -0.233 (0.00)
n 291 503
Pseudo R2 0.122 0.085
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.646 (0.74) -0.859 (0.55)
Foreign owner 0.210 (0.72) 0.541 (0.25)
Family (individual) owner -1.572 (0.17) -0.188 (0.76)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.446 (0.43) 0.000 (1.00)
Financial owner -0.760 (0.39) 0.018 (0.98)
ln(Firm Size) -0.018 (0.89) -0.027 (0.77)
Investment over depreciation 0.005 (0.93) 0.012 (0.62)
Earnings surprise 0.148 (0.58) 0.217 (0.23)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.017 (0.65) -0.002 (0.91)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.136 (0.10) -0.155 (0.01)
n 291 503
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.039
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.32 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.445 (0.10) -1.494 (0.17)
Foreign owner 0.925 (0.05) 1.168 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.094 (0.06) 0.726 (0.08)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.070 (0.87) 0.137 (0.67)
Financial owner 0.786 (0.17) 1.267 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.068 (0.42) 0.029 (0.66)
Investment over depreciation 0.071 (0.04) 0.039 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.219 (0.21) -0.161 (0.22)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.085 (0.00) 0.037 (0.01)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.144 (0.01) -0.100 (0.04)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.075
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.405 (0.37) -0.513 (0.66)
Foreign owner 0.306 (0.51) 0.354 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.348 (0.61) -0.224 (0.62)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.576 (0.21) -0.403 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.444 (0.43) 0.882 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.052 (0.57) -0.003 (0.96)
Investment over depreciation 0.039 (0.16) 0.027 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.117 (0.54) 0.061 (0.69)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.043 (0.10) 0.020 (0.12)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.239 (0.00) -0.218 (0.00)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.089
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.405 (0.37) -0.513 (0.66)
Foreign owner 0.306 (0.51) 0.354 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.348 (0.61) -0.224 (0.62)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.576 (0.21) -0.403 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.444 (0.43) 0.882 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.052 (0.57) -0.003 (0.96)
Investment over depreciation 0.039 (0.16) 0.027 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.117 (0.54) 0.061 (0.69)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.043 (0.10) 0.020 (0.12)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.239 (0.00) -0.218 (0.00)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.089
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.901 (0.66) -0.193 (0.89)
Foreign owner 0.036 (0.95) 0.530 (0.27)
Family (individual) owner -0.780 (0.41) 0.143 (0.81)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.377 (0.53) 0.178 (0.69)
Financial owner -0.951 (0.29) 0.516 (0.36)
ln(Firm Size) -0.055 (0.65) -0.098 (0.26)
Investment over depreciation 0.062 (0.06) 0.032 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.215 (0.34) -0.011 (0.95)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.041 (0.20) 0.009 (0.55)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.165 (0.05) -0.157 (0.01)
n 304 531
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.042
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.1.5 Performance measure: RoS
Table 7.33 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depre-
ciation over long term assets. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.227 (0.43) -2.000 (0.10)
Foreign owner 0.850 (0.07) 1.281 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.089 (0.87) 0.379 (0.40)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.404 (0.34) 0.007 (0.98)
Financial owner 1.044 (0.08) 1.534 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.024 (0.79) 0.065 (0.37)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.404 (0.13) 1.770 (0.13)
Earnings surprise 0.088 (0.62) 0.122 (0.37)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.001 (0.44) 0.001 (0.63)
n 292 465
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.074
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.143 (0.20) -1.610 (0.21)
Foreign owner 0.514 (0.27) 0.659 (0.08)
Family (individual) owner -1.309 (0.06) -0.635 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.762 (0.09) -0.341 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.598 (0.32) 1.110 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) 0.085 (0.38) 0.033 (0.67)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.629 (0.21) 1.035 (0.24)
Earnings surprise 0.191 (0.36) 0.100 (0.50)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.002 (0.30) 0.001 (0.49)
n 292 465
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.056
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.143 (0.20) -1.610 (0.21)
Foreign owner 0.514 (0.27) 0.659 (0.08)
Family (individual) owner -1.309 (0.06) -0.635 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.762 (0.09) -0.341 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.598 (0.32) 1.110 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) 0.085 (0.38) 0.033 (0.67)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.629 (0.21) 1.035 (0.24)
Earnings surprise 0.191 (0.36) 0.100 (0.50)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.002 (0.30) 0.001 (0.49)
n 292 465
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.056
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.634 (0.47) -0.244 (0.88)
Foreign owner 0.164 (0.78) 0.543 (0.24)
Family (individual) owner -2.157 (0.07) -1.050 (0.15)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.695 (0.24) -0.413 (0.36)
Financial owner -0.564 (0.53) 0.212 (0.73)
ln(Firm Size) -0.023 (0.86) -0.105 (0.29)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.260 (0.22) 0.780 (0.39)
Earnings surprise 0.088 (0.74) 0.036 (0.84)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.003 (0.18) 0.002 (0.27)
n 292 465
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.040
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.34 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.906 (0.52) -1.033 (0.36)
Foreign owner 1.178 (0.01) 1.430 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.793 (0.15) 0.868 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.093 (0.83) 0.207 (0.55)
Financial owner 0.973 (0.09) 1.608 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.002 (0.98) -0.007 (0.92)
Investment over depreciation 0.070 (0.05) 0.041 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.042 (0.80) -0.100 (0.45)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.003 (0.10) 0.003 (0.05)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.070
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.137 (0.47) -0.049 (0.97)
Foreign owner 0.580 (0.21) 0.637 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -1.010 (0.12) -0.470 (0.34)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.784 (0.09) -0.513 (0.15)
Financial owner 0.833 (0.15) 1.261 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.014 (0.88) -0.068 (0.36)
Investment over depreciation 0.037 (0.14) 0.028 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.052 (0.77) 0.053 (0.72)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.005 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.093 0.075
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.137 (0.47) -0.049 (0.97)
Foreign owner 0.580 (0.21) 0.637 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -1.010 (0.12) -0.470 (0.34)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.784 (0.09) -0.513 (0.15)
Financial owner 0.833 (0.15) 1.261 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.014 (0.88) -0.068 (0.36)
Investment over depreciation 0.037 (0.14) 0.028 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.052 (0.77) 0.053 (0.72)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.005 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.093 0.075
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.768 (0.71) 0.494 (0.74)
Foreign owner 0.304 (0.62) 0.602 (0.23)
Family (individual) owner -1.176 (0.21) -0.477 (0.47)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.494 (0.42) -0.149 (0.75)
Financial owner -0.634 (0.49) 0.683 (0.25)
ln(Firm Size) -0.086 (0.50) -0.178 (0.06)
Investment over depreciation 0.056 (0.05) 0.037 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.170 (0.43) -0.091 (0.60)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.005 (0.02) 0.005 (0.00)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.059
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.35 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation
over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.373 (0.39) -1.945 (0.11)
Foreign owner 0.699 (0.14) 1.107 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.241 (0.66) 0.472 (0.30)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.357 (0.41) -0.026 (0.94)
Financial owner 0.965 (0.11) 1.395 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.052 (0.57) 0.083 (0.26)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.586 (0.12) 1.867 (0.12)
Earnings surprise 0.101 (0.57) 0.134 (0.32)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.001 (0.52) 0.001 (0.71)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.093 (0.10) -0.100 (0.04)
n 292 465
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.081
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.238 (0.18) -1.372 (0.30)
Foreign owner 0.276 (0.56) 0.383 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.858 (0.22) -0.342 (0.53)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.504 (0.27) -0.269 (0.46)
Financial owner 0.467 (0.44) 0.869 (0.08)
ln(Firm Size) 0.133 (0.18) 0.062 (0.44)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.668 (0.19) 1.087 (0.21)
Earnings surprise 0.220 (0.29) 0.110 (0.45)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.002 (0.39) 0.001 (0.59)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.221 (0.00) -0.211 (0.00)
n 292 465
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.083
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.238 (0.18) -1.372 (0.30)
Foreign owner 0.276 (0.56) 0.383 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.858 (0.22) -0.342 (0.53)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.504 (0.27) -0.269 (0.46)
Financial owner 0.467 (0.44) 0.869 (0.08)
ln(Firm Size) 0.133 (0.18) 0.062 (0.44)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.668 (0.19) 1.087 (0.21)
Earnings surprise 0.220 (0.29) 0.110 (0.45)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.002 (0.39) 0.001 (0.59)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.221 (0.00) -0.211 (0.00)
n 292 465
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.083
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.764 (0.44) -0.227 (0.89)
Foreign owner -0.051 (0.93) 0.343 (0.47)
Family (individual) owner -1.967 (0.09) -0.933 (0.20)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.525 (0.38) -0.355 (0.43)
Financial owner -0.691 (0.44) 0.055 (0.93)
ln(Firm Size) 0.019 (0.89) -0.075 (0.46)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.541 (0.19) 0.853 (0.35)
Earnings surprise 0.120 (0.65) 0.049 (0.78)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.002 (0.26) 0.002 (0.33)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.130 (0.12) -0.115 (0.07)
n 292 465
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.049
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.36 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.999 (0.49) -0.970 (0.39)
Foreign owner 0.937 (0.05) 1.275 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.027 (0.07) 0.972 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.066 (0.88) 0.178 (0.60)
Financial owner 0.840 (0.14) 1.490 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.034 (0.70) 0.011 (0.87)
Investment over depreciation 0.075 (0.04) 0.040 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.015 (0.93) -0.087 (0.51)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.003 (0.08) 0.003 (0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.150 (0.01) -0.101 (0.04)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.076
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.153 (0.47) 0.289 (0.82)
Foreign owner 0.301 (0.53) 0.373 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.370 (0.59) -0.085 (0.87)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.537 (0.25) -0.433 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.677 (0.25) 1.039 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) 0.063 (0.51) -0.044 (0.57)
Investment over depreciation 0.035 (0.20) 0.022 (0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.034 (0.85) 0.072 (0.63)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.005 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.257 (0.00) -0.229 (0.00)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.104
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.153 (0.47) 0.289 (0.82)
Foreign owner 0.301 (0.53) 0.373 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.370 (0.59) -0.085 (0.87)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.537 (0.25) -0.433 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.677 (0.25) 1.039 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) 0.063 (0.51) -0.044 (0.57)
Investment over depreciation 0.035 (0.20) 0.022 (0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.034 (0.85) 0.072 (0.63)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.005 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.257 (0.00) -0.229 (0.00)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.104
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.880 (0.68) 0.537 (0.72)
Foreign owner 0.027 (0.97) 0.401 (0.43)
Family (individual) owner -0.813 (0.39) -0.299 (0.65)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.337 (0.58) -0.094 (0.84)
Financial owner -0.805 (0.38) 0.546 (0.36)
ln(Firm Size) -0.034 (0.79) -0.146 (0.13)
Investment over depreciation 0.057 (0.07) 0.034 (0.08)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.116 (0.59) -0.060 (0.73)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.005 (0.02) 0.005 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.170 (0.05) -0.134 (0.04)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.070
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.37 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Invest-
ments over depreciation. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.084 (0.95) -0.929 (0.43)
Foreign owner 0.869 (0.06) 1.256 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.039 (0.94) 0.320 (0.48)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.616 (0.15) -0.126 (0.71)
Financial owner 0.931 (0.12) 1.305 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.038 (0.66) 0.007 (0.93)
Investment over depreciation 0.028 (0.40) 0.013 (0.56)
Earnings surprise 0.066 (0.71) 0.137 (0.33)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.002 (0.33) 0.001 (0.52)
n 284 444
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.064
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.671 (0.30) -1.423 (0.26)
Foreign owner 0.526 (0.26) 0.763 (0.05)
Family (individual) owner -1.324 (0.05) -0.614 (0.25)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.939 (0.04) -0.378 (0.30)
Financial owner 0.549 (0.36) 1.049 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.062 (0.52) 0.027 (0.73)
Investment over depreciation 0.034 (0.34) 0.006 (0.77)
Earnings surprise 0.150 (0.48) 0.136 (0.38)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.002 (0.28) 0.001 (0.48)
n 284 444
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.056
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.671 (0.30) -1.423 (0.26)
Foreign owner 0.526 (0.26) 0.763 (0.05)
Family (individual) owner -1.324 (0.05) -0.614 (0.25)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.939 (0.04) -0.378 (0.30)
Financial owner 0.549 (0.36) 1.049 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.062 (0.52) 0.027 (0.73)
Investment over depreciation 0.034 (0.34) 0.006 (0.77)
Earnings surprise 0.150 (0.48) 0.136 (0.38)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.002 (0.28) 0.001 (0.48)
n 284 444
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.056
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.584 (0.78) -0.129 (0.93)
Foreign owner 0.237 (0.68) 0.579 (0.22)
Family (individual) owner -2.092 (0.07) -1.049 (0.15)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.808 (0.17) -0.411 (0.36)
Financial owner -0.648 (0.47) 0.115 (0.86)
ln(Firm Size) -0.068 (0.59) -0.109 (0.27)
Investment over depreciation 0.007 (0.89) 0.019 (0.43)
Earnings surprise 0.106 (0.69) 0.148 (0.44)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.003 (0.15) 0.002 (0.31)
n 284 444
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.036
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.38 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.906 (0.52) -1.033 (0.36)
Foreign owner 1.178 (0.01) 1.430 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.793 (0.15) 0.868 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.093 (0.83) 0.207 (0.55)
Financial owner 0.973 (0.09) 1.608 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.002 (0.98) -0.007 (0.92)
Investment over depreciation 0.070 (0.05) 0.041 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.042 (0.80) -0.100 (0.45)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.003 (0.10) 0.003 (0.05)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.070
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.137 (0.47) -0.049 (0.97)
Foreign owner 0.580 (0.21) 0.637 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -1.010 (0.12) -0.470 (0.34)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.784 (0.09) -0.513 (0.15)
Financial owner 0.833 (0.15) 1.261 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.014 (0.88) -0.068 (0.36)
Investment over depreciation 0.037 (0.14) 0.028 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.052 (0.77) 0.053 (0.72)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.005 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.093 0.075
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.137 (0.47) -0.049 (0.97)
Foreign owner 0.580 (0.21) 0.637 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -1.010 (0.12) -0.470 (0.34)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.784 (0.09) -0.513 (0.15)
Financial owner 0.833 (0.15) 1.261 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.014 (0.88) -0.068 (0.36)
Investment over depreciation 0.037 (0.14) 0.028 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.052 (0.77) 0.053 (0.72)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.005 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.093 0.075
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.768 (0.71) 0.494 (0.74)
Foreign owner 0.304 (0.62) 0.602 (0.23)
Family (individual) owner -1.176 (0.21) -0.477 (0.47)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.494 (0.42) -0.149 (0.75)
Financial owner -0.634 (0.49) 0.683 (0.25)
ln(Firm Size) -0.086 (0.50) -0.178 (0.06)
Investment over depreciation 0.056 (0.05) 0.037 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.170 (0.43) -0.091 (0.60)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.005 (0.02) 0.005 (0.00)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.059
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.39 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments
over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.009 (0.99) -0.852 (0.47)
Foreign owner 0.716 (0.13) 1.080 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.211 (0.70) 0.431 (0.35)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.569 (0.18) -0.153 (0.66)
Financial owner 0.847 (0.16) 1.163 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.011 (0.90) 0.025 (0.73)
Investment over depreciation 0.029 (0.38) 0.010 (0.64)
Earnings surprise 0.079 (0.66) 0.149 (0.29)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.001 (0.41) 0.001 (0.60)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.098 (0.08) -0.102 (0.04)
n 284 444
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.071
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.877 (0.25) -1.231 (0.34)
Foreign owner 0.270 (0.57) 0.469 (0.24)
Family (individual) owner -0.754 (0.29) -0.268 (0.63)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.660 (0.15) -0.288 (0.43)
Financial owner 0.419 (0.49) 0.802 (0.12)
ln(Firm Size) 0.120 (0.23) 0.062 (0.44)
Investment over depreciation 0.047 (0.23) 0.003 (0.91)
Earnings surprise 0.185 (0.38) 0.150 (0.33)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.002 (0.40) 0.001 (0.58)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.243 (0.00) -0.223 (0.00)
n 284 444
Pseudo R2 0.130 0.086
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.877 (0.25) -1.231 (0.34)
Foreign owner 0.270 (0.57) 0.469 (0.24)
Family (individual) owner -0.754 (0.29) -0.268 (0.63)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.660 (0.15) -0.288 (0.43)
Financial owner 0.419 (0.49) 0.802 (0.12)
ln(Firm Size) 0.120 (0.23) 0.062 (0.44)
Investment over depreciation 0.047 (0.23) 0.003 (0.91)
Earnings surprise 0.185 (0.38) 0.150 (0.33)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.002 (0.40) 0.001 (0.58)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.243 (0.00) -0.223 (0.00)
n 284 444
Pseudo R2 0.130 0.086
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.649 (0.76) -0.134 (0.93)
Foreign owner 0.051 (0.93) 0.380 (0.43)
Family (individual) owner -1.856 (0.11) -0.909 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.648 (0.27) -0.347 (0.45)
Financial owner -0.763 (0.39) -0.031 (0.96)
ln(Firm Size) -0.030 (0.82) -0.077 (0.45)
Investment over depreciation 0.002 (0.97) 0.016 (0.53)
Earnings surprise 0.140 (0.59) 0.163 (0.39)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.003 (0.22) 0.002 (0.37)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.121 (0.15) -0.116 (0.08)
n 284 444
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.045
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.40 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.999 (0.49) -0.970 (0.39)
Foreign owner 0.937 (0.05) 1.275 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.027 (0.07) 0.972 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.066 (0.88) 0.178 (0.60)
Financial owner 0.840 (0.14) 1.490 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.034 (0.70) 0.011 (0.87)
Investment over depreciation 0.075 (0.04) 0.040 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.015 (0.93) -0.087 (0.51)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.003 (0.08) 0.003 (0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.150 (0.01) -0.101 (0.04)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.076
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.153 (0.47) 0.289 (0.82)
Foreign owner 0.301 (0.53) 0.373 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.370 (0.59) -0.085 (0.87)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.537 (0.25) -0.433 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.677 (0.25) 1.039 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) 0.063 (0.51) -0.044 (0.57)
Investment over depreciation 0.035 (0.20) 0.022 (0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.034 (0.85) 0.072 (0.63)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.005 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.257 (0.00) -0.229 (0.00)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.104
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.153 (0.47) 0.289 (0.82)
Foreign owner 0.301 (0.53) 0.373 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.370 (0.59) -0.085 (0.87)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.537 (0.25) -0.433 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.677 (0.25) 1.039 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) 0.063 (0.51) -0.044 (0.57)
Investment over depreciation 0.035 (0.20) 0.022 (0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.034 (0.85) 0.072 (0.63)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.005 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.257 (0.00) -0.229 (0.00)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.104
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.880 (0.68) 0.537 (0.72)
Foreign owner 0.027 (0.97) 0.401 (0.43)
Family (individual) owner -0.813 (0.39) -0.299 (0.65)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.337 (0.58) -0.094 (0.84)
Financial owner -0.805 (0.38) 0.546 (0.36)
ln(Firm Size) -0.034 (0.79) -0.146 (0.13)
Investment over depreciation 0.057 (0.07) 0.034 (0.08)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.116 (0.59) -0.060 (0.73)
lag(-1)(RoS) 0.005 (0.02) 0.005 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.170 (0.05) -0.134 (0.04)
n 298 471
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.070
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.1.6 Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Table 7.41 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depre-
ciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.668 (0.27) -1.544 (0.19)
Foreign owner 0.934 (0.04) 1.179 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.237 (0.66) 0.254 (0.55)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.248 (0.55) -0.110 (0.73)
Financial owner 1.082 (0.06) 1.134 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.047 (0.59) 0.038 (0.58)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.822 (0.09) 3.207 (0.02)
Earnings surprise 0.142 (0.43) 0.164 (0.22)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) -0.000 (0.91) -0.003 (0.24)
n 297 496
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.071
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.190 (0.18) -1.270 (0.31)
Foreign owner 0.625 (0.17) 0.604 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -1.179 (0.08) -0.593 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.667 (0.13) -0.452 (0.18)
Financial owner 0.493 (0.39) 0.885 (0.05)
ln(Firm Size) 0.093 (0.33) 0.020 (0.79)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.658 (0.78) 1.283 (0.33)
Earnings surprise 0.233 (0.27) 0.115 (0.42)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.45) -0.002 (0.47)
n 297 496
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.052
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.190 (0.18) -1.270 (0.31)
Foreign owner 0.625 (0.17) 0.604 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -1.179 (0.08) -0.593 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.667 (0.13) -0.452 (0.18)
Financial owner 0.493 (0.39) 0.885 (0.05)
ln(Firm Size) 0.093 (0.33) 0.020 (0.79)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.658 (0.78) 1.283 (0.33)
Earnings surprise 0.233 (0.27) 0.115 (0.42)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.45) -0.002 (0.47)
n 297 496
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.052
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.971 (0.36) -0.434 (0.78)
Foreign owner 0.276 (0.63) 0.647 (0.14)
Family (individual) owner -1.936 (0.09) -0.526 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.476 (0.40) -0.348 (0.42)
Financial owner -0.590 (0.50) -0.041 (0.94)
ln(Firm Size) -0.006 (0.96) -0.084 (0.36)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.813 (0.16) 0.328 (0.83)
Earnings surprise 0.127 (0.63) 0.057 (0.73)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.002 (0.64) -0.003 (0.44)
n 297 496
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.026
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.42 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.968 (0.47) -0.126 (0.90)
Foreign owner 1.247 (0.01) 1.313 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.885 (0.11) 0.722 (0.08)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.024 (0.95) 0.069 (0.83)
Financial owner 1.014 (0.07) 1.223 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.004 (0.96) -0.049 (0.45)
Investment over depreciation 0.077 (0.04) 0.035 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.041 (0.80) -0.047 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.25) 0.001 (0.74)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.054
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.921 (0.53) 0.454 (0.69)
Foreign owner 0.669 (0.14) 0.589 (0.10)
Family (individual) owner -0.905 (0.16) -0.526 (0.25)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.688 (0.12) -0.575 (0.09)
Financial owner 0.713 (0.20) 1.006 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) 0.005 (0.95) -0.090 (0.21)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.12) 0.028 (0.14)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.063 (0.72) 0.160 (0.29)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.06) 0.001 (0.71)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.061
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.921 (0.53) 0.454 (0.69)
Foreign owner 0.669 (0.14) 0.589 (0.10)
Family (individual) owner -0.905 (0.16) -0.526 (0.25)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.688 (0.12) -0.575 (0.09)
Financial owner 0.713 (0.20) 1.006 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) 0.005 (0.95) -0.090 (0.21)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.12) 0.028 (0.14)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.063 (0.72) 0.160 (0.29)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.06) 0.001 (0.71)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.061
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.271 (0.89) 0.805 (0.56)
Foreign owner 0.380 (0.53) 0.703 (0.15)
Family (individual) owner -1.087 (0.24) -0.206 (0.73)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.398 (0.50) -0.005 (0.99)
Financial owner -0.716 (0.43) 0.499 (0.39)
ln(Firm Size) -0.111 (0.34) -0.192 (0.03)
Investment over depreciation 0.060 (0.05) 0.034 (0.08)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.198 (0.34) -0.011 (0.95)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.13) 0.002 (0.57)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.031
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.43 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation
over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.852 (0.23) -1.485 (0.21)
Foreign owner 0.764 (0.10) 0.983 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.399 (0.46) 0.351 (0.41)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.200 (0.64) -0.144 (0.66)
Financial owner 0.992 (0.09) 0.969 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) 0.079 (0.38) 0.061 (0.40)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.988 (0.08) 3.288 (0.02)
Earnings surprise 0.151 (0.40) 0.175 (0.18)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) -0.000 (0.93) -0.003 (0.24)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.103 (0.07) -0.123 (0.01)
n 297 496
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.081
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.240 (0.18) -1.035 (0.41)
Foreign owner 0.371 (0.43) 0.330 (0.38)
Family (individual) owner -0.710 (0.30) -0.330 (0.51)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.425 (0.34) -0.373 (0.28)
Financial owner 0.337 (0.57) 0.625 (0.17)
ln(Firm Size) 0.142 (0.15) 0.053 (0.49)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.450 (0.85) 1.168 (0.37)
Earnings surprise 0.258 (0.21) 0.123 (0.38)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.39) -0.002 (0.52)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.228 (0.00) -0.231 (0.00)
n 297 496
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.084
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.240 (0.18) -1.035 (0.41)
Foreign owner 0.371 (0.43) 0.330 (0.38)
Family (individual) owner -0.710 (0.30) -0.330 (0.51)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.425 (0.34) -0.373 (0.28)
Financial owner 0.337 (0.57) 0.625 (0.17)
ln(Firm Size) 0.142 (0.15) 0.053 (0.49)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.450 (0.85) 1.168 (0.37)
Earnings surprise 0.258 (0.21) 0.123 (0.38)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.39) -0.002 (0.52)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.228 (0.00) -0.231 (0.00)
n 297 496
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.084
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.170 (0.32) -0.445 (0.77)
Foreign owner 0.018 (0.98) 0.421 (0.35)
Family (individual) owner -1.773 (0.12) -0.431 (0.48)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.297 (0.60) -0.276 (0.52)
Financial owner -0.749 (0.40) -0.238 (0.69)
ln(Firm Size) 0.044 (0.73) -0.047 (0.62)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.069 (0.14) 0.363 (0.81)
Earnings surprise 0.157 (0.55) 0.071 (0.67)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.002 (0.63) -0.003 (0.46)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.149 (0.07) -0.144 (0.02)
n 297 496
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.040
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.44 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.066 (0.43) -0.074 (0.94)
Foreign owner 1.013 (0.03) 1.155 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.123 (0.05) 0.825 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.002 (1.00) 0.043 (0.89)
Financial owner 0.883 (0.12) 1.098 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.040 (0.63) -0.029 (0.67)
Investment over depreciation 0.082 (0.03) 0.034 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.017 (0.92) -0.035 (0.79)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.005 (0.21) 0.001 (0.69)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.149 (0.01) -0.111 (0.02)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.062
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.907 (0.54) 0.706 (0.54)
Foreign owner 0.395 (0.40) 0.346 (0.35)
Family (individual) owner -0.237 (0.73) -0.181 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.453 (0.32) -0.477 (0.16)
Financial owner 0.548 (0.33) 0.795 (0.08)
ln(Firm Size) 0.052 (0.57) -0.060 (0.41)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.17) 0.022 (0.25)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.052 (0.77) 0.170 (0.26)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.04) 0.001 (0.66)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.256 (0.00) -0.234 (0.00)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.091
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.907 (0.54) 0.706 (0.54)
Foreign owner 0.395 (0.40) 0.346 (0.35)
Family (individual) owner -0.237 (0.73) -0.181 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.453 (0.32) -0.477 (0.16)
Financial owner 0.548 (0.33) 0.795 (0.08)
ln(Firm Size) 0.052 (0.57) -0.060 (0.41)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.17) 0.022 (0.25)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.052 (0.77) 0.170 (0.26)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.04) 0.001 (0.66)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.256 (0.00) -0.234 (0.00)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.091
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.487 (0.80) 0.760 (0.59)
Foreign owner 0.099 (0.87) 0.517 (0.29)
Family (individual) owner -0.665 (0.48) -0.030 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.215 (0.72) 0.078 (0.86)
Financial owner -0.884 (0.33) 0.369 (0.53)
ln(Firm Size) -0.051 (0.67) -0.153 (0.09)
Investment over depreciation 0.063 (0.07) 0.031 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.144 (0.49) 0.017 (0.92)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.12) 0.002 (0.54)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.182 (0.03) -0.148 (0.02)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.044
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.45 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Invest-
ments over depreciation. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.247 (0.86) 0.110 (0.92)
Foreign owner 0.966 (0.03) 1.224 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.199 (0.71) 0.228 (0.59)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.460 (0.27) -0.252 (0.44)
Financial owner 0.976 (0.09) 0.955 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) -0.019 (0.82) -0.048 (0.48)
Investment over depreciation 0.027 (0.41) 0.006 (0.79)
Earnings surprise 0.120 (0.51) 0.182 (0.18)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.000 (0.93) -0.002 (0.37)
n 290 473
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.059
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.898 (0.21) -0.732 (0.54)
Foreign owner 0.614 (0.18) 0.759 (0.04)
Family (individual) owner -1.209 (0.07) -0.548 (0.26)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.804 (0.07) -0.464 (0.18)
Financial owner 0.455 (0.43) 0.859 (0.07)
ln(Firm Size) 0.076 (0.41) -0.009 (0.90)
Investment over depreciation 0.035 (0.32) 0.005 (0.83)
Earnings surprise 0.189 (0.37) 0.152 (0.31)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.45) -0.002 (0.56)
n 290 473
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.052
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.898 (0.21) -0.732 (0.54)
Foreign owner 0.614 (0.18) 0.759 (0.04)
Family (individual) owner -1.209 (0.07) -0.548 (0.26)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.804 (0.07) -0.464 (0.18)
Financial owner 0.455 (0.43) 0.859 (0.07)
ln(Firm Size) 0.076 (0.41) -0.009 (0.90)
Investment over depreciation 0.035 (0.32) 0.005 (0.83)
Earnings surprise 0.189 (0.37) 0.152 (0.31)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.45) -0.002 (0.56)
n 290 473
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.052
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.773 (0.69) -0.122 (0.93)
Foreign owner 0.370 (0.52) 0.791 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -1.878 (0.10) -0.444 (0.48)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.602 (0.28) -0.232 (0.60)
Financial owner -0.660 (0.45) 0.007 (0.99)
ln(Firm Size) -0.056 (0.64) -0.112 (0.23)
Investment over depreciation 0.009 (0.86) 0.013 (0.58)
Earnings surprise 0.147 (0.58) 0.162 (0.38)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.55) -0.002 (0.57)
n 290 473
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.029
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.46 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.968 (0.47) -0.126 (0.90)
Foreign owner 1.247 (0.01) 1.313 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.885 (0.11) 0.722 (0.08)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.024 (0.95) 0.069 (0.83)
Financial owner 1.014 (0.07) 1.223 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.004 (0.96) -0.049 (0.45)
Investment over depreciation 0.077 (0.04) 0.035 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.041 (0.80) -0.047 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.25) 0.001 (0.74)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.054
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.921 (0.53) 0.454 (0.69)
Foreign owner 0.669 (0.14) 0.589 (0.10)
Family (individual) owner -0.905 (0.16) -0.526 (0.25)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.688 (0.12) -0.575 (0.09)
Financial owner 0.713 (0.20) 1.006 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) 0.005 (0.95) -0.090 (0.21)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.12) 0.028 (0.14)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.063 (0.72) 0.160 (0.29)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.06) 0.001 (0.71)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.061
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.921 (0.53) 0.454 (0.69)
Foreign owner 0.669 (0.14) 0.589 (0.10)
Family (individual) owner -0.905 (0.16) -0.526 (0.25)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.688 (0.12) -0.575 (0.09)
Financial owner 0.713 (0.20) 1.006 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) 0.005 (0.95) -0.090 (0.21)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.12) 0.028 (0.14)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.063 (0.72) 0.160 (0.29)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.06) 0.001 (0.71)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.061
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.271 (0.89) 0.805 (0.56)
Foreign owner 0.380 (0.53) 0.703 (0.15)
Family (individual) owner -1.087 (0.24) -0.206 (0.73)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.398 (0.50) -0.005 (0.99)
Financial owner -0.716 (0.43) 0.499 (0.39)
ln(Firm Size) -0.111 (0.34) -0.192 (0.03)
Investment over depreciation 0.060 (0.05) 0.034 (0.08)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.198 (0.34) -0.011 (0.95)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.13) 0.002 (0.57)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.031
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.47 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments
over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.383 (0.78) 0.194 (0.86)
Foreign owner 0.791 (0.09) 1.021 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.380 (0.48) 0.336 (0.44)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.414 (0.32) -0.284 (0.39)
Financial owner 0.880 (0.13) 0.785 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.012 (0.89) -0.026 (0.71)
Investment over depreciation 0.029 (0.39) 0.003 (0.89)
Earnings surprise 0.128 (0.47) 0.193 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.000 (0.92) -0.002 (0.38)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.109 (0.05) -0.124 (0.01)
n 290 473
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.070
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.117 (0.17) -0.580 (0.63)
Foreign owner 0.333 (0.48) 0.460 (0.23)
Family (individual) owner -0.654 (0.35) -0.241 (0.63)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.533 (0.24) -0.365 (0.30)
Financial owner 0.299 (0.61) 0.596 (0.21)
ln(Firm Size) 0.135 (0.16) 0.030 (0.69)
Investment over depreciation 0.050 (0.20) 0.000 (0.98)
Earnings surprise 0.218 (0.30) 0.165 (0.27)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.39) -0.002 (0.61)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.251 (0.00) -0.243 (0.00)
n 290 473
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.087
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.117 (0.17) -0.580 (0.63)
Foreign owner 0.333 (0.48) 0.460 (0.23)
Family (individual) owner -0.654 (0.35) -0.241 (0.63)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.533 (0.24) -0.365 (0.30)
Financial owner 0.299 (0.61) 0.596 (0.21)
ln(Firm Size) 0.135 (0.16) 0.030 (0.69)
Investment over depreciation 0.050 (0.20) 0.000 (0.98)
Earnings surprise 0.218 (0.30) 0.165 (0.27)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.39) -0.002 (0.61)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.251 (0.00) -0.243 (0.00)
n 290 473
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.087
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.902 (0.65) -0.177 (0.91)
Foreign owner 0.137 (0.81) 0.564 (0.23)
Family (individual) owner -1.641 (0.15) -0.326 (0.60)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.430 (0.45) -0.153 (0.73)
Financial owner -0.805 (0.36) -0.171 (0.79)
ln(Firm Size) -0.010 (0.93) -0.071 (0.46)
Investment over depreciation 0.004 (0.95) 0.009 (0.71)
Earnings surprise 0.179 (0.49) 0.178 (0.33)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.54) -0.002 (0.59)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.140 (0.09) -0.145 (0.02)
n 290 473
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.043
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.48 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.066 (0.43) -0.074 (0.94)
Foreign owner 1.013 (0.03) 1.155 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.123 (0.05) 0.825 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.002 (1.00) 0.043 (0.89)
Financial owner 0.883 (0.12) 1.098 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.040 (0.63) -0.029 (0.67)
Investment over depreciation 0.082 (0.03) 0.034 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.017 (0.92) -0.035 (0.79)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.005 (0.21) 0.001 (0.69)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.149 (0.01) -0.111 (0.02)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.062
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.907 (0.54) 0.706 (0.54)
Foreign owner 0.395 (0.40) 0.346 (0.35)
Family (individual) owner -0.237 (0.73) -0.181 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.453 (0.32) -0.477 (0.16)
Financial owner 0.548 (0.33) 0.795 (0.08)
ln(Firm Size) 0.052 (0.57) -0.060 (0.41)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.17) 0.022 (0.25)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.052 (0.77) 0.170 (0.26)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.04) 0.001 (0.66)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.256 (0.00) -0.234 (0.00)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.091
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.907 (0.54) 0.706 (0.54)
Foreign owner 0.395 (0.40) 0.346 (0.35)
Family (individual) owner -0.237 (0.73) -0.181 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.453 (0.32) -0.477 (0.16)
Financial owner 0.548 (0.33) 0.795 (0.08)
ln(Firm Size) 0.052 (0.57) -0.060 (0.41)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.17) 0.022 (0.25)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.052 (0.77) 0.170 (0.26)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.04) 0.001 (0.66)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.256 (0.00) -0.234 (0.00)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.091
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.487 (0.80) 0.760 (0.59)
Foreign owner 0.099 (0.87) 0.517 (0.29)
Family (individual) owner -0.665 (0.48) -0.030 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.215 (0.72) 0.078 (0.86)
Financial owner -0.884 (0.33) 0.369 (0.53)
ln(Firm Size) -0.051 (0.67) -0.153 (0.09)
Investment over depreciation 0.063 (0.07) 0.031 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.144 (0.49) 0.017 (0.92)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.12) 0.002 (0.54)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.182 (0.03) -0.148 (0.02)
n 304 500
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.044
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.1.7 Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Table 7.49 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depre-
ciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.643 (0.70) -1.511 (0.27)
Foreign owner 0.744 (0.11) 1.396 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.093 (0.87) 0.378 (0.44)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.506 (0.26) -0.107 (0.77)
Financial owner 0.824 (0.18) 1.438 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.005 (0.96) 0.036 (0.66)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.397 (0.13) 1.691 (0.36)
Earnings surprise 0.100 (0.58) 0.171 (0.25)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.003 (0.37) -0.000 (0.98)
n 284 401
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.082
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.508 (0.16) -2.360 (0.11)
Foreign owner 0.656 (0.17) 0.918 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -1.182 (0.09) -0.679 (0.26)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.622 (0.19) -0.321 (0.41)
Financial owner 0.566 (0.36) 0.975 (0.07)
ln(Firm Size) 0.111 (0.28) 0.091 (0.30)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.536 (0.82) -0.423 (0.83)
Earnings surprise 0.227 (0.29) 0.199 (0.24)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.004 (0.24) -0.001 (0.70)
n 284 401
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.067
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.508 (0.16) -2.360 (0.11)
Foreign owner 0.656 (0.17) 0.918 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -1.182 (0.09) -0.679 (0.26)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.622 (0.19) -0.321 (0.41)
Financial owner 0.566 (0.36) 0.975 (0.07)
ln(Firm Size) 0.111 (0.28) 0.091 (0.30)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.536 (0.82) -0.423 (0.83)
Earnings surprise 0.227 (0.29) 0.199 (0.24)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.004 (0.24) -0.001 (0.70)
n 284 401
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.067
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.491 (0.53) -0.947 (0.61)
Foreign owner 0.146 (0.81) 0.687 (0.15)
Family (individual) owner -2.040 (0.08) -1.164 (0.17)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.662 (0.28) -0.494 (0.30)
Financial owner -1.311 (0.25) -0.270 (0.71)
ln(Firm Size) -0.027 (0.84) -0.044 (0.69)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.591 (0.20) -0.364 (0.88)
Earnings surprise 0.200 (0.48) 0.178 (0.39)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) -0.000 (0.97) -0.003 (0.43)
n 284 401
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.045
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.50 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.104 (0.94) -0.766 (0.54)
Foreign owner 1.028 (0.03) 1.439 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.540 (0.34) 0.800 (0.10)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.295 (0.51) 0.052 (0.89)
Financial owner 0.711 (0.23) 1.473 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.052 (0.55) -0.014 (0.85)
Investment over depreciation 0.067 (0.07) 0.039 (0.08)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.040 (0.81) -0.113 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.004 (0.21) 0.003 (0.30)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.070
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.972 (0.56) -1.030 (0.45)
Foreign owner 0.624 (0.19) 0.826 (0.04)
Family (individual) owner -1.062 (0.12) -0.716 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.791 (0.10) -0.493 (0.20)
Financial owner 0.741 (0.23) 1.219 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) 0.008 (0.94) -0.001 (0.99)
Investment over depreciation 0.036 (0.16) 0.028 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.091 (0.62) -0.024 (0.88)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.008 (0.02) 0.005 (0.06)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.076
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.972 (0.56) -1.030 (0.45)
Foreign owner 0.624 (0.19) 0.826 (0.04)
Family (individual) owner -1.062 (0.12) -0.716 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.791 (0.10) -0.493 (0.20)
Financial owner 0.741 (0.23) 1.219 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) 0.008 (0.94) -0.001 (0.99)
Investment over depreciation 0.036 (0.16) 0.028 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.091 (0.62) -0.024 (0.88)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.008 (0.02) 0.005 (0.06)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.076
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.005 (1.00) 0.435 (0.80)
Foreign owner 0.159 (0.80) 0.561 (0.26)
Family (individual) owner -1.302 (0.17) -0.797 (0.30)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.713 (0.26) -0.406 (0.41)
Financial owner -1.369 (0.24) 0.049 (0.94)
ln(Firm Size) -0.115 (0.39) -0.150 (0.15)
Investment over depreciation 0.055 (0.07) 0.028 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.165 (0.44) -0.149 (0.42)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.58) 0.001 (0.72)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.033
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.51 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation
over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.818 (0.62) -1.497 (0.28)
Foreign owner 0.611 (0.20) 1.239 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.079 (0.89) 0.494 (0.32)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.441 (0.32) -0.117 (0.75)
Financial owner 0.763 (0.22) 1.323 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) 0.023 (0.81) 0.054 (0.51)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.631 (0.11) 1.847 (0.32)
Earnings surprise 0.116 (0.52) 0.183 (0.22)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.53) -0.000 (0.84)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.089 (0.12) -0.090 (0.08)
n 284 401
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.088
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.691 (0.14) -2.249 (0.14)
Foreign owner 0.441 (0.36) 0.659 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -0.646 (0.37) -0.295 (0.63)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.330 (0.49) -0.201 (0.61)
Financial owner 0.457 (0.47) 0.768 (0.16)
ln(Firm Size) 0.164 (0.12) 0.124 (0.17)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.558 (0.81) -0.260 (0.90)
Earnings surprise 0.264 (0.22) 0.209 (0.21)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.49) -0.002 (0.52)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.222 (0.00) -0.200 (0.00)
n 284 401
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.093
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.691 (0.14) -2.249 (0.14)
Foreign owner 0.441 (0.36) 0.659 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -0.646 (0.37) -0.295 (0.63)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.330 (0.49) -0.201 (0.61)
Financial owner 0.457 (0.47) 0.768 (0.16)
ln(Firm Size) 0.164 (0.12) 0.124 (0.17)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.558 (0.81) -0.260 (0.90)
Earnings surprise 0.264 (0.22) 0.209 (0.21)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.49) -0.002 (0.52)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.222 (0.00) -0.200 (0.00)
n 284 401
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.093
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.685 (0.48) -0.985 (0.60)
Foreign owner -0.081 (0.89) 0.490 (0.32)
Family (individual) owner -1.837 (0.12) -1.021 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.448 (0.46) -0.402 (0.40)
Financial owner -1.430 (0.21) -0.396 (0.59)
ln(Firm Size) 0.020 (0.89) -0.015 (0.89)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.939 (0.16) -0.004 (1.00)
Earnings surprise 0.227 (0.41) 0.186 (0.37)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) -0.001 (0.74) -0.003 (0.34)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.143 (0.09) -0.106 (0.11)
n 284 401
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.053
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.52 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.017 (0.99) -0.736 (0.56)
Foreign owner 0.833 (0.08) 1.302 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.783 (0.18) 0.930 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.238 (0.60) 0.045 (0.90)
Financial owner 0.606 (0.32) 1.363 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.019 (0.83) 0.003 (0.97)
Investment over depreciation 0.073 (0.05) 0.038 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.004 (0.98) -0.089 (0.53)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.003 (0.30) 0.003 (0.33)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.133 (0.02) -0.090 (0.08)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.075
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.177 (0.48) -0.811 (0.56)
Foreign owner 0.415 (0.39) 0.608 (0.14)
Family (individual) owner -0.401 (0.58) -0.287 (0.64)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.495 (0.31) -0.369 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.629 (0.31) 1.023 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.062 (0.54) 0.024 (0.78)
Investment over depreciation 0.034 (0.21) 0.022 (0.28)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.053 (0.77) 0.015 (0.93)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.006 (0.06) 0.005 (0.11)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.228 (0.00) -0.195 (0.00)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.099
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.177 (0.48) -0.811 (0.56)
Foreign owner 0.415 (0.39) 0.608 (0.14)
Family (individual) owner -0.401 (0.58) -0.287 (0.64)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.495 (0.31) -0.369 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.629 (0.31) 1.023 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.062 (0.54) 0.024 (0.78)
Investment over depreciation 0.034 (0.21) 0.022 (0.28)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.053 (0.77) 0.015 (0.93)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.006 (0.06) 0.005 (0.11)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.228 (0.00) -0.195 (0.00)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.099
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.241 (0.91) 0.443 (0.80)
Foreign owner -0.037 (0.95) 0.413 (0.42)
Family (individual) owner -0.908 (0.35) -0.584 (0.45)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.495 (0.44) -0.314 (0.52)
Financial owner -1.464 (0.21) -0.054 (0.94)
ln(Firm Size) -0.062 (0.65) -0.122 (0.25)
Investment over depreciation 0.057 (0.10) 0.025 (0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.098 (0.65) -0.104 (0.58)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.80) 0.001 (0.82)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.152 (0.08) -0.108 (0.12)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.040
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.53 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Invest-
ments over depreciation. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.715 (0.64) -0.800 (0.53)
Foreign owner 0.751 (0.11) 1.348 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.177 (0.75) 0.350 (0.47)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.735 (0.10) -0.184 (0.61)
Financial owner 0.702 (0.25) 1.307 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.069 (0.45) 0.001 (0.99)
Investment over depreciation 0.032 (0.34) 0.009 (0.70)
Earnings surprise 0.077 (0.67) 0.178 (0.25)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.003 (0.23) 0.001 (0.75)
n 277 387
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.073
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.284 (0.18) -2.500 (0.08)
Foreign owner 0.636 (0.18) 0.988 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -1.234 (0.08) -0.659 (0.28)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.766 (0.10) -0.321 (0.41)
Financial owner 0.530 (0.39) 0.875 (0.11)
ln(Firm Size) 0.097 (0.34) 0.096 (0.27)
Investment over depreciation 0.038 (0.31) 0.001 (0.98)
Earnings surprise 0.179 (0.41) 0.252 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.004 (0.18) -0.000 (0.87)
n 277 387
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.071
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.284 (0.18) -2.500 (0.08)
Foreign owner 0.636 (0.18) 0.988 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -1.234 (0.08) -0.659 (0.28)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.766 (0.10) -0.321 (0.41)
Financial owner 0.530 (0.39) 0.875 (0.11)
ln(Firm Size) 0.097 (0.34) 0.096 (0.27)
Investment over depreciation 0.038 (0.31) 0.001 (0.98)
Earnings surprise 0.179 (0.41) 0.252 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.004 (0.18) -0.000 (0.87)
n 277 387
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.071
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.312 (0.89) -1.126 (0.52)
Foreign owner 0.223 (0.70) 0.696 (0.15)
Family (individual) owner -2.023 (0.08) -1.169 (0.17)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.804 (0.18) -0.433 (0.36)
Financial owner -1.406 (0.22) -0.680 (0.42)
ln(Firm Size) -0.077 (0.56) -0.038 (0.73)
Investment over depreciation 0.012 (0.81) 0.008 (0.78)
Earnings surprise 0.220 (0.44) 0.352 (0.14)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.000 (0.93) -0.002 (0.62)
n 277 387
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.050
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.54 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.104 (0.94) -0.766 (0.54)
Foreign owner 1.028 (0.03) 1.439 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.540 (0.34) 0.800 (0.10)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.295 (0.51) 0.052 (0.89)
Financial owner 0.711 (0.23) 1.473 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.052 (0.55) -0.014 (0.85)
Investment over depreciation 0.067 (0.07) 0.039 (0.08)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.040 (0.81) -0.113 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.004 (0.21) 0.003 (0.30)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.070
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.972 (0.56) -1.030 (0.45)
Foreign owner 0.624 (0.19) 0.826 (0.04)
Family (individual) owner -1.062 (0.12) -0.716 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.791 (0.10) -0.493 (0.20)
Financial owner 0.741 (0.23) 1.219 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) 0.008 (0.94) -0.001 (0.99)
Investment over depreciation 0.036 (0.16) 0.028 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.091 (0.62) -0.024 (0.88)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.008 (0.02) 0.005 (0.06)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.076
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.972 (0.56) -1.030 (0.45)
Foreign owner 0.624 (0.19) 0.826 (0.04)
Family (individual) owner -1.062 (0.12) -0.716 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.791 (0.10) -0.493 (0.20)
Financial owner 0.741 (0.23) 1.219 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) 0.008 (0.94) -0.001 (0.99)
Investment over depreciation 0.036 (0.16) 0.028 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.091 (0.62) -0.024 (0.88)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.008 (0.02) 0.005 (0.06)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.076
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.005 (1.00) 0.435 (0.80)
Foreign owner 0.159 (0.80) 0.561 (0.26)
Family (individual) owner -1.302 (0.17) -0.797 (0.30)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.713 (0.26) -0.406 (0.41)
Financial owner -1.369 (0.24) 0.049 (0.94)
ln(Firm Size) -0.115 (0.39) -0.150 (0.15)
Investment over depreciation 0.055 (0.07) 0.028 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.165 (0.44) -0.149 (0.42)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.58) 0.001 (0.72)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.033
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
317
Table 7.55 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments
over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.604 (0.69) -0.744 (0.57)
Foreign owner 0.620 (0.19) 1.176 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.014 (0.98) 0.493 (0.32)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.673 (0.13) -0.194 (0.59)
Financial owner 0.637 (0.30) 1.178 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.044 (0.64) 0.020 (0.81)
Investment over depreciation 0.032 (0.35) 0.007 (0.78)
Earnings surprise 0.093 (0.60) 0.192 (0.21)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.003 (0.36) 0.000 (0.91)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.091 (0.11) -0.099 (0.06)
n 277 387
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.080
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.614 (0.13) -2.387 (0.10)
Foreign owner 0.409 (0.40) 0.710 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -0.593 (0.42) -0.242 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.444 (0.35) -0.193 (0.62)
Financial owner 0.425 (0.50) 0.650 (0.24)
ln(Firm Size) 0.160 (0.12) 0.133 (0.14)
Investment over depreciation 0.048 (0.22) -0.004 (0.89)
Earnings surprise 0.223 (0.30) 0.266 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.003 (0.43) -0.001 (0.66)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.242 (0.00) -0.209 (0.00)
n 277 387
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.101
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.614 (0.13) -2.387 (0.10)
Foreign owner 0.409 (0.40) 0.710 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -0.593 (0.42) -0.242 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.444 (0.35) -0.193 (0.62)
Financial owner 0.425 (0.50) 0.650 (0.24)
ln(Firm Size) 0.160 (0.12) 0.133 (0.14)
Investment over depreciation 0.048 (0.22) -0.004 (0.89)
Earnings surprise 0.223 (0.30) 0.266 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.003 (0.43) -0.001 (0.66)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.242 (0.00) -0.209 (0.00)
n 277 387
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.101
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.423 (0.85) -1.103 (0.53)
Foreign owner 0.034 (0.95) 0.508 (0.31)
Family (individual) owner -1.753 (0.14) -1.012 (0.24)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.600 (0.32) -0.352 (0.46)
Financial owner -1.509 (0.19) -0.808 (0.34)
ln(Firm Size) -0.035 (0.80) -0.010 (0.93)
Investment over depreciation 0.005 (0.92) 0.003 (0.91)
Earnings surprise 0.252 (0.36) 0.358 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) -0.001 (0.85) -0.002 (0.52)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.132 (0.12) -0.104 (0.13)
n 277 387
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.058
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.56 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.017 (0.99) -0.736 (0.56)
Foreign owner 0.833 (0.08) 1.302 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.783 (0.18) 0.930 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.238 (0.60) 0.045 (0.90)
Financial owner 0.606 (0.32) 1.363 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.019 (0.83) 0.003 (0.97)
Investment over depreciation 0.073 (0.05) 0.038 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.004 (0.98) -0.089 (0.53)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.003 (0.30) 0.003 (0.33)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.133 (0.02) -0.090 (0.08)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.075
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.177 (0.48) -0.811 (0.56)
Foreign owner 0.415 (0.39) 0.608 (0.14)
Family (individual) owner -0.401 (0.58) -0.287 (0.64)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.495 (0.31) -0.369 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.629 (0.31) 1.023 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.062 (0.54) 0.024 (0.78)
Investment over depreciation 0.034 (0.21) 0.022 (0.28)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.053 (0.77) 0.015 (0.93)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.006 (0.06) 0.005 (0.11)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.228 (0.00) -0.195 (0.00)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.099
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.177 (0.48) -0.811 (0.56)
Foreign owner 0.415 (0.39) 0.608 (0.14)
Family (individual) owner -0.401 (0.58) -0.287 (0.64)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.495 (0.31) -0.369 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.629 (0.31) 1.023 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) 0.062 (0.54) 0.024 (0.78)
Investment over depreciation 0.034 (0.21) 0.022 (0.28)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.053 (0.77) 0.015 (0.93)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.006 (0.06) 0.005 (0.11)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.228 (0.00) -0.195 (0.00)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.099
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.241 (0.91) 0.443 (0.80)
Foreign owner -0.037 (0.95) 0.413 (0.42)
Family (individual) owner -0.908 (0.35) -0.584 (0.45)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.495 (0.44) -0.314 (0.52)
Financial owner -1.464 (0.21) -0.054 (0.94)
ln(Firm Size) -0.062 (0.65) -0.122 (0.25)
Investment over depreciation 0.057 (0.10) 0.025 (0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.098 (0.65) -0.104 (0.58)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.80) 0.001 (0.82)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.152 (0.08) -0.108 (0.12)
n 288 403
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.040
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.1.8 Performance measure: ∆Q
Table 7.57 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depre-
ciation over long term assets. Performance measure: ∆Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.567 (0.30) -2.025 (0.07)
Foreign owner 0.948 (0.04) 1.211 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.169 (0.75) 0.314 (0.44)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.262 (0.53) 0.025 (0.94)
Financial owner 1.092 (0.06) 1.289 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.043 (0.62) 0.069 (0.30)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.286 (0.14) 2.742 (0.03)
Earnings surprise 0.107 (0.54) 0.241 (0.06)
∆Q 0.362 (0.24) 0.035 (0.80)
n 299 541
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.071
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.364 (0.14) -1.580 (0.17)
Foreign owner 0.600 (0.19) 0.646 (0.07)
Family (individual) owner -1.104 (0.10) -0.586 (0.21)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.657 (0.13) -0.370 (0.26)
Financial owner 0.495 (0.39) 0.911 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.096 (0.30) 0.037 (0.60)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.965 (0.16) 1.202 (0.16)
Earnings surprise 0.257 (0.23) 0.214 (0.13)
∆Q -0.219 (0.52) -0.218 (0.14)
n 299 541
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.056
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.364 (0.14) -1.580 (0.17)
Foreign owner 0.600 (0.19) 0.646 (0.07)
Family (individual) owner -1.104 (0.10) -0.586 (0.21)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.657 (0.13) -0.370 (0.26)
Financial owner 0.495 (0.39) 0.911 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.096 (0.30) 0.037 (0.60)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.965 (0.16) 1.202 (0.16)
Earnings surprise 0.257 (0.23) 0.214 (0.13)
∆Q -0.219 (0.52) -0.218 (0.14)
n 299 541
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.056
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.874 (0.38) -0.600 (0.67)
Foreign owner 0.273 (0.64) 0.685 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -1.905 (0.10) -0.292 (0.60)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.504 (0.37) -0.194 (0.64)
Financial owner -0.596 (0.50) 0.188 (0.73)
ln(Firm Size) -0.012 (0.92) -0.082 (0.33)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.877 (0.15) 0.992 (0.25)
Earnings surprise 0.128 (0.63) 0.190 (0.26)
∆Q 0.016 (0.97) -0.153 (0.34)
n 299 541
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.030
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.58 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: ∆Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.837 (0.53) -0.598 (0.56)
Foreign owner 1.201 (0.01) 1.359 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.842 (0.12) 0.662 (0.10)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.069 (0.87) 0.170 (0.59)
Financial owner 0.979 (0.07) 1.387 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.003 (0.97) -0.022 (0.72)
Investment over depreciation 0.078 (0.03) 0.042 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.014 (0.93) -0.047 (0.70)
∆Q 0.127 (0.62) 0.080 (0.59)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.056
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.630 (0.67) -0.117 (0.92)
Foreign owner 0.588 (0.19) 0.600 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -0.935 (0.14) -0.466 (0.30)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.778 (0.08) -0.485 (0.14)
Financial owner 0.645 (0.24) 1.079 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.012 (0.89) -0.056 (0.41)
Investment over depreciation 0.042 (0.11) 0.032 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.014 (0.93) 0.137 (0.35)
∆Q 0.175 (0.53) 0.052 (0.74)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.058
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.630 (0.67) -0.117 (0.92)
Foreign owner 0.588 (0.19) 0.600 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -0.935 (0.14) -0.466 (0.30)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.778 (0.08) -0.485 (0.14)
Financial owner 0.645 (0.24) 1.079 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.012 (0.89) -0.056 (0.41)
Investment over depreciation 0.042 (0.11) 0.032 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.014 (0.93) 0.137 (0.35)
∆Q 0.175 (0.53) 0.052 (0.74)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.058
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.042 (0.98) 0.214 (0.87)
Foreign owner 0.283 (0.64) 0.760 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -1.099 (0.23) 0.057 (0.92)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.510 (0.38) 0.093 (0.84)
Financial owner -0.755 (0.40) 0.639 (0.25)
ln(Firm Size) -0.128 (0.28) -0.156 (0.06)
Investment over depreciation 0.063 (0.06) 0.034 (0.07)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.145 (0.49) 0.007 (0.97)
∆Q 0.364 (0.32) -0.010 (0.95)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.027
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.59 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation
over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: ∆Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.751 (0.26) -1.983 (0.08)
Foreign owner 0.790 (0.09) 1.015 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.333 (0.55) 0.389 (0.35)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.219 (0.60) -0.018 (0.95)
Financial owner 1.007 (0.08) 1.121 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.074 (0.41) 0.092 (0.17)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.496 (0.12) 2.810 (0.03)
Earnings surprise 0.118 (0.50) 0.248 (0.05)
∆Q 0.315 (0.31) 0.034 (0.81)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.096 (0.09) -0.124 (0.01)
n 299 541
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.081
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.539 (0.12) -1.397 (0.24)
Foreign owner 0.351 (0.45) 0.379 (0.29)
Family (individual) owner -0.613 (0.38) -0.391 (0.41)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.408 (0.36) -0.317 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.343 (0.56) 0.670 (0.13)
ln(Firm Size) 0.150 (0.12) 0.069 (0.34)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.022 (0.15) 1.207 (0.15)
Earnings surprise 0.286 (0.18) 0.210 (0.13)
∆Q -0.344 (0.32) -0.199 (0.17)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.227 (0.00) -0.215 (0.00)
n 299 541
Pseudo R2 0.121 0.083
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.539 (0.12) -1.397 (0.24)
Foreign owner 0.351 (0.45) 0.379 (0.29)
Family (individual) owner -0.613 (0.38) -0.391 (0.41)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.408 (0.36) -0.317 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.343 (0.56) 0.670 (0.13)
ln(Firm Size) 0.150 (0.12) 0.069 (0.34)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.022 (0.15) 1.207 (0.15)
Earnings surprise 0.286 (0.18) 0.210 (0.13)
∆Q -0.344 (0.32) -0.199 (0.17)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.227 (0.00) -0.215 (0.00)
n 299 541
Pseudo R2 0.121 0.083
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.100 (0.33) -0.614 (0.66)
Foreign owner 0.032 (0.96) 0.446 (0.31)
Family (individual) owner -1.721 (0.14) -0.220 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.330 (0.56) -0.143 (0.73)
Financial owner -0.750 (0.40) -0.009 (0.99)
ln(Firm Size) 0.038 (0.77) -0.043 (0.62)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.187 (0.13) 1.033 (0.23)
Earnings surprise 0.159 (0.54) 0.193 (0.25)
∆Q -0.075 (0.86) -0.131 (0.41)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.144 (0.08) -0.150 (0.01)
n 299 541
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.044
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.60 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: ∆Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.945 (0.49) -0.591 (0.56)
Foreign owner 0.973 (0.04) 1.211 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.073 (0.06) 0.742 (0.07)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.046 (0.91) 0.145 (0.65)
Financial owner 0.848 (0.13) 1.268 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.032 (0.70) -0.000 (1.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.084 (0.02) 0.041 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.012 (0.94) -0.039 (0.75)
∆Q 0.090 (0.72) 0.071 (0.62)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.145 (0.01) -0.108 (0.02)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.063
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.668 (0.65) 0.021 (0.98)
Foreign owner 0.332 (0.48) 0.372 (0.30)
Family (individual) owner -0.309 (0.65) -0.191 (0.68)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.536 (0.24) -0.393 (0.24)
Financial owner 0.488 (0.38) 0.885 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.036 (0.69) -0.022 (0.76)
Investment over depreciation 0.043 (0.15) 0.028 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.007 (0.97) 0.137 (0.35)
∆Q 0.128 (0.63) 0.062 (0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.247 (0.00) -0.224 (0.00)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.085
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.668 (0.65) 0.021 (0.98)
Foreign owner 0.332 (0.48) 0.372 (0.30)
Family (individual) owner -0.309 (0.65) -0.191 (0.68)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.536 (0.24) -0.393 (0.24)
Financial owner 0.488 (0.38) 0.885 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.036 (0.69) -0.022 (0.76)
Investment over depreciation 0.043 (0.15) 0.028 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.007 (0.97) 0.137 (0.35)
∆Q 0.128 (0.63) 0.062 (0.69)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.247 (0.00) -0.224 (0.00)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.085
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.184 (0.92) 0.086 (0.95)
Foreign owner 0.047 (0.94) 0.568 (0.24)
Family (individual) owner -0.749 (0.42) 0.217 (0.71)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.322 (0.59) 0.178 (0.69)
Financial owner -0.902 (0.32) 0.507 (0.37)
ln(Firm Size) -0.071 (0.56) -0.109 (0.21)
Investment over depreciation 0.066 (0.08) 0.031 (0.11)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.090 (0.67) 0.026 (0.88)
∆Q 0.266 (0.45) -0.011 (0.95)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.171 (0.04) -0.161 (0.01)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.043
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.61 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Invest-
ments over depreciation. Performance measure: ∆Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.257 (0.85) -0.487 (0.64)
Foreign owner 0.973 (0.03) 1.223 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.097 (0.86) 0.277 (0.50)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.460 (0.27) -0.113 (0.72)
Financial owner 1.000 (0.08) 1.123 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.020 (0.81) -0.014 (0.83)
Investment over depreciation 0.031 (0.35) 0.009 (0.68)
Earnings surprise 0.084 (0.63) 0.235 (0.07)
∆Q 0.483 (0.11) 0.035 (0.80)
n 291 513
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.058
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.757 (0.25) -1.291 (0.26)
Foreign owner 0.615 (0.18) 0.758 (0.04)
Family (individual) owner -1.149 (0.09) -0.525 (0.27)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.844 (0.06) -0.384 (0.26)
Financial owner 0.443 (0.44) 0.895 (0.05)
ln(Firm Size) 0.067 (0.46) 0.023 (0.74)
Investment over depreciation 0.035 (0.33) 0.005 (0.80)
Earnings surprise 0.210 (0.32) 0.240 (0.10)
∆Q -0.130 (0.70) -0.217 (0.14)
n 291 513
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.055
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.757 (0.25) -1.291 (0.26)
Foreign owner 0.615 (0.18) 0.758 (0.04)
Family (individual) owner -1.149 (0.09) -0.525 (0.27)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.844 (0.06) -0.384 (0.26)
Financial owner 0.443 (0.44) 0.895 (0.05)
ln(Firm Size) 0.067 (0.46) 0.023 (0.74)
Investment over depreciation 0.035 (0.33) 0.005 (0.80)
Earnings surprise 0.210 (0.32) 0.240 (0.10)
∆Q -0.130 (0.70) -0.217 (0.14)
n 291 513
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.055
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.628 (0.75) -0.506 (0.71)
Foreign owner 0.370 (0.52) 0.824 (0.07)
Family (individual) owner -1.870 (0.10) -0.171 (0.77)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.636 (0.26) -0.114 (0.79)
Financial owner -0.661 (0.45) 0.285 (0.62)
ln(Firm Size) -0.065 (0.59) -0.090 (0.30)
Investment over depreciation 0.010 (0.85) 0.012 (0.62)
Earnings surprise 0.143 (0.59) 0.274 (0.14)
∆Q 0.113 (0.79) -0.151 (0.36)
n 291 513
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.029
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.62 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: ∆Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.837 (0.53) -0.598 (0.56)
Foreign owner 1.201 (0.01) 1.359 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.842 (0.12) 0.662 (0.10)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.069 (0.87) 0.170 (0.59)
Financial owner 0.979 (0.07) 1.387 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.003 (0.97) -0.022 (0.72)
Investment over depreciation 0.078 (0.03) 0.042 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.014 (0.93) -0.047 (0.70)
∆Q 0.127 (0.62) 0.080 (0.59)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.056
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.630 (0.67) -0.117 (0.92)
Foreign owner 0.588 (0.19) 0.600 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -0.935 (0.14) -0.466 (0.30)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.778 (0.08) -0.485 (0.14)
Financial owner 0.645 (0.24) 1.079 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.012 (0.89) -0.056 (0.41)
Investment over depreciation 0.042 (0.11) 0.032 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.014 (0.93) 0.137 (0.35)
∆Q 0.175 (0.53) 0.052 (0.74)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.058
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.630 (0.67) -0.117 (0.92)
Foreign owner 0.588 (0.19) 0.600 (0.09)
Family (individual) owner -0.935 (0.14) -0.466 (0.30)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.778 (0.08) -0.485 (0.14)
Financial owner 0.645 (0.24) 1.079 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.012 (0.89) -0.056 (0.41)
Investment over depreciation 0.042 (0.11) 0.032 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.014 (0.93) 0.137 (0.35)
∆Q 0.175 (0.53) 0.052 (0.74)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.058
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.042 (0.98) 0.214 (0.87)
Foreign owner 0.283 (0.64) 0.760 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -1.099 (0.23) 0.057 (0.92)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.510 (0.38) 0.093 (0.84)
Financial owner -0.755 (0.40) 0.639 (0.25)
ln(Firm Size) -0.128 (0.28) -0.156 (0.06)
Investment over depreciation 0.063 (0.06) 0.034 (0.07)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.145 (0.49) 0.007 (0.97)
∆Q 0.364 (0.32) -0.010 (0.95)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.027
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.63 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments
over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: ∆Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.380 (0.78) -0.450 (0.67)
Foreign owner 0.815 (0.08) 1.029 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.278 (0.61) 0.359 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.420 (0.31) -0.151 (0.64)
Financial owner 0.910 (0.12) 0.957 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.009 (0.92) 0.010 (0.88)
Investment over depreciation 0.032 (0.34) 0.006 (0.77)
Earnings surprise 0.094 (0.59) 0.244 (0.06)
∆Q 0.431 (0.16) 0.032 (0.82)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.099 (0.08) -0.122 (0.01)
n 291 513
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.068
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.015 (0.19) -1.222 (0.29)
Foreign owner 0.345 (0.46) 0.473 (0.21)
Family (individual) owner -0.538 (0.44) -0.286 (0.56)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.579 (0.20) -0.314 (0.36)
Financial owner 0.287 (0.63) 0.648 (0.16)
ln(Firm Size) 0.129 (0.18) 0.066 (0.37)
Investment over depreciation 0.048 (0.21) 0.002 (0.93)
Earnings surprise 0.245 (0.24) 0.242 (0.10)
∆Q -0.272 (0.43) -0.199 (0.17)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.250 (0.00) -0.232 (0.00)
n 291 513
Pseudo R2 0.124 0.085
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.015 (0.19) -1.222 (0.29)
Foreign owner 0.345 (0.46) 0.473 (0.21)
Family (individual) owner -0.538 (0.44) -0.286 (0.56)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.579 (0.20) -0.314 (0.36)
Financial owner 0.287 (0.63) 0.648 (0.16)
ln(Firm Size) 0.129 (0.18) 0.066 (0.37)
Investment over depreciation 0.048 (0.21) 0.002 (0.93)
Earnings surprise 0.245 (0.24) 0.242 (0.10)
∆Q -0.272 (0.43) -0.199 (0.17)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.250 (0.00) -0.232 (0.00)
n 291 513
Pseudo R2 0.124 0.085
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.767 (0.69) -0.616 (0.66)
Foreign owner 0.159 (0.79) 0.579 (0.21)
Family (individual) owner -1.633 (0.15) -0.072 (0.90)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.472 (0.40) -0.054 (0.90)
Financial owner -0.797 (0.37) 0.099 (0.87)
ln(Firm Size) -0.021 (0.87) -0.043 (0.63)
Investment over depreciation 0.005 (0.93) 0.008 (0.75)
Earnings surprise 0.177 (0.50) 0.281 (0.12)
∆Q 0.036 (0.93) -0.131 (0.42)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.134 (0.10) -0.157 (0.01)
n 291 513
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.045
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.64 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: ∆Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.945 (0.49) -0.591 (0.56)
Foreign owner 0.973 (0.04) 1.211 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 1.073 (0.06) 0.742 (0.07)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.046 (0.91) 0.145 (0.65)
Financial owner 0.848 (0.13) 1.268 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.032 (0.70) -0.000 (1.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.084 (0.02) 0.041 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.012 (0.94) -0.039 (0.75)
∆Q 0.090 (0.72) 0.071 (0.62)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.145 (0.01) -0.108 (0.02)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.063
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.668 (0.65) 0.021 (0.98)
Foreign owner 0.332 (0.48) 0.372 (0.30)
Family (individual) owner -0.309 (0.65) -0.191 (0.68)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.536 (0.24) -0.393 (0.24)
Financial owner 0.488 (0.38) 0.885 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.036 (0.69) -0.022 (0.76)
Investment over depreciation 0.043 (0.15) 0.028 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.007 (0.97) 0.137 (0.35)
∆Q 0.128 (0.63) 0.062 (0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.247 (0.00) -0.224 (0.00)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.085
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.668 (0.65) 0.021 (0.98)
Foreign owner 0.332 (0.48) 0.372 (0.30)
Family (individual) owner -0.309 (0.65) -0.191 (0.68)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.536 (0.24) -0.393 (0.24)
Financial owner 0.488 (0.38) 0.885 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) 0.036 (0.69) -0.022 (0.76)
Investment over depreciation 0.043 (0.15) 0.028 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.007 (0.97) 0.137 (0.35)
∆Q 0.128 (0.63) 0.062 (0.69)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.247 (0.00) -0.224 (0.00)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.085
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.184 (0.92) 0.086 (0.95)
Foreign owner 0.047 (0.94) 0.568 (0.24)
Family (individual) owner -0.749 (0.42) 0.217 (0.71)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.322 (0.59) 0.178 (0.69)
Financial owner -0.902 (0.32) 0.507 (0.37)
ln(Firm Size) -0.071 (0.56) -0.109 (0.21)
Investment over depreciation 0.066 (0.08) 0.031 (0.11)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.090 (0.67) 0.026 (0.88)
∆Q 0.266 (0.45) -0.011 (0.95)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.171 (0.04) -0.161 (0.01)
n 304 528
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.043
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only
data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed
to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange ﬁrms and investors in 19891999
underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).Note that only samples (2) and (4)
are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation.
That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the
ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.2 The ﬁrm's ﬁve largest owners
7.2.1 Performance measure: Q
Table 7.65 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depre-
ciation over long term assets. Q
Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.667 (0.01) -1.102 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -0.122 (0.49) -0.274 (0.04)
Owner rank 2 0.069 (0.69) 0.013 (0.92)
Owner rank 3 0.038 (0.82) 0.080 (0.53)
Owner rank 4 0.188 (0.27) 0.102 (0.42)
Foreign owner 1.097 (0.00) 1.101 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.223 (0.39) 0.237 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.002 (0.99) 0.073 (0.63)
Financial owner 0.778 (0.00) 0.648 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.058 (0.10) 0.029 (0.31)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.045 (0.03) 1.245 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.070 (0.34) 0.059 (0.25)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.081 (0.36) 0.097 (0.02)
n 1495 2710
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.045
Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.519 (0.43) 0.463 (0.36)
Owner rank 1 -2.005 (0.00) -2.027 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.126 (0.00) -1.171 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.718 (0.00) -0.673 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.312 (0.09) -0.440 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.603 (0.00) 0.480 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.142 (0.60) -0.259 (0.20)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.228 (0.25) -0.293 (0.06)
Financial owner 0.190 (0.35) 0.172 (0.29)
ln(Firm Size) 0.068 (0.07) 0.030 (0.32)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.043 (0.00) 1.801 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.003 (0.97) 0.038 (0.48)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.069 (0.47) 0.056 (0.21)
n 1495 2710
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.109
Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.074 (0.09) 0.005 (0.99)
Owner rank 1 -0.882 (0.00) -0.902 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.429 (0.01) -0.389 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.138 (0.41) -0.072 (0.56)
Owner rank 4 0.089 (0.59) -0.034 (0.78)
Foreign owner 0.814 (0.00) 0.787 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.221 (0.41) 0.114 (0.57)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.124 (0.53) 0.053 (0.73)
Financial owner 0.565 (0.01) 0.535 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.027 (0.45) -0.030 (0.29)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.897 (0.00) 1.355 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.011 (0.88) 0.052 (0.32)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.023 (0.79) 0.020 (0.63)
n 1495 2710
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.047
Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.269 (0.70) 0.949 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -1.918 (0.00) -1.688 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.425 (0.00) -1.341 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.031 (0.00) -0.873 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.450 (0.01) -0.499 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.928 (0.00) 0.945 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.086 (0.78) -0.003 (0.99)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.195 (0.41) 0.108 (0.55)
Financial owner 0.492 (0.04) 0.387 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.024 (0.55) -0.088 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.562 (0.00) 1.128 (0.01)
Earnings surprise -0.007 (0.93) 0.045 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.040 (0.68) -0.021 (0.62)
n 1495 2710
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.086
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.66 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets. Q
Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.722 (0.01) -1.094 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -0.120 (0.48) -0.200 (0.12)
Owner rank 2 0.073 (0.67) -0.049 (0.70)
Owner rank 3 0.027 (0.87) 0.055 (0.66)
Owner rank 4 0.158 (0.34) 0.081 (0.51)
Foreign owner 1.065 (0.00) 1.053 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.408 (0.12) 0.340 (0.08)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.109 (0.57) 0.121 (0.42)
Financial owner 0.874 (0.00) 0.725 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.049 (0.16) 0.030 (0.28)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.999 (0.00) 1.863 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.091 (0.18) -0.030 (0.58)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.013 (0.87) 0.045 (0.30)
n 1545 2765
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.039
Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.329 (0.61) 1.105 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.907 (0.00) -1.887 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.013 (0.00) -1.094 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.622 (0.00) -0.583 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.134 (0.47) -0.248 (0.07)
Foreign owner 0.461 (0.03) 0.361 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner -0.043 (0.87) -0.244 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.296 (0.13) -0.384 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.296 (0.15) 0.247 (0.13)
ln(Firm Size) 0.016 (0.67) -0.008 (0.80)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.662 (0.00) 0.161 (0.70)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.094 (0.20) -0.001 (0.99)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.116 (0.18) 0.087 (0.06)
n 1545 2765
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.104
Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.164 (0.79) 0.503 (0.27)
Owner rank 1 -0.764 (0.00) -0.778 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.301 (0.07) -0.345 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.028 (0.86) 0.013 (0.92)
Owner rank 4 0.183 (0.26) 0.067 (0.58)
Foreign owner 0.627 (0.00) 0.593 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.205 (0.44) 0.080 (0.68)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.063 (0.74) -0.110 (0.48)
Financial owner 0.574 (0.00) 0.535 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.026 (0.45) -0.055 (0.04)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.516 (0.07) 0.150 (0.70)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.047 (0.50) 0.027 (0.62)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.043 (0.59) 0.046 (0.28)
n 1545 2765
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.043
Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.220 (0.74) 0.973 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -1.885 (0.00) -1.639 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.387 (0.00) -1.362 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.865 (0.00) -0.773 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.375 (0.02) -0.423 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.747 (0.00) 0.779 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.139 (0.65) -0.022 (0.92)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.147 (0.52) 0.101 (0.57)
Financial owner 0.466 (0.04) 0.438 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.054 (0.16) -0.089 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.267 (0.01) 0.377 (0.35)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.036 (0.64) -0.011 (0.85)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.031 (0.72) 0.014 (0.76)
n 1545 2765
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.079
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.67 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation
over long term assets and Duration. Q
Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.422 (0.02) -0.853 (0.07)
Owner rank 1 -0.062 (0.73) -0.217 (0.10)
Owner rank 2 0.100 (0.56) 0.039 (0.76)
Owner rank 3 0.080 (0.64) 0.104 (0.41)
Owner rank 4 0.205 (0.23) 0.115 (0.36)
Foreign owner 1.041 (0.00) 1.020 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.356 (0.18) 0.320 (0.10)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.075 (0.70) 0.099 (0.52)
Financial owner 0.772 (0.00) 0.599 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.061 (0.09) 0.034 (0.23)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.891 (0.05) 1.131 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.071 (0.33) 0.051 (0.32)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.090 (0.31) 0.087 (0.04)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.128 (0.00) -0.140 (0.00)
n 1495 2710
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.055
Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.092 (0.89) 0.768 (0.13)
Owner rank 1 -1.600 (0.00) -1.682 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.957 (0.00) -1.020 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.618 (0.00) -0.584 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.272 (0.14) -0.410 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.552 (0.01) 0.393 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -0.029 (0.92) -0.212 (0.30)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.130 (0.51) -0.232 (0.15)
Financial owner 0.173 (0.40) 0.117 (0.48)
ln(Firm Size) 0.067 (0.08) 0.037 (0.22)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.161 (0.00) 1.580 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.025 (0.74) 0.038 (0.48)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.065 (0.49) 0.043 (0.34)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.241 (0.00) -0.264 (0.00)
n 1495 2710
Pseudo R2 0.138 0.127
Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.829 (0.19) 0.239 (0.62)
Owner rank 1 -0.711 (0.00) -0.758 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.372 (0.03) -0.335 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.070 (0.68) -0.023 (0.86)
Owner rank 4 0.106 (0.53) -0.026 (0.83)
Foreign owner 0.735 (0.00) 0.678 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.403 (0.14) 0.198 (0.33)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.255 (0.21) 0.122 (0.45)
Financial owner 0.556 (0.01) 0.471 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.042 (0.26) -0.014 (0.63)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.194 (0.01) 1.176 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.020 (0.79) 0.045 (0.39)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.011 (0.90) 0.008 (0.85)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.193 (0.00) -0.207 (0.00)
n 1495 2710
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.066
Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.045 (0.95) 1.178 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.620 (0.00) -1.461 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.241 (0.00) -1.192 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.873 (0.00) -0.744 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.357 (0.04) -0.417 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.802 (0.00) 0.779 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.182 (0.57) 0.005 (0.98)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.278 (0.24) 0.118 (0.52)
Financial owner 0.440 (0.06) 0.277 (0.12)
ln(Firm Size) -0.013 (0.76) -0.070 (0.03)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.860 (0.01) 0.947 (0.02)
Earnings surprise 0.002 (0.98) 0.037 (0.52)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.012 (0.90) -0.030 (0.48)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.195 (0.00) -0.196 (0.00)
n 1495 2710
Pseudo R2 0.126 0.103
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.68 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Q
Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.506 (0.01) -0.894 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -0.082 (0.63) -0.156 (0.23)
Owner rank 2 0.095 (0.58) -0.029 (0.81)
Owner rank 3 0.052 (0.76) 0.071 (0.57)
Owner rank 4 0.181 (0.28) 0.101 (0.42)
Foreign owner 1.013 (0.00) 0.992 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.515 (0.05) 0.415 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.158 (0.41) 0.143 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.863 (0.00) 0.687 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.051 (0.14) 0.035 (0.21)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.574 (0.00) 1.687 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.086 (0.21) -0.034 (0.53)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.024 (0.77) 0.040 (0.37)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.098 (0.00) -0.114 (0.00)
n 1545 2765
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.046
Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.716 (0.27) 1.409 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.464 (0.00) -1.523 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.829 (0.00) -0.942 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.513 (0.01) -0.494 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.084 (0.65) -0.210 (0.13)
Foreign owner 0.385 (0.07) 0.277 (0.10)
Family (individual) owner 0.116 (0.68) -0.180 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.203 (0.31) -0.325 (0.04)
Financial owner 0.273 (0.19) 0.197 (0.23)
ln(Firm Size) 0.020 (0.59) 0.002 (0.95)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.801 (0.06) -0.110 (0.79)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.080 (0.28) -0.003 (0.95)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.130 (0.14) 0.077 (0.10)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.279 (0.00) -0.281 (0.00)
n 1545 2765
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.123
Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.096 (0.88) 0.733 (0.11)
Owner rank 1 -0.588 (0.00) -0.636 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.243 (0.15) -0.299 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.036 (0.83) 0.052 (0.68)
Owner rank 4 0.211 (0.20) 0.082 (0.51)
Foreign owner 0.519 (0.01) 0.482 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.410 (0.14) 0.171 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.048 (0.81) -0.047 (0.76)
Financial owner 0.549 (0.01) 0.469 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.009 (0.80) -0.037 (0.18)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.749 (0.38) -0.050 (0.90)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.024 (0.73) 0.031 (0.57)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.058 (0.47) 0.036 (0.40)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.214 (0.00) -0.212 (0.00)
n 1545 2765
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.062
Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.516 (0.45) 1.161 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.638 (0.00) -1.449 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.230 (0.00) -1.236 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.726 (0.00) -0.664 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.288 (0.08) -0.346 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.618 (0.01) 0.632 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.226 (0.47) -0.015 (0.95)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.176 (0.45) 0.099 (0.58)
Financial owner 0.396 (0.08) 0.341 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) -0.043 (0.26) -0.073 (0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.451 (0.11) 0.154 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.021 (0.78) -0.015 (0.79)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.009 (0.92) 0.011 (0.81)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.160 (0.00) -0.163 (0.00)
n 1545 2765
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.091
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.69 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Invest-
ments over depreciation. Q
Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.998 (0.10) -0.554 (0.24)
Owner rank 1 -0.111 (0.53) -0.290 (0.03)
Owner rank 2 0.058 (0.74) -0.010 (0.94)
Owner rank 3 0.061 (0.72) 0.073 (0.57)
Owner rank 4 0.229 (0.18) 0.136 (0.29)
Foreign owner 1.135 (0.00) 1.124 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.250 (0.34) 0.260 (0.18)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.047 (0.81) 0.022 (0.89)
Financial owner 0.755 (0.00) 0.609 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.017 (0.63) -0.004 (0.90)
Investment over depreciation 0.023 (0.12) 0.006 (0.53)
Earnings surprise 0.055 (0.45) 0.049 (0.36)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.083 (0.35) 0.129 (0.00)
n 1455 2570
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.044
Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.585 (0.36) 0.800 (0.11)
Owner rank 1 -1.963 (0.00) -2.023 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.084 (0.00) -1.161 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.692 (0.00) -0.667 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.282 (0.13) -0.397 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.646 (0.00) 0.558 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.172 (0.53) -0.249 (0.22)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.327 (0.10) -0.317 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.172 (0.40) 0.154 (0.36)
ln(Firm Size) 0.018 (0.62) 0.013 (0.66)
Investment over depreciation -0.011 (0.47) -0.002 (0.80)
Earnings surprise -0.013 (0.86) 0.028 (0.61)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.125 (0.20) 0.107 (0.01)
n 1455 2570
Pseudo R2 0.111 0.109
Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.272 (0.65) 0.313 (0.51)
Owner rank 1 -0.848 (0.00) -0.892 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.379 (0.03) -0.375 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.102 (0.55) -0.060 (0.64)
Owner rank 4 0.137 (0.41) -0.008 (0.95)
Foreign owner 0.829 (0.00) 0.792 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.218 (0.42) 0.107 (0.59)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.035 (0.86) -0.005 (0.97)
Financial owner 0.549 (0.01) 0.489 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.009 (0.80) -0.045 (0.12)
Investment over depreciation -0.003 (0.82) -0.002 (0.83)
Earnings surprise 0.004 (0.96) 0.042 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.015 (0.86) 0.061 (0.13)
n 1455 2570
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.045
Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.600 (0.37) 1.182 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.853 (0.00) -1.668 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.396 (0.00) -1.361 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.976 (0.00) -0.854 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.412 (0.01) -0.483 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.967 (0.00) 0.970 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.062 (0.84) 0.014 (0.95)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.104 (0.66) 0.080 (0.66)
Financial owner 0.471 (0.04) 0.368 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) -0.067 (0.09) -0.101 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.004 (0.81) 0.003 (0.79)
Earnings surprise -0.010 (0.90) 0.052 (0.38)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.019 (0.84) 0.013 (0.76)
n 1455 2570
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.084
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.70 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. Q
Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.821 (0.16) -0.604 (0.19)
Owner rank 1 -0.086 (0.62) -0.225 (0.09)
Owner rank 2 0.103 (0.54) -0.078 (0.54)
Owner rank 3 0.038 (0.82) 0.047 (0.71)
Owner rank 4 0.183 (0.28) 0.100 (0.43)
Foreign owner 1.070 (0.00) 1.042 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.351 (0.18) 0.295 (0.13)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.008 (0.97) 0.046 (0.76)
Financial owner 0.873 (0.00) 0.695 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.006 (0.87) 0.000 (0.99)
Investment over depreciation 0.045 (0.00) 0.027 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.089 (0.20) -0.051 (0.36)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.049 (0.55) 0.109 (0.01)
n 1520 2645
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.039
Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.107 (0.07) 1.037 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.902 (0.00) -1.921 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.004 (0.00) -1.120 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.618 (0.00) -0.604 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.112 (0.55) -0.226 (0.12)
Foreign owner 0.516 (0.01) 0.434 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.079 (0.77) -0.227 (0.27)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.372 (0.06) -0.394 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.293 (0.16) 0.235 (0.16)
ln(Firm Size) -0.025 (0.50) -0.007 (0.81)
Investment over depreciation 0.019 (0.13) 0.022 (0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.078 (0.29) -0.006 (0.92)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.152 (0.09) 0.096 (0.03)
n 1520 2645
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.111
Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.243 (0.68) 0.549 (0.23)
Owner rank 1 -0.753 (0.00) -0.781 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.259 (0.12) -0.337 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.003 (0.99) 0.020 (0.88)
Owner rank 4 0.220 (0.18) 0.092 (0.46)
Foreign owner 0.646 (0.00) 0.587 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.168 (0.53) 0.051 (0.80)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.124 (0.52) -0.169 (0.28)
Financial owner 0.569 (0.00) 0.479 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.049 (0.15) -0.060 (0.03)
Investment over depreciation 0.024 (0.04) 0.020 (0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.037 (0.60) 0.016 (0.78)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.054 (0.50) 0.054 (0.19)
n 1520 2645
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.045
Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.682 (0.29) 0.982 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -1.848 (0.00) -1.631 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.359 (0.00) -1.388 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.853 (0.00) -0.773 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.350 (0.04) -0.407 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.769 (0.00) 0.783 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.084 (0.79) -0.033 (0.89)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.073 (0.75) 0.057 (0.75)
Financial owner 0.472 (0.04) 0.407 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.078 (0.04) -0.094 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.042 (0.00) 0.027 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.034 (0.67) -0.034 (0.57)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.021 (0.81) 0.030 (0.49)
n 1520 2645
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.083
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.71 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments
over depreciation and Duration. Q
Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.862 (0.16) -0.393 (0.41)
Owner rank 1 -0.041 (0.82) -0.232 (0.09)
Owner rank 2 0.094 (0.59) 0.015 (0.91)
Owner rank 3 0.110 (0.53) 0.099 (0.45)
Owner rank 4 0.248 (0.15) 0.147 (0.26)
Foreign owner 1.069 (0.00) 1.043 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.396 (0.14) 0.345 (0.08)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.038 (0.85) 0.052 (0.74)
Financial owner 0.756 (0.00) 0.567 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.026 (0.48) 0.007 (0.82)
Investment over depreciation 0.026 (0.08) 0.005 (0.57)
Earnings surprise 0.060 (0.42) 0.045 (0.40)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.089 (0.32) 0.116 (0.01)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.132 (0.00) -0.134 (0.00)
n 1455 2570
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.053
Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.807 (0.21) 1.024 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -1.544 (0.00) -1.674 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.903 (0.00) -1.007 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.581 (0.00) -0.574 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.238 (0.21) -0.369 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.594 (0.01) 0.466 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.042 (0.88) -0.197 (0.35)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.198 (0.32) -0.245 (0.14)
Financial owner 0.159 (0.44) 0.101 (0.55)
ln(Firm Size) 0.026 (0.48) 0.026 (0.39)
Investment over depreciation -0.002 (0.92) -0.003 (0.79)
Earnings surprise 0.004 (0.96) 0.030 (0.60)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.104 (0.28) 0.085 (0.05)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.259 (0.00) -0.268 (0.00)
n 1455 2570
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.127
Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.221 (0.72) 0.452 (0.35)
Owner rank 1 -0.674 (0.00) -0.752 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.321 (0.07) -0.324 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.030 (0.86) -0.012 (0.93)
Owner rank 4 0.160 (0.35) 0.001 (1.00)
Foreign owner 0.743 (0.00) 0.680 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.419 (0.13) 0.191 (0.35)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.189 (0.35) 0.068 (0.68)
Financial owner 0.542 (0.01) 0.426 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.014 (0.69) -0.023 (0.44)
Investment over depreciation 0.000 (0.99) -0.003 (0.73)
Earnings surprise 0.011 (0.88) 0.037 (0.50)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.016 (0.86) 0.043 (0.28)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.201 (0.00) -0.203 (0.00)
n 1455 2570
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.063
Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.680 (0.32) 1.276 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.569 (0.00) -1.449 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.214 (0.00) -1.220 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.815 (0.00) -0.726 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.323 (0.06) -0.407 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.826 (0.00) 0.803 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.166 (0.61) 0.026 (0.91)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.201 (0.40) 0.098 (0.60)
Financial owner 0.420 (0.07) 0.267 (0.15)
ln(Firm Size) -0.044 (0.28) -0.075 (0.02)
Investment over depreciation 0.005 (0.77) 0.000 (0.96)
Earnings surprise 0.005 (0.96) 0.049 (0.40)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.004 (0.97) -0.002 (0.97)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.194 (0.00) -0.189 (0.00)
n 1455 2570
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.100
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.72 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. Q
Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.732 (0.21) -0.479 (0.30)
Owner rank 1 -0.042 (0.81) -0.181 (0.17)
Owner rank 2 0.130 (0.45) -0.059 (0.65)
Owner rank 3 0.069 (0.68) 0.065 (0.61)
Owner rank 4 0.210 (0.21) 0.120 (0.35)
Foreign owner 1.008 (0.00) 0.976 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.479 (0.07) 0.376 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.077 (0.69) 0.075 (0.63)
Financial owner 0.869 (0.00) 0.661 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.015 (0.67) 0.010 (0.72)
Investment over depreciation 0.046 (0.00) 0.025 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.078 (0.27) -0.051 (0.35)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.053 (0.51) 0.098 (0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.109 (0.00) -0.112 (0.00)
n 1520 2645
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.046
Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.282 (0.04) 1.261 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.459 (0.00) -1.567 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.815 (0.00) -0.974 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.502 (0.01) -0.516 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.058 (0.76) -0.190 (0.19)
Foreign owner 0.437 (0.04) 0.343 (0.05)
Family (individual) owner 0.096 (0.74) -0.157 (0.45)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.251 (0.21) -0.329 (0.04)
Financial owner 0.273 (0.19) 0.187 (0.27)
ln(Firm Size) -0.011 (0.77) 0.007 (0.81)
Investment over depreciation 0.022 (0.10) 0.019 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.059 (0.43) -0.004 (0.95)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.153 (0.09) 0.075 (0.10)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.290 (0.00) -0.275 (0.00)
n 1520 2645
Pseudo R2 0.139 0.129
Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.292 (0.62) 0.695 (0.14)
Owner rank 1 -0.580 (0.00) -0.647 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.202 (0.24) -0.296 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.062 (0.71) 0.056 (0.66)
Owner rank 4 0.253 (0.13) 0.107 (0.40)
Foreign owner 0.528 (0.01) 0.472 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.381 (0.17) 0.140 (0.49)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.006 (0.97) -0.106 (0.51)
Financial owner 0.545 (0.01) 0.415 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.022 (0.53) -0.038 (0.17)
Investment over depreciation 0.024 (0.05) 0.017 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.012 (0.86) 0.023 (0.68)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.061 (0.45) 0.037 (0.37)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.214 (0.00) -0.202 (0.00)
n 1520 2645
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.064
Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.724 (0.27) 1.058 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -1.616 (0.00) -1.455 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.209 (0.00) -1.273 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.719 (0.00) -0.673 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.269 (0.11) -0.338 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.626 (0.01) 0.640 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.175 (0.58) -0.020 (0.93)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.119 (0.60) 0.058 (0.75)
Financial owner 0.404 (0.08) 0.319 (0.08)
ln(Firm Size) -0.056 (0.15) -0.072 (0.02)
Investment over depreciation 0.042 (0.00) 0.025 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.016 (0.84) -0.034 (0.57)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.008 (0.93) 0.020 (0.66)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.155 (0.00) -0.149 (0.00)
n 1520 2645
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.093
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.73 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt
Maturity. Q
Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.863 (0.13) -0.389 (0.37)
Owner rank 1 -0.106 (0.54) -0.296 (0.02)
Owner rank 2 0.070 (0.68) 0.027 (0.83)
Owner rank 3 0.037 (0.83) 0.070 (0.57)
Owner rank 4 0.197 (0.24) 0.079 (0.53)
Foreign owner 1.144 (0.00) 1.103 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.244 (0.35) 0.269 (0.16)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.049 (0.80) 0.028 (0.85)
Financial owner 0.756 (0.00) 0.611 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.014 (0.68) -0.004 (0.88)
Long term debt over total debt 0.035 (0.88) -0.119 (0.46)
Earnings surprise 0.089 (0.22) 0.065 (0.21)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.051 (0.57) 0.096 (0.03)
n 1505 2740
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.042
Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.856 (0.15) 1.188 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.918 (0.00) -2.026 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.079 (0.00) -1.165 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.692 (0.00) -0.659 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.316 (0.09) -0.453 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.643 (0.00) 0.524 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.120 (0.66) -0.208 (0.30)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.355 (0.07) -0.325 (0.04)
Financial owner 0.161 (0.43) 0.164 (0.32)
ln(Firm Size) 0.004 (0.91) -0.004 (0.90)
Long term debt over total debt 0.025 (0.92) -0.090 (0.60)
Earnings surprise 0.036 (0.64) 0.040 (0.46)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.062 (0.52) 0.064 (0.16)
n 1505 2740
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.106
Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.111 (0.85) 0.527 (0.23)
Owner rank 1 -0.822 (0.00) -0.897 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.408 (0.02) -0.376 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.147 (0.38) -0.073 (0.55)
Owner rank 4 0.084 (0.61) -0.054 (0.66)
Foreign owner 0.889 (0.00) 0.802 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.209 (0.43) 0.141 (0.47)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.036 (0.85) -0.002 (0.99)
Financial owner 0.579 (0.00) 0.531 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.033 (0.33) -0.062 (0.02)
Long term debt over total debt 0.319 (0.16) 0.139 (0.39)
Earnings surprise 0.050 (0.50) 0.063 (0.22)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.020 (0.82) 0.051 (0.23)
n 1505 2740
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.045
Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.795 (0.21) 1.473 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.820 (0.00) -1.686 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.390 (0.00) -1.308 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.031 (0.00) -0.865 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.448 (0.01) -0.522 (0.00)
Foreign owner 1.011 (0.00) 0.970 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.100 (0.75) 0.055 (0.80)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.116 (0.62) 0.069 (0.70)
Financial owner 0.500 (0.03) 0.389 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.088 (0.02) -0.119 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.225 (0.37) 0.092 (0.60)
Earnings surprise 0.032 (0.69) 0.059 (0.29)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.028 (0.78) -0.006 (0.89)
n 1505 2740
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.083
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.74 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Debt Maturity. Q
Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.482 (0.39) -0.288 (0.51)
Owner rank 1 -0.096 (0.57) -0.231 (0.07)
Owner rank 2 0.081 (0.63) -0.049 (0.69)
Owner rank 3 0.026 (0.87) 0.038 (0.76)
Owner rank 4 0.161 (0.33) 0.065 (0.60)
Foreign owner 1.080 (0.00) 1.027 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.408 (0.11) 0.308 (0.11)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.027 (0.89) 0.084 (0.58)
Financial owner 0.860 (0.00) 0.690 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.003 (0.94) -0.004 (0.89)
Long term debt over total debt -0.211 (0.34) -0.177 (0.27)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.082 (0.23) -0.038 (0.47)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.008 (0.92) 0.064 (0.16)
n 1555 2795
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.033
Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.077 (0.07) 1.077 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.862 (0.00) -1.886 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.988 (0.00) -1.085 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.608 (0.00) -0.569 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.145 (0.43) -0.256 (0.07)
Foreign owner 0.487 (0.02) 0.412 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.050 (0.85) -0.201 (0.32)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.364 (0.06) -0.369 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.286 (0.16) 0.262 (0.11)
ln(Firm Size) -0.014 (0.70) -0.001 (0.98)
Long term debt over total debt -0.027 (0.91) -0.047 (0.79)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.078 (0.28) 0.001 (0.99)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.107 (0.23) 0.062 (0.20)
n 1555 2795
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.104
Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.195 (0.73) 0.520 (0.23)
Owner rank 1 -0.734 (0.00) -0.777 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.297 (0.07) -0.343 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.046 (0.78) 0.003 (0.98)
Owner rank 4 0.173 (0.29) 0.054 (0.66)
Foreign owner 0.681 (0.00) 0.598 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.167 (0.53) 0.080 (0.68)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.097 (0.62) -0.129 (0.40)
Financial owner 0.600 (0.00) 0.535 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.051 (0.13) -0.059 (0.03)
Long term debt over total debt 0.220 (0.33) 0.141 (0.39)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.037 (0.59) 0.022 (0.68)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.073 (0.37) 0.050 (0.27)
n 1555 2795
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.042
Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.849 (0.17) 1.095 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.820 (0.00) -1.649 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.370 (0.00) -1.345 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.874 (0.00) -0.778 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.381 (0.02) -0.433 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.796 (0.00) 0.777 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.112 (0.71) -0.012 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.103 (0.65) 0.092 (0.60)
Financial owner 0.483 (0.03) 0.435 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.081 (0.03) -0.091 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.017 (0.94) -0.017 (0.92)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.022 (0.77) -0.022 (0.70)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.025 (0.78) 0.002 (0.96)
n 1555 2795
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.078
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.75 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt Ma-
turity and Duration. Q
Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.677 (0.24) -0.156 (0.72)
Owner rank 1 -0.050 (0.78) -0.240 (0.07)
Owner rank 2 0.099 (0.57) 0.053 (0.67)
Owner rank 3 0.078 (0.65) 0.095 (0.45)
Owner rank 4 0.214 (0.21) 0.094 (0.45)
Foreign owner 1.085 (0.00) 1.019 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.376 (0.15) 0.351 (0.07)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.037 (0.85) 0.060 (0.70)
Financial owner 0.749 (0.00) 0.556 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.020 (0.55) 0.005 (0.84)
Long term debt over total debt 0.027 (0.91) -0.158 (0.33)
Earnings surprise 0.089 (0.23) 0.055 (0.29)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.058 (0.52) 0.077 (0.07)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.132 (0.00) -0.147 (0.00)
n 1505 2740
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.053
Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.119 (0.06) 1.464 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.506 (0.00) -1.680 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.903 (0.00) -1.012 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.585 (0.00) -0.568 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.271 (0.14) -0.420 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.583 (0.01) 0.427 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.020 (0.94) -0.159 (0.44)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.229 (0.24) -0.257 (0.11)
Financial owner 0.140 (0.49) 0.099 (0.55)
ln(Firm Size) 0.012 (0.73) 0.009 (0.76)
Long term debt over total debt -0.014 (0.95) -0.147 (0.40)
Earnings surprise 0.056 (0.47) 0.039 (0.48)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.041 (0.67) 0.038 (0.40)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.257 (0.00) -0.272 (0.00)
n 1505 2740
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.124
Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.022 (0.97) 0.736 (0.10)
Owner rank 1 -0.663 (0.00) -0.759 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.356 (0.04) -0.323 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.079 (0.64) -0.024 (0.85)
Owner rank 4 0.100 (0.55) -0.044 (0.72)
Foreign owner 0.803 (0.00) 0.686 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.404 (0.14) 0.222 (0.27)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.187 (0.35) 0.073 (0.65)
Financial owner 0.561 (0.01) 0.456 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.010 (0.77) -0.041 (0.14)
Long term debt over total debt 0.243 (0.29) 0.070 (0.67)
Earnings surprise 0.054 (0.46) 0.054 (0.30)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.009 (0.92) 0.026 (0.54)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.198 (0.00) -0.212 (0.00)
n 1505 2740
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.064
Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.958 (0.13) 1.658 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.536 (0.00) -1.462 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.206 (0.00) -1.157 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.866 (0.00) -0.732 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.353 (0.04) -0.437 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.875 (0.00) 0.791 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.191 (0.55) 0.051 (0.82)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.218 (0.36) 0.082 (0.65)
Financial owner 0.439 (0.06) 0.266 (0.14)
ln(Firm Size) -0.068 (0.07) -0.096 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.215 (0.40) 0.052 (0.77)
Earnings surprise 0.038 (0.64) 0.048 (0.40)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.011 (0.91) -0.025 (0.58)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.201 (0.00) -0.203 (0.00)
n 1505 2740
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.102
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.76 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Debt
Maturity and Duration. Q
Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.352 (0.54) -0.126 (0.77)
Owner rank 1 -0.062 (0.72) -0.186 (0.14)
Owner rank 2 0.101 (0.55) -0.029 (0.82)
Owner rank 3 0.052 (0.76) 0.056 (0.65)
Owner rank 4 0.186 (0.26) 0.088 (0.48)
Foreign owner 1.024 (0.00) 0.962 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.531 (0.04) 0.389 (0.04)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.098 (0.61) 0.114 (0.46)
Financial owner 0.850 (0.00) 0.648 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.010 (0.76) 0.006 (0.83)
Long term debt over total debt -0.213 (0.34) -0.193 (0.24)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.076 (0.27) -0.043 (0.42)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.015 (0.86) 0.051 (0.26)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.112 (0.00) -0.124 (0.00)
n 1555 2795
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.042
Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.254 (0.04) 1.285 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.420 (0.00) -1.523 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.801 (0.00) -0.933 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.497 (0.01) -0.481 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.090 (0.63) -0.214 (0.12)
Foreign owner 0.399 (0.06) 0.321 (0.06)
Family (individual) owner 0.123 (0.66) -0.135 (0.51)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.246 (0.21) -0.307 (0.06)
Financial owner 0.258 (0.21) 0.206 (0.21)
ln(Firm Size) 0.003 (0.94) 0.016 (0.58)
Long term debt over total debt -0.080 (0.74) -0.077 (0.66)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.064 (0.38) -0.001 (0.99)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.106 (0.24) 0.039 (0.41)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.290 (0.00) -0.284 (0.00)
n 1555 2795
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.124
Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.295 (0.61) 0.681 (0.12)
Owner rank 1 -0.573 (0.00) -0.638 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.246 (0.14) -0.298 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.016 (0.92) 0.041 (0.74)
Owner rank 4 0.201 (0.23) 0.070 (0.57)
Foreign owner 0.568 (0.01) 0.484 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.377 (0.17) 0.172 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.038 (0.85) -0.062 (0.69)
Financial owner 0.566 (0.01) 0.464 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.023 (0.51) -0.034 (0.21)
Long term debt over total debt 0.136 (0.55) 0.097 (0.56)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.014 (0.84) 0.027 (0.62)
lag(-1)(Q ) 0.067 (0.42) 0.027 (0.54)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.214 (0.00) -0.215 (0.00)
n 1555 2795
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.063
Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.960 (0.13) 1.211 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.582 (0.00) -1.458 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.214 (0.00) -1.216 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.733 (0.00) -0.667 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.291 (0.08) -0.354 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.659 (0.01) 0.624 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.198 (0.53) -0.007 (0.97)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.156 (0.50) 0.093 (0.60)
Financial owner 0.404 (0.08) 0.331 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) -0.061 (0.10) -0.069 (0.02)
Long term debt over total debt -0.004 (0.99) -0.034 (0.85)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.008 (0.92) -0.027 (0.65)
lag(-1)(Q ) -0.016 (0.85) -0.011 (0.82)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.166 (0.00) -0.167 (0.00)
n 1555 2795
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.091
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.2.2 Performance measure: Marginal Q
Table 7.77 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depre-
ciation over long term assets. Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.308 (0.04) -1.203 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -0.095 (0.61) -0.235 (0.11)
Owner rank 2 0.120 (0.51) 0.082 (0.56)
Owner rank 3 0.068 (0.70) 0.137 (0.33)
Owner rank 4 0.271 (0.13) 0.211 (0.13)
Foreign owner 1.161 (0.00) 1.195 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.289 (0.29) 0.350 (0.11)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.012 (0.95) 0.047 (0.78)
Financial owner 0.830 (0.00) 0.682 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.044 (0.24) 0.043 (0.17)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.950 (0.06) 1.375 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.147 (0.06) 0.075 (0.19)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.052 (0.04) -0.065 (0.00)
n 1360 2160
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.051
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.062 (0.93) 0.670 (0.23)
Owner rank 1 -2.020 (0.00) -2.034 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.112 (0.00) -1.131 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.697 (0.00) -0.634 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.330 (0.09) -0.440 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.553 (0.01) 0.491 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.109 (0.70) -0.241 (0.29)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.309 (0.14) -0.404 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.153 (0.47) 0.080 (0.65)
ln(Firm Size) 0.047 (0.24) 0.018 (0.59)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.008 (0.00) 2.414 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.090 (0.26) 0.074 (0.22)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.007 (0.79) 0.015 (0.49)
n 1360 2160
Pseudo R2 0.121 0.115
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.708 (0.28) 0.086 (0.87)
Owner rank 1 -0.879 (0.00) -0.834 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.403 (0.03) -0.287 (0.04)
Owner rank 3 -0.139 (0.43) 0.007 (0.96)
Owner rank 4 0.094 (0.59) 0.069 (0.62)
Foreign owner 0.780 (0.00) 0.818 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.287 (0.31) 0.244 (0.27)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.061 (0.77) -0.017 (0.92)
Financial owner 0.571 (0.01) 0.507 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.004 (0.91) -0.039 (0.21)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.066 (0.00) 1.720 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.088 (0.26) 0.071 (0.22)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.032 (0.21) -0.015 (0.46)
n 1360 2160
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.051
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.126 (0.86) 0.859 (0.13)
Owner rank 1 -1.944 (0.00) -1.694 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.435 (0.00) -1.260 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.996 (0.00) -0.803 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.438 (0.01) -0.436 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.874 (0.00) 0.904 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.223 (0.49) 0.047 (0.85)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.173 (0.48) 0.035 (0.86)
Financial owner 0.482 (0.04) 0.325 (0.09)
ln(Firm Size) -0.034 (0.41) -0.087 (0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.627 (0.00) 1.465 (0.01)
Earnings surprise -0.008 (0.93) 0.022 (0.73)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.022 (0.44) -0.012 (0.59)
n 1360 2160
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.086
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.78 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets. Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.421 (0.03) -1.150 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -0.093 (0.61) -0.186 (0.19)
Owner rank 2 0.065 (0.71) -0.034 (0.81)
Owner rank 3 0.037 (0.83) 0.085 (0.54)
Owner rank 4 0.257 (0.14) 0.207 (0.13)
Foreign owner 1.041 (0.00) 1.028 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.335 (0.22) 0.425 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.029 (0.89) 0.035 (0.83)
Financial owner 0.861 (0.00) 0.708 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.034 (0.36) 0.033 (0.27)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.594 (0.00) 2.615 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.122 (0.08) -0.037 (0.52)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.053 (0.06) -0.036 (0.10)
n 1415 2285
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.047
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.827 (0.22) 1.527 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.875 (0.00) -1.855 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.021 (0.00) -1.081 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.636 (0.00) -0.578 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.158 (0.41) -0.238 (0.12)
Foreign owner 0.456 (0.04) 0.381 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner -0.165 (0.56) -0.220 (0.33)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.460 (0.03) -0.543 (0.00)
Financial owner 0.202 (0.35) 0.108 (0.54)
ln(Firm Size) -0.000 (0.99) -0.029 (0.36)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.529 (0.01) 0.355 (0.41)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.117 (0.11) -0.053 (0.39)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.004 (0.88) 0.036 (0.10)
n 1415 2285
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.105
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.351 (0.58) 0.876 (0.08)
Owner rank 1 -0.724 (0.00) -0.698 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.315 (0.07) -0.293 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 -0.047 (0.78) 0.052 (0.70)
Owner rank 4 0.192 (0.26) 0.165 (0.22)
Foreign owner 0.617 (0.00) 0.604 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.105 (0.71) 0.141 (0.52)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.247 (0.22) -0.258 (0.12)
Financial owner 0.519 (0.01) 0.430 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.049 (0.18) -0.077 (0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.513 (0.09) 0.294 (0.46)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.078 (0.27) -0.010 (0.87)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.037 (0.18) 0.005 (0.83)
n 1415 2285
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.045
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.539 (0.44) 1.273 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.885 (0.00) -1.603 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.388 (0.00) -1.306 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.847 (0.00) -0.721 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.352 (0.04) -0.327 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.694 (0.00) 0.731 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.040 (0.90) -0.025 (0.92)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.003 (0.99) -0.059 (0.76)
Financial owner 0.392 (0.09) 0.317 (0.09)
ln(Firm Size) -0.070 (0.08) -0.109 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.404 (0.01) 0.626 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.047 (0.54) -0.039 (0.53)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.033 (0.28) 0.015 (0.52)
n 1415 2285
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.080
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.79 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation
over long term assets and Duration. Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.027 (0.12) -0.918 (0.09)
Owner rank 1 -0.035 (0.85) -0.175 (0.24)
Owner rank 2 0.144 (0.43) 0.104 (0.47)
Owner rank 3 0.105 (0.56) 0.160 (0.26)
Owner rank 4 0.291 (0.10) 0.227 (0.11)
Foreign owner 1.107 (0.00) 1.118 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.424 (0.13) 0.459 (0.04)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.088 (0.67) 0.076 (0.65)
Financial owner 0.830 (0.00) 0.641 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.044 (0.24) 0.044 (0.17)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.795 (0.09) 1.212 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.144 (0.07) 0.068 (0.24)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.050 (0.06) -0.062 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.125 (0.00) -0.129 (0.00)
n 1360 2160
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.061
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.322 (0.65) 1.036 (0.07)
Owner rank 1 -1.633 (0.00) -1.654 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.958 (0.00) -0.972 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.612 (0.00) -0.543 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.298 (0.13) -0.408 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.493 (0.02) 0.402 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner 0.010 (0.97) -0.160 (0.49)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.201 (0.34) -0.327 (0.06)
Financial owner 0.150 (0.48) 0.036 (0.84)
ln(Firm Size) 0.047 (0.25) 0.019 (0.57)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.269 (0.00) 2.059 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.102 (0.20) 0.077 (0.20)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.008 (0.76) 0.018 (0.41)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.233 (0.00) -0.255 (0.00)
n 1360 2160
Pseudo R2 0.138 0.131
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.413 (0.54) 0.393 (0.46)
Owner rank 1 -0.725 (0.00) -0.680 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.359 (0.05) -0.238 (0.09)
Owner rank 3 -0.084 (0.64) 0.051 (0.72)
Owner rank 4 0.109 (0.54) 0.073 (0.60)
Foreign owner 0.699 (0.00) 0.705 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.470 (0.10) 0.375 (0.10)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.186 (0.38) 0.060 (0.73)
Financial owner 0.565 (0.01) 0.448 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.015 (0.70) -0.029 (0.36)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.411 (0.01) 1.434 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.093 (0.23) 0.066 (0.26)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.035 (0.19) -0.015 (0.47)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.181 (0.00) -0.197 (0.00)
n 1360 2160
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.070
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.285 (0.70) 1.167 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -1.646 (0.00) -1.453 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.260 (0.00) -1.113 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.838 (0.00) -0.670 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.340 (0.06) -0.351 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.743 (0.00) 0.736 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.326 (0.33) 0.090 (0.72)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.255 (0.31) 0.052 (0.79)
Financial owner 0.430 (0.08) 0.217 (0.27)
ln(Firm Size) -0.027 (0.53) -0.076 (0.03)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.893 (0.01) 1.187 (0.01)
Earnings surprise -0.001 (0.99) 0.017 (0.79)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.017 (0.57) -0.006 (0.77)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.194 (0.00) -0.181 (0.00)
n 1360 2160
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.103
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
342
Table 7.80 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.135 (0.08) -0.890 (0.09)
Owner rank 1 -0.045 (0.80) -0.136 (0.34)
Owner rank 2 0.084 (0.64) -0.017 (0.90)
Owner rank 3 0.064 (0.72) 0.101 (0.46)
Owner rank 4 0.288 (0.10) 0.232 (0.09)
Foreign owner 0.980 (0.00) 0.961 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.455 (0.10) 0.529 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.028 (0.89) 0.060 (0.71)
Financial owner 0.856 (0.00) 0.673 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.034 (0.35) 0.036 (0.24)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.121 (0.00) 2.359 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.112 (0.11) -0.035 (0.55)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.049 (0.08) -0.034 (0.11)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.114 (0.00) -0.121 (0.00)
n 1415 2285
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.055
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.206 (0.07) 1.890 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.437 (0.00) -1.444 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.845 (0.00) -0.916 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.537 (0.00) -0.486 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.113 (0.56) -0.197 (0.20)
Foreign owner 0.369 (0.09) 0.288 (0.11)
Family (individual) owner -0.017 (0.95) -0.128 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.353 (0.09) -0.472 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.195 (0.37) 0.066 (0.71)
ln(Firm Size) 0.004 (0.92) -0.024 (0.45)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.763 (0.07) 0.021 (0.96)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.096 (0.20) -0.044 (0.47)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.003 (0.92) 0.042 (0.07)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.284 (0.00) -0.291 (0.00)
n 1415 2285
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.126
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.684 (0.29) 1.183 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -0.566 (0.00) -0.548 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.271 (0.13) -0.254 (0.07)
Owner rank 3 0.009 (0.96) 0.088 (0.52)
Owner rank 4 0.222 (0.20) 0.180 (0.19)
Foreign owner 0.494 (0.02) 0.477 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.297 (0.30) 0.268 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.135 (0.52) -0.189 (0.26)
Financial owner 0.491 (0.02) 0.362 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.034 (0.36) -0.064 (0.04)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.792 (0.37) 0.038 (0.92)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.045 (0.53) 0.009 (0.88)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.036 (0.21) 0.006 (0.79)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.215 (0.00) -0.215 (0.00)
n 1415 2285
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.067
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.976 (0.17) 1.549 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.614 (0.00) -1.392 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.223 (0.00) -1.173 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.695 (0.00) -0.598 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.250 (0.15) -0.239 (0.08)
Foreign owner 0.532 (0.03) 0.561 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.103 (0.75) -0.005 (0.98)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.019 (0.94) -0.065 (0.73)
Financial owner 0.306 (0.20) 0.207 (0.28)
ln(Firm Size) -0.062 (0.13) -0.097 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.492 (0.12) 0.353 (0.39)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.022 (0.78) -0.032 (0.61)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.028 (0.37) 0.018 (0.43)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.184 (0.00) -0.171 (0.00)
n 1415 2285
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.095
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.81 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Invest-
ments over depreciation. Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.590 (0.35) -0.489 (0.35)
Owner rank 1 -0.087 (0.65) -0.259 (0.09)
Owner rank 2 0.107 (0.56) 0.064 (0.66)
Owner rank 3 0.093 (0.61) 0.139 (0.34)
Owner rank 4 0.320 (0.08) 0.251 (0.08)
Foreign owner 1.220 (0.00) 1.263 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.311 (0.26) 0.423 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.033 (0.87) 0.019 (0.91)
Financial owner 0.805 (0.00) 0.662 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.004 (0.91) 0.003 (0.92)
Investment over depreciation 0.052 (0.01) 0.008 (0.46)
Earnings surprise 0.142 (0.07) 0.096 (0.11)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.062 (0.02) -0.080 (0.00)
n 1320 2060
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.052
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.129 (0.09) 1.256 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.975 (0.00) -2.006 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.066 (0.00) -1.093 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.668 (0.00) -0.618 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.295 (0.14) -0.403 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.629 (0.00) 0.606 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.141 (0.62) -0.192 (0.41)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.412 (0.05) -0.440 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.131 (0.54) 0.085 (0.64)
ln(Firm Size) -0.005 (0.90) -0.006 (0.85)
Investment over depreciation 0.004 (0.85) 0.000 (1.00)
Earnings surprise 0.087 (0.28) 0.087 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.001 (0.96) 0.004 (0.86)
n 1320 2060
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.111
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.224 (0.72) 0.488 (0.35)
Owner rank 1 -0.841 (0.00) -0.815 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.348 (0.06) -0.252 (0.08)
Owner rank 3 -0.098 (0.58) 0.016 (0.91)
Owner rank 4 0.151 (0.40) 0.090 (0.52)
Foreign owner 0.821 (0.00) 0.877 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.285 (0.31) 0.298 (0.18)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.036 (0.86) -0.059 (0.73)
Financial owner 0.552 (0.01) 0.511 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.038 (0.32) -0.054 (0.09)
Investment over depreciation 0.009 (0.66) -0.002 (0.82)
Earnings surprise 0.094 (0.23) 0.087 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.040 (0.14) -0.028 (0.18)
n 1320 2060
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.048
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.842 (0.22) 1.299 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.878 (0.00) -1.685 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.404 (0.00) -1.266 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.936 (0.00) -0.783 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.395 (0.03) -0.431 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.931 (0.00) 0.985 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.196 (0.55) 0.112 (0.66)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.078 (0.75) 0.031 (0.88)
Financial owner 0.457 (0.06) 0.331 (0.09)
ln(Firm Size) -0.082 (0.05) -0.107 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.014 (0.53) 0.003 (0.80)
Earnings surprise -0.001 (0.99) 0.059 (0.37)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.029 (0.32) -0.031 (0.18)
n 1320 2060
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.084
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.82 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.322 (0.60) -0.383 (0.44)
Owner rank 1 -0.053 (0.77) -0.218 (0.13)
Owner rank 2 0.099 (0.58) -0.059 (0.67)
Owner rank 3 0.053 (0.76) 0.082 (0.55)
Owner rank 4 0.289 (0.10) 0.225 (0.11)
Foreign owner 1.068 (0.00) 1.056 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.264 (0.34) 0.433 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.146 (0.47) -0.019 (0.91)
Financial owner 0.859 (0.00) 0.706 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.015 (0.67) -0.003 (0.92)
Investment over depreciation 0.046 (0.00) 0.024 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.103 (0.15) -0.037 (0.53)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.060 (0.04) -0.045 (0.04)
n 1390 2200
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.043
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.650 (0.01) 1.575 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.874 (0.00) -1.883 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.013 (0.00) -1.094 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.630 (0.00) -0.600 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.130 (0.51) -0.228 (0.14)
Foreign owner 0.535 (0.01) 0.456 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.209 (0.47) -0.198 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.541 (0.01) -0.567 (0.00)
Financial owner 0.198 (0.36) 0.108 (0.55)
ln(Firm Size) -0.041 (0.29) -0.032 (0.32)
Investment over depreciation 0.022 (0.09) 0.021 (0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.091 (0.23) -0.052 (0.40)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.020 (0.51) 0.022 (0.34)
n 1390 2200
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.111
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.815 (0.18) 0.935 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -0.713 (0.00) -0.703 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.269 (0.13) -0.272 (0.05)
Owner rank 3 -0.019 (0.91) 0.049 (0.72)
Owner rank 4 0.238 (0.17) 0.183 (0.18)
Foreign owner 0.648 (0.00) 0.625 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.057 (0.84) 0.137 (0.53)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.319 (0.12) -0.305 (0.07)
Financial owner 0.510 (0.01) 0.409 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.073 (0.04) -0.081 (0.01)
Investment over depreciation 0.025 (0.04) 0.017 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.061 (0.40) -0.013 (0.83)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.049 (0.09) -0.010 (0.66)
n 1390 2200
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.048
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.077 (0.11) 1.412 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.842 (0.00) -1.614 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.357 (0.00) -1.321 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.833 (0.00) -0.729 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.322 (0.06) -0.321 (0.02)
Foreign owner 0.725 (0.00) 0.768 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.028 (0.93) -0.014 (0.95)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.089 (0.71) -0.087 (0.65)
Financial owner 0.395 (0.09) 0.300 (0.12)
ln(Firm Size) -0.097 (0.01) -0.118 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.041 (0.00) 0.025 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.037 (0.64) -0.055 (0.39)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.040 (0.21) -0.001 (0.97)
n 1390 2200
Pseudo R2 0.099 0.084
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.83 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments
over depreciation and Duration. Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.417 (0.51) -0.292 (0.58)
Owner rank 1 -0.017 (0.93) -0.198 (0.20)
Owner rank 2 0.135 (0.46) 0.086 (0.56)
Owner rank 3 0.137 (0.45) 0.163 (0.26)
Owner rank 4 0.343 (0.06) 0.266 (0.07)
Foreign owner 1.156 (0.00) 1.179 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.461 (0.10) 0.533 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.050 (0.81) 0.052 (0.76)
Financial owner 0.813 (0.00) 0.625 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.002 (0.96) 0.009 (0.77)
Investment over depreciation 0.053 (0.01) 0.006 (0.60)
Earnings surprise 0.142 (0.07) 0.090 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.060 (0.03) -0.078 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.128 (0.00) -0.126 (0.00)
n 1320 2060
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.061
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.329 (0.05) 1.515 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.572 (0.00) -1.624 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.901 (0.00) -0.930 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.573 (0.00) -0.523 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.260 (0.19) -0.373 (0.02)
Foreign owner 0.560 (0.01) 0.501 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.004 (0.99) -0.108 (0.65)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.272 (0.20) -0.349 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.134 (0.53) 0.044 (0.81)
ln(Firm Size) 0.002 (0.95) 0.001 (0.97)
Investment over depreciation 0.009 (0.68) -0.004 (0.74)
Earnings surprise 0.094 (0.25) 0.086 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.002 (0.95) 0.006 (0.79)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.251 (0.00) -0.261 (0.00)
n 1320 2060
Pseudo R2 0.131 0.129
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.331 (0.60) 0.683 (0.20)
Owner rank 1 -0.685 (0.00) -0.668 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.304 (0.10) -0.206 (0.15)
Owner rank 3 -0.038 (0.83) 0.059 (0.68)
Owner rank 4 0.170 (0.34) 0.094 (0.51)
Foreign owner 0.726 (0.00) 0.751 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.488 (0.09) 0.427 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.111 (0.60) 0.025 (0.89)
Financial owner 0.548 (0.01) 0.451 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.018 (0.64) -0.038 (0.24)
Investment over depreciation 0.007 (0.72) -0.006 (0.54)
Earnings surprise 0.096 (0.23) 0.078 (0.20)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.041 (0.13) -0.027 (0.20)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.189 (0.00) -0.194 (0.00)
n 1320 2060
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.067
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.993 (0.16) 1.450 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.596 (0.00) -1.459 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.234 (0.00) -1.130 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.776 (0.00) -0.654 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.301 (0.10) -0.354 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.775 (0.00) 0.809 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.309 (0.35) 0.154 (0.55)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.172 (0.49) 0.057 (0.78)
Financial owner 0.405 (0.10) 0.231 (0.25)
ln(Firm Size) -0.062 (0.14) -0.088 (0.01)
Investment over depreciation 0.010 (0.66) -0.002 (0.89)
Earnings surprise 0.009 (0.92) 0.053 (0.41)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.022 (0.45) -0.024 (0.30)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.191 (0.00) -0.173 (0.00)
n 1320 2060
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.099
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.84 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.180 (0.77) -0.200 (0.69)
Owner rank 1 0.003 (0.99) -0.165 (0.26)
Owner rank 2 0.123 (0.49) -0.041 (0.77)
Owner rank 3 0.087 (0.62) 0.101 (0.47)
Owner rank 4 0.326 (0.07) 0.253 (0.07)
Foreign owner 0.993 (0.00) 0.975 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.409 (0.14) 0.547 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.069 (0.73) 0.013 (0.94)
Financial owner 0.861 (0.00) 0.671 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.007 (0.84) 0.004 (0.90)
Investment over depreciation 0.048 (0.00) 0.022 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.089 (0.21) -0.031 (0.60)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.057 (0.05) -0.044 (0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.126 (0.00) -0.127 (0.00)
n 1390 2200
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.052
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.829 (0.01) 1.841 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.436 (0.00) -1.492 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.832 (0.00) -0.938 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.525 (0.01) -0.510 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.084 (0.67) -0.190 (0.23)
Foreign owner 0.439 (0.05) 0.346 (0.06)
Family (individual) owner -0.047 (0.88) -0.109 (0.64)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.411 (0.05) -0.493 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.193 (0.38) 0.065 (0.72)
ln(Firm Size) -0.028 (0.47) -0.023 (0.47)
Investment over depreciation 0.025 (0.07) 0.018 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.067 (0.38) -0.040 (0.53)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.014 (0.65) 0.026 (0.26)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.293 (0.00) -0.281 (0.00)
n 1390 2200
Pseudo R2 0.140 0.131
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.934 (0.13) 1.149 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -0.557 (0.00) -0.565 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.226 (0.21) -0.238 (0.09)
Owner rank 3 0.038 (0.83) 0.082 (0.56)
Owner rank 4 0.271 (0.12) 0.198 (0.15)
Foreign owner 0.510 (0.02) 0.486 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.259 (0.37) 0.256 (0.26)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.189 (0.36) -0.237 (0.17)
Financial owner 0.483 (0.02) 0.340 (0.05)
ln(Firm Size) -0.050 (0.18) -0.064 (0.04)
Investment over depreciation 0.024 (0.06) 0.014 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.029 (0.69) 0.008 (0.90)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.046 (0.11) -0.007 (0.74)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.213 (0.00) -0.203 (0.00)
n 1390 2200
Pseudo R2 0.081 0.068
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.209 (0.08) 1.562 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.590 (0.00) -1.423 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.202 (0.00) -1.203 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.687 (0.00) -0.619 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.227 (0.20) -0.245 (0.08)
Foreign owner 0.543 (0.02) 0.597 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.043 (0.90) 0.006 (0.98)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.049 (0.84) -0.090 (0.64)
Financial owner 0.311 (0.19) 0.200 (0.30)
ln(Firm Size) -0.075 (0.06) -0.101 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.00) 0.023 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.013 (0.87) -0.045 (0.48)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.033 (0.30) 0.003 (0.89)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.178 (0.00) -0.155 (0.00)
n 1390 2200
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.096
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.85 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt
Maturity. Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.575 (0.33) -0.460 (0.34)
Owner rank 1 -0.087 (0.64) -0.290 (0.05)
Owner rank 2 0.116 (0.52) 0.078 (0.58)
Owner rank 3 0.063 (0.72) 0.107 (0.45)
Owner rank 4 0.279 (0.12) 0.182 (0.19)
Foreign owner 1.191 (0.00) 1.184 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.313 (0.25) 0.403 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.028 (0.89) 0.017 (0.92)
Financial owner 0.802 (0.00) 0.637 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.006 (0.87) 0.013 (0.67)
Long term debt over total debt -0.056 (0.80) -0.195 (0.25)
Earnings surprise 0.165 (0.03) 0.085 (0.14)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.060 (0.02) -0.069 (0.00)
n 1370 2185
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.048
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.293 (0.04) 1.454 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.939 (0.00) -2.036 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.068 (0.00) -1.115 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.672 (0.00) -0.616 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.335 (0.09) -0.456 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.585 (0.01) 0.545 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.081 (0.78) -0.158 (0.49)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.430 (0.04) -0.439 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.115 (0.59) 0.063 (0.72)
ln(Firm Size) -0.013 (0.73) -0.012 (0.72)
Long term debt over total debt -0.057 (0.81) -0.157 (0.39)
Earnings surprise 0.125 (0.12) 0.087 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.007 (0.80) 0.013 (0.53)
n 1370 2185
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.110
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.330 (0.57) 0.666 (0.17)
Owner rank 1 -0.819 (0.00) -0.844 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.383 (0.03) -0.273 (0.05)
Owner rank 3 -0.150 (0.39) -0.014 (0.92)
Owner rank 4 0.088 (0.61) 0.035 (0.80)
Foreign owner 0.863 (0.00) 0.855 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.282 (0.31) 0.308 (0.16)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.022 (0.91) -0.051 (0.77)
Financial owner 0.584 (0.01) 0.512 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.053 (0.13) -0.068 (0.02)
Long term debt over total debt 0.241 (0.29) 0.079 (0.64)
Earnings surprise 0.133 (0.09) 0.093 (0.11)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.026 (0.30) -0.011 (0.58)
n 1370 2185
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.047
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.986 (0.13) 1.427 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.843 (0.00) -1.708 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.399 (0.00) -1.233 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.998 (0.00) -0.815 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.437 (0.01) -0.465 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.960 (0.00) 0.942 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.231 (0.47) 0.143 (0.56)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.094 (0.70) 0.018 (0.93)
Financial owner 0.488 (0.04) 0.332 (0.09)
ln(Firm Size) -0.098 (0.01) -0.117 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.205 (0.41) 0.079 (0.67)
Earnings surprise 0.038 (0.65) 0.048 (0.44)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.018 (0.52) -0.009 (0.68)
n 1370 2185
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.082
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.86 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Debt Maturity. Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.075 (0.90) -0.130 (0.78)
Owner rank 1 -0.071 (0.69) -0.236 (0.09)
Owner rank 2 0.072 (0.68) -0.045 (0.74)
Owner rank 3 0.038 (0.83) 0.056 (0.68)
Owner rank 4 0.260 (0.14) 0.186 (0.17)
Foreign owner 1.042 (0.00) 1.011 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.342 (0.21) 0.418 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.117 (0.56) 0.011 (0.95)
Financial owner 0.832 (0.00) 0.669 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.008 (0.81) -0.000 (0.99)
Long term debt over total debt -0.382 (0.09) -0.343 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.112 (0.11) -0.035 (0.54)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.065 (0.02) -0.044 (0.04)
n 1425 2320
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.038
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.509 (0.01) 1.512 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.838 (0.00) -1.865 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.998 (0.00) -1.071 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.621 (0.00) -0.562 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.167 (0.39) -0.245 (0.11)
Foreign owner 0.468 (0.03) 0.420 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -0.166 (0.56) -0.192 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.521 (0.01) -0.533 (0.00)
Financial owner 0.182 (0.40) 0.108 (0.54)
ln(Firm Size) -0.022 (0.55) -0.020 (0.53)
Long term debt over total debt -0.138 (0.56) -0.124 (0.49)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.103 (0.17) -0.057 (0.34)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.008 (0.78) 0.032 (0.16)
n 1425 2320
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.106
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.701 (0.23) 0.888 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -0.697 (0.00) -0.710 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.312 (0.07) -0.292 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 -0.066 (0.70) 0.029 (0.83)
Owner rank 4 0.183 (0.28) 0.148 (0.27)
Foreign owner 0.669 (0.00) 0.617 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.073 (0.79) 0.147 (0.49)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.271 (0.18) -0.259 (0.12)
Financial owner 0.544 (0.01) 0.439 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.067 (0.06) -0.077 (0.01)
Long term debt over total debt 0.114 (0.62) 0.062 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.065 (0.36) -0.016 (0.78)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.032 (0.25) 0.006 (0.77)
n 1425 2320
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.044
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.162 (0.07) 1.408 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.815 (0.00) -1.625 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.369 (0.00) -1.293 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.857 (0.00) -0.735 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.357 (0.04) -0.338 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.743 (0.00) 0.733 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.008 (0.98) -0.009 (0.97)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.047 (0.84) -0.052 (0.79)
Financial owner 0.411 (0.08) 0.316 (0.09)
ln(Firm Size) -0.096 (0.01) -0.109 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.021 (0.94) -0.069 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.028 (0.72) -0.052 (0.40)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.031 (0.32) 0.014 (0.53)
n 1425 2320
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.079
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.87 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt Ma-
turity and Duration. Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.358 (0.55) -0.211 (0.67)
Owner rank 1 -0.031 (0.87) -0.232 (0.12)
Owner rank 2 0.139 (0.44) 0.100 (0.48)
Owner rank 3 0.100 (0.58) 0.130 (0.36)
Owner rank 4 0.299 (0.09) 0.201 (0.15)
Foreign owner 1.133 (0.00) 1.102 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.448 (0.10) 0.507 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.057 (0.78) 0.052 (0.76)
Financial owner 0.803 (0.00) 0.589 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.010 (0.78) 0.017 (0.56)
Long term debt over total debt -0.063 (0.78) -0.213 (0.21)
Earnings surprise 0.158 (0.04) 0.075 (0.20)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.057 (0.03) -0.067 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.129 (0.00) -0.136 (0.00)
n 1370 2185
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.059
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.525 (0.01) 1.751 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.545 (0.00) -1.654 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.908 (0.00) -0.952 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.582 (0.00) -0.522 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.298 (0.13) -0.420 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.509 (0.02) 0.442 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner 0.061 (0.83) -0.079 (0.73)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.299 (0.15) -0.355 (0.04)
Financial owner 0.108 (0.61) 0.008 (0.96)
ln(Firm Size) -0.005 (0.89) -0.005 (0.87)
Long term debt over total debt -0.091 (0.70) -0.189 (0.30)
Earnings surprise 0.133 (0.10) 0.086 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) 0.007 (0.79) 0.015 (0.48)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.248 (0.00) -0.266 (0.00)
n 1370 2185
Pseudo R2 0.127 0.128
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.489 (0.41) 0.912 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -0.676 (0.00) -0.698 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.345 (0.06) -0.227 (0.11)
Owner rank 3 -0.095 (0.59) 0.030 (0.83)
Owner rank 4 0.102 (0.56) 0.040 (0.77)
Foreign owner 0.766 (0.00) 0.731 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.476 (0.10) 0.430 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.122 (0.56) 0.036 (0.84)
Financial owner 0.569 (0.01) 0.440 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.034 (0.34) -0.053 (0.08)
Long term debt over total debt 0.164 (0.48) 0.025 (0.89)
Earnings surprise 0.130 (0.10) 0.082 (0.16)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.030 (0.25) -0.013 (0.54)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.186 (0.00) -0.203 (0.00)
n 1370 2185
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.067
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.216 (0.06) 1.659 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.559 (0.00) -1.469 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.225 (0.00) -1.082 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.834 (0.00) -0.676 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.336 (0.06) -0.376 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.811 (0.00) 0.761 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.329 (0.32) 0.171 (0.49)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.197 (0.43) 0.042 (0.83)
Financial owner 0.426 (0.08) 0.211 (0.28)
ln(Firm Size) -0.082 (0.04) -0.101 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.194 (0.45) 0.065 (0.73)
Earnings surprise 0.038 (0.66) 0.038 (0.54)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.013 (0.66) -0.004 (0.86)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.201 (0.00) -0.190 (0.00)
n 1370 2185
Pseudo R2 0.121 0.101
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.88 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Debt
Maturity and Duration. Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.116 (0.84) 0.071 (0.88)
Owner rank 1 -0.029 (0.88) -0.184 (0.19)
Owner rank 2 0.088 (0.62) -0.027 (0.84)
Owner rank 3 0.065 (0.71) 0.074 (0.59)
Owner rank 4 0.294 (0.09) 0.216 (0.11)
Foreign owner 0.976 (0.00) 0.938 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.478 (0.08) 0.529 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.038 (0.85) 0.044 (0.79)
Financial owner 0.829 (0.00) 0.627 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.003 (0.94) 0.006 (0.83)
Long term debt over total debt -0.373 (0.10) -0.339 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.101 (0.15) -0.034 (0.55)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.061 (0.03) -0.043 (0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.128 (0.00) -0.134 (0.00)
n 1425 2320
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.049
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.687 (0.01) 1.739 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.401 (0.00) -1.458 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.820 (0.00) -0.906 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.522 (0.01) -0.470 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.119 (0.54) -0.199 (0.19)
Foreign owner 0.363 (0.10) 0.317 (0.08)
Family (individual) owner -0.007 (0.98) -0.106 (0.65)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.393 (0.06) -0.462 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.169 (0.43) 0.059 (0.74)
ln(Firm Size) -0.007 (0.85) -0.008 (0.81)
Long term debt over total debt -0.173 (0.48) -0.123 (0.50)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.084 (0.27) -0.049 (0.42)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.001 (0.97) 0.037 (0.11)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.293 (0.00) -0.294 (0.00)
n 1425 2320
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.128
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.854 (0.15) 1.087 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -0.553 (0.00) -0.565 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.276 (0.12) -0.255 (0.06)
Owner rank 3 -0.013 (0.94) 0.063 (0.64)
Owner rank 4 0.212 (0.22) 0.165 (0.22)
Foreign owner 0.533 (0.01) 0.484 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.269 (0.35) 0.269 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.137 (0.50) -0.187 (0.27)
Financial owner 0.507 (0.01) 0.364 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.042 (0.25) -0.057 (0.06)
Long term debt over total debt 0.041 (0.86) 0.043 (0.81)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.037 (0.61) 0.001 (0.99)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.033 (0.24) 0.007 (0.75)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.215 (0.00) -0.218 (0.00)
n 1425 2320
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.067
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.373 (0.03) 1.582 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.557 (0.00) -1.413 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.208 (0.00) -1.157 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.704 (0.00) -0.611 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.253 (0.14) -0.248 (0.07)
Foreign owner 0.569 (0.02) 0.556 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.068 (0.83) 0.005 (0.98)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.000 (1.00) -0.055 (0.77)
Financial owner 0.315 (0.18) 0.200 (0.29)
ln(Firm Size) -0.078 (0.05) -0.091 (0.01)
Long term debt over total debt 0.014 (0.96) -0.061 (0.74)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.006 (0.94) -0.046 (0.45)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q ) -0.026 (0.40) 0.018 (0.44)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.190 (0.00) -0.176 (0.00)
n 1425 2320
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.095
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.2.3 Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Table 7.89 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depre-
ciation over long term assets. Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.866 (0.25) 0.264 (0.64)
Owner rank 1 -0.166 (0.46) -0.328 (0.03)
Owner rank 2 0.089 (0.68) 0.050 (0.74)
Owner rank 3 0.075 (0.72) 0.157 (0.29)
Owner rank 4 0.227 (0.28) 0.092 (0.53)
Foreign owner 0.558 (0.02) 0.664 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.356 (0.28) -0.172 (0.45)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.449 (0.06) -0.316 (0.08)
Financial owner 0.459 (0.06) 0.244 (0.19)
ln(Firm Size) 0.037 (0.41) -0.027 (0.42)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.975 (0.05) 1.180 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.063 (0.52) 0.110 (0.08)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.016 (0.87) 0.019 (0.70)
n 960 1955
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.037
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.968 (0.24) 1.029 (0.09)
Owner rank 1 -2.275 (0.00) -2.151 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.296 (0.00) -1.260 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.956 (0.00) -0.768 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.544 (0.02) -0.629 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.201 (0.44) 0.181 (0.37)
Family (individual) owner -0.230 (0.50) -0.520 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.266 (0.28) -0.405 (0.04)
Financial owner 0.116 (0.66) 0.070 (0.72)
ln(Firm Size) 0.116 (0.01) 0.013 (0.71)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.967 (0.00) 1.839 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.085 (0.41) 0.078 (0.24)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.229 (0.04) 0.055 (0.30)
n 960 1955
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.111
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.539 (0.49) 1.272 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -0.991 (0.00) -0.991 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.454 (0.04) -0.407 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.153 (0.46) -0.059 (0.69)
Owner rank 4 -0.039 (0.85) -0.155 (0.29)
Foreign owner 0.314 (0.21) 0.409 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner -0.193 (0.56) -0.282 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.228 (0.35) -0.275 (0.14)
Financial owner 0.275 (0.27) 0.277 (0.14)
ln(Firm Size) 0.010 (0.82) -0.089 (0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.252 (0.00) 1.265 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.123 (0.22) 0.140 (0.03)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.077 (0.42) -0.010 (0.85)
n 960 1955
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.051
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.482 (0.57) 2.320 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -2.023 (0.00) -1.821 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.272 (0.00) -1.349 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.021 (0.00) -0.855 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.470 (0.03) -0.564 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.396 (0.15) 0.454 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner -0.248 (0.51) -0.484 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.203 (0.46) -0.331 (0.11)
Financial owner 0.185 (0.50) -0.025 (0.90)
ln(Firm Size) -0.051 (0.30) -0.149 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.170 (0.01) 0.879 (0.05)
Earnings surprise 0.004 (0.97) 0.110 (0.11)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.054 (0.61) -0.074 (0.17)
n 960 1955
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.089
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.90 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets. Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.628 (0.40) 0.202 (0.71)
Owner rank 1 -0.172 (0.42) -0.240 (0.11)
Owner rank 2 0.053 (0.80) -0.079 (0.59)
Owner rank 3 0.052 (0.80) 0.103 (0.48)
Owner rank 4 0.265 (0.20) 0.079 (0.58)
Foreign owner 0.498 (0.04) 0.587 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.265 (0.41) -0.128 (0.57)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.391 (0.09) -0.300 (0.10)
Financial owner 0.485 (0.04) 0.303 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.003 (0.95) -0.025 (0.44)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.203 (0.00) 1.746 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.009 (0.93) 0.026 (0.70)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.036 (0.68) -0.017 (0.74)
n 1015 2035
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.033
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.072 (0.93) 1.638 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -2.092 (0.00) -1.969 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.110 (0.00) -1.168 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.822 (0.00) -0.685 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.366 (0.11) -0.446 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.064 (0.81) 0.014 (0.94)
Family (individual) owner -0.142 (0.67) -0.423 (0.08)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.465 (0.06) -0.576 (0.00)
Financial owner 0.068 (0.79) 0.048 (0.81)
ln(Firm Size) 0.061 (0.18) -0.016 (0.63)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.054 (0.00) 0.206 (0.62)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.055 (0.60) 0.029 (0.68)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.177 (0.06) 0.054 (0.32)
n 1015 2035
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.100
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.517 (0.49) 1.667 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -0.896 (0.00) -0.857 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.294 (0.15) -0.367 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.072 (0.72) 0.012 (0.93)
Owner rank 4 0.071 (0.72) -0.048 (0.74)
Foreign owner 0.164 (0.50) 0.172 (0.36)
Family (individual) owner -0.198 (0.54) -0.279 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.441 (0.06) -0.464 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.245 (0.31) 0.222 (0.23)
ln(Firm Size) -0.044 (0.31) -0.103 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.816 (0.05) 0.175 (0.65)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.057 (0.56) 0.044 (0.51)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.065 (0.45) -0.016 (0.75)
n 1015 2035
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.043
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.974 (0.23) 2.156 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.931 (0.00) -1.701 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.234 (0.00) -1.386 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.831 (0.00) -0.766 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.395 (0.05) -0.483 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.195 (0.47) 0.233 (0.26)
Family (individual) owner -0.233 (0.52) -0.508 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.292 (0.27) -0.338 (0.09)
Financial owner 0.205 (0.44) 0.054 (0.79)
ln(Firm Size) -0.079 (0.10) -0.134 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.013 (0.04) 0.295 (0.47)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.008 (0.94) -0.002 (0.98)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.051 (0.58) -0.050 (0.37)
n 1015 2035
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.079
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.91 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation
over long term assets and Duration. Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.474 (0.54) 0.539 (0.34)
Owner rank 1 -0.071 (0.76) -0.254 (0.10)
Owner rank 2 0.136 (0.53) 0.085 (0.57)
Owner rank 3 0.137 (0.52) 0.184 (0.22)
Owner rank 4 0.249 (0.24) 0.107 (0.47)
Foreign owner 0.458 (0.07) 0.544 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.239 (0.47) -0.113 (0.62)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.397 (0.10) -0.328 (0.08)
Financial owner 0.430 (0.08) 0.158 (0.40)
ln(Firm Size) 0.035 (0.43) -0.020 (0.56)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.799 (0.09) 1.012 (0.03)
Earnings surprise 0.055 (0.58) 0.093 (0.14)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.036 (0.71) 0.014 (0.78)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.141 (0.00) -0.147 (0.00)
n 960 1955
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.051
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.544 (0.51) 1.261 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -1.775 (0.00) -1.774 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.106 (0.00) -1.102 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.821 (0.00) -0.667 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.474 (0.04) -0.589 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.119 (0.65) 0.066 (0.75)
Family (individual) owner -0.157 (0.66) -0.521 (0.04)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.187 (0.46) -0.367 (0.06)
Financial owner 0.087 (0.74) -0.006 (0.97)
ln(Firm Size) 0.116 (0.02) 0.025 (0.49)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.018 (0.00) 1.600 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.086 (0.40) 0.061 (0.36)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.216 (0.05) 0.052 (0.33)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.234 (0.00) -0.256 (0.00)
n 960 1955
Pseudo R2 0.154 0.129
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.120 (0.88) 1.541 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -0.728 (0.00) -0.808 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.363 (0.10) -0.335 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 -0.028 (0.90) 0.011 (0.94)
Owner rank 4 -0.015 (0.94) -0.151 (0.30)
Foreign owner 0.168 (0.51) 0.241 (0.22)
Family (individual) owner -0.060 (0.86) -0.256 (0.29)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.143 (0.56) -0.256 (0.18)
Financial owner 0.212 (0.40) 0.160 (0.41)
ln(Firm Size) 0.021 (0.65) -0.072 (0.04)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.389 (0.01) 1.049 (0.02)
Earnings surprise 0.116 (0.25) 0.118 (0.07)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.077 (0.43) -0.016 (0.75)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.211 (0.00) -0.218 (0.00)
n 960 1955
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.074
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.076 (0.22) 2.625 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.531 (0.00) -1.530 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.970 (0.00) -1.156 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.766 (0.00) -0.691 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.329 (0.13) -0.466 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.116 (0.69) 0.168 (0.43)
Family (individual) owner -0.255 (0.52) -0.570 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.216 (0.45) -0.415 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.020 (0.94) -0.233 (0.27)
ln(Firm Size) -0.041 (0.42) -0.127 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.468 (0.02) 0.672 (0.10)
Earnings surprise 0.004 (0.97) 0.088 (0.21)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.026 (0.81) -0.076 (0.16)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.245 (0.00) -0.221 (0.00)
n 960 1955
Pseudo R2 0.141 0.113
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.92 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.264 (0.73) 0.414 (0.45)
Owner rank 1 -0.084 (0.70) -0.173 (0.25)
Owner rank 2 0.098 (0.64) -0.050 (0.73)
Owner rank 3 0.097 (0.64) 0.121 (0.41)
Owner rank 4 0.317 (0.13) 0.112 (0.44)
Foreign owner 0.395 (0.11) 0.489 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.138 (0.67) -0.069 (0.76)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.354 (0.13) -0.305 (0.09)
Financial owner 0.458 (0.06) 0.234 (0.21)
ln(Firm Size) 0.004 (0.92) -0.017 (0.61)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.528 (0.00) 1.526 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.012 (0.90) 0.010 (0.88)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.054 (0.54) -0.017 (0.74)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.128 (0.00) -0.127 (0.00)
n 1015 2035
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.043
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.462 (0.56) 1.866 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.533 (0.00) -1.560 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.898 (0.00) -1.010 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.683 (0.00) -0.591 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.288 (0.21) -0.397 (0.01)
Foreign owner -0.067 (0.80) -0.110 (0.59)
Family (individual) owner -0.020 (0.95) -0.409 (0.10)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.407 (0.10) -0.551 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.038 (0.88) -0.027 (0.89)
ln(Firm Size) 0.067 (0.15) -0.002 (0.96)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.072 (0.05) -0.079 (0.84)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.053 (0.61) 0.009 (0.90)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.175 (0.07) 0.055 (0.32)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.265 (0.00) -0.271 (0.00)
n 1015 2035
Pseudo R2 0.142 0.120
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.947 (0.22) 1.912 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -0.619 (0.01) -0.677 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.202 (0.34) -0.311 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 0.033 (0.87) 0.060 (0.68)
Owner rank 4 0.113 (0.58) -0.032 (0.82)
Foreign owner -0.037 (0.88) -0.006 (0.98)
Family (individual) owner -0.052 (0.88) -0.247 (0.29)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.388 (0.11) -0.452 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.157 (0.53) 0.100 (0.60)
ln(Firm Size) -0.027 (0.54) -0.082 (0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.833 (0.38) -0.050 (0.90)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.039 (0.70) 0.036 (0.60)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.063 (0.47) -0.021 (0.68)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.231 (0.00) -0.221 (0.00)
n 1015 2035
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.068
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.464 (0.08) 2.359 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.536 (0.00) -1.474 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.993 (0.00) -1.239 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.629 (0.00) -0.646 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.253 (0.22) -0.390 (0.01)
Foreign owner -0.059 (0.83) 0.000 (1.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.209 (0.57) -0.573 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.335 (0.21) -0.404 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.052 (0.85) -0.111 (0.59)
ln(Firm Size) -0.066 (0.17) -0.114 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.883 (0.38) 0.045 (0.91)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.016 (0.88) -0.023 (0.75)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.034 (0.72) -0.045 (0.41)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.191 (0.00) -0.168 (0.00)
n 1015 2035
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.095
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.93 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Invest-
ments over depreciation. Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.022 (0.98) 1.014 (0.07)
Owner rank 1 -0.155 (0.49) -0.362 (0.02)
Owner rank 2 0.084 (0.70) -0.012 (0.94)
Owner rank 3 0.149 (0.49) 0.164 (0.28)
Owner rank 4 0.305 (0.15) 0.146 (0.33)
Foreign owner 0.665 (0.01) 0.724 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.323 (0.33) -0.126 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.495 (0.04) -0.352 (0.06)
Financial owner 0.426 (0.08) 0.205 (0.28)
ln(Firm Size) -0.024 (0.59) -0.070 (0.04)
Investment over depreciation 0.041 (0.05) 0.002 (0.85)
Earnings surprise 0.038 (0.71) 0.104 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.012 (0.90) 0.047 (0.34)
n 930 1850
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.037
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.625 (0.43) 1.544 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -2.226 (0.00) -2.169 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.269 (0.00) -1.279 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.913 (0.00) -0.767 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.501 (0.04) -0.576 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.288 (0.28) 0.223 (0.28)
Family (individual) owner -0.295 (0.39) -0.535 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.387 (0.12) -0.457 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.098 (0.71) 0.004 (0.98)
ln(Firm Size) 0.046 (0.33) -0.006 (0.86)
Investment over depreciation -0.005 (0.82) -0.004 (0.72)
Earnings surprise 0.060 (0.56) 0.063 (0.37)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.208 (0.06) 0.102 (0.06)
n 930 1850
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.111
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.536 (0.47) 1.702 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -0.962 (0.00) -0.997 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.405 (0.06) -0.418 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.082 (0.70) -0.043 (0.77)
Owner rank 4 0.029 (0.89) -0.114 (0.44)
Foreign owner 0.391 (0.12) 0.435 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner -0.179 (0.59) -0.273 (0.25)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.304 (0.21) -0.318 (0.10)
Financial owner 0.270 (0.28) 0.218 (0.26)
ln(Firm Size) -0.040 (0.37) -0.108 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation -0.001 (0.95) -0.005 (0.63)
Earnings surprise 0.115 (0.26) 0.130 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.061 (0.53) 0.026 (0.59)
n 930 1850
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.048
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.454 (0.08) 2.602 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.963 (0.00) -1.798 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.255 (0.00) -1.406 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.940 (0.00) -0.848 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.413 (0.05) -0.526 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.484 (0.08) 0.485 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -0.264 (0.49) -0.466 (0.07)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.254 (0.36) -0.349 (0.10)
Financial owner 0.172 (0.53) -0.065 (0.75)
ln(Firm Size) -0.102 (0.04) -0.162 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.004 (0.88) -0.001 (0.94)
Earnings surprise -0.007 (0.95) 0.121 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.067 (0.53) -0.050 (0.35)
n 930 1850
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.088
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.94 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.407 (0.57) 0.872 (0.10)
Owner rank 1 -0.125 (0.56) -0.279 (0.07)
Owner rank 2 0.085 (0.68) -0.140 (0.35)
Owner rank 3 0.076 (0.71) 0.087 (0.55)
Owner rank 4 0.297 (0.15) 0.102 (0.49)
Foreign owner 0.579 (0.02) 0.622 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.312 (0.33) -0.143 (0.53)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.459 (0.05) -0.343 (0.06)
Financial owner 0.503 (0.04) 0.280 (0.13)
ln(Firm Size) -0.046 (0.28) -0.060 (0.06)
Investment over depreciation 0.038 (0.01) 0.019 (0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.005 (0.96) 0.017 (0.81)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.038 (0.66) 0.037 (0.47)
n 1000 1940
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.032
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.001 (0.19) 1.597 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -2.096 (0.00) -2.023 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.119 (0.00) -1.210 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.811 (0.00) -0.727 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.343 (0.14) -0.429 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.143 (0.58) 0.062 (0.76)
Family (individual) owner -0.193 (0.57) -0.424 (0.08)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.526 (0.03) -0.595 (0.00)
Financial owner 0.064 (0.80) -0.003 (0.99)
ln(Firm Size) 0.017 (0.71) -0.013 (0.70)
Investment over depreciation 0.019 (0.13) 0.017 (0.06)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.009 (0.93) 0.021 (0.78)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.181 (0.06) 0.072 (0.18)
n 1000 1940
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.106
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.048 (0.15) 1.775 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -0.900 (0.00) -0.883 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.277 (0.18) -0.388 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.053 (0.80) -0.012 (0.94)
Owner rank 4 0.099 (0.62) -0.033 (0.82)
Foreign owner 0.219 (0.37) 0.192 (0.32)
Family (individual) owner -0.233 (0.47) -0.290 (0.21)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.472 (0.05) -0.493 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.248 (0.31) 0.167 (0.38)
ln(Firm Size) -0.071 (0.10) -0.111 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.019 (0.11) 0.013 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.034 (0.74) 0.030 (0.67)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.072 (0.40) 0.002 (0.98)
n 1000 1940
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.045
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.405 (0.07) 2.183 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.917 (0.00) -1.705 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.228 (0.00) -1.448 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.821 (0.00) -0.786 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.376 (0.07) -0.470 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.254 (0.35) 0.261 (0.21)
Family (individual) owner -0.277 (0.44) -0.497 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.324 (0.22) -0.354 (0.08)
Financial owner 0.221 (0.40) 0.027 (0.90)
ln(Firm Size) -0.101 (0.03) -0.138 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.032 (0.01) 0.020 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.018 (0.87) -0.028 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.047 (0.61) -0.031 (0.57)
n 1000 1940
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.084
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.95 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments
over depreciation and Duration. Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.259 (0.73) 1.136 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -0.046 (0.84) -0.288 (0.07)
Owner rank 2 0.142 (0.52) 0.023 (0.88)
Owner rank 3 0.224 (0.30) 0.194 (0.20)
Owner rank 4 0.333 (0.12) 0.159 (0.29)
Foreign owner 0.552 (0.03) 0.610 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.193 (0.56) -0.059 (0.80)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.433 (0.07) -0.351 (0.06)
Financial owner 0.410 (0.10) 0.139 (0.47)
ln(Firm Size) -0.017 (0.70) -0.056 (0.11)
Investment over depreciation 0.040 (0.06) -0.001 (0.95)
Earnings surprise 0.036 (0.72) 0.092 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.031 (0.75) 0.038 (0.45)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.141 (0.00) -0.137 (0.00)
n 930 1850
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.049
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.825 (0.30) 1.645 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.704 (0.00) -1.787 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.063 (0.00) -1.119 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.762 (0.00) -0.662 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.427 (0.07) -0.538 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.195 (0.47) 0.106 (0.62)
Family (individual) owner -0.208 (0.56) -0.532 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.271 (0.28) -0.404 (0.04)
Financial owner 0.069 (0.79) -0.067 (0.75)
ln(Firm Size) 0.055 (0.25) 0.014 (0.71)
Investment over depreciation 0.001 (0.95) -0.007 (0.51)
Earnings surprise 0.051 (0.63) 0.042 (0.55)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.205 (0.07) 0.094 (0.08)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.261 (0.00) -0.261 (0.00)
n 930 1850
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.130
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.710 (0.36) 1.809 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -0.694 (0.00) -0.818 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.305 (0.17) -0.347 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.058 (0.79) 0.029 (0.85)
Owner rank 4 0.063 (0.77) -0.108 (0.47)
Foreign owner 0.222 (0.38) 0.268 (0.18)
Family (individual) owner -0.024 (0.94) -0.239 (0.32)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.194 (0.43) -0.286 (0.14)
Financial owner 0.207 (0.41) 0.110 (0.57)
ln(Firm Size) -0.017 (0.71) -0.082 (0.02)
Investment over depreciation -0.005 (0.82) -0.009 (0.39)
Earnings surprise 0.104 (0.31) 0.107 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.066 (0.50) 0.015 (0.77)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.221 (0.00) -0.213 (0.00)
n 930 1850
Pseudo R2 0.081 0.071
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.725 (0.04) 2.674 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.490 (0.00) -1.517 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.952 (0.00) -1.221 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.677 (0.00) -0.686 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.273 (0.21) -0.434 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.175 (0.54) 0.210 (0.34)
Family (individual) owner -0.246 (0.53) -0.531 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.251 (0.38) -0.410 (0.06)
Financial owner 0.018 (0.95) -0.246 (0.25)
ln(Firm Size) -0.075 (0.14) -0.128 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation -0.005 (0.84) -0.006 (0.60)
Earnings surprise 0.005 (0.96) 0.106 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.042 (0.70) -0.058 (0.28)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.244 (0.00) -0.209 (0.00)
n 930 1850
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.110
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.96 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.544 (0.45) 0.953 (0.08)
Owner rank 1 -0.023 (0.92) -0.211 (0.17)
Owner rank 2 0.143 (0.50) -0.110 (0.46)
Owner rank 3 0.132 (0.53) 0.108 (0.47)
Owner rank 4 0.358 (0.09) 0.136 (0.36)
Foreign owner 0.451 (0.07) 0.522 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.168 (0.60) -0.072 (0.75)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.399 (0.09) -0.337 (0.07)
Financial owner 0.484 (0.05) 0.223 (0.23)
ln(Firm Size) -0.033 (0.44) -0.046 (0.17)
Investment over depreciation 0.038 (0.01) 0.017 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.010 (0.92) 0.006 (0.93)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.057 (0.52) 0.030 (0.55)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.139 (0.00) -0.124 (0.00)
n 1000 1940
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.041
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.128 (0.14) 1.695 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.525 (0.00) -1.624 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.894 (0.00) -1.056 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.663 (0.00) -0.633 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.261 (0.26) -0.382 (0.02)
Foreign owner -0.008 (0.97) -0.069 (0.74)
Family (individual) owner -0.060 (0.86) -0.403 (0.11)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.439 (0.08) -0.562 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.033 (0.90) -0.072 (0.73)
ln(Firm Size) 0.035 (0.44) 0.008 (0.82)
Investment over depreciation 0.021 (0.12) 0.015 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.003 (0.98) 0.007 (0.92)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.187 (0.05) 0.065 (0.23)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.285 (0.00) -0.266 (0.00)
n 1000 1940
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.126
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.189 (0.11) 1.882 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -0.624 (0.01) -0.710 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.179 (0.40) -0.334 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 0.055 (0.79) 0.034 (0.82)
Owner rank 4 0.151 (0.47) -0.014 (0.93)
Foreign owner -0.007 (0.98) 0.017 (0.93)
Family (individual) owner -0.081 (0.81) -0.251 (0.29)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.397 (0.10) -0.472 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.160 (0.52) 0.057 (0.77)
ln(Firm Size) -0.042 (0.35) -0.084 (0.01)
Investment over depreciation 0.017 (0.17) 0.010 (0.20)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.016 (0.88) 0.027 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.072 (0.42) -0.011 (0.83)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.233 (0.00) -0.210 (0.00)
n 1000 1940
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.068
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.505 (0.06) 2.214 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.548 (0.00) -1.496 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.998 (0.00) -1.314 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.629 (0.00) -0.676 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.243 (0.24) -0.385 (0.01)
Foreign owner -0.030 (0.91) 0.045 (0.83)
Family (individual) owner -0.246 (0.51) -0.541 (0.04)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.344 (0.20) -0.404 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.073 (0.78) -0.113 (0.58)
ln(Firm Size) -0.071 (0.14) -0.111 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.030 (0.02) 0.018 (0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.029 (0.80) -0.042 (0.58)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.030 (0.75) -0.036 (0.51)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.184 (0.00) -0.152 (0.00)
n 1000 1940
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.097
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.97 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt
Maturity. Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.176 (0.80) 0.970 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -0.155 (0.48) -0.374 (0.01)
Owner rank 2 0.077 (0.72) 0.037 (0.80)
Owner rank 3 0.067 (0.75) 0.122 (0.40)
Owner rank 4 0.239 (0.25) 0.051 (0.72)
Foreign owner 0.622 (0.01) 0.697 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.298 (0.36) -0.108 (0.63)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.504 (0.03) -0.311 (0.09)
Financial owner 0.404 (0.10) 0.227 (0.22)
ln(Firm Size) -0.017 (0.68) -0.052 (0.10)
Long term debt over total debt -0.213 (0.40) -0.360 (0.04)
Earnings surprise 0.080 (0.41) 0.115 (0.07)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.048 (0.61) -0.013 (0.79)
n 970 1995
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.036
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.064 (0.14) 1.807 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -2.120 (0.00) -2.151 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.221 (0.00) -1.243 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.903 (0.00) -0.752 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.538 (0.02) -0.638 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.304 (0.24) 0.228 (0.26)
Family (individual) owner -0.170 (0.61) -0.449 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.436 (0.07) -0.438 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.057 (0.82) 0.047 (0.81)
ln(Firm Size) 0.019 (0.65) -0.019 (0.56)
Long term debt over total debt -0.135 (0.61) -0.169 (0.35)
Earnings surprise 0.142 (0.16) 0.078 (0.24)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.098 (0.34) 0.041 (0.45)
n 970 1995
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.106
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.832 (0.22) 1.743 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -0.906 (0.00) -1.010 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.435 (0.04) -0.409 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.172 (0.41) -0.093 (0.52)
Owner rank 4 -0.047 (0.82) -0.188 (0.19)
Foreign owner 0.452 (0.07) 0.458 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -0.175 (0.59) -0.206 (0.37)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.327 (0.17) -0.280 (0.13)
Financial owner 0.279 (0.26) 0.297 (0.12)
ln(Firm Size) -0.063 (0.12) -0.111 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.117 (0.65) -0.004 (0.98)
Earnings surprise 0.176 (0.08) 0.146 (0.02)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.010 (0.91) -0.004 (0.93)
n 970 1995
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.048
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.688 (0.02) 2.671 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.893 (0.00) -1.840 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.245 (0.00) -1.337 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.035 (0.00) -0.874 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.472 (0.02) -0.602 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.532 (0.05) 0.501 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.225 (0.54) -0.390 (0.13)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.282 (0.30) -0.322 (0.12)
Financial owner 0.178 (0.51) -0.003 (0.99)
ln(Firm Size) -0.120 (0.01) -0.166 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.096 (0.73) 0.023 (0.90)
Earnings surprise 0.051 (0.63) 0.120 (0.08)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.125 (0.24) -0.081 (0.14)
n 970 1995
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.087
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.98 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Debt Maturity. Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.773 (0.26) 1.035 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -0.140 (0.51) -0.287 (0.05)
Owner rank 2 0.057 (0.78) -0.101 (0.48)
Owner rank 3 0.053 (0.80) 0.069 (0.63)
Owner rank 4 0.269 (0.19) 0.058 (0.68)
Foreign owner 0.583 (0.02) 0.601 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.220 (0.48) -0.125 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.454 (0.05) -0.288 (0.11)
Financial owner 0.485 (0.04) 0.287 (0.12)
ln(Firm Size) -0.053 (0.19) -0.054 (0.08)
Long term debt over total debt -0.256 (0.30) -0.334 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.017 (0.86) 0.015 (0.81)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.024 (0.78) -0.029 (0.57)
n 1025 2080
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.028
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.062 (0.14) 1.568 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -2.024 (0.00) -1.967 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.075 (0.00) -1.149 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.795 (0.00) -0.672 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.376 (0.10) -0.450 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.128 (0.62) 0.071 (0.72)
Family (individual) owner -0.124 (0.71) -0.382 (0.11)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.534 (0.03) -0.560 (0.00)
Financial owner 0.053 (0.83) 0.049 (0.80)
ln(Firm Size) 0.022 (0.61) -0.006 (0.86)
Long term debt over total debt -0.173 (0.50) -0.124 (0.49)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.021 (0.84) 0.019 (0.79)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.112 (0.22) 0.023 (0.68)
n 1025 2080
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.099
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.041 (0.13) 1.602 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -0.856 (0.00) -0.866 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.294 (0.15) -0.374 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.098 (0.63) -0.023 (0.87)
Owner rank 4 0.057 (0.78) -0.064 (0.65)
Foreign owner 0.259 (0.29) 0.213 (0.25)
Family (individual) owner -0.218 (0.49) -0.242 (0.29)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.463 (0.05) -0.443 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.279 (0.25) 0.244 (0.19)
ln(Firm Size) -0.070 (0.09) -0.097 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.065 (0.79) 0.002 (0.99)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.038 (0.70) 0.028 (0.68)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.040 (0.64) -0.028 (0.59)
n 1025 2080
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.042
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.575 (0.03) 2.163 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.846 (0.00) -1.714 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.220 (0.00) -1.377 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.848 (0.00) -0.788 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.404 (0.04) -0.492 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.301 (0.26) 0.264 (0.19)
Family (individual) owner -0.251 (0.48) -0.469 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.317 (0.23) -0.314 (0.12)
Financial owner 0.238 (0.37) 0.069 (0.73)
ln(Firm Size) -0.107 (0.02) -0.129 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.019 (0.94) -0.067 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.034 (0.75) -0.024 (0.73)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.089 (0.34) -0.074 (0.19)
n 1025 2080
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.079
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.99 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt Ma-
turity and Duration. Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.474 (0.49) 1.201 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -0.067 (0.77) -0.302 (0.05)
Owner rank 2 0.120 (0.58) 0.071 (0.63)
Owner rank 3 0.128 (0.55) 0.151 (0.31)
Owner rank 4 0.260 (0.22) 0.069 (0.64)
Foreign owner 0.517 (0.04) 0.573 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.189 (0.57) -0.055 (0.81)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.438 (0.07) -0.316 (0.09)
Financial owner 0.377 (0.12) 0.136 (0.47)
ln(Firm Size) -0.013 (0.75) -0.042 (0.19)
Long term debt over total debt -0.198 (0.44) -0.373 (0.03)
Earnings surprise 0.068 (0.49) 0.095 (0.14)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.023 (0.81) -0.023 (0.65)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.145 (0.00) -0.154 (0.00)
n 970 1995
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.050
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.321 (0.07) 2.002 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.608 (0.00) -1.782 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.023 (0.00) -1.088 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.762 (0.00) -0.653 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.465 (0.05) -0.596 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.198 (0.45) 0.104 (0.61)
Family (individual) owner -0.065 (0.85) -0.455 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.325 (0.19) -0.395 (0.04)
Financial owner 0.015 (0.95) -0.041 (0.84)
ln(Firm Size) 0.029 (0.50) -0.004 (0.90)
Long term debt over total debt -0.200 (0.46) -0.210 (0.26)
Earnings surprise 0.137 (0.18) 0.058 (0.39)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.096 (0.35) 0.031 (0.57)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.257 (0.00) -0.260 (0.00)
n 970 1995
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.125
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.083 (0.12) 1.958 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -0.662 (0.01) -0.837 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.353 (0.10) -0.341 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 -0.046 (0.83) -0.022 (0.88)
Owner rank 4 -0.026 (0.90) -0.182 (0.21)
Foreign owner 0.282 (0.26) 0.284 (0.14)
Family (individual) owner -0.035 (0.92) -0.188 (0.43)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.216 (0.38) -0.251 (0.18)
Financial owner 0.201 (0.42) 0.170 (0.37)
ln(Firm Size) -0.042 (0.31) -0.089 (0.01)
Long term debt over total debt 0.026 (0.92) -0.055 (0.75)
Earnings surprise 0.159 (0.11) 0.121 (0.06)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.016 (0.86) -0.019 (0.71)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.217 (0.00) -0.222 (0.00)
n 970 1995
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.072
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 2.054 (0.01) 2.895 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.430 (0.00) -1.556 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.948 (0.00) -1.145 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.777 (0.00) -0.708 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.331 (0.12) -0.501 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.229 (0.42) 0.206 (0.33)
Family (individual) owner -0.247 (0.52) -0.490 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.272 (0.33) -0.400 (0.06)
Financial owner 0.007 (0.98) -0.220 (0.29)
ln(Firm Size) -0.098 (0.03) -0.139 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.086 (0.76) 0.011 (0.95)
Earnings surprise 0.041 (0.70) 0.094 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.085 (0.43) -0.086 (0.12)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.249 (0.00) -0.225 (0.00)
n 970 1995
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.113
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.100 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Debt Maturity and Duration. Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.980 (0.15) 1.172 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -0.058 (0.79) -0.218 (0.14)
Owner rank 2 0.099 (0.64) -0.070 (0.63)
Owner rank 3 0.097 (0.64) 0.089 (0.53)
Owner rank 4 0.324 (0.12) 0.094 (0.51)
Foreign owner 0.466 (0.06) 0.500 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.088 (0.79) -0.061 (0.79)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.395 (0.09) -0.288 (0.11)
Financial owner 0.455 (0.06) 0.214 (0.25)
ln(Firm Size) -0.044 (0.28) -0.042 (0.18)
Long term debt over total debt -0.224 (0.37) -0.317 (0.06)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.012 (0.90) -0.001 (0.98)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.001 (0.99) -0.032 (0.54)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.143 (0.00) -0.136 (0.00)
n 1025 2080
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.040
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.189 (0.10) 1.662 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.460 (0.00) -1.566 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.861 (0.00) -0.993 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.658 (0.00) -0.580 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.295 (0.19) -0.398 (0.01)
Foreign owner -0.034 (0.90) -0.060 (0.77)
Family (individual) owner 0.005 (0.99) -0.370 (0.13)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.452 (0.07) -0.536 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.011 (0.97) -0.032 (0.88)
ln(Firm Size) 0.043 (0.33) 0.016 (0.63)
Long term debt over total debt -0.227 (0.39) -0.122 (0.50)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.025 (0.81) 0.002 (0.98)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.118 (0.20) 0.019 (0.73)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.281 (0.00) -0.271 (0.00)
n 1025 2080
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.120
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.211 (0.09) 1.729 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -0.601 (0.01) -0.690 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.214 (0.31) -0.319 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 0.001 (0.99) 0.025 (0.86)
Owner rank 4 0.097 (0.64) -0.046 (0.75)
Foreign owner 0.036 (0.89) 0.035 (0.85)
Family (individual) owner -0.082 (0.81) -0.210 (0.37)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.385 (0.11) -0.425 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.177 (0.47) 0.121 (0.52)
ln(Firm Size) -0.040 (0.35) -0.069 (0.03)
Long term debt over total debt 0.007 (0.98) -0.004 (0.98)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.025 (0.80) 0.020 (0.77)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) 0.041 (0.64) -0.038 (0.47)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.233 (0.00) -0.223 (0.00)
n 1025 2080
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.067
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.755 (0.02) 2.254 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.472 (0.00) -1.487 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.987 (0.00) -1.227 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.651 (0.00) -0.666 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.264 (0.20) -0.397 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.022 (0.94) 0.029 (0.89)
Family (individual) owner -0.247 (0.50) -0.536 (0.04)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.336 (0.21) -0.377 (0.06)
Financial owner 0.072 (0.79) -0.097 (0.63)
ln(Firm Size) -0.081 (0.07) -0.103 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.042 (0.88) -0.041 (0.82)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.038 (0.73) -0.046 (0.52)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry) -0.062 (0.51) -0.072 (0.20)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.195 (0.00) -0.171 (0.00)
n 1025 2080
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.096
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.2.4 Performance measure: RoA
Table 7.101 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and De-
preciation over long term assets. RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.070 (0.00) -1.254 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -0.145 (0.41) -0.256 (0.05)
Owner rank 2 0.057 (0.74) 0.035 (0.79)
Owner rank 3 0.037 (0.83) 0.106 (0.41)
Owner rank 4 0.189 (0.27) 0.092 (0.47)
Foreign owner 1.066 (0.00) 1.106 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.229 (0.39) 0.246 (0.21)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.020 (0.92) 0.065 (0.67)
Financial owner 0.764 (0.00) 0.630 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.061 (0.09) 0.037 (0.20)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.853 (0.06) 1.092 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.161 (0.04) 0.084 (0.12)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.044 (0.00) 0.014 (0.01)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.044
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.434 (0.51) 0.210 (0.68)
Owner rank 1 -2.005 (0.00) -2.005 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.105 (0.00) -1.137 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.717 (0.00) -0.630 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.298 (0.11) -0.397 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.613 (0.00) 0.495 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.138 (0.61) -0.239 (0.24)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.224 (0.26) -0.259 (0.11)
Financial owner 0.189 (0.36) 0.180 (0.28)
ln(Firm Size) 0.067 (0.08) 0.044 (0.15)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.255 (0.00) 2.079 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.003 (0.97) 0.047 (0.40)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.002 (0.88) 0.004 (0.45)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.108
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.987 (0.12) -0.141 (0.77)
Owner rank 1 -0.893 (0.00) -0.867 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.420 (0.01) -0.345 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.136 (0.42) -0.019 (0.88)
Owner rank 4 0.089 (0.60) -0.010 (0.94)
Foreign owner 0.800 (0.00) 0.757 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.204 (0.45) 0.135 (0.50)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.108 (0.59) 0.031 (0.84)
Financial owner 0.546 (0.01) 0.524 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.027 (0.46) -0.018 (0.52)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.086 (0.00) 1.538 (0.00)
Earnings surprise -0.011 (0.89) 0.052 (0.33)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.010 (0.35) -0.002 (0.65)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.046
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.304 (0.66) 0.714 (0.17)
Owner rank 1 -1.916 (0.00) -1.693 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.421 (0.00) -1.326 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.020 (0.00) -0.841 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.454 (0.01) -0.493 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.898 (0.00) 0.896 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.069 (0.83) -0.004 (0.98)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.183 (0.44) 0.097 (0.59)
Financial owner 0.465 (0.05) 0.371 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) -0.024 (0.55) -0.070 (0.03)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.485 (0.00) 1.270 (0.01)
Earnings surprise -0.008 (0.92) 0.032 (0.59)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.000 (1.00) -0.007 (0.20)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.083
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.102 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets. RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.008 (0.00) -1.171 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -0.126 (0.47) -0.208 (0.11)
Owner rank 2 0.084 (0.62) -0.026 (0.84)
Owner rank 3 0.036 (0.83) 0.071 (0.57)
Owner rank 4 0.158 (0.34) 0.067 (0.59)
Foreign owner 1.035 (0.00) 1.033 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.399 (0.13) 0.344 (0.07)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.089 (0.64) 0.085 (0.58)
Financial owner 0.863 (0.00) 0.700 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.053 (0.13) 0.032 (0.25)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.736 (0.00) 1.888 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.149 (0.04) -0.055 (0.33)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.024 (0.02) 0.010 (0.09)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.040
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.340 (0.60) 1.056 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.911 (0.00) -1.899 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.014 (0.00) -1.100 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.622 (0.00) -0.584 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.133 (0.47) -0.269 (0.06)
Foreign owner 0.503 (0.02) 0.396 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -0.025 (0.93) -0.176 (0.38)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.293 (0.14) -0.369 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.315 (0.13) 0.275 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.015 (0.69) -0.005 (0.87)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.824 (0.00) 0.364 (0.37)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.105 (0.18) -0.006 (0.92)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.011 (0.34) 0.008 (0.20)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.105
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.110 (0.86) 0.608 (0.19)
Owner rank 1 -0.770 (0.00) -0.782 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.291 (0.08) -0.329 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.017 (0.92) 0.023 (0.85)
Owner rank 4 0.183 (0.26) 0.053 (0.67)
Foreign owner 0.627 (0.00) 0.581 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.199 (0.45) 0.109 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.075 (0.70) -0.148 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.562 (0.01) 0.510 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.028 (0.43) -0.057 (0.04)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.626 (0.06) 0.321 (0.39)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.044 (0.56) 0.039 (0.49)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.001 (0.90) -0.001 (0.89)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.043
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.015 (0.98) 1.034 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -1.879 (0.00) -1.657 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.380 (0.00) -1.364 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.858 (0.00) -0.770 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.377 (0.02) -0.440 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.705 (0.00) 0.760 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.122 (0.69) -0.014 (0.95)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.131 (0.57) 0.072 (0.69)
Financial owner 0.448 (0.05) 0.413 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.051 (0.18) -0.089 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.100 (0.02) 0.462 (0.24)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.073 (0.37) -0.004 (0.95)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.013 (0.25) -0.003 (0.64)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.079
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.103 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Deprecia-
tion over long term assets and Duration. RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.802 (0.01) -0.970 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -0.083 (0.64) -0.196 (0.14)
Owner rank 2 0.088 (0.61) 0.062 (0.63)
Owner rank 3 0.078 (0.65) 0.130 (0.31)
Owner rank 4 0.204 (0.23) 0.104 (0.41)
Foreign owner 1.017 (0.00) 1.026 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.362 (0.18) 0.333 (0.09)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.093 (0.64) 0.089 (0.57)
Financial owner 0.758 (0.00) 0.578 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.063 (0.08) 0.041 (0.15)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.733 (0.09) 0.995 (0.02)
Earnings surprise 0.159 (0.04) 0.074 (0.17)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.042 (0.00) 0.012 (0.03)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.125 (0.00) -0.140 (0.00)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.055
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.007 (0.99) 0.554 (0.29)
Owner rank 1 -1.599 (0.00) -1.644 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.936 (0.00) -0.980 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.618 (0.00) -0.537 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.259 (0.17) -0.367 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.564 (0.01) 0.404 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -0.026 (0.93) -0.187 (0.37)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.124 (0.54) -0.194 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.173 (0.40) 0.124 (0.46)
ln(Firm Size) 0.067 (0.08) 0.050 (0.10)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.354 (0.00) 1.802 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.023 (0.78) 0.047 (0.41)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.003 (0.82) 0.002 (0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.241 (0.00) -0.270 (0.00)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.127
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.695 (0.28) 0.143 (0.77)
Owner rank 1 -0.717 (0.00) -0.716 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.363 (0.04) -0.289 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 -0.068 (0.69) 0.031 (0.81)
Owner rank 4 0.103 (0.54) -0.003 (0.98)
Foreign owner 0.730 (0.00) 0.645 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.389 (0.16) 0.227 (0.26)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.238 (0.24) 0.098 (0.55)
Financial owner 0.537 (0.01) 0.456 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.041 (0.26) -0.004 (0.89)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.382 (0.01) 1.337 (0.01)
Earnings surprise -0.005 (0.95) 0.043 (0.42)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.013 (0.24) -0.005 (0.34)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.195 (0.00) -0.209 (0.00)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.066
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.067 (0.93) 0.994 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -1.614 (0.00) -1.459 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.236 (0.00) -1.175 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.858 (0.00) -0.709 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.363 (0.03) -0.411 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.787 (0.00) 0.733 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.168 (0.60) 0.012 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.266 (0.27) 0.106 (0.57)
Financial owner 0.413 (0.08) 0.259 (0.16)
ln(Firm Size) -0.012 (0.77) -0.053 (0.09)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.842 (0.01) 1.085 (0.01)
Earnings surprise -0.002 (0.98) 0.022 (0.71)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.003 (0.83) -0.010 (0.08)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.197 (0.00) -0.196 (0.00)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.101
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.104 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.766 (0.01) -0.941 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -0.088 (0.61) -0.165 (0.20)
Owner rank 2 0.106 (0.53) -0.006 (0.96)
Owner rank 3 0.061 (0.72) 0.087 (0.49)
Owner rank 4 0.180 (0.28) 0.087 (0.48)
Foreign owner 0.988 (0.00) 0.970 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.504 (0.06) 0.417 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.138 (0.48) 0.104 (0.50)
Financial owner 0.854 (0.00) 0.659 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.055 (0.12) 0.036 (0.19)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.354 (0.00) 1.719 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.140 (0.06) -0.056 (0.33)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.022 (0.03) 0.008 (0.15)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.096 (0.00) -0.114 (0.00)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.047
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.758 (0.25) 1.399 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.474 (0.00) -1.533 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.832 (0.00) -0.946 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.513 (0.01) -0.495 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.084 (0.65) -0.231 (0.10)
Foreign owner 0.434 (0.04) 0.307 (0.07)
Family (individual) owner 0.128 (0.65) -0.114 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.201 (0.31) -0.313 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.292 (0.16) 0.221 (0.19)
ln(Firm Size) 0.018 (0.62) 0.003 (0.91)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.004 (0.03) 0.073 (0.86)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.086 (0.28) -0.005 (0.93)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.009 (0.42) 0.006 (0.34)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.275 (0.00) -0.284 (0.00)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.124
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.218 (0.73) 0.895 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -0.594 (0.00) -0.640 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.234 (0.17) -0.284 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.048 (0.77) 0.062 (0.62)
Owner rank 4 0.210 (0.21) 0.066 (0.60)
Foreign owner 0.526 (0.01) 0.464 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.401 (0.14) 0.197 (0.32)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.036 (0.86) -0.092 (0.56)
Financial owner 0.536 (0.01) 0.437 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.011 (0.75) -0.041 (0.15)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.920 (0.28) 0.116 (0.76)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.010 (0.89) 0.050 (0.39)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.002 (0.83) -0.003 (0.53)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.213 (0.00) -0.215 (0.00)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.063
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.365 (0.60) 1.271 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.633 (0.00) -1.464 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.224 (0.00) -1.237 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.719 (0.00) -0.660 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.291 (0.08) -0.363 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.587 (0.01) 0.609 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.212 (0.50) -0.007 (0.97)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.163 (0.48) 0.065 (0.72)
Financial owner 0.380 (0.10) 0.310 (0.08)
ln(Firm Size) -0.041 (0.29) -0.074 (0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.350 (0.14) 0.246 (0.53)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.050 (0.54) -0.003 (0.97)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.011 (0.35) -0.005 (0.42)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.159 (0.00) -0.165 (0.00)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.092
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.105 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and In-
vestments over depreciation. RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.503 (0.01) -0.709 (0.14)
Owner rank 1 -0.128 (0.47) -0.274 (0.04)
Owner rank 2 0.051 (0.77) -0.008 (0.95)
Owner rank 3 0.056 (0.75) 0.095 (0.47)
Owner rank 4 0.230 (0.18) 0.127 (0.33)
Foreign owner 1.096 (0.00) 1.165 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.248 (0.35) 0.289 (0.14)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.033 (0.87) 0.042 (0.79)
Financial owner 0.739 (0.00) 0.616 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.024 (0.51) 0.004 (0.88)
Investment over depreciation 0.024 (0.10) 0.007 (0.43)
Earnings surprise 0.160 (0.04) 0.091 (0.10)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.047 (0.00) 0.016 (0.00)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.044
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.663 (0.30) 0.669 (0.19)
Owner rank 1 -1.956 (0.00) -1.999 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.081 (0.00) -1.131 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.688 (0.00) -0.619 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.279 (0.14) -0.354 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.684 (0.00) 0.593 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.160 (0.56) -0.221 (0.28)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.324 (0.10) -0.286 (0.08)
Financial owner 0.178 (0.39) 0.163 (0.33)
ln(Firm Size) 0.018 (0.62) 0.023 (0.46)
Investment over depreciation -0.011 (0.48) -0.003 (0.76)
Earnings surprise 0.011 (0.89) 0.054 (0.34)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.007 (0.54) 0.009 (0.10)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.107
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.211 (0.73) 0.229 (0.63)
Owner rank 1 -0.846 (0.00) -0.863 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.378 (0.03) -0.344 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.101 (0.55) -0.018 (0.89)
Owner rank 4 0.138 (0.41) 0.021 (0.87)
Foreign owner 0.841 (0.00) 0.817 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.220 (0.41) 0.172 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.034 (0.86) 0.014 (0.93)
Financial owner 0.553 (0.01) 0.521 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.010 (0.79) -0.037 (0.20)
Investment over depreciation -0.003 (0.82) -0.001 (0.88)
Earnings surprise -0.001 (0.99) 0.059 (0.28)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.003 (0.77) 0.001 (0.81)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.044
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.508 (0.45) 1.030 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -1.857 (0.00) -1.673 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.398 (0.00) -1.355 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.978 (0.00) -0.837 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.413 (0.01) -0.466 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.950 (0.00) 0.969 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.058 (0.85) 0.047 (0.84)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.105 (0.66) 0.100 (0.59)
Financial owner 0.466 (0.04) 0.398 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.066 (0.10) -0.088 (0.01)
Investment over depreciation 0.004 (0.81) 0.004 (0.72)
Earnings surprise -0.002 (0.98) 0.054 (0.36)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.005 (0.68) -0.005 (0.41)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.083
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.106 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.233 (0.04) -0.712 (0.13)
Owner rank 1 -0.086 (0.62) -0.221 (0.09)
Owner rank 2 0.104 (0.54) -0.075 (0.56)
Owner rank 3 0.038 (0.82) 0.049 (0.70)
Owner rank 4 0.183 (0.28) 0.083 (0.51)
Foreign owner 1.065 (0.00) 1.065 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.357 (0.17) 0.346 (0.07)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.009 (0.96) 0.055 (0.72)
Financial owner 0.883 (0.00) 0.713 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.016 (0.64) 0.005 (0.85)
Investment over depreciation 0.042 (0.00) 0.026 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.156 (0.04) -0.080 (0.16)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.028 (0.01) 0.015 (0.01)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.039
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.098 (0.08) 1.086 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.893 (0.00) -1.918 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.000 (0.00) -1.114 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.614 (0.00) -0.600 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.111 (0.55) -0.236 (0.10)
Foreign owner 0.564 (0.01) 0.463 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.061 (0.82) -0.177 (0.38)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.364 (0.06) -0.384 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.314 (0.13) 0.248 (0.14)
ln(Firm Size) -0.021 (0.56) -0.008 (0.80)
Investment over depreciation 0.019 (0.12) 0.022 (0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.092 (0.24) -0.012 (0.84)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.013 (0.25) 0.007 (0.22)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.109
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.292 (0.63) 0.693 (0.14)
Owner rank 1 -0.750 (0.00) -0.783 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.258 (0.12) -0.333 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.002 (0.99) 0.013 (0.92)
Owner rank 4 0.221 (0.18) 0.076 (0.55)
Foreign owner 0.667 (0.00) 0.613 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.173 (0.51) 0.107 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.122 (0.53) -0.168 (0.28)
Financial owner 0.576 (0.00) 0.486 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.049 (0.15) -0.064 (0.02)
Investment over depreciation 0.025 (0.04) 0.020 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.033 (0.66) 0.028 (0.63)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.001 (0.89) -0.001 (0.87)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.045
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.408 (0.54) 1.069 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -1.851 (0.00) -1.641 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.361 (0.00) -1.398 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.857 (0.00) -0.786 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.352 (0.03) -0.422 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.743 (0.00) 0.792 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.078 (0.80) -0.003 (0.99)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.068 (0.77) 0.061 (0.74)
Financial owner 0.468 (0.04) 0.413 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.072 (0.06) -0.094 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.041 (0.00) 0.027 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.076 (0.36) -0.024 (0.70)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.014 (0.20) -0.003 (0.67)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.083
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.107 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Invest-
ments over depreciation and Duration. RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.343 (0.03) -0.524 (0.28)
Owner rank 1 -0.057 (0.75) -0.214 (0.12)
Owner rank 2 0.087 (0.62) 0.018 (0.89)
Owner rank 3 0.104 (0.55) 0.120 (0.36)
Owner rank 4 0.249 (0.15) 0.138 (0.29)
Foreign owner 1.036 (0.00) 1.084 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.393 (0.14) 0.380 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.048 (0.81) 0.072 (0.65)
Financial owner 0.741 (0.00) 0.574 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.032 (0.38) 0.014 (0.64)
Investment over depreciation 0.027 (0.07) 0.007 (0.48)
Earnings surprise 0.161 (0.04) 0.084 (0.12)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.045 (0.00) 0.014 (0.01)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.128 (0.00) -0.134 (0.00)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.053
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.901 (0.16) 0.916 (0.07)
Owner rank 1 -1.536 (0.00) -1.634 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.900 (0.00) -0.971 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.577 (0.00) -0.523 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.235 (0.21) -0.324 (0.03)
Foreign owner 0.629 (0.00) 0.497 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.032 (0.91) -0.162 (0.44)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.195 (0.33) -0.209 (0.20)
Financial owner 0.165 (0.42) 0.109 (0.52)
ln(Firm Size) 0.026 (0.49) 0.035 (0.26)
Investment over depreciation -0.002 (0.92) -0.003 (0.72)
Earnings surprise 0.020 (0.81) 0.051 (0.38)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.003 (0.76) 0.006 (0.27)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.260 (0.00) -0.276 (0.00)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.127
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.100 (0.87) 0.406 (0.41)
Owner rank 1 -0.669 (0.00) -0.715 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.318 (0.07) -0.290 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 -0.027 (0.87) 0.033 (0.80)
Owner rank 4 0.161 (0.34) 0.030 (0.82)
Foreign owner 0.763 (0.00) 0.704 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.423 (0.13) 0.269 (0.19)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.187 (0.35) 0.091 (0.58)
Financial owner 0.549 (0.01) 0.457 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.013 (0.71) -0.016 (0.58)
Investment over depreciation 0.000 (0.99) -0.003 (0.76)
Earnings surprise -0.002 (0.98) 0.049 (0.37)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.008 (0.49) -0.002 (0.71)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.202 (0.00) -0.207 (0.00)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.063
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.653 (0.34) 1.162 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.570 (0.00) -1.447 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.215 (0.00) -1.209 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.815 (0.00) -0.706 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.323 (0.06) -0.388 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.821 (0.00) 0.804 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.165 (0.61) 0.070 (0.76)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.201 (0.40) 0.120 (0.52)
Financial owner 0.418 (0.08) 0.298 (0.11)
ln(Firm Size) -0.044 (0.28) -0.063 (0.05)
Investment over depreciation 0.005 (0.77) 0.001 (0.90)
Earnings surprise 0.007 (0.93) 0.048 (0.42)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.002 (0.89) -0.008 (0.18)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.194 (0.00) -0.189 (0.00)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.099
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.108 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.095 (0.07) -0.562 (0.23)
Owner rank 1 -0.043 (0.81) -0.177 (0.18)
Owner rank 2 0.129 (0.45) -0.056 (0.66)
Owner rank 3 0.068 (0.69) 0.066 (0.60)
Owner rank 4 0.209 (0.21) 0.103 (0.42)
Foreign owner 1.009 (0.00) 0.999 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.480 (0.07) 0.424 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.075 (0.70) 0.081 (0.60)
Financial owner 0.879 (0.00) 0.677 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.024 (0.49) 0.014 (0.62)
Investment over depreciation 0.043 (0.00) 0.025 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.139 (0.06) -0.076 (0.19)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.025 (0.02) 0.013 (0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.105 (0.00) -0.112 (0.00)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.046
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.342 (0.04) 1.337 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.451 (0.00) -1.562 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.811 (0.00) -0.967 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.499 (0.01) -0.512 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.058 (0.76) -0.199 (0.17)
Foreign owner 0.489 (0.02) 0.368 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner 0.110 (0.70) -0.111 (0.59)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.244 (0.22) -0.320 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.294 (0.16) 0.196 (0.25)
ln(Firm Size) -0.009 (0.80) 0.005 (0.86)
Investment over depreciation 0.023 (0.09) 0.019 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.063 (0.43) -0.004 (0.95)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.009 (0.43) 0.004 (0.46)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.289 (0.00) -0.278 (0.00)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.138 0.129
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.441 (0.47) 0.883 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -0.576 (0.00) -0.647 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.200 (0.24) -0.292 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.064 (0.70) 0.051 (0.69)
Owner rank 4 0.253 (0.13) 0.091 (0.47)
Foreign owner 0.557 (0.01) 0.495 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.387 (0.16) 0.198 (0.32)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.009 (0.96) -0.106 (0.50)
Financial owner 0.553 (0.01) 0.418 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.024 (0.49) -0.044 (0.13)
Investment over depreciation 0.025 (0.05) 0.017 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.006 (0.94) 0.044 (0.46)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.004 (0.72) -0.004 (0.45)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.214 (0.00) -0.205 (0.00)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.064
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.532 (0.43) 1.182 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.621 (0.00) -1.465 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.212 (0.00) -1.283 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.723 (0.00) -0.685 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.271 (0.11) -0.352 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.612 (0.01) 0.647 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.171 (0.59) 0.010 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.116 (0.62) 0.060 (0.74)
Financial owner 0.403 (0.08) 0.323 (0.07)
ln(Firm Size) -0.052 (0.18) -0.074 (0.02)
Investment over depreciation 0.041 (0.00) 0.025 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.046 (0.58) -0.018 (0.78)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.011 (0.35) -0.005 (0.40)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.154 (0.00) -0.150 (0.00)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.094
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.109 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt
Maturity. RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.587 (0.01) -0.685 (0.13)
Owner rank 1 -0.129 (0.47) -0.253 (0.06)
Owner rank 2 0.070 (0.69) 0.041 (0.75)
Owner rank 3 0.044 (0.80) 0.093 (0.47)
Owner rank 4 0.194 (0.25) 0.068 (0.59)
Foreign owner 1.101 (0.00) 1.104 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.214 (0.42) 0.247 (0.20)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.031 (0.87) 0.023 (0.88)
Financial owner 0.750 (0.00) 0.619 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.016 (0.63) 0.005 (0.87)
Long term debt over total debt 0.327 (0.16) 0.014 (0.93)
Earnings surprise 0.210 (0.01) 0.102 (0.06)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.054 (0.00) 0.018 (0.00)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.042
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.863 (0.16) 0.945 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -1.927 (0.00) -1.979 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.063 (0.00) -1.124 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.696 (0.00) -0.619 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.308 (0.10) -0.411 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.629 (0.00) 0.512 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.115 (0.67) -0.223 (0.27)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.352 (0.07) -0.316 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.159 (0.44) 0.176 (0.29)
ln(Firm Size) 0.001 (0.97) 0.008 (0.78)
Long term debt over total debt 0.010 (0.96) -0.067 (0.70)
Earnings surprise 0.061 (0.44) 0.057 (0.31)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.010 (0.40) 0.008 (0.16)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.104
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.072 (0.90) 0.359 (0.43)
Owner rank 1 -0.840 (0.00) -0.851 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.392 (0.02) -0.337 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.137 (0.41) -0.035 (0.78)
Owner rank 4 0.079 (0.64) -0.031 (0.80)
Foreign owner 0.846 (0.00) 0.765 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.184 (0.49) 0.136 (0.49)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.009 (0.96) -0.021 (0.90)
Financial owner 0.543 (0.01) 0.537 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.033 (0.32) -0.051 (0.06)
Long term debt over total debt 0.306 (0.18) 0.155 (0.35)
Earnings surprise 0.059 (0.45) 0.077 (0.15)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.003 (0.80) 0.004 (0.49)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.043
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.647 (0.32) 1.231 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.841 (0.00) -1.681 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.382 (0.00) -1.317 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.014 (0.00) -0.851 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.460 (0.01) -0.519 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.949 (0.00) 0.903 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.066 (0.83) 0.002 (0.99)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.095 (0.69) 0.050 (0.78)
Financial owner 0.462 (0.05) 0.380 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) -0.089 (0.02) -0.104 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.286 (0.26) 0.135 (0.45)
Earnings surprise 0.060 (0.48) 0.057 (0.33)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.012 (0.35) -0.002 (0.74)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.081
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.110 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Debt Maturity. RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.970 (0.10) -0.426 (0.34)
Owner rank 1 -0.101 (0.55) -0.214 (0.09)
Owner rank 2 0.103 (0.54) -0.029 (0.81)
Owner rank 3 0.044 (0.79) 0.057 (0.65)
Owner rank 4 0.157 (0.34) 0.053 (0.67)
Foreign owner 1.034 (0.00) 1.012 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.381 (0.14) 0.309 (0.10)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.003 (0.99) 0.046 (0.76)
Financial owner 0.848 (0.00) 0.689 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.008 (0.81) -0.003 (0.91)
Long term debt over total debt -0.096 (0.66) -0.092 (0.56)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.159 (0.03) -0.064 (0.26)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.031 (0.00) 0.014 (0.01)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.035
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.053 (0.09) 1.082 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.871 (0.00) -1.885 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.991 (0.00) -1.088 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.611 (0.00) -0.577 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.148 (0.42) -0.274 (0.05)
Foreign owner 0.519 (0.01) 0.422 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.028 (0.92) -0.164 (0.41)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.364 (0.06) -0.382 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.314 (0.13) 0.283 (0.09)
ln(Firm Size) -0.016 (0.65) -0.005 (0.87)
Long term debt over total debt -0.037 (0.87) 0.003 (0.98)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.114 (0.14) -0.010 (0.86)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.016 (0.15) 0.008 (0.17)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.104
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.253 (0.67) 0.619 (0.17)
Owner rank 1 -0.744 (0.00) -0.770 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.276 (0.10) -0.327 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.024 (0.88) 0.005 (0.97)
Owner rank 4 0.171 (0.30) 0.040 (0.74)
Foreign owner 0.663 (0.00) 0.583 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.155 (0.56) 0.097 (0.62)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.121 (0.53) -0.172 (0.27)
Financial owner 0.581 (0.00) 0.523 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.052 (0.13) -0.063 (0.02)
Long term debt over total debt 0.182 (0.40) 0.165 (0.30)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.048 (0.52) 0.035 (0.54)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.006 (0.54) 0.002 (0.70)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.042
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.562 (0.38) 1.152 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.833 (0.00) -1.658 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.355 (0.00) -1.360 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.860 (0.00) -0.783 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.387 (0.02) -0.449 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.736 (0.00) 0.746 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.081 (0.79) -0.036 (0.87)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.074 (0.74) 0.042 (0.81)
Financial owner 0.463 (0.04) 0.414 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.081 (0.03) -0.097 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.099 (0.68) 0.088 (0.61)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.078 (0.34) -0.007 (0.91)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.019 (0.10) -0.000 (0.98)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.078
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.111 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt
Maturity and Duration. RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.355 (0.03) -0.403 (0.38)
Owner rank 1 -0.071 (0.69) -0.195 (0.14)
Owner rank 2 0.098 (0.57) 0.066 (0.61)
Owner rank 3 0.084 (0.63) 0.117 (0.36)
Owner rank 4 0.208 (0.22) 0.081 (0.53)
Foreign owner 1.048 (0.00) 1.023 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.348 (0.19) 0.337 (0.09)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.047 (0.81) 0.053 (0.74)
Financial owner 0.744 (0.00) 0.564 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.023 (0.51) 0.012 (0.66)
Long term debt over total debt 0.297 (0.20) -0.040 (0.81)
Earnings surprise 0.202 (0.01) 0.086 (0.11)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.051 (0.00) 0.014 (0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.128 (0.00) -0.145 (0.00)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.053
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.165 (0.06) 1.266 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.510 (0.00) -1.619 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.887 (0.00) -0.968 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.589 (0.00) -0.524 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.265 (0.15) -0.379 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.574 (0.01) 0.419 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.030 (0.91) -0.163 (0.43)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.222 (0.26) -0.240 (0.14)
Financial owner 0.143 (0.49) 0.116 (0.49)
ln(Firm Size) 0.010 (0.78) 0.019 (0.52)
Long term debt over total debt -0.050 (0.83) -0.143 (0.42)
Earnings surprise 0.069 (0.39) 0.049 (0.39)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.005 (0.67) 0.004 (0.46)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.259 (0.00) -0.274 (0.00)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.123
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.161 (0.79) 0.643 (0.17)
Owner rank 1 -0.676 (0.00) -0.706 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.341 (0.05) -0.284 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 -0.071 (0.68) 0.014 (0.91)
Owner rank 4 0.090 (0.59) -0.024 (0.85)
Foreign owner 0.765 (0.00) 0.651 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.381 (0.16) 0.229 (0.26)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.155 (0.44) 0.054 (0.74)
Financial owner 0.524 (0.01) 0.462 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.012 (0.74) -0.033 (0.24)
Long term debt over total debt 0.188 (0.42) 0.063 (0.71)
Earnings surprise 0.048 (0.53) 0.061 (0.26)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.004 (0.75) -0.001 (0.90)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.199 (0.00) -0.211 (0.00)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.062
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.934 (0.16) 1.498 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.553 (0.00) -1.453 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.197 (0.00) -1.167 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.848 (0.00) -0.717 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.368 (0.03) -0.436 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.825 (0.00) 0.734 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.162 (0.61) 0.013 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.191 (0.42) 0.064 (0.73)
Financial owner 0.399 (0.09) 0.261 (0.15)
ln(Firm Size) -0.070 (0.07) -0.084 (0.01)
Long term debt over total debt 0.219 (0.40) 0.067 (0.71)
Earnings surprise 0.053 (0.54) 0.040 (0.49)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.006 (0.65) -0.006 (0.29)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.203 (0.00) -0.198 (0.00)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.099
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.112 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Debt Maturity and Duration. RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.780 (0.18) -0.227 (0.61)
Owner rank 1 -0.068 (0.69) -0.171 (0.18)
Owner rank 2 0.121 (0.47) -0.009 (0.94)
Owner rank 3 0.069 (0.68) 0.074 (0.55)
Owner rank 4 0.180 (0.28) 0.074 (0.55)
Foreign owner 0.982 (0.00) 0.946 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.502 (0.06) 0.391 (0.04)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.064 (0.74) 0.073 (0.63)
Financial owner 0.837 (0.00) 0.644 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.015 (0.66) 0.005 (0.85)
Long term debt over total debt -0.119 (0.58) -0.116 (0.47)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.146 (0.05) -0.063 (0.26)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.028 (0.01) 0.012 (0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.108 (0.00) -0.123 (0.00)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.043
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.303 (0.04) 1.321 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.431 (0.00) -1.523 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.807 (0.00) -0.937 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.500 (0.01) -0.489 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.096 (0.60) -0.235 (0.09)
Foreign owner 0.437 (0.04) 0.333 (0.05)
Family (individual) owner 0.145 (0.61) -0.098 (0.64)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.244 (0.22) -0.319 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.287 (0.17) 0.227 (0.17)
ln(Firm Size) -0.001 (0.98) 0.011 (0.72)
Long term debt over total debt -0.109 (0.64) -0.033 (0.85)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.092 (0.24) -0.008 (0.90)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.012 (0.29) 0.005 (0.39)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.288 (0.00) -0.284 (0.00)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.124
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.468 (0.43) 0.844 (0.07)
Owner rank 1 -0.582 (0.00) -0.633 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.227 (0.18) -0.284 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.035 (0.83) 0.042 (0.73)
Owner rank 4 0.194 (0.24) 0.052 (0.67)
Foreign owner 0.549 (0.01) 0.466 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.361 (0.19) 0.188 (0.34)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.008 (0.97) -0.111 (0.48)
Financial owner 0.543 (0.01) 0.447 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.026 (0.46) -0.041 (0.14)
Long term debt over total debt 0.074 (0.74) 0.110 (0.50)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.012 (0.87) 0.047 (0.41)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.000 (0.98) -0.002 (0.75)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.214 (0.00) -0.215 (0.00)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.063
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.778 (0.23) 1.326 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.596 (0.00) -1.469 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.201 (0.00) -1.234 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.722 (0.00) -0.673 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.301 (0.07) -0.373 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.606 (0.01) 0.594 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.168 (0.59) -0.029 (0.90)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.125 (0.59) 0.040 (0.82)
Financial owner 0.383 (0.10) 0.308 (0.08)
ln(Firm Size) -0.062 (0.10) -0.077 (0.01)
Long term debt over total debt 0.046 (0.85) 0.056 (0.75)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.051 (0.53) -0.005 (0.94)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.014 (0.23) -0.003 (0.59)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.165 (0.00) -0.167 (0.00)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.092
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.2.5 Performance measure: RoS
Table 7.113 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and De-
preciation over long term assets. RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.070 (0.00) -1.254 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -0.145 (0.41) -0.256 (0.05)
Owner rank 2 0.057 (0.74) 0.035 (0.79)
Owner rank 3 0.037 (0.83) 0.106 (0.41)
Owner rank 4 0.189 (0.27) 0.092 (0.47)
Foreign owner 1.066 (0.00) 1.106 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.229 (0.39) 0.246 (0.21)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.020 (0.92) 0.065 (0.67)
Financial owner 0.764 (0.00) 0.630 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.061 (0.09) 0.037 (0.20)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.853 (0.06) 1.092 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.161 (0.04) 0.084 (0.12)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.044 (0.00) 0.014 (0.01)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.044
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.434 (0.51) 0.210 (0.68)
Owner rank 1 -2.005 (0.00) -2.005 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.105 (0.00) -1.137 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.717 (0.00) -0.630 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.298 (0.11) -0.397 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.613 (0.00) 0.495 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.138 (0.61) -0.239 (0.24)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.224 (0.26) -0.259 (0.11)
Financial owner 0.189 (0.36) 0.180 (0.28)
ln(Firm Size) 0.067 (0.08) 0.044 (0.15)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.255 (0.00) 2.079 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.003 (0.97) 0.047 (0.40)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.002 (0.88) 0.004 (0.45)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.108
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.987 (0.12) -0.141 (0.77)
Owner rank 1 -0.893 (0.00) -0.867 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.420 (0.01) -0.345 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.136 (0.42) -0.019 (0.88)
Owner rank 4 0.089 (0.60) -0.010 (0.94)
Foreign owner 0.800 (0.00) 0.757 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.204 (0.45) 0.135 (0.50)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.108 (0.59) 0.031 (0.84)
Financial owner 0.546 (0.01) 0.524 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.027 (0.46) -0.018 (0.52)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.086 (0.00) 1.538 (0.00)
Earnings surprise -0.011 (0.89) 0.052 (0.33)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.010 (0.35) -0.002 (0.65)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.046
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.304 (0.66) 0.714 (0.17)
Owner rank 1 -1.916 (0.00) -1.693 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.421 (0.00) -1.326 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.020 (0.00) -0.841 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.454 (0.01) -0.493 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.898 (0.00) 0.896 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.069 (0.83) -0.004 (0.98)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.183 (0.44) 0.097 (0.59)
Financial owner 0.465 (0.05) 0.371 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) -0.024 (0.55) -0.070 (0.03)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.485 (0.00) 1.270 (0.01)
Earnings surprise -0.008 (0.92) 0.032 (0.59)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.000 (1.00) -0.007 (0.20)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.083
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.114 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets. RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.008 (0.00) -1.171 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -0.126 (0.47) -0.208 (0.11)
Owner rank 2 0.084 (0.62) -0.026 (0.84)
Owner rank 3 0.036 (0.83) 0.071 (0.57)
Owner rank 4 0.158 (0.34) 0.067 (0.59)
Foreign owner 1.035 (0.00) 1.033 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.399 (0.13) 0.344 (0.07)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.089 (0.64) 0.085 (0.58)
Financial owner 0.863 (0.00) 0.700 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.053 (0.13) 0.032 (0.25)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.736 (0.00) 1.888 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.149 (0.04) -0.055 (0.33)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.024 (0.02) 0.010 (0.09)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.040
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.340 (0.60) 1.056 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.911 (0.00) -1.899 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.014 (0.00) -1.100 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.622 (0.00) -0.584 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.133 (0.47) -0.269 (0.06)
Foreign owner 0.503 (0.02) 0.396 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -0.025 (0.93) -0.176 (0.38)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.293 (0.14) -0.369 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.315 (0.13) 0.275 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) 0.015 (0.69) -0.005 (0.87)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.824 (0.00) 0.364 (0.37)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.105 (0.18) -0.006 (0.92)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.011 (0.34) 0.008 (0.20)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.105
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.110 (0.86) 0.608 (0.19)
Owner rank 1 -0.770 (0.00) -0.782 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.291 (0.08) -0.329 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.017 (0.92) 0.023 (0.85)
Owner rank 4 0.183 (0.26) 0.053 (0.67)
Foreign owner 0.627 (0.00) 0.581 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.199 (0.45) 0.109 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.075 (0.70) -0.148 (0.34)
Financial owner 0.562 (0.01) 0.510 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.028 (0.43) -0.057 (0.04)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.626 (0.06) 0.321 (0.39)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.044 (0.56) 0.039 (0.49)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.001 (0.90) -0.001 (0.89)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.043
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.015 (0.98) 1.034 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -1.879 (0.00) -1.657 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.380 (0.00) -1.364 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.858 (0.00) -0.770 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.377 (0.02) -0.440 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.705 (0.00) 0.760 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.122 (0.69) -0.014 (0.95)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.131 (0.57) 0.072 (0.69)
Financial owner 0.448 (0.05) 0.413 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.051 (0.18) -0.089 (0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.100 (0.02) 0.462 (0.24)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.073 (0.37) -0.004 (0.95)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.013 (0.25) -0.003 (0.64)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.079
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.115 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Deprecia-
tion over long term assets and Duration. RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.802 (0.01) -0.970 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -0.083 (0.64) -0.196 (0.14)
Owner rank 2 0.088 (0.61) 0.062 (0.63)
Owner rank 3 0.078 (0.65) 0.130 (0.31)
Owner rank 4 0.204 (0.23) 0.104 (0.41)
Foreign owner 1.017 (0.00) 1.026 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.362 (0.18) 0.333 (0.09)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.093 (0.64) 0.089 (0.57)
Financial owner 0.758 (0.00) 0.578 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.063 (0.08) 0.041 (0.15)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.733 (0.09) 0.995 (0.02)
Earnings surprise 0.159 (0.04) 0.074 (0.17)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.042 (0.00) 0.012 (0.03)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.125 (0.00) -0.140 (0.00)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.055
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.007 (0.99) 0.554 (0.29)
Owner rank 1 -1.599 (0.00) -1.644 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.936 (0.00) -0.980 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.618 (0.00) -0.537 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.259 (0.17) -0.367 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.564 (0.01) 0.404 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -0.026 (0.93) -0.187 (0.37)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.124 (0.54) -0.194 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.173 (0.40) 0.124 (0.46)
ln(Firm Size) 0.067 (0.08) 0.050 (0.10)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.354 (0.00) 1.802 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.023 (0.78) 0.047 (0.41)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.003 (0.82) 0.002 (0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.241 (0.00) -0.270 (0.00)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.127
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.695 (0.28) 0.143 (0.77)
Owner rank 1 -0.717 (0.00) -0.716 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.363 (0.04) -0.289 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 -0.068 (0.69) 0.031 (0.81)
Owner rank 4 0.103 (0.54) -0.003 (0.98)
Foreign owner 0.730 (0.00) 0.645 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.389 (0.16) 0.227 (0.26)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.238 (0.24) 0.098 (0.55)
Financial owner 0.537 (0.01) 0.456 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.041 (0.26) -0.004 (0.89)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.382 (0.01) 1.337 (0.01)
Earnings surprise -0.005 (0.95) 0.043 (0.42)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.013 (0.24) -0.005 (0.34)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.195 (0.00) -0.209 (0.00)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.066
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.067 (0.93) 0.994 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -1.614 (0.00) -1.459 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.236 (0.00) -1.175 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.858 (0.00) -0.709 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.363 (0.03) -0.411 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.787 (0.00) 0.733 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.168 (0.60) 0.012 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.266 (0.27) 0.106 (0.57)
Financial owner 0.413 (0.08) 0.259 (0.16)
ln(Firm Size) -0.012 (0.77) -0.053 (0.09)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.842 (0.01) 1.085 (0.01)
Earnings surprise -0.002 (0.98) 0.022 (0.71)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.003 (0.83) -0.010 (0.08)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.197 (0.00) -0.196 (0.00)
n 1485 2615
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.101
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.116 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.766 (0.01) -0.941 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -0.088 (0.61) -0.165 (0.20)
Owner rank 2 0.106 (0.53) -0.006 (0.96)
Owner rank 3 0.061 (0.72) 0.087 (0.49)
Owner rank 4 0.180 (0.28) 0.087 (0.48)
Foreign owner 0.988 (0.00) 0.970 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.504 (0.06) 0.417 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.138 (0.48) 0.104 (0.50)
Financial owner 0.854 (0.00) 0.659 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.055 (0.12) 0.036 (0.19)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.354 (0.00) 1.719 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.140 (0.06) -0.056 (0.33)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.022 (0.03) 0.008 (0.15)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.096 (0.00) -0.114 (0.00)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.047
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.758 (0.25) 1.399 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.474 (0.00) -1.533 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.832 (0.00) -0.946 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.513 (0.01) -0.495 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.084 (0.65) -0.231 (0.10)
Foreign owner 0.434 (0.04) 0.307 (0.07)
Family (individual) owner 0.128 (0.65) -0.114 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.201 (0.31) -0.313 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.292 (0.16) 0.221 (0.19)
ln(Firm Size) 0.018 (0.62) 0.003 (0.91)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.004 (0.03) 0.073 (0.86)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.086 (0.28) -0.005 (0.93)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.009 (0.42) 0.006 (0.34)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.275 (0.00) -0.284 (0.00)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.124
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.218 (0.73) 0.895 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -0.594 (0.00) -0.640 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.234 (0.17) -0.284 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.048 (0.77) 0.062 (0.62)
Owner rank 4 0.210 (0.21) 0.066 (0.60)
Foreign owner 0.526 (0.01) 0.464 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.401 (0.14) 0.197 (0.32)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.036 (0.86) -0.092 (0.56)
Financial owner 0.536 (0.01) 0.437 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.011 (0.75) -0.041 (0.15)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.920 (0.28) 0.116 (0.76)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.010 (0.89) 0.050 (0.39)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.002 (0.83) -0.003 (0.53)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.213 (0.00) -0.215 (0.00)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.063
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.365 (0.60) 1.271 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.633 (0.00) -1.464 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.224 (0.00) -1.237 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.719 (0.00) -0.660 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.291 (0.08) -0.363 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.587 (0.01) 0.609 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.212 (0.50) -0.007 (0.97)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.163 (0.48) 0.065 (0.72)
Financial owner 0.380 (0.10) 0.310 (0.08)
ln(Firm Size) -0.041 (0.29) -0.074 (0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.350 (0.14) 0.246 (0.53)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.050 (0.54) -0.003 (0.97)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.011 (0.35) -0.005 (0.42)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.159 (0.00) -0.165 (0.00)
n 1540 2745
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.092
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
379
Table 7.117 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and In-
vestments over depreciation. RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.503 (0.01) -0.709 (0.14)
Owner rank 1 -0.128 (0.47) -0.274 (0.04)
Owner rank 2 0.051 (0.77) -0.008 (0.95)
Owner rank 3 0.056 (0.75) 0.095 (0.47)
Owner rank 4 0.230 (0.18) 0.127 (0.33)
Foreign owner 1.096 (0.00) 1.165 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.248 (0.35) 0.289 (0.14)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.033 (0.87) 0.042 (0.79)
Financial owner 0.739 (0.00) 0.616 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.024 (0.51) 0.004 (0.88)
Investment over depreciation 0.024 (0.10) 0.007 (0.43)
Earnings surprise 0.160 (0.04) 0.091 (0.10)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.047 (0.00) 0.016 (0.00)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.044
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.663 (0.30) 0.669 (0.19)
Owner rank 1 -1.956 (0.00) -1.999 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.081 (0.00) -1.131 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.688 (0.00) -0.619 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.279 (0.14) -0.354 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.684 (0.00) 0.593 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.160 (0.56) -0.221 (0.28)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.324 (0.10) -0.286 (0.08)
Financial owner 0.178 (0.39) 0.163 (0.33)
ln(Firm Size) 0.018 (0.62) 0.023 (0.46)
Investment over depreciation -0.011 (0.48) -0.003 (0.76)
Earnings surprise 0.011 (0.89) 0.054 (0.34)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.007 (0.54) 0.009 (0.10)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.107
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.211 (0.73) 0.229 (0.63)
Owner rank 1 -0.846 (0.00) -0.863 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.378 (0.03) -0.344 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.101 (0.55) -0.018 (0.89)
Owner rank 4 0.138 (0.41) 0.021 (0.87)
Foreign owner 0.841 (0.00) 0.817 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.220 (0.41) 0.172 (0.39)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.034 (0.86) 0.014 (0.93)
Financial owner 0.553 (0.01) 0.521 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.010 (0.79) -0.037 (0.20)
Investment over depreciation -0.003 (0.82) -0.001 (0.88)
Earnings surprise -0.001 (0.99) 0.059 (0.28)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.003 (0.77) 0.001 (0.81)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.044
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.508 (0.45) 1.030 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -1.857 (0.00) -1.673 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.398 (0.00) -1.355 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.978 (0.00) -0.837 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.413 (0.01) -0.466 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.950 (0.00) 0.969 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.058 (0.85) 0.047 (0.84)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.105 (0.66) 0.100 (0.59)
Financial owner 0.466 (0.04) 0.398 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.066 (0.10) -0.088 (0.01)
Investment over depreciation 0.004 (0.81) 0.004 (0.72)
Earnings surprise -0.002 (0.98) 0.054 (0.36)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.005 (0.68) -0.005 (0.41)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.083
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.118 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.233 (0.04) -0.712 (0.13)
Owner rank 1 -0.086 (0.62) -0.221 (0.09)
Owner rank 2 0.104 (0.54) -0.075 (0.56)
Owner rank 3 0.038 (0.82) 0.049 (0.70)
Owner rank 4 0.183 (0.28) 0.083 (0.51)
Foreign owner 1.065 (0.00) 1.065 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.357 (0.17) 0.346 (0.07)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.009 (0.96) 0.055 (0.72)
Financial owner 0.883 (0.00) 0.713 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.016 (0.64) 0.005 (0.85)
Investment over depreciation 0.042 (0.00) 0.026 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.156 (0.04) -0.080 (0.16)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.028 (0.01) 0.015 (0.01)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.039
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.098 (0.08) 1.086 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.893 (0.00) -1.918 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.000 (0.00) -1.114 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.614 (0.00) -0.600 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.111 (0.55) -0.236 (0.10)
Foreign owner 0.564 (0.01) 0.463 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.061 (0.82) -0.177 (0.38)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.364 (0.06) -0.384 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.314 (0.13) 0.248 (0.14)
ln(Firm Size) -0.021 (0.56) -0.008 (0.80)
Investment over depreciation 0.019 (0.12) 0.022 (0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.092 (0.24) -0.012 (0.84)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.013 (0.25) 0.007 (0.22)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.109
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.292 (0.63) 0.693 (0.14)
Owner rank 1 -0.750 (0.00) -0.783 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.258 (0.12) -0.333 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.002 (0.99) 0.013 (0.92)
Owner rank 4 0.221 (0.18) 0.076 (0.55)
Foreign owner 0.667 (0.00) 0.613 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.173 (0.51) 0.107 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.122 (0.53) -0.168 (0.28)
Financial owner 0.576 (0.00) 0.486 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.049 (0.15) -0.064 (0.02)
Investment over depreciation 0.025 (0.04) 0.020 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.033 (0.66) 0.028 (0.63)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.001 (0.89) -0.001 (0.87)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.045
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.408 (0.54) 1.069 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -1.851 (0.00) -1.641 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.361 (0.00) -1.398 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.857 (0.00) -0.786 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.352 (0.03) -0.422 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.743 (0.00) 0.792 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.078 (0.80) -0.003 (0.99)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.068 (0.77) 0.061 (0.74)
Financial owner 0.468 (0.04) 0.413 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.072 (0.06) -0.094 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.041 (0.00) 0.027 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.076 (0.36) -0.024 (0.70)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.014 (0.20) -0.003 (0.67)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.083
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.119 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Invest-
ments over depreciation and Duration. RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.343 (0.03) -0.524 (0.28)
Owner rank 1 -0.057 (0.75) -0.214 (0.12)
Owner rank 2 0.087 (0.62) 0.018 (0.89)
Owner rank 3 0.104 (0.55) 0.120 (0.36)
Owner rank 4 0.249 (0.15) 0.138 (0.29)
Foreign owner 1.036 (0.00) 1.084 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.393 (0.14) 0.380 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.048 (0.81) 0.072 (0.65)
Financial owner 0.741 (0.00) 0.574 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.032 (0.38) 0.014 (0.64)
Investment over depreciation 0.027 (0.07) 0.007 (0.48)
Earnings surprise 0.161 (0.04) 0.084 (0.12)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.045 (0.00) 0.014 (0.01)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.128 (0.00) -0.134 (0.00)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.053
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.901 (0.16) 0.916 (0.07)
Owner rank 1 -1.536 (0.00) -1.634 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.900 (0.00) -0.971 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.577 (0.00) -0.523 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.235 (0.21) -0.324 (0.03)
Foreign owner 0.629 (0.00) 0.497 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.032 (0.91) -0.162 (0.44)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.195 (0.33) -0.209 (0.20)
Financial owner 0.165 (0.42) 0.109 (0.52)
ln(Firm Size) 0.026 (0.49) 0.035 (0.26)
Investment over depreciation -0.002 (0.92) -0.003 (0.72)
Earnings surprise 0.020 (0.81) 0.051 (0.38)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.003 (0.76) 0.006 (0.27)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.260 (0.00) -0.276 (0.00)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.127
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.100 (0.87) 0.406 (0.41)
Owner rank 1 -0.669 (0.00) -0.715 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.318 (0.07) -0.290 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 -0.027 (0.87) 0.033 (0.80)
Owner rank 4 0.161 (0.34) 0.030 (0.82)
Foreign owner 0.763 (0.00) 0.704 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.423 (0.13) 0.269 (0.19)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.187 (0.35) 0.091 (0.58)
Financial owner 0.549 (0.01) 0.457 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.013 (0.71) -0.016 (0.58)
Investment over depreciation 0.000 (0.99) -0.003 (0.76)
Earnings surprise -0.002 (0.98) 0.049 (0.37)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.008 (0.49) -0.002 (0.71)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.202 (0.00) -0.207 (0.00)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.063
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.653 (0.34) 1.162 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.570 (0.00) -1.447 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.215 (0.00) -1.209 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.815 (0.00) -0.706 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.323 (0.06) -0.388 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.821 (0.00) 0.804 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.165 (0.61) 0.070 (0.76)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.201 (0.40) 0.120 (0.52)
Financial owner 0.418 (0.08) 0.298 (0.11)
ln(Firm Size) -0.044 (0.28) -0.063 (0.05)
Investment over depreciation 0.005 (0.77) 0.001 (0.90)
Earnings surprise 0.007 (0.93) 0.048 (0.42)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.002 (0.89) -0.008 (0.18)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.194 (0.00) -0.189 (0.00)
n 1455 2515
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.099
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.120 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.095 (0.07) -0.562 (0.23)
Owner rank 1 -0.043 (0.81) -0.177 (0.18)
Owner rank 2 0.129 (0.45) -0.056 (0.66)
Owner rank 3 0.068 (0.69) 0.066 (0.60)
Owner rank 4 0.209 (0.21) 0.103 (0.42)
Foreign owner 1.009 (0.00) 0.999 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.480 (0.07) 0.424 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.075 (0.70) 0.081 (0.60)
Financial owner 0.879 (0.00) 0.677 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.024 (0.49) 0.014 (0.62)
Investment over depreciation 0.043 (0.00) 0.025 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.139 (0.06) -0.076 (0.19)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.025 (0.02) 0.013 (0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.105 (0.00) -0.112 (0.00)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.046
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.342 (0.04) 1.337 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.451 (0.00) -1.562 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.811 (0.00) -0.967 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.499 (0.01) -0.512 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.058 (0.76) -0.199 (0.17)
Foreign owner 0.489 (0.02) 0.368 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner 0.110 (0.70) -0.111 (0.59)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.244 (0.22) -0.320 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.294 (0.16) 0.196 (0.25)
ln(Firm Size) -0.009 (0.80) 0.005 (0.86)
Investment over depreciation 0.023 (0.09) 0.019 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.063 (0.43) -0.004 (0.95)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.009 (0.43) 0.004 (0.46)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.289 (0.00) -0.278 (0.00)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.138 0.129
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.441 (0.47) 0.883 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -0.576 (0.00) -0.647 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.200 (0.24) -0.292 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.064 (0.70) 0.051 (0.69)
Owner rank 4 0.253 (0.13) 0.091 (0.47)
Foreign owner 0.557 (0.01) 0.495 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.387 (0.16) 0.198 (0.32)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.009 (0.96) -0.106 (0.50)
Financial owner 0.553 (0.01) 0.418 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.024 (0.49) -0.044 (0.13)
Investment over depreciation 0.025 (0.05) 0.017 (0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) 0.006 (0.94) 0.044 (0.46)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.004 (0.72) -0.004 (0.45)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.214 (0.00) -0.205 (0.00)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.064
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.532 (0.43) 1.182 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.621 (0.00) -1.465 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.212 (0.00) -1.283 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.723 (0.00) -0.685 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.271 (0.11) -0.352 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.612 (0.01) 0.647 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.171 (0.59) 0.010 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.116 (0.62) 0.060 (0.74)
Financial owner 0.403 (0.08) 0.323 (0.07)
ln(Firm Size) -0.052 (0.18) -0.074 (0.02)
Investment over depreciation 0.041 (0.00) 0.025 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.046 (0.58) -0.018 (0.78)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.011 (0.35) -0.005 (0.40)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.154 (0.00) -0.150 (0.00)
n 1520 2655
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.094
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.121 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt
Maturity. RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.587 (0.01) -0.685 (0.13)
Owner rank 1 -0.129 (0.47) -0.253 (0.06)
Owner rank 2 0.070 (0.69) 0.041 (0.75)
Owner rank 3 0.044 (0.80) 0.093 (0.47)
Owner rank 4 0.194 (0.25) 0.068 (0.59)
Foreign owner 1.101 (0.00) 1.104 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.214 (0.42) 0.247 (0.20)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.031 (0.87) 0.023 (0.88)
Financial owner 0.750 (0.00) 0.619 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.016 (0.63) 0.005 (0.87)
Long term debt over total debt 0.327 (0.16) 0.014 (0.93)
Earnings surprise 0.210 (0.01) 0.102 (0.06)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.054 (0.00) 0.018 (0.00)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.042
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.863 (0.16) 0.945 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -1.927 (0.00) -1.979 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.063 (0.00) -1.124 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.696 (0.00) -0.619 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.308 (0.10) -0.411 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.629 (0.00) 0.512 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.115 (0.67) -0.223 (0.27)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.352 (0.07) -0.316 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.159 (0.44) 0.176 (0.29)
ln(Firm Size) 0.001 (0.97) 0.008 (0.78)
Long term debt over total debt 0.010 (0.96) -0.067 (0.70)
Earnings surprise 0.061 (0.44) 0.057 (0.31)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.010 (0.40) 0.008 (0.16)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.104
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.072 (0.90) 0.359 (0.43)
Owner rank 1 -0.840 (0.00) -0.851 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.392 (0.02) -0.337 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.137 (0.41) -0.035 (0.78)
Owner rank 4 0.079 (0.64) -0.031 (0.80)
Foreign owner 0.846 (0.00) 0.765 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.184 (0.49) 0.136 (0.49)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.009 (0.96) -0.021 (0.90)
Financial owner 0.543 (0.01) 0.537 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.033 (0.32) -0.051 (0.06)
Long term debt over total debt 0.306 (0.18) 0.155 (0.35)
Earnings surprise 0.059 (0.45) 0.077 (0.15)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.003 (0.80) 0.004 (0.49)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.043
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.647 (0.32) 1.231 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.841 (0.00) -1.681 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.382 (0.00) -1.317 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.014 (0.00) -0.851 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.460 (0.01) -0.519 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.949 (0.00) 0.903 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.066 (0.83) 0.002 (0.99)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.095 (0.69) 0.050 (0.78)
Financial owner 0.462 (0.05) 0.380 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) -0.089 (0.02) -0.104 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.286 (0.26) 0.135 (0.45)
Earnings surprise 0.060 (0.48) 0.057 (0.33)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.012 (0.35) -0.002 (0.74)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.081
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.122 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Debt Maturity. RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.970 (0.10) -0.426 (0.34)
Owner rank 1 -0.101 (0.55) -0.214 (0.09)
Owner rank 2 0.103 (0.54) -0.029 (0.81)
Owner rank 3 0.044 (0.79) 0.057 (0.65)
Owner rank 4 0.157 (0.34) 0.053 (0.67)
Foreign owner 1.034 (0.00) 1.012 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.381 (0.14) 0.309 (0.10)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.003 (0.99) 0.046 (0.76)
Financial owner 0.848 (0.00) 0.689 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.008 (0.81) -0.003 (0.91)
Long term debt over total debt -0.096 (0.66) -0.092 (0.56)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.159 (0.03) -0.064 (0.26)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.031 (0.00) 0.014 (0.01)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.035
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.053 (0.09) 1.082 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.871 (0.00) -1.885 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.991 (0.00) -1.088 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.611 (0.00) -0.577 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.148 (0.42) -0.274 (0.05)
Foreign owner 0.519 (0.01) 0.422 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.028 (0.92) -0.164 (0.41)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.364 (0.06) -0.382 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.314 (0.13) 0.283 (0.09)
ln(Firm Size) -0.016 (0.65) -0.005 (0.87)
Long term debt over total debt -0.037 (0.87) 0.003 (0.98)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.114 (0.14) -0.010 (0.86)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.016 (0.15) 0.008 (0.17)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.104
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.253 (0.67) 0.619 (0.17)
Owner rank 1 -0.744 (0.00) -0.770 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.276 (0.10) -0.327 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.024 (0.88) 0.005 (0.97)
Owner rank 4 0.171 (0.30) 0.040 (0.74)
Foreign owner 0.663 (0.00) 0.583 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.155 (0.56) 0.097 (0.62)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.121 (0.53) -0.172 (0.27)
Financial owner 0.581 (0.00) 0.523 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.052 (0.13) -0.063 (0.02)
Long term debt over total debt 0.182 (0.40) 0.165 (0.30)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.048 (0.52) 0.035 (0.54)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.006 (0.54) 0.002 (0.70)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.042
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.562 (0.38) 1.152 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.833 (0.00) -1.658 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.355 (0.00) -1.360 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.860 (0.00) -0.783 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.387 (0.02) -0.449 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.736 (0.00) 0.746 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.081 (0.79) -0.036 (0.87)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.074 (0.74) 0.042 (0.81)
Financial owner 0.463 (0.04) 0.414 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.081 (0.03) -0.097 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt 0.099 (0.68) 0.088 (0.61)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.078 (0.34) -0.007 (0.91)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.019 (0.10) -0.000 (0.98)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.078
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.123 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt
Maturity and Duration. RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.355 (0.03) -0.403 (0.38)
Owner rank 1 -0.071 (0.69) -0.195 (0.14)
Owner rank 2 0.098 (0.57) 0.066 (0.61)
Owner rank 3 0.084 (0.63) 0.117 (0.36)
Owner rank 4 0.208 (0.22) 0.081 (0.53)
Foreign owner 1.048 (0.00) 1.023 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.348 (0.19) 0.337 (0.09)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.047 (0.81) 0.053 (0.74)
Financial owner 0.744 (0.00) 0.564 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.023 (0.51) 0.012 (0.66)
Long term debt over total debt 0.297 (0.20) -0.040 (0.81)
Earnings surprise 0.202 (0.01) 0.086 (0.11)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.051 (0.00) 0.014 (0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.128 (0.00) -0.145 (0.00)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.053
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.165 (0.06) 1.266 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.510 (0.00) -1.619 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.887 (0.00) -0.968 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.589 (0.00) -0.524 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.265 (0.15) -0.379 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.574 (0.01) 0.419 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner 0.030 (0.91) -0.163 (0.43)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.222 (0.26) -0.240 (0.14)
Financial owner 0.143 (0.49) 0.116 (0.49)
ln(Firm Size) 0.010 (0.78) 0.019 (0.52)
Long term debt over total debt -0.050 (0.83) -0.143 (0.42)
Earnings surprise 0.069 (0.39) 0.049 (0.39)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.005 (0.67) 0.004 (0.46)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.259 (0.00) -0.274 (0.00)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.123
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.161 (0.79) 0.643 (0.17)
Owner rank 1 -0.676 (0.00) -0.706 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.341 (0.05) -0.284 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 -0.071 (0.68) 0.014 (0.91)
Owner rank 4 0.090 (0.59) -0.024 (0.85)
Foreign owner 0.765 (0.00) 0.651 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.381 (0.16) 0.229 (0.26)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.155 (0.44) 0.054 (0.74)
Financial owner 0.524 (0.01) 0.462 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.012 (0.74) -0.033 (0.24)
Long term debt over total debt 0.188 (0.42) 0.063 (0.71)
Earnings surprise 0.048 (0.53) 0.061 (0.26)
lag(-1)(RoA) -0.004 (0.75) -0.001 (0.90)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.199 (0.00) -0.211 (0.00)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.062
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.934 (0.16) 1.498 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.553 (0.00) -1.453 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.197 (0.00) -1.167 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.848 (0.00) -0.717 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.368 (0.03) -0.436 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.825 (0.00) 0.734 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.162 (0.61) 0.013 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.191 (0.42) 0.064 (0.73)
Financial owner 0.399 (0.09) 0.261 (0.15)
ln(Firm Size) -0.070 (0.07) -0.084 (0.01)
Long term debt over total debt 0.219 (0.40) 0.067 (0.71)
Earnings surprise 0.053 (0.54) 0.040 (0.49)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.006 (0.65) -0.006 (0.29)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.203 (0.00) -0.198 (0.00)
n 1490 2635
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.099
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.124 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Debt Maturity and Duration. RoS
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.780 (0.18) -0.227 (0.61)
Owner rank 1 -0.068 (0.69) -0.171 (0.18)
Owner rank 2 0.121 (0.47) -0.009 (0.94)
Owner rank 3 0.069 (0.68) 0.074 (0.55)
Owner rank 4 0.180 (0.28) 0.074 (0.55)
Foreign owner 0.982 (0.00) 0.946 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.502 (0.06) 0.391 (0.04)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.064 (0.74) 0.073 (0.63)
Financial owner 0.837 (0.00) 0.644 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.015 (0.66) 0.005 (0.85)
Long term debt over total debt -0.119 (0.58) -0.116 (0.47)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.146 (0.05) -0.063 (0.26)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.028 (0.01) 0.012 (0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.108 (0.00) -0.123 (0.00)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.043
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.303 (0.04) 1.321 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.431 (0.00) -1.523 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.807 (0.00) -0.937 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.500 (0.01) -0.489 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.096 (0.60) -0.235 (0.09)
Foreign owner 0.437 (0.04) 0.333 (0.05)
Family (individual) owner 0.145 (0.61) -0.098 (0.64)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.244 (0.22) -0.319 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.287 (0.17) 0.227 (0.17)
ln(Firm Size) -0.001 (0.98) 0.011 (0.72)
Long term debt over total debt -0.109 (0.64) -0.033 (0.85)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.092 (0.24) -0.008 (0.90)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.012 (0.29) 0.005 (0.39)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.288 (0.00) -0.284 (0.00)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.124
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.468 (0.43) 0.844 (0.07)
Owner rank 1 -0.582 (0.00) -0.633 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.227 (0.18) -0.284 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 0.035 (0.83) 0.042 (0.73)
Owner rank 4 0.194 (0.24) 0.052 (0.67)
Foreign owner 0.549 (0.01) 0.466 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.361 (0.19) 0.188 (0.34)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.008 (0.97) -0.111 (0.48)
Financial owner 0.543 (0.01) 0.447 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.026 (0.46) -0.041 (0.14)
Long term debt over total debt 0.074 (0.74) 0.110 (0.50)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.012 (0.87) 0.047 (0.41)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.000 (0.98) -0.002 (0.75)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.214 (0.00) -0.215 (0.00)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.063
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.778 (0.23) 1.326 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.596 (0.00) -1.469 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.201 (0.00) -1.234 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.722 (0.00) -0.673 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.301 (0.07) -0.373 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.606 (0.01) 0.594 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.168 (0.59) -0.029 (0.90)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.125 (0.59) 0.040 (0.82)
Financial owner 0.383 (0.10) 0.308 (0.08)
ln(Firm Size) -0.062 (0.10) -0.077 (0.01)
Long term debt over total debt 0.046 (0.85) 0.056 (0.75)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.051 (0.53) -0.005 (0.94)
lag(-1)(RoA) 0.014 (0.23) -0.003 (0.59)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.165 (0.00) -0.167 (0.00)
n 1545 2770
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.092
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.2.6 Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Table 7.125 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and De-
preciation over long term assets. Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -2.248 (0.00) -1.376 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -0.153 (0.39) -0.297 (0.03)
Owner rank 2 0.038 (0.83) -0.027 (0.84)
Owner rank 3 0.036 (0.83) 0.065 (0.62)
Owner rank 4 0.194 (0.26) 0.095 (0.47)
Foreign owner 1.106 (0.00) 1.152 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.233 (0.38) 0.270 (0.19)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.050 (0.80) 0.076 (0.63)
Financial owner 0.758 (0.00) 0.605 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.079 (0.03) 0.042 (0.16)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.854 (0.00) 3.389 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.040 (0.59) 0.041 (0.46)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.002 (0.23) 0.000 (0.97)
n 1485 2480
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.053
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.500 (0.45) 0.259 (0.62)
Owner rank 1 -2.001 (0.00) -2.023 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.118 (0.00) -1.155 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.721 (0.00) -0.671 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.314 (0.09) -0.467 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.599 (0.00) 0.514 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.158 (0.56) -0.285 (0.18)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.219 (0.27) -0.289 (0.07)
Financial owner 0.198 (0.33) 0.140 (0.40)
ln(Firm Size) 0.074 (0.05) 0.044 (0.16)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.901 (0.00) 2.462 (0.00)
Earnings surprise -0.015 (0.84) 0.030 (0.61)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.05) 0.001 (0.54)
n 1485 2480
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.109
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.162 (0.06) -0.149 (0.77)
Owner rank 1 -0.879 (0.00) -0.880 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.422 (0.01) -0.373 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.142 (0.40) -0.077 (0.55)
Owner rank 4 0.101 (0.55) -0.016 (0.90)
Foreign owner 0.778 (0.00) 0.795 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.196 (0.47) 0.140 (0.50)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.135 (0.50) 0.057 (0.72)
Financial owner 0.566 (0.01) 0.512 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.033 (0.36) -0.020 (0.51)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.648 (0.00) 1.514 (0.01)
Earnings surprise -0.009 (0.90) 0.040 (0.46)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.06) 0.001 (0.60)
n 1485 2480
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.045
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.668 (0.33) 0.663 (0.22)
Owner rank 1 -1.961 (0.00) -1.742 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.457 (0.00) -1.351 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.050 (0.00) -0.889 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.447 (0.01) -0.484 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.873 (0.00) 0.944 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.004 (0.99) -0.009 (0.97)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.230 (0.33) 0.118 (0.53)
Financial owner 0.473 (0.04) 0.367 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) -0.010 (0.81) -0.073 (0.02)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.006 (0.00) 1.374 (0.01)
Earnings surprise -0.051 (0.54) 0.030 (0.62)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.01) 0.002 (0.18)
n 1485 2480
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.088
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.126 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets.Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.667 (0.01) -1.197 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -0.121 (0.48) -0.225 (0.09)
Owner rank 2 0.073 (0.67) -0.076 (0.55)
Owner rank 3 0.025 (0.88) 0.038 (0.77)
Owner rank 4 0.159 (0.34) 0.070 (0.59)
Foreign owner 1.051 (0.00) 1.063 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.388 (0.14) 0.392 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.105 (0.58) 0.116 (0.45)
Financial owner 0.874 (0.00) 0.708 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.049 (0.16) 0.039 (0.18)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.861 (0.00) 2.348 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.108 (0.12) -0.027 (0.62)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.04) 0.001 (0.39)
n 1545 2600
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.042
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.559 (0.38) 1.163 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.923 (0.00) -1.875 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.023 (0.00) -1.067 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.629 (0.00) -0.575 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.134 (0.47) -0.246 (0.09)
Foreign owner 0.468 (0.03) 0.390 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -0.070 (0.80) -0.205 (0.33)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.302 (0.12) -0.395 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.303 (0.14) 0.220 (0.19)
ln(Firm Size) 0.015 (0.68) -0.005 (0.86)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.498 (0.01) 0.552 (0.18)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.118 (0.11) -0.014 (0.81)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.007 (0.00) 0.003 (0.02)
n 1545 2600
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.104
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.068 (0.91) 0.527 (0.26)
Owner rank 1 -0.765 (0.00) -0.761 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.303 (0.07) -0.321 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.030 (0.86) 0.009 (0.94)
Owner rank 4 0.183 (0.26) 0.085 (0.50)
Foreign owner 0.620 (0.00) 0.609 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.184 (0.49) 0.139 (0.50)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.068 (0.73) -0.119 (0.45)
Financial owner 0.575 (0.00) 0.509 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.027 (0.45) -0.054 (0.06)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.402 (0.09) 0.397 (0.29)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.062 (0.37) 0.021 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.02) 0.001 (0.28)
n 1545 2600
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.042
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.239 (0.72) 0.927 (0.07)
Owner rank 1 -1.890 (0.00) -1.671 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.393 (0.00) -1.357 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.871 (0.00) -0.773 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.377 (0.02) -0.391 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.707 (0.00) 0.792 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.099 (0.75) 0.016 (0.95)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.133 (0.56) 0.104 (0.57)
Financial owner 0.453 (0.05) 0.432 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.054 (0.16) -0.086 (0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.066 (0.02) 0.480 (0.22)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.058 (0.45) -0.022 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.06) 0.002 (0.14)
n 1545 2600
Pseudo R2 0.093 0.081
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.127 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Deprecia-
tion over long term assets and Duration. Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.955 (0.00) -1.095 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -0.090 (0.62) -0.237 (0.09)
Owner rank 2 0.070 (0.69) -0.001 (1.00)
Owner rank 3 0.074 (0.67) 0.090 (0.50)
Owner rank 4 0.208 (0.23) 0.107 (0.42)
Foreign owner 1.058 (0.00) 1.073 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.350 (0.19) 0.377 (0.07)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.109 (0.58) 0.105 (0.51)
Financial owner 0.753 (0.00) 0.558 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.079 (0.03) 0.046 (0.13)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.330 (0.00) 3.112 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.044 (0.55) 0.037 (0.50)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.002 (0.24) 0.000 (0.94)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.113 (0.00) -0.135 (0.00)
n 1485 2480
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.062
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.065 (0.92) 0.626 (0.24)
Owner rank 1 -1.591 (0.00) -1.649 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.949 (0.00) -0.994 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.621 (0.00) -0.577 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.274 (0.14) -0.433 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.543 (0.01) 0.429 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.045 (0.87) -0.216 (0.32)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.121 (0.54) -0.218 (0.19)
Financial owner 0.179 (0.39) 0.083 (0.62)
ln(Firm Size) 0.073 (0.06) 0.048 (0.13)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.983 (0.00) 2.040 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.008 (0.92) 0.036 (0.53)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.04) 0.001 (0.50)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.243 (0.00) -0.265 (0.00)
n 1485 2480
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.127
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.880 (0.17) 0.133 (0.79)
Owner rank 1 -0.702 (0.00) -0.723 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.364 (0.04) -0.314 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 -0.074 (0.67) -0.025 (0.85)
Owner rank 4 0.119 (0.48) -0.008 (0.95)
Foreign owner 0.705 (0.00) 0.688 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.382 (0.17) 0.265 (0.21)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.265 (0.19) 0.137 (0.40)
Financial owner 0.557 (0.01) 0.447 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.046 (0.21) -0.006 (0.83)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.876 (0.04) 1.134 (0.04)
Earnings surprise 0.004 (0.95) 0.040 (0.47)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.09) 0.000 (0.70)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.194 (0.00) -0.208 (0.00)
n 1485 2480
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.065
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.298 (0.67) 0.943 (0.09)
Owner rank 1 -1.661 (0.00) -1.504 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.280 (0.00) -1.196 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.895 (0.00) -0.754 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.358 (0.04) -0.400 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.765 (0.00) 0.787 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.104 (0.75) 0.040 (0.87)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.305 (0.20) 0.137 (0.47)
Financial owner 0.428 (0.07) 0.264 (0.16)
ln(Firm Size) 0.000 (0.99) -0.059 (0.07)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.096 (0.00) 0.937 (0.10)
Earnings surprise -0.037 (0.66) 0.027 (0.65)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.02) 0.002 (0.19)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.185 (0.00) -0.188 (0.00)
n 1485 2480
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.105
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.128 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.437 (0.02) -0.987 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -0.082 (0.64) -0.181 (0.17)
Owner rank 2 0.095 (0.58) -0.058 (0.66)
Owner rank 3 0.050 (0.77) 0.053 (0.68)
Owner rank 4 0.181 (0.28) 0.089 (0.49)
Foreign owner 1.003 (0.00) 1.001 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.497 (0.06) 0.484 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.155 (0.42) 0.141 (0.36)
Financial owner 0.865 (0.00) 0.671 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.051 (0.14) 0.043 (0.14)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.447 (0.00) 2.121 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.101 (0.14) -0.028 (0.61)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.04) 0.001 (0.38)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.098 (0.00) -0.112 (0.00)
n 1545 2600
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.049
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.997 (0.12) 1.506 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.473 (0.00) -1.484 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.835 (0.00) -0.905 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.518 (0.00) -0.482 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.083 (0.66) -0.202 (0.16)
Foreign owner 0.391 (0.06) 0.305 (0.08)
Family (individual) owner 0.093 (0.75) -0.119 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.211 (0.29) -0.331 (0.04)
Financial owner 0.279 (0.18) 0.167 (0.32)
ln(Firm Size) 0.018 (0.62) 0.001 (0.96)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.597 (0.09) 0.213 (0.60)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.105 (0.16) -0.012 (0.84)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.007 (0.00) 0.003 (0.01)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.286 (0.00) -0.288 (0.00)
n 1545 2600
Pseudo R2 0.143 0.124
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.212 (0.73) 0.770 (0.11)
Owner rank 1 -0.589 (0.00) -0.611 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.245 (0.15) -0.274 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 0.034 (0.84) 0.048 (0.71)
Owner rank 4 0.212 (0.20) 0.100 (0.43)
Foreign owner 0.518 (0.01) 0.495 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.388 (0.16) 0.263 (0.21)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.043 (0.83) -0.049 (0.76)
Financial owner 0.550 (0.01) 0.442 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.009 (0.79) -0.038 (0.19)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.659 (0.44) 0.150 (0.69)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.037 (0.60) 0.033 (0.56)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.02) 0.001 (0.37)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.213 (0.00) -0.214 (0.00)
n 1545 2600
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.063
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.558 (0.41) 1.124 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.642 (0.00) -1.475 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.236 (0.00) -1.228 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.731 (0.00) -0.662 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.291 (0.08) -0.313 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.588 (0.01) 0.645 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.189 (0.55) 0.051 (0.83)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.165 (0.47) 0.107 (0.56)
Financial owner 0.386 (0.09) 0.336 (0.07)
ln(Firm Size) -0.044 (0.26) -0.071 (0.02)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.283 (0.16) 0.233 (0.55)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.040 (0.60) -0.019 (0.76)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.07) 0.002 (0.16)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.160 (0.00) -0.160 (0.00)
n 1545 2600
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.094
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.129 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and In-
vestments over depreciation. Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.009 (0.09) -0.373 (0.44)
Owner rank 1 -0.094 (0.60) -0.275 (0.05)
Owner rank 2 0.060 (0.73) -0.012 (0.93)
Owner rank 3 0.064 (0.71) 0.074 (0.58)
Owner rank 4 0.230 (0.18) 0.121 (0.37)
Foreign owner 1.142 (0.00) 1.202 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.237 (0.37) 0.345 (0.09)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.048 (0.81) 0.010 (0.95)
Financial owner 0.766 (0.00) 0.598 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.025 (0.49) -0.004 (0.90)
Investment over depreciation 0.024 (0.10) 0.005 (0.61)
Earnings surprise 0.032 (0.67) 0.053 (0.35)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.06) 0.001 (0.53)
n 1450 2365
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.043
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.621 (0.32) 0.874 (0.09)
Owner rank 1 -1.957 (0.00) -1.977 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.076 (0.00) -1.116 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.693 (0.00) -0.658 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.283 (0.13) -0.428 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.658 (0.00) 0.616 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.188 (0.49) -0.227 (0.29)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.314 (0.11) -0.318 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.183 (0.37) 0.152 (0.37)
ln(Firm Size) 0.027 (0.48) 0.018 (0.57)
Investment over depreciation -0.010 (0.52) -0.005 (0.61)
Earnings surprise -0.031 (0.69) 0.028 (0.64)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.02) 0.001 (0.28)
n 1450 2365
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.105
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.383 (0.52) 0.222 (0.65)
Owner rank 1 -0.845 (0.00) -0.849 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.373 (0.03) -0.341 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.106 (0.53) -0.067 (0.61)
Owner rank 4 0.150 (0.37) 0.005 (0.97)
Foreign owner 0.801 (0.00) 0.820 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.193 (0.47) 0.178 (0.40)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.054 (0.79) 0.010 (0.95)
Financial owner 0.552 (0.01) 0.498 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.000 (0.99) -0.034 (0.26)
Investment over depreciation -0.002 (0.87) -0.004 (0.66)
Earnings surprise -0.019 (0.80) 0.041 (0.47)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.02) 0.001 (0.39)
n 1450 2365
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.043
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.361 (0.59) 0.983 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -1.864 (0.00) -1.705 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.407 (0.00) -1.353 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.999 (0.00) -0.886 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.406 (0.02) -0.478 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.910 (0.00) 0.982 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.012 (0.97) 0.057 (0.81)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.130 (0.58) 0.108 (0.57)
Financial owner 0.476 (0.04) 0.368 (0.05)
ln(Firm Size) -0.052 (0.19) -0.087 (0.01)
Investment over depreciation 0.005 (0.74) 0.003 (0.80)
Earnings surprise -0.052 (0.53) 0.054 (0.38)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.005 (0.00) 0.002 (0.10)
n 1450 2365
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.086
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.130 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.746 (0.19) -0.423 (0.36)
Owner rank 1 -0.086 (0.62) -0.236 (0.08)
Owner rank 2 0.103 (0.54) -0.090 (0.49)
Owner rank 3 0.038 (0.82) 0.040 (0.76)
Owner rank 4 0.183 (0.28) 0.079 (0.54)
Foreign owner 1.069 (0.00) 1.074 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.333 (0.20) 0.394 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.008 (0.96) 0.051 (0.74)
Financial owner 0.877 (0.00) 0.696 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.006 (0.85) -0.000 (0.99)
Investment over depreciation 0.044 (0.00) 0.023 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.104 (0.14) -0.043 (0.45)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.02) 0.001 (0.35)
n 1520 2500
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.037
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.355 (0.03) 1.254 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.920 (0.00) -1.892 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.015 (0.00) -1.083 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.624 (0.00) -0.598 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.111 (0.56) -0.240 (0.10)
Foreign owner 0.535 (0.01) 0.455 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.106 (0.70) -0.175 (0.41)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.374 (0.06) -0.409 (0.01)
Financial owner 0.303 (0.14) 0.222 (0.19)
ln(Firm Size) -0.024 (0.51) -0.012 (0.70)
Investment over depreciation 0.019 (0.14) 0.020 (0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.101 (0.18) -0.014 (0.81)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.007 (0.00) 0.003 (0.02)
n 1520 2500
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.108
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.330 (0.57) 0.609 (0.19)
Owner rank 1 -0.754 (0.00) -0.757 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.261 (0.12) -0.308 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 -0.004 (0.98) 0.010 (0.94)
Owner rank 4 0.221 (0.18) 0.095 (0.46)
Foreign owner 0.642 (0.00) 0.604 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.146 (0.58) 0.128 (0.53)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.125 (0.52) -0.171 (0.28)
Financial owner 0.570 (0.00) 0.474 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.048 (0.16) -0.059 (0.04)
Investment over depreciation 0.024 (0.04) 0.017 (0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.052 (0.46) 0.013 (0.81)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.01) 0.001 (0.29)
n 1520 2500
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.044
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.674 (0.29) 1.018 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -1.855 (0.00) -1.665 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.366 (0.00) -1.378 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.860 (0.00) -0.784 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.353 (0.03) -0.394 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.731 (0.00) 0.796 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.046 (0.88) 0.019 (0.94)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.065 (0.78) 0.068 (0.71)
Financial owner 0.459 (0.04) 0.407 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.077 (0.04) -0.094 (0.00)
Investment over depreciation 0.041 (0.00) 0.026 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.056 (0.47) -0.047 (0.44)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.05) 0.002 (0.14)
n 1520 2500
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.084
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.131 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Invest-
ments over depreciation and Duration. Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.859 (0.15) -0.193 (0.69)
Owner rank 1 -0.022 (0.90) -0.212 (0.13)
Owner rank 2 0.096 (0.58) 0.016 (0.90)
Owner rank 3 0.112 (0.52) 0.102 (0.45)
Owner rank 4 0.249 (0.15) 0.132 (0.33)
Foreign owner 1.081 (0.00) 1.111 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.381 (0.15) 0.456 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.035 (0.86) 0.046 (0.78)
Financial owner 0.767 (0.00) 0.552 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.032 (0.37) 0.005 (0.86)
Investment over depreciation 0.027 (0.07) 0.004 (0.67)
Earnings surprise 0.039 (0.60) 0.050 (0.37)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.07) 0.001 (0.53)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.130 (0.00) -0.139 (0.00)
n 1450 2365
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.053
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.828 (0.19) 1.121 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.534 (0.00) -1.599 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.896 (0.00) -0.951 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.585 (0.00) -0.561 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.240 (0.20) -0.394 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.595 (0.01) 0.515 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.060 (0.83) -0.158 (0.47)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.185 (0.36) -0.235 (0.16)
Financial owner 0.167 (0.42) 0.094 (0.58)
ln(Firm Size) 0.035 (0.36) 0.028 (0.39)
Investment over depreciation -0.001 (0.97) -0.005 (0.61)
Earnings surprise -0.013 (0.87) 0.032 (0.59)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.02) 0.001 (0.29)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.262 (0.00) -0.273 (0.00)
n 1450 2365
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.125
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.313 (0.61) 0.378 (0.44)
Owner rank 1 -0.669 (0.00) -0.697 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.315 (0.07) -0.286 (0.04)
Owner rank 3 -0.035 (0.84) -0.017 (0.90)
Owner rank 4 0.173 (0.31) 0.013 (0.92)
Foreign owner 0.717 (0.00) 0.699 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.395 (0.16) 0.297 (0.17)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.205 (0.31) 0.095 (0.57)
Financial owner 0.543 (0.01) 0.430 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.022 (0.55) -0.014 (0.64)
Investment over depreciation 0.001 (0.95) -0.005 (0.57)
Earnings surprise -0.007 (0.93) 0.038 (0.50)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.04) 0.001 (0.51)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.200 (0.00) -0.206 (0.00)
n 1450 2365
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.063
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.478 (0.48) 1.093 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -1.575 (0.00) -1.476 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.229 (0.00) -1.208 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.837 (0.00) -0.754 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.317 (0.07) -0.401 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.777 (0.00) 0.813 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.122 (0.71) 0.100 (0.68)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.225 (0.35) 0.135 (0.48)
Financial owner 0.424 (0.07) 0.266 (0.16)
ln(Firm Size) -0.031 (0.45) -0.065 (0.05)
Investment over depreciation 0.006 (0.71) 0.001 (0.96)
Earnings surprise -0.032 (0.70) 0.054 (0.39)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.005 (0.01) 0.002 (0.12)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.191 (0.00) -0.182 (0.00)
n 1450 2365
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.101
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.132 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.652 (0.26) -0.294 (0.53)
Owner rank 1 -0.041 (0.81) -0.191 (0.16)
Owner rank 2 0.130 (0.45) -0.071 (0.59)
Owner rank 3 0.068 (0.69) 0.058 (0.66)
Owner rank 4 0.210 (0.21) 0.100 (0.44)
Foreign owner 1.010 (0.00) 1.001 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.460 (0.08) 0.492 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.077 (0.69) 0.082 (0.60)
Financial owner 0.873 (0.00) 0.659 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.015 (0.66) 0.009 (0.76)
Investment over depreciation 0.046 (0.00) 0.021 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.093 (0.19) -0.040 (0.47)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.02) 0.001 (0.36)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.108 (0.00) -0.117 (0.00)
n 1520 2500
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.044
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.555 (0.01) 1.490 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -1.471 (0.00) -1.514 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.824 (0.00) -0.927 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.508 (0.01) -0.506 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.057 (0.76) -0.198 (0.18)
Foreign owner 0.450 (0.03) 0.355 (0.04)
Family (individual) owner 0.070 (0.81) -0.092 (0.68)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.257 (0.20) -0.340 (0.04)
Financial owner 0.280 (0.18) 0.168 (0.33)
ln(Firm Size) -0.011 (0.76) 0.000 (0.99)
Investment over depreciation 0.021 (0.11) 0.017 (0.07)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.084 (0.27) -0.009 (0.89)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.00) 0.003 (0.01)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.296 (0.00) -0.282 (0.00)
n 1520 2500
Pseudo R2 0.147 0.128
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.392 (0.51) 0.759 (0.11)
Owner rank 1 -0.582 (0.00) -0.615 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.204 (0.23) -0.265 (0.04)
Owner rank 3 0.061 (0.72) 0.047 (0.72)
Owner rank 4 0.253 (0.13) 0.110 (0.40)
Foreign owner 0.527 (0.01) 0.478 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.358 (0.20) 0.244 (0.25)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.002 (0.99) -0.104 (0.52)
Financial owner 0.546 (0.01) 0.405 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.022 (0.54) -0.038 (0.19)
Investment over depreciation 0.023 (0.06) 0.014 (0.08)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.026 (0.72) 0.028 (0.62)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.02) 0.001 (0.40)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.213 (0.00) -0.205 (0.00)
n 1520 2500
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.063
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.730 (0.26) 1.100 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.623 (0.00) -1.486 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.217 (0.00) -1.262 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.725 (0.00) -0.682 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.273 (0.10) -0.325 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.595 (0.01) 0.649 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.140 (0.66) 0.050 (0.83)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.112 (0.63) 0.071 (0.70)
Financial owner 0.393 (0.09) 0.318 (0.09)
ln(Firm Size) -0.055 (0.15) -0.074 (0.02)
Investment over depreciation 0.041 (0.00) 0.024 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.036 (0.65) -0.040 (0.51)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.07) 0.002 (0.17)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.154 (0.00) -0.145 (0.00)
n 1520 2500
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.095
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
395
Table 7.133 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt
Maturity. Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.157 (0.05) -0.473 (0.32)
Owner rank 1 -0.108 (0.54) -0.307 (0.02)
Owner rank 2 0.054 (0.76) -0.011 (0.93)
Owner rank 3 0.039 (0.82) 0.072 (0.58)
Owner rank 4 0.195 (0.25) 0.079 (0.55)
Foreign owner 1.135 (0.00) 1.173 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.248 (0.34) 0.341 (0.09)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.039 (0.84) 0.017 (0.91)
Financial owner 0.780 (0.00) 0.585 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.039 (0.28) 0.015 (0.61)
Long term debt over total debt -0.007 (0.98) -0.234 (0.13)
Earnings surprise 0.060 (0.42) 0.045 (0.41)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.06) 0.000 (0.74)
n 1490 2490
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.044
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.330 (0.59) 0.823 (0.10)
Owner rank 1 -1.944 (0.00) -2.026 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.088 (0.00) -1.153 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.705 (0.00) -0.656 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.311 (0.09) -0.466 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.606 (0.00) 0.542 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.154 (0.57) -0.213 (0.32)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.300 (0.12) -0.304 (0.06)
Financial owner 0.196 (0.34) 0.148 (0.38)
ln(Firm Size) 0.048 (0.20) 0.030 (0.34)
Long term debt over total debt -0.087 (0.70) -0.186 (0.26)
Earnings surprise -0.006 (0.94) 0.034 (0.55)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.01) 0.001 (0.22)
n 1490 2490
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.106
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.613 (0.30) 0.222 (0.64)
Owner rank 1 -0.835 (0.00) -0.890 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.411 (0.02) -0.372 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.142 (0.40) -0.062 (0.63)
Owner rank 4 0.105 (0.53) -0.022 (0.86)
Foreign owner 0.844 (0.00) 0.814 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.196 (0.46) 0.197 (0.34)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.088 (0.65) 0.029 (0.86)
Financial owner 0.606 (0.00) 0.514 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.004 (0.91) -0.034 (0.25)
Long term debt over total debt 0.248 (0.26) 0.016 (0.92)
Earnings surprise 0.014 (0.85) 0.049 (0.38)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.02) 0.001 (0.43)
n 1490 2490
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.043
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.140 (0.83) 0.951 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -1.868 (0.00) -1.749 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.426 (0.00) -1.328 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.032 (0.00) -0.865 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.435 (0.01) -0.495 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.948 (0.00) 0.980 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.028 (0.93) 0.084 (0.72)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.171 (0.47) 0.105 (0.57)
Financial owner 0.529 (0.02) 0.383 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) -0.046 (0.25) -0.085 (0.01)
Long term debt over total debt 0.210 (0.39) 0.064 (0.70)
Earnings surprise -0.023 (0.78) 0.042 (0.49)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.005 (0.00) 0.002 (0.10)
n 1490 2490
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.086
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.134 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Debt Maturity. Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.718 (0.20) -0.373 (0.41)
Owner rank 1 -0.097 (0.57) -0.249 (0.06)
Owner rank 2 0.078 (0.64) -0.077 (0.55)
Owner rank 3 0.022 (0.90) 0.037 (0.77)
Owner rank 4 0.158 (0.34) 0.068 (0.59)
Foreign owner 1.059 (0.00) 1.058 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.396 (0.13) 0.386 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.040 (0.83) 0.086 (0.57)
Financial owner 0.880 (0.00) 0.678 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.020 (0.57) 0.012 (0.67)
Long term debt over total debt -0.195 (0.35) -0.267 (0.08)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.110 (0.11) -0.034 (0.53)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.01) 0.001 (0.33)
n 1550 2615
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.035
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.128 (0.06) 1.151 (0.02)
Owner rank 1 -1.893 (0.00) -1.876 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.007 (0.00) -1.064 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.621 (0.00) -0.564 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.132 (0.48) -0.236 (0.10)
Foreign owner 0.474 (0.02) 0.419 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.081 (0.77) -0.176 (0.40)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.354 (0.07) -0.380 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.299 (0.14) 0.231 (0.17)
ln(Firm Size) -0.003 (0.93) 0.003 (0.93)
Long term debt over total debt -0.055 (0.81) -0.093 (0.57)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.114 (0.12) -0.012 (0.84)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.00) 0.003 (0.01)
n 1550 2615
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.104
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.235 (0.68) 0.576 (0.20)
Owner rank 1 -0.741 (0.00) -0.761 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.303 (0.07) -0.324 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.035 (0.83) 0.019 (0.88)
Owner rank 4 0.185 (0.26) 0.093 (0.46)
Foreign owner 0.670 (0.00) 0.614 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.178 (0.50) 0.152 (0.45)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.089 (0.64) -0.133 (0.40)
Financial owner 0.607 (0.00) 0.503 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.045 (0.19) -0.055 (0.05)
Long term debt over total debt 0.191 (0.37) 0.054 (0.73)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.054 (0.43) 0.017 (0.76)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.01) 0.002 (0.21)
n 1550 2615
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.042
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.686 (0.27) 0.969 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -1.844 (0.00) -1.677 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.388 (0.00) -1.343 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.871 (0.00) -0.759 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.373 (0.02) -0.380 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.748 (0.00) 0.792 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.101 (0.74) 0.040 (0.86)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.104 (0.65) 0.100 (0.58)
Financial owner 0.479 (0.04) 0.425 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.073 (0.06) -0.083 (0.01)
Long term debt over total debt 0.069 (0.77) -0.030 (0.86)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.049 (0.52) -0.035 (0.56)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.02) 0.002 (0.09)
n 1550 2615
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.080
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.135 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt
Maturity and Duration. Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.960 (0.11) -0.241 (0.61)
Owner rank 1 -0.049 (0.78) -0.249 (0.07)
Owner rank 2 0.085 (0.62) 0.015 (0.91)
Owner rank 3 0.081 (0.64) 0.098 (0.46)
Owner rank 4 0.213 (0.21) 0.093 (0.48)
Foreign owner 1.080 (0.00) 1.080 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.380 (0.15) 0.445 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.044 (0.82) 0.055 (0.73)
Financial owner 0.774 (0.00) 0.528 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.045 (0.22) 0.022 (0.46)
Long term debt over total debt -0.019 (0.93) -0.246 (0.12)
Earnings surprise 0.062 (0.41) 0.039 (0.48)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.08) 0.000 (0.73)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.128 (0.00) -0.147 (0.00)
n 1490 2490
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.056
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.573 (0.36) 1.098 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.526 (0.00) -1.647 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.912 (0.00) -0.989 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.601 (0.00) -0.561 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.265 (0.15) -0.430 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.535 (0.01) 0.436 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.028 (0.92) -0.154 (0.48)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.176 (0.37) -0.224 (0.18)
Financial owner 0.171 (0.41) 0.079 (0.64)
ln(Firm Size) 0.056 (0.14) 0.039 (0.21)
Long term debt over total debt -0.113 (0.62) -0.208 (0.21)
Earnings surprise 0.014 (0.86) 0.039 (0.51)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.01) 0.002 (0.21)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.260 (0.00) -0.279 (0.00)
n 1490 2490
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.127
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.509 (0.40) 0.404 (0.40)
Owner rank 1 -0.668 (0.00) -0.739 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.356 (0.04) -0.315 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 -0.070 (0.68) -0.011 (0.93)
Owner rank 4 0.126 (0.46) -0.013 (0.92)
Foreign owner 0.753 (0.00) 0.688 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.396 (0.15) 0.310 (0.14)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.244 (0.22) 0.120 (0.47)
Financial owner 0.588 (0.00) 0.437 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.028 (0.45) -0.014 (0.65)
Long term debt over total debt 0.173 (0.44) -0.022 (0.89)
Earnings surprise 0.020 (0.79) 0.044 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.003 (0.04) 0.001 (0.53)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.201 (0.00) -0.214 (0.00)
n 1490 2490
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.065
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.332 (0.62) 1.123 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.575 (0.00) -1.512 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.240 (0.00) -1.171 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.864 (0.00) -0.726 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.337 (0.05) -0.407 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.817 (0.00) 0.801 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.125 (0.70) 0.114 (0.63)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.274 (0.25) 0.132 (0.48)
Financial owner 0.466 (0.05) 0.264 (0.16)
ln(Firm Size) -0.027 (0.51) -0.065 (0.05)
Long term debt over total debt 0.191 (0.44) 0.059 (0.73)
Earnings surprise -0.013 (0.88) 0.036 (0.55)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.005 (0.00) 0.002 (0.11)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.199 (0.00) -0.196 (0.00)
n 1490 2490
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.105
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.136 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Debt Maturity and Duration. Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.576 (0.31) -0.220 (0.63)
Owner rank 1 -0.062 (0.72) -0.204 (0.12)
Owner rank 2 0.100 (0.55) -0.057 (0.66)
Owner rank 3 0.048 (0.77) 0.054 (0.67)
Owner rank 4 0.185 (0.27) 0.091 (0.48)
Foreign owner 1.005 (0.00) 0.987 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.520 (0.05) 0.482 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.110 (0.56) 0.118 (0.45)
Financial owner 0.870 (0.00) 0.635 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.027 (0.44) 0.020 (0.48)
Long term debt over total debt -0.202 (0.34) -0.265 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.103 (0.14) -0.036 (0.51)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.02) 0.001 (0.33)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.110 (0.00) -0.123 (0.00)
n 1550 2615
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.043
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.353 (0.03) 1.375 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -1.446 (0.00) -1.485 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.818 (0.00) -0.900 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.509 (0.01) -0.472 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.076 (0.69) -0.190 (0.19)
Foreign owner 0.381 (0.07) 0.321 (0.06)
Family (individual) owner 0.090 (0.75) -0.096 (0.66)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.242 (0.22) -0.316 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.267 (0.20) 0.170 (0.32)
ln(Firm Size) 0.010 (0.78) 0.016 (0.61)
Long term debt over total debt -0.090 (0.70) -0.088 (0.59)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.101 (0.18) -0.009 (0.87)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.008 (0.00) 0.003 (0.01)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.294 (0.00) -0.292 (0.00)
n 1550 2615
Pseudo R2 0.142 0.126
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.327 (0.57) 0.717 (0.12)
Owner rank 1 -0.576 (0.00) -0.614 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.249 (0.14) -0.277 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 0.031 (0.85) 0.058 (0.65)
Owner rank 4 0.217 (0.19) 0.109 (0.39)
Foreign owner 0.552 (0.01) 0.490 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.392 (0.15) 0.272 (0.19)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.044 (0.82) -0.060 (0.71)
Financial owner 0.572 (0.00) 0.430 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.017 (0.62) -0.032 (0.26)
Long term debt over total debt 0.117 (0.59) 0.036 (0.82)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.031 (0.66) 0.028 (0.61)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.01) 0.001 (0.29)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.216 (0.00) -0.217 (0.00)
n 1550 2615
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.064
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.817 (0.20) 1.076 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.602 (0.00) -1.479 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.229 (0.00) -1.211 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.725 (0.00) -0.645 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.281 (0.09) -0.300 (0.02)
Foreign owner 0.614 (0.01) 0.635 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.194 (0.54) 0.068 (0.77)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.158 (0.49) 0.105 (0.57)
Financial owner 0.402 (0.08) 0.322 (0.08)
ln(Firm Size) -0.053 (0.17) -0.063 (0.04)
Long term debt over total debt 0.046 (0.85) -0.026 (0.88)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.031 (0.68) -0.032 (0.58)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual) 0.004 (0.03) 0.002 (0.10)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.166 (0.00) -0.165 (0.00)
n 1550 2615
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.094
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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7.2.7 Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Table 7.137 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and De-
preciation over long term assets. Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.693 (0.01) -1.529 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -0.205 (0.26) -0.327 (0.03)
Owner rank 2 0.061 (0.73) 0.041 (0.78)
Owner rank 3 -0.006 (0.97) 0.096 (0.52)
Owner rank 4 0.204 (0.25) 0.148 (0.31)
Foreign owner 1.069 (0.00) 1.208 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.191 (0.49) 0.185 (0.44)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.023 (0.91) 0.080 (0.64)
Financial owner 0.762 (0.00) 0.677 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.045 (0.24) 0.041 (0.22)
Depreciation over long term assets 5.091 (0.00) 4.287 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.059 (0.43) 0.057 (0.34)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.26) -0.001 (0.32)
n 1420 2005
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.061
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.117 (0.87) 0.085 (0.89)
Owner rank 1 -2.036 (0.00) -2.152 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.144 (0.00) -1.209 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.759 (0.00) -0.744 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.340 (0.08) -0.461 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.601 (0.01) 0.568 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.237 (0.40) -0.225 (0.36)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.267 (0.19) -0.311 (0.08)
Financial owner 0.218 (0.31) 0.221 (0.23)
ln(Firm Size) 0.052 (0.19) 0.054 (0.12)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.967 (0.00) 2.919 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.044 (0.58) 0.092 (0.14)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) -0.000 (0.89) -0.001 (0.27)
n 1420 2005
Pseudo R2 0.121 0.124
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.958 (0.14) -0.500 (0.38)
Owner rank 1 -0.897 (0.00) -0.962 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.443 (0.01) -0.403 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.168 (0.33) -0.061 (0.67)
Owner rank 4 0.080 (0.64) 0.019 (0.89)
Foreign owner 0.794 (0.00) 0.850 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.123 (0.66) 0.228 (0.35)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.121 (0.56) 0.096 (0.59)
Financial owner 0.607 (0.00) 0.599 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.021 (0.59) -0.006 (0.86)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.740 (0.00) 2.429 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.035 (0.64) 0.087 (0.15)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.63) -0.001 (0.27)
n 1420 2005
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.055
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.374 (0.61) 0.471 (0.44)
Owner rank 1 -1.995 (0.00) -1.841 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.446 (0.00) -1.284 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.105 (0.00) -0.931 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.447 (0.01) -0.496 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.879 (0.00) 0.933 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.041 (0.90) -0.087 (0.76)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.183 (0.46) 0.088 (0.67)
Financial owner 0.497 (0.04) 0.418 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) -0.028 (0.51) -0.070 (0.05)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.160 (0.00) 2.925 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.007 (0.93) 0.074 (0.27)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.56) -0.001 (0.35)
n 1420 2005
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.095
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.138 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Depreciation over long term assets.Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.350 (0.04) -1.773 (0.00)
Owner rank 1 -0.119 (0.50) -0.233 (0.12)
Owner rank 2 0.088 (0.61) -0.023 (0.87)
Owner rank 3 -0.022 (0.90) 0.063 (0.66)
Owner rank 4 0.196 (0.26) 0.157 (0.27)
Foreign owner 1.032 (0.00) 1.075 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.389 (0.15) 0.424 (0.07)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.054 (0.79) 0.173 (0.31)
Financial owner 0.879 (0.00) 0.771 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.026 (0.47) 0.059 (0.07)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.296 (0.00) 3.931 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.079 (0.26) -0.051 (0.40)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.26) 0.000 (0.94)
n 1465 2085
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.048
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.668 (0.33) 0.474 (0.42)
Owner rank 1 -1.955 (0.00) -2.001 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.045 (0.00) -1.145 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.657 (0.00) -0.640 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.152 (0.43) -0.225 (0.16)
Foreign owner 0.461 (0.03) 0.421 (0.02)
Family (individual) owner -0.056 (0.84) -0.072 (0.77)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.361 (0.08) -0.361 (0.04)
Financial owner 0.308 (0.15) 0.289 (0.12)
ln(Firm Size) 0.008 (0.83) 0.031 (0.37)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.579 (0.01) 1.883 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.084 (0.26) -0.058 (0.37)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.003 (0.06) 0.002 (0.06)
n 1465 2085
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.119
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.092 (0.89) -0.237 (0.67)
Owner rank 1 -0.783 (0.00) -0.811 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.312 (0.07) -0.343 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 -0.050 (0.77) 0.036 (0.80)
Owner rank 4 0.191 (0.26) 0.148 (0.29)
Foreign owner 0.631 (0.00) 0.668 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.178 (0.52) 0.310 (0.20)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.078 (0.70) -0.011 (0.95)
Financial owner 0.605 (0.00) 0.605 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.027 (0.46) -0.018 (0.57)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.586 (0.06) 1.511 (0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.050 (0.48) -0.036 (0.56)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.16) 0.001 (0.33)
n 1465 2085
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.048
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.183 (0.80) 0.328 (0.58)
Owner rank 1 -1.922 (0.00) -1.698 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.395 (0.00) -1.336 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.916 (0.00) -0.778 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.353 (0.04) -0.352 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.729 (0.00) 0.794 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.106 (0.74) 0.159 (0.57)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.116 (0.63) 0.155 (0.44)
Financial owner 0.517 (0.03) 0.524 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.053 (0.19) -0.060 (0.09)
Depreciation over long term assets 2.410 (0.01) 1.663 (0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.035 (0.65) -0.053 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.000 (0.88) -0.000 (0.82)
n 1465 2085
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.083
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.139 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Deprecia-
tion over long term assets and Duration. Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.368 (0.04) -1.200 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -0.138 (0.46) -0.265 (0.09)
Owner rank 2 0.098 (0.58) 0.070 (0.64)
Owner rank 3 0.036 (0.84) 0.126 (0.40)
Owner rank 4 0.222 (0.21) 0.164 (0.27)
Foreign owner 1.024 (0.00) 1.136 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.335 (0.23) 0.327 (0.18)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.093 (0.64) 0.120 (0.49)
Financial owner 0.763 (0.00) 0.637 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.044 (0.25) 0.041 (0.23)
Depreciation over long term assets 4.542 (0.00) 3.940 (0.00)
Earnings surprise 0.064 (0.39) 0.058 (0.33)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.29) -0.001 (0.34)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.120 (0.00) -0.127 (0.00)
n 1420 2005
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.071
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.306 (0.66) 0.510 (0.40)
Owner rank 1 -1.613 (0.00) -1.733 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.964 (0.00) -1.029 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.649 (0.00) -0.632 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.298 (0.12) -0.427 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.560 (0.01) 0.491 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.109 (0.71) -0.121 (0.64)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.153 (0.46) -0.225 (0.21)
Financial owner 0.211 (0.33) 0.178 (0.34)
ln(Firm Size) 0.051 (0.21) 0.054 (0.13)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.096 (0.00) 2.316 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.066 (0.40) 0.104 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) -0.001 (0.70) -0.001 (0.24)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.243 (0.00) -0.258 (0.00)
n 1420 2005
Pseudo R2 0.141 0.144
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.663 (0.32) -0.157 (0.79)
Owner rank 1 -0.705 (0.00) -0.780 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.374 (0.04) -0.332 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 -0.087 (0.62) 0.009 (0.95)
Owner rank 4 0.106 (0.54) 0.031 (0.83)
Foreign owner 0.729 (0.00) 0.749 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.347 (0.23) 0.417 (0.10)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.276 (0.19) 0.203 (0.26)
Financial owner 0.612 (0.00) 0.549 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.034 (0.38) 0.004 (0.91)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.949 (0.03) 1.858 (0.02)
Earnings surprise 0.051 (0.50) 0.098 (0.11)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.000 (0.83) -0.001 (0.23)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.207 (0.00) -0.204 (0.00)
n 1420 2005
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.077
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.050 (0.95) 0.843 (0.18)
Owner rank 1 -1.665 (0.00) -1.566 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.245 (0.00) -1.106 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.933 (0.00) -0.781 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.344 (0.05) -0.403 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.772 (0.00) 0.779 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.085 (0.80) 0.007 (0.98)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.272 (0.27) 0.121 (0.56)
Financial owner 0.459 (0.06) 0.322 (0.11)
ln(Firm Size) -0.020 (0.65) -0.062 (0.10)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.202 (0.00) 2.302 (0.01)
Earnings surprise 0.024 (0.77) 0.081 (0.22)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.71) -0.001 (0.36)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.198 (0.00) -0.181 (0.00)
n 1420 2005
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.113
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.140 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -1.102 (0.09) -1.510 (0.01)
Owner rank 1 -0.079 (0.66) -0.189 (0.21)
Owner rank 2 0.113 (0.52) -0.002 (0.99)
Owner rank 3 0.006 (0.97) 0.080 (0.58)
Owner rank 4 0.223 (0.20) 0.180 (0.21)
Foreign owner 0.986 (0.00) 1.015 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.521 (0.06) 0.550 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.114 (0.57) 0.204 (0.23)
Financial owner 0.872 (0.00) 0.736 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.027 (0.46) 0.060 (0.07)
Depreciation over long term assets 3.858 (0.00) 3.604 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.071 (0.31) -0.046 (0.44)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.25) 0.000 (0.90)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.100 (0.00) -0.106 (0.00)
n 1465 2085
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.055
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.037 (0.13) 0.870 (0.14)
Owner rank 1 -1.510 (0.00) -1.563 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.855 (0.00) -0.965 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.542 (0.00) -0.533 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.102 (0.60) -0.183 (0.26)
Foreign owner 0.400 (0.06) 0.342 (0.07)
Family (individual) owner 0.134 (0.65) 0.061 (0.81)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.252 (0.23) -0.282 (0.12)
Financial owner 0.297 (0.17) 0.250 (0.18)
ln(Firm Size) 0.013 (0.75) 0.034 (0.33)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.740 (0.07) 1.245 (0.11)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.069 (0.36) -0.049 (0.46)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.003 (0.06) 0.002 (0.04)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.272 (0.00) -0.279 (0.00)
n 1465 2085
Pseudo R2 0.143 0.141
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.200 (0.76) 0.102 (0.86)
Owner rank 1 -0.602 (0.00) -0.637 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.248 (0.15) -0.287 (0.05)
Owner rank 3 0.026 (0.88) 0.086 (0.55)
Owner rank 4 0.228 (0.18) 0.161 (0.26)
Foreign owner 0.536 (0.01) 0.555 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.421 (0.15) 0.508 (0.04)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.055 (0.79) 0.077 (0.66)
Financial owner 0.590 (0.01) 0.547 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.011 (0.77) -0.006 (0.84)
Depreciation over long term assets 0.832 (0.33) 0.982 (0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.024 (0.74) -0.016 (0.80)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.17) 0.001 (0.30)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.217 (0.00) -0.211 (0.00)
n 1465 2085
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.072
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.539 (0.45) 0.639 (0.29)
Owner rank 1 -1.669 (0.00) -1.481 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.235 (0.00) -1.194 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.772 (0.00) -0.661 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.262 (0.12) -0.273 (0.06)
Foreign owner 0.613 (0.01) 0.651 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.215 (0.52) 0.239 (0.40)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.153 (0.53) 0.159 (0.44)
Financial owner 0.453 (0.06) 0.430 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.047 (0.26) -0.052 (0.14)
Depreciation over long term assets 1.638 (0.07) 1.173 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.017 (0.83) -0.042 (0.53)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.000 (0.91) -0.000 (0.88)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.156 (0.00) -0.149 (0.00)
n 1465 2085
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.096
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.141 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and In-
vestments over depreciation. Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.445 (0.48) -0.545 (0.32)
Owner rank 1 -0.144 (0.43) -0.301 (0.05)
Owner rank 2 0.084 (0.64) 0.032 (0.83)
Owner rank 3 0.021 (0.91) 0.110 (0.46)
Owner rank 4 0.243 (0.17) 0.180 (0.23)
Foreign owner 1.113 (0.00) 1.254 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.193 (0.48) 0.286 (0.23)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.075 (0.71) 0.021 (0.91)
Financial owner 0.769 (0.00) 0.678 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.009 (0.82) 0.001 (0.97)
Investment over depreciation 0.020 (0.17) 0.010 (0.34)
Earnings surprise 0.058 (0.45) 0.077 (0.21)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.05) -0.000 (0.80)
n 1385 1935
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.050
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.034 (0.13) 0.740 (0.20)
Owner rank 1 -1.994 (0.00) -2.121 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.101 (0.00) -1.178 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.732 (0.00) -0.720 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.307 (0.12) -0.427 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.666 (0.00) 0.658 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.271 (0.34) -0.178 (0.47)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.364 (0.08) -0.355 (0.05)
Financial owner 0.199 (0.35) 0.202 (0.28)
ln(Firm Size) 0.005 (0.91) 0.030 (0.40)
Investment over depreciation -0.015 (0.34) -0.008 (0.44)
Earnings surprise 0.033 (0.68) 0.099 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.000 (0.81) -0.001 (0.46)
n 1385 1935
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.122
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.146 (0.82) 0.083 (0.88)
Owner rank 1 -0.863 (0.00) -0.934 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.393 (0.03) -0.365 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.133 (0.44) -0.042 (0.78)
Owner rank 4 0.131 (0.45) 0.049 (0.74)
Foreign owner 0.820 (0.00) 0.883 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.120 (0.67) 0.276 (0.26)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.035 (0.86) 0.028 (0.88)
Financial owner 0.591 (0.01) 0.565 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.014 (0.71) -0.026 (0.43)
Investment over depreciation -0.005 (0.72) -0.010 (0.35)
Earnings surprise 0.030 (0.70) 0.101 (0.11)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.42) -0.001 (0.40)
n 1385 1935
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.052
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.672 (0.34) 1.127 (0.06)
Owner rank 1 -1.892 (0.00) -1.800 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.393 (0.00) -1.272 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.054 (0.00) -0.927 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.403 (0.02) -0.473 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.920 (0.00) 0.968 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.039 (0.91) -0.014 (0.96)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.078 (0.75) 0.015 (0.94)
Financial owner 0.499 (0.04) 0.378 (0.06)
ln(Firm Size) -0.071 (0.09) -0.094 (0.01)
Investment over depreciation 0.003 (0.84) -0.001 (0.93)
Earnings surprise 0.013 (0.88) 0.112 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.27) -0.001 (0.55)
n 1385 1935
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.091
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.142 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Investments over depreciation. Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.322 (0.60) -0.827 (0.12)
Owner rank 1 -0.082 (0.64) -0.237 (0.12)
Owner rank 2 0.119 (0.49) -0.031 (0.83)
Owner rank 3 -0.010 (0.95) 0.068 (0.64)
Owner rank 4 0.221 (0.20) 0.167 (0.25)
Foreign owner 1.052 (0.00) 1.092 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.340 (0.21) 0.428 (0.07)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.046 (0.82) 0.085 (0.62)
Financial owner 0.873 (0.00) 0.764 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.019 (0.60) 0.017 (0.60)
Investment over depreciation 0.035 (0.01) 0.031 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.069 (0.33) -0.057 (0.36)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.12) 0.001 (0.51)
n 1440 2015
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.042
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.512 (0.02) 0.882 (0.12)
Owner rank 1 -1.951 (0.00) -2.021 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.037 (0.00) -1.148 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.652 (0.00) -0.661 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.128 (0.51) -0.227 (0.17)
Foreign owner 0.529 (0.01) 0.508 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.085 (0.77) -0.040 (0.88)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.436 (0.03) -0.403 (0.02)
Financial owner 0.301 (0.16) 0.286 (0.12)
ln(Firm Size) -0.033 (0.40) 0.012 (0.72)
Investment over depreciation 0.013 (0.28) 0.021 (0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.061 (0.42) -0.051 (0.45)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.003 (0.04) 0.003 (0.03)
n 1440 2015
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.122
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.381 (0.54) 0.124 (0.82)
Owner rank 1 -0.772 (0.00) -0.809 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.268 (0.12) -0.308 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 -0.023 (0.89) 0.030 (0.83)
Owner rank 4 0.231 (0.17) 0.160 (0.27)
Foreign owner 0.655 (0.00) 0.689 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.146 (0.60) 0.305 (0.21)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.139 (0.49) -0.080 (0.65)
Financial owner 0.596 (0.00) 0.572 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.051 (0.16) -0.034 (0.29)
Investment over depreciation 0.018 (0.12) 0.017 (0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.036 (0.62) -0.035 (0.58)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.13) 0.001 (0.25)
n 1440 2015
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.049
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.708 (0.30) 0.670 (0.25)
Owner rank 1 -1.877 (0.00) -1.709 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.361 (0.00) -1.339 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.903 (0.00) -0.795 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.326 (0.06) -0.348 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.757 (0.00) 0.811 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.060 (0.85) 0.154 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.046 (0.85) 0.084 (0.68)
Financial owner 0.522 (0.03) 0.484 (0.02)
ln(Firm Size) -0.079 (0.05) -0.075 (0.03)
Investment over depreciation 0.035 (0.01) 0.027 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.027 (0.73) -0.070 (0.30)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.72) 0.000 (0.98)
n 1440 2015
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.086
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
405
Table 7.143 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Invest-
ments over depreciation and Duration. Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.267 (0.68) -0.314 (0.57)
Owner rank 1 -0.068 (0.71) -0.237 (0.13)
Owner rank 2 0.125 (0.49) 0.064 (0.67)
Owner rank 3 0.075 (0.68) 0.147 (0.33)
Owner rank 4 0.266 (0.13) 0.198 (0.18)
Foreign owner 1.054 (0.00) 1.171 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.370 (0.19) 0.441 (0.07)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.022 (0.91) 0.073 (0.68)
Financial owner 0.777 (0.00) 0.641 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.002 (0.96) 0.006 (0.86)
Investment over depreciation 0.023 (0.13) 0.010 (0.35)
Earnings surprise 0.067 (0.38) 0.081 (0.19)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.07) -0.000 (0.79)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.137 (0.00) -0.134 (0.00)
n 1385 1935
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.061
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.237 (0.07) 1.030 (0.08)
Owner rank 1 -1.559 (0.00) -1.703 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.910 (0.00) -0.997 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.612 (0.00) -0.603 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.261 (0.18) -0.392 (0.02)
Foreign owner 0.618 (0.01) 0.568 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.125 (0.67) -0.072 (0.78)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.219 (0.29) -0.251 (0.17)
Financial owner 0.197 (0.36) 0.159 (0.40)
ln(Firm Size) 0.011 (0.78) 0.035 (0.33)
Investment over depreciation -0.006 (0.69) -0.008 (0.48)
Earnings surprise 0.050 (0.54) 0.107 (0.10)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) -0.000 (0.90) -0.001 (0.35)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.260 (0.00) -0.265 (0.00)
n 1385 1935
Pseudo R2 0.138 0.143
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.064 (0.92) 0.279 (0.62)
Owner rank 1 -0.671 (0.00) -0.758 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.324 (0.07) -0.298 (0.05)
Owner rank 3 -0.047 (0.79) 0.029 (0.84)
Owner rank 4 0.163 (0.35) 0.062 (0.68)
Foreign owner 0.743 (0.00) 0.769 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.363 (0.22) 0.468 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.214 (0.31) 0.146 (0.42)
Financial owner 0.597 (0.01) 0.512 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) 0.008 (0.83) -0.010 (0.77)
Investment over depreciation -0.003 (0.87) -0.010 (0.32)
Earnings surprise 0.043 (0.57) 0.107 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.67) -0.001 (0.30)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.214 (0.00) -0.208 (0.00)
n 1385 1935
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.075
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.839 (0.24) 1.318 (0.03)
Owner rank 1 -1.577 (0.00) -1.542 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.190 (0.00) -1.102 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.874 (0.00) -0.778 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.300 (0.09) -0.385 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.788 (0.00) 0.800 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.101 (0.77) 0.074 (0.79)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.189 (0.45) 0.059 (0.78)
Financial owner 0.454 (0.06) 0.281 (0.17)
ln(Firm Size) -0.051 (0.24) -0.077 (0.04)
Investment over depreciation 0.003 (0.84) -0.003 (0.82)
Earnings surprise 0.036 (0.68) 0.120 (0.08)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.45) -0.001 (0.50)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.205 (0.00) -0.179 (0.00)
n 1385 1935
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.108
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.144 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Investments over depreciation and Duration. Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.214 (0.73) -0.648 (0.23)
Owner rank 1 -0.037 (0.84) -0.192 (0.20)
Owner rank 2 0.150 (0.39) -0.009 (0.95)
Owner rank 3 0.025 (0.88) 0.090 (0.54)
Owner rank 4 0.253 (0.15) 0.194 (0.18)
Foreign owner 0.994 (0.00) 1.021 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.498 (0.07) 0.571 (0.02)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.037 (0.85) 0.128 (0.46)
Financial owner 0.873 (0.00) 0.731 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.011 (0.77) 0.023 (0.49)
Investment over depreciation 0.037 (0.01) 0.030 (0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.056 (0.43) -0.049 (0.43)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.13) 0.001 (0.49)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.112 (0.00) -0.114 (0.00)
n 1440 2015
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.050
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.661 (0.01) 1.148 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -1.505 (0.00) -1.599 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.842 (0.00) -0.974 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.531 (0.01) -0.552 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.075 (0.70) -0.184 (0.27)
Foreign owner 0.461 (0.03) 0.414 (0.03)
Family (individual) owner 0.123 (0.68) 0.102 (0.70)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.299 (0.15) -0.311 (0.09)
Financial owner 0.294 (0.18) 0.245 (0.19)
ln(Firm Size) -0.019 (0.62) 0.020 (0.56)
Investment over depreciation 0.016 (0.23) 0.018 (0.07)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.042 (0.58) -0.037 (0.58)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.003 (0.05) 0.003 (0.03)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.283 (0.00) -0.277 (0.00)
n 1440 2015
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.144
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.459 (0.47) 0.333 (0.54)
Owner rank 1 -0.592 (0.00) -0.649 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.205 (0.24) -0.258 (0.08)
Owner rank 3 0.054 (0.76) 0.079 (0.59)
Owner rank 4 0.272 (0.12) 0.175 (0.23)
Foreign owner 0.546 (0.01) 0.563 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.398 (0.17) 0.504 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.012 (0.95) 0.016 (0.93)
Financial owner 0.583 (0.01) 0.512 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.026 (0.48) -0.017 (0.60)
Investment over depreciation 0.017 (0.15) 0.013 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.010 (0.89) -0.012 (0.84)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.15) 0.001 (0.25)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.217 (0.00) -0.207 (0.00)
n 1440 2015
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.072
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.812 (0.24) 0.825 (0.16)
Owner rank 1 -1.638 (0.00) -1.517 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.208 (0.00) -1.213 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.762 (0.00) -0.687 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.240 (0.16) -0.277 (0.06)
Foreign owner 0.623 (0.01) 0.665 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.172 (0.60) 0.231 (0.41)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.099 (0.68) 0.095 (0.65)
Financial owner 0.460 (0.06) 0.396 (0.05)
ln(Firm Size) -0.061 (0.14) -0.062 (0.08)
Investment over depreciation 0.034 (0.01) 0.024 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.008 (0.92) -0.058 (0.39)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.000 (0.78) 0.000 (0.95)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.152 (0.00) -0.136 (0.00)
n 1440 2015
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.097
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.145 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt
Maturity. Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.637 (0.31) -0.663 (0.22)
Owner rank 1 -0.158 (0.38) -0.326 (0.03)
Owner rank 2 0.076 (0.67) 0.050 (0.74)
Owner rank 3 -0.005 (0.98) 0.101 (0.49)
Owner rank 4 0.204 (0.24) 0.142 (0.33)
Foreign owner 1.108 (0.00) 1.252 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.203 (0.46) 0.301 (0.20)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.065 (0.74) 0.023 (0.89)
Financial owner 0.786 (0.00) 0.691 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.008 (0.84) 0.010 (0.76)
Long term debt over total debt 0.003 (0.99) 0.043 (0.81)
Earnings surprise 0.086 (0.25) 0.079 (0.19)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.05) -0.000 (0.82)
n 1425 2015
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.050
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.646 (0.33) 0.582 (0.31)
Owner rank 1 -1.981 (0.00) -2.154 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.115 (0.00) -1.203 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.742 (0.00) -0.731 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.335 (0.08) -0.467 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.611 (0.01) 0.610 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.227 (0.42) -0.136 (0.58)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.338 (0.10) -0.325 (0.07)
Financial owner 0.213 (0.32) 0.228 (0.21)
ln(Firm Size) 0.033 (0.41) 0.043 (0.23)
Long term debt over total debt -0.163 (0.48) -0.080 (0.67)
Earnings surprise 0.055 (0.48) 0.102 (0.11)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.59) -0.001 (0.60)
n 1425 2015
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.121
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.417 (0.51) -0.043 (0.94)
Owner rank 1 -0.854 (0.00) -0.968 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.433 (0.01) -0.397 (0.01)
Owner rank 3 -0.170 (0.32) -0.058 (0.69)
Owner rank 4 0.085 (0.62) 0.015 (0.91)
Foreign owner 0.854 (0.00) 0.894 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.125 (0.66) 0.315 (0.19)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.073 (0.72) 0.074 (0.68)
Financial owner 0.641 (0.00) 0.614 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.005 (0.90) -0.023 (0.49)
Long term debt over total debt 0.174 (0.43) 0.067 (0.71)
Earnings surprise 0.058 (0.45) 0.103 (0.09)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.29) -0.001 (0.54)
n 1425 2015
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.052
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.425 (0.54) 0.958 (0.10)
Owner rank 1 -1.897 (0.00) -1.829 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.414 (0.00) -1.261 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -1.087 (0.00) -0.913 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.434 (0.01) -0.493 (0.00)
Foreign owner 0.951 (0.00) 0.995 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner -0.020 (0.95) 0.055 (0.84)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.123 (0.61) 0.077 (0.70)
Financial owner 0.546 (0.02) 0.450 (0.03)
ln(Firm Size) -0.060 (0.15) -0.089 (0.01)
Long term debt over total debt 0.134 (0.59) 0.106 (0.58)
Earnings surprise 0.039 (0.65) 0.097 (0.14)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.18) -0.000 (0.75)
n 1425 2015
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.090
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.146 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and
Debt Maturity. Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.365 (0.55) -0.824 (0.11)
Owner rank 1 -0.095 (0.59) -0.243 (0.10)
Owner rank 2 0.092 (0.59) -0.019 (0.89)
Owner rank 3 -0.026 (0.88) 0.061 (0.67)
Owner rank 4 0.193 (0.26) 0.144 (0.31)
Foreign owner 1.046 (0.00) 1.105 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.399 (0.14) 0.469 (0.05)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.011 (0.95) 0.126 (0.46)
Financial owner 0.881 (0.00) 0.775 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.003 (0.94) 0.025 (0.43)
Long term debt over total debt -0.200 (0.35) -0.075 (0.67)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.073 (0.30) -0.054 (0.37)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.16) 0.001 (0.57)
n 1470 2100
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.038
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.202 (0.06) 0.868 (0.12)
Owner rank 1 -1.925 (0.00) -2.012 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.029 (0.00) -1.145 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.648 (0.00) -0.633 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.150 (0.43) -0.236 (0.14)
Foreign owner 0.468 (0.03) 0.454 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.063 (0.83) -0.038 (0.88)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.406 (0.04) -0.364 (0.04)
Financial owner 0.299 (0.16) 0.297 (0.11)
ln(Firm Size) -0.006 (0.88) 0.018 (0.60)
Long term debt over total debt -0.097 (0.67) -0.027 (0.88)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.074 (0.32) -0.061 (0.35)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.003 (0.03) 0.003 (0.02)
n 1470 2100
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.118
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.239 (0.69) 0.128 (0.81)
Owner rank 1 -0.759 (0.00) -0.826 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.313 (0.07) -0.342 (0.02)
Owner rank 3 -0.056 (0.74) 0.033 (0.81)
Owner rank 4 0.193 (0.25) 0.139 (0.32)
Foreign owner 0.678 (0.00) 0.703 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.171 (0.54) 0.348 (0.15)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.103 (0.61) -0.019 (0.92)
Financial owner 0.631 (0.00) 0.614 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.045 (0.22) -0.034 (0.29)
Long term debt over total debt 0.158 (0.47) 0.049 (0.78)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.039 (0.58) -0.043 (0.47)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.09) 0.001 (0.19)
n 1470 2100
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.047
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.676 (0.31) 0.683 (0.23)
Owner rank 1 -1.871 (0.00) -1.707 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.388 (0.00) -1.322 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.915 (0.00) -0.773 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.348 (0.04) -0.357 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.769 (0.00) 0.831 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.111 (0.73) 0.222 (0.42)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.085 (0.72) 0.168 (0.41)
Financial owner 0.539 (0.02) 0.534 (0.01)
ln(Firm Size) -0.071 (0.08) -0.069 (0.05)
Long term debt over total debt 0.019 (0.94) -0.102 (0.59)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.021 (0.79) -0.069 (0.29)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.65) 0.000 (0.89)
n 1470 2100
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.082
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.147 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt
Maturity and Duration. Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.403 (0.52) -0.388 (0.48)
Owner rank 1 -0.096 (0.60) -0.271 (0.08)
Owner rank 2 0.112 (0.53) 0.079 (0.59)
Owner rank 3 0.042 (0.81) 0.133 (0.36)
Owner rank 4 0.227 (0.19) 0.161 (0.27)
Foreign owner 1.054 (0.00) 1.169 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.366 (0.19) 0.442 (0.06)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.032 (0.87) 0.076 (0.66)
Financial owner 0.786 (0.00) 0.644 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.012 (0.76) 0.014 (0.69)
Long term debt over total debt -0.016 (0.94) 0.018 (0.92)
Earnings surprise 0.088 (0.24) 0.077 (0.20)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.08) -0.000 (0.80)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.135 (0.00) -0.136 (0.00)
n 1425 2015
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.062
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.896 (0.18) 0.892 (0.12)
Owner rank 1 -1.551 (0.00) -1.734 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.928 (0.00) -1.020 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.628 (0.00) -0.617 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.287 (0.14) -0.431 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.552 (0.01) 0.515 (0.01)
Family (individual) owner -0.084 (0.77) -0.037 (0.89)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.197 (0.34) -0.225 (0.21)
Financial owner 0.199 (0.35) 0.175 (0.34)
ln(Firm Size) 0.041 (0.32) 0.048 (0.18)
Long term debt over total debt -0.203 (0.39) -0.115 (0.55)
Earnings surprise 0.073 (0.36) 0.111 (0.08)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.000 (0.91) -0.001 (0.47)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.259 (0.00) -0.270 (0.00)
n 1425 2015
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.143
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.295 (0.64) 0.182 (0.74)
Owner rank 1 -0.673 (0.00) -0.795 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.368 (0.04) -0.328 (0.03)
Owner rank 3 -0.085 (0.63) 0.013 (0.93)
Owner rank 4 0.114 (0.51) 0.028 (0.85)
Foreign owner 0.769 (0.00) 0.777 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.365 (0.21) 0.497 (0.04)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.258 (0.22) 0.199 (0.27)
Financial owner 0.636 (0.00) 0.552 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.020 (0.61) -0.005 (0.88)
Long term debt over total debt 0.079 (0.73) -0.001 (1.00)
Earnings surprise 0.065 (0.39) 0.107 (0.08)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.55) -0.001 (0.40)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.214 (0.00) -0.212 (0.00)
n 1425 2015
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.075
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.682 (0.34) 1.223 (0.04)
Owner rank 1 -1.579 (0.00) -1.562 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.204 (0.00) -1.077 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.901 (0.00) -0.755 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.321 (0.07) -0.395 (0.01)
Foreign owner 0.820 (0.00) 0.818 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.104 (0.76) 0.125 (0.66)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.241 (0.33) 0.124 (0.55)
Financial owner 0.490 (0.04) 0.337 (0.10)
ln(Firm Size) -0.043 (0.31) -0.074 (0.04)
Long term debt over total debt 0.095 (0.71) 0.079 (0.69)
Earnings surprise 0.049 (0.56) 0.100 (0.13)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.001 (0.35) -0.000 (0.67)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.212 (0.00) -0.192 (0.00)
n 1425 2015
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.110
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Table 7.148 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise,
Debt Maturity and Duration. Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.202 (0.74) -0.619 (0.24)
Owner rank 1 -0.059 (0.74) -0.202 (0.17)
Owner rank 2 0.117 (0.50) 0.003 (0.98)
Owner rank 3 0.005 (0.98) 0.081 (0.57)
Owner rank 4 0.225 (0.19) 0.171 (0.23)
Foreign owner 0.993 (0.00) 1.038 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.553 (0.04) 0.602 (0.01)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.072 (0.72) 0.169 (0.32)
Financial owner 0.874 (0.00) 0.734 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.003 (0.93) 0.030 (0.35)
Long term debt over total debt -0.209 (0.34) -0.083 (0.63)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.065 (0.36) -0.049 (0.41)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.16) 0.001 (0.55)
Duration: Maintain Stake -0.114 (0.00) -0.117 (0.00)
n 1470 2100
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.046
Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 1.376 (0.03) 1.121 (0.05)
Owner rank 1 -1.481 (0.00) -1.575 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.837 (0.00) -0.963 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.533 (0.00) -0.526 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.094 (0.62) -0.191 (0.24)
Foreign owner 0.390 (0.07) 0.362 (0.06)
Family (individual) owner 0.139 (0.64) 0.094 (0.72)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner -0.275 (0.18) -0.272 (0.13)
Financial owner 0.280 (0.20) 0.247 (0.18)
ln(Firm Size) 0.008 (0.83) 0.029 (0.41)
Long term debt over total debt -0.143 (0.54) -0.046 (0.81)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.061 (0.42) -0.049 (0.45)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.003 (0.04) 0.003 (0.02)
Duration: Keep Same Rank -0.281 (0.00) -0.288 (0.00)
n 1470 2100
Pseudo R2 0.141 0.141
Duration: Maintain Rank
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.344 (0.58) 0.338 (0.53)
Owner rank 1 -0.588 (0.00) -0.660 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -0.252 (0.15) -0.288 (0.05)
Owner rank 3 0.022 (0.90) 0.083 (0.56)
Owner rank 4 0.233 (0.17) 0.155 (0.28)
Foreign owner 0.567 (0.01) 0.577 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.428 (0.14) 0.544 (0.03)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.055 (0.79) 0.086 (0.63)
Financial owner 0.607 (0.00) 0.545 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.018 (0.63) -0.014 (0.67)
Long term debt over total debt 0.072 (0.74) -0.002 (0.99)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.016 (0.82) -0.023 (0.71)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.002 (0.12) 0.001 (0.19)
Duration: Maintain Rank -0.220 (0.00) -0.217 (0.00)
n 1470 2100
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.072
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (2) Sample (4)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.861 (0.20) 0.887 (0.12)
Owner rank 1 -1.622 (0.00) -1.489 (0.00)
Owner rank 2 -1.224 (0.00) -1.176 (0.00)
Owner rank 3 -0.763 (0.00) -0.651 (0.00)
Owner rank 4 -0.251 (0.14) -0.272 (0.06)
Foreign owner 0.637 (0.01) 0.672 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner 0.225 (0.50) 0.294 (0.29)
Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner 0.146 (0.55) 0.183 (0.37)
Financial owner 0.464 (0.05) 0.428 (0.04)
ln(Firm Size) -0.056 (0.17) -0.055 (0.12)
Long term debt over total debt -0.011 (0.96) -0.120 (0.53)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise) -0.004 (0.96) -0.059 (0.36)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual) 0.000 (0.74) 0.000 (0.87)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest -0.164 (0.00) -0.157 (0.00)
n 1470 2100
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.096
The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the
relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables
include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or
stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the
forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner deﬁnition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use
information which is only observable in the ﬁnal sample year. Variable deﬁnitions are found in appendix A.
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Chapter 8
Ownership duration for relational
investors
In the paper Bhagat et al. (2004) duration of ownership was linked to ﬁrm performance in a diﬀerent
manner from what is done in the present report. The concept of relationship investor was introduced.
For comparison with the results of that paper this chapter describes relationship investing using the logic
of Bhagat et al. (2004).
Table 8.1 The relative frequency of relational investors under alternative restrictions on the holding size
and the holding period
Ownership fraction Ownership duration is at least
is at least 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
5% 82 58 46 36
10% 64 45 38 31
20% 43 33 27 23
33.4% 26 20 17 14
50% 15 12 10 9
66.7% 7 5 4 3
The table reports the relative frequency of relational investors across ﬁrms under six alternative restrictions on minimum holding
size and four alternative restrictions on minimum holding period over the period 19891999. Bhagat et al. (2004) has details. The
sample is all ﬁrms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange during the period 19891999.
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Table 8.2 The relative frequency of relational investors for single years under alternative restrictions on
holding size.
Panel A
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
No comps w ≥ 5% blockholders 64 67 73 88 98 115 136 148 191 199 193
fraction of all companies 100.0% 98.5% 100.0% 100.0% 99.0% 99.1% 96.5% 94.3% 95.0% 87.7% 83.5%
No comps w ≥ 10% blockholders 52 54 64 77 80 95 113 129 157 161 164
fraction of all companies 81.2% 79.4% 87.7% 87.5% 80.8% 81.9% 80.1% 82.2% 78.1% 70.9% 71.0%
No comps w ≥ 20% blockholders 31 34 37 52 52 62 73 90 110 108 123
fraction of all companies 48.4% 50.0% 50.7% 59.1% 52.5% 53.4% 51.8% 57.3% 54.7% 47.6% 53.2%
No comps w ≥ 33% blockholders 16 20 21 29 29 37 46 47 57 62 77
fraction of all companies 25.0% 29.4% 28.8% 33.0% 29.3% 31.9% 32.6% 29.9% 28.4% 27.3% 33.3%
No comps w ≥ 50% blockholders 11 12 11 13 14 20 23 24 33 33 40
fraction of all companies 17.2% 17.6% 15.1% 14.8% 14.1% 17.2% 16.3% 15.3% 16.4% 14.5% 17.3%
No comps w ≥ 67% blockholders 1 2 6 6 7 9 9 11 9 12 26
fraction of all companies 1.6% 2.9% 8.2% 6.8% 7.1% 7.8% 6.4% 7.0% 4.5% 5.3% 11.3%
Panel B
Ownership fraction 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
5%10% 20.3% 19.1% 12.3% 13.6% 18.2% 18.1% 17.7% 14.0% 18.4% 18.1% 13.0%
10%20% 34.4% 29.4% 37.0% 28.4% 28.3% 28.4% 28.4% 24.8% 23.9% 23.8% 18.2%
20%33% 23.4% 20.6% 21.9% 26.1% 23.2% 21.6% 19.1% 27.4% 26.4% 20.3% 19.9%
33%50% 7.8% 11.8% 13.7% 18.2% 15.2% 14.7% 16.3% 14.6% 11.9% 12.8% 16.0%
50%100% 17.2% 17.6% 15.1% 14.8% 14.1% 17.2% 16.3% 15.3% 16.4% 14.5% 17.3%
Panel C
Ownership fraction 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
≥ 5% 100.0% 98.5% 100.0% 100.0% 99.0% 99.1% 96.5% 94.3% 95.0% 87.7% 83.5%
≥ 10% 81.2% 79.4% 87.7% 87.5% 80.8% 81.9% 80.1% 82.2% 78.1% 70.9% 71.0%
≥ 15% 70.3% 63.2% 65.8% 71.6% 64.6% 62.1% 64.5% 66.9% 61.7% 58.6% 62.3%
≥ 20% 48.4% 50.0% 50.7% 59.1% 52.5% 53.4% 51.8% 57.3% 54.7% 47.6% 53.2%
≥ 33% 25.0% 29.4% 28.8% 33.0% 29.3% 31.0% 32.6% 28.7% 27.4% 26.9% 32.9%
≥ 50% 17.2% 17.6% 15.1% 14.8% 14.1% 17.2% 16.3% 15.3% 16.4% 14.5% 17.3%
≥ 67% 1.6% 2.9% 8.2% 6.8% 7.1% 7.8% 6.4% 7.0% 4.5% 5.3% 11.3%
shows the number and fraction of companies having at least one investor with an ownership fraction listed in the lefthand column.
Panels B and C group the companies based on the ownership fraction of each investor. For instance, the 5%10% row only includes
ﬁrms with owners who have an equity fraction between 5% and 10%. The sample is all ﬁrms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange
during the period 19891999.
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Table 8.3 Relational investing for several years grouped by holding size intervals
2 year periods
Ownership fraction 1989-1990 1991-1992 1993-1994 1995-1996 1997-1998 Average Avg no blockh
5%10% 57.8% 65.8% 57.6% 44.0% 54.2% 55.9% 1.6
10%20% 42.2% 49.3% 38.4% 31.2% 31.8% 38.6% 1.3
20%33% 25.0% 24.7% 20.2% 18.4% 22.9% 22.2% 1.2
33%50% 3.1% 11.0% 11.1% 12.1% 9.0% 9.2% 1.0
50%100% 17.2% 13.7% 13.1% 13.5% 13.4% 14.2% 1.0
3 year periods
Ownership fraction 1989-1991 1992-1994 1995-1997 Average Avg no blockh
5%10% 37.5% 43.2% 32.6% 37.8% 1.4
10%20% 32.8% 25.0% 20.6% 26.1% 1.2
20%33% 17.2% 20.5% 16.3% 18.0% 1.1
33%50% 3.1% 9.1% 9.9% 7.4% 1.0
50%100% 14.1% 11.4% 12.8% 12.7% 1.0
4 year periods
Ownership fraction 1989-1992 1993-1996 Average Avg no blockh
5%10% 28.1% 26.3% 27.2% 1.3
10%20% 29.7% 19.2% 24.4% 1.2
20%33% 15.6% 16.2% 15.9% 1.2
33%50% 3.1% 7.1% 5.1% 1.0
50%100% 10.9% 11.1% 11.0% 1.0
5 year periods
Ownership fraction 1989-1993 1994-1998 Average Avg no blockh
5%10% 17.2% 18.1% 17.6% 1.2
10%20% 23.4% 13.8% 18.6% 1.1
20%33% 12.5% 15.5% 14.0% 1.1
33%50% 3.1% 5.2% 4.1% 1.0
50%100% 10.9% 11.2% 11.1% 1.0
The table describes relational investing over several years. The left column shows the interval of the initial stake. We use all
owners with the indicated ownership stake, not just the largest. We group large owners into ownership stake intervals based on
their ownership stake in the ﬁrst year. We then list the percentage fractions of ﬁrms which have at least one owner with duration
for the speciﬁed number of years. Ownership duration is deﬁned as not lowering the fraction of the company held. When computing
the average in the rightmost column, we only count ﬁrms with at least one blockholder.
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Table 8.4 Relationship investing for several years grouped by lower ownership fraction bounds
2 year periods
Ownership fraction 1989-1990 1991-1992 1993-1994 1995-1996 1997-1998 Average Avg no blockh
≥ 5% 89.1% 94.5% 89.9% 80.1% 82.1% 87.1% 2.1
≥ 10% 67.2% 75.3% 68.7% 61.7% 61.2% 66.8% 1.5
≥ 15% 56.2% 54.8% 51.5% 50.4% 49.3% 52.4% 1.3
≥ 20% 42.2% 43.8% 42.4% 43.3% 43.8% 43.1% 1.1
≥ 33% 20.3% 24.7% 24.2% 25.5% 21.4% 23.2% 1.0
≥ 50% 17.2% 13.7% 13.1% 13.5% 13.4% 14.2% 1.0
≥ 67% 1.6% 8.2% 6.1% 5.7% 3.0% 4.9% 1.0
3 year periods
Ownership fraction 1989-1991 1992-1994 1995-1997 Average Avg no blockh
≥ 5% 71.9% 75.0% 64.5% 70.5% 1.7
≥ 10% 54.7% 54.5% 49.6% 53.0% 1.3
≥ 15% 43.8% 42.0% 42.6% 42.8% 1.2
≥ 20% 32.8% 37.5% 38.3% 36.2% 1.1
≥ 33% 17.2% 20.5% 22.7% 20.1% 1.0
≥ 50% 14.1% 11.4% 12.8% 12.7% 1.0
≥ 67% 1.6% 4.5% 5.0% 3.7% 1.0
4 year periods
Ownership fraction 1989-1992 1993-1996 Average Avg no blockh
≥ 5% 59.4% 56.6% 58.0% 1.7
≥ 10% 48.4% 45.5% 46.9% 1.3
≥ 15% 37.5% 37.4% 37.4% 1.3
≥ 20% 28.1% 34.3% 31.2% 1.1
≥ 33% 14.1% 18.2% 16.1% 1.0
≥ 50% 10.9% 11.1% 11.0% 1.0
≥ 67% 1.6% 5.1% 3.3% 1.0
5 year periods
Ownership fraction 1989-1993 1994-1998 Average Avg no blockh
≥ 5% 48.4% 46.6% 47.5% 1.5
≥ 10% 40.6% 38.8% 39.7% 1.3
≥ 15% 32.8% 33.6% 33.2% 1.2
≥ 20% 25.0% 31.0% 28.0% 1.1
≥ 33% 14.1% 16.4% 15.2% 1.0
≥ 50% 10.9% 11.2% 11.1% 1.0
≥ 67% 1.6% 4.3% 2.9% 1.0
The table describes relational investing over several years. The left column shows the interval of the initial stake. We use all
owners with the indicated ownership stake, not just the largest. We group large owners into ownership stake intervals based on
their ownership stake in the ﬁrst year. We then list the percentage fractions of ﬁrms which have at least one owner with duration
for the speciﬁed number of years. Ownership duration is deﬁned as not lowering the fraction of the company held. When computing




This appendix details deﬁnitions for variables and data used in the report.
A.1 Data sources
• OBI  Oslo Børs Informasjon (The Oslo Stock Exchange data center).
From OBI we get complete annual accounts for all companies with stocks listed at the OSE. We
also get daily price observations of all stocks traded, as well as information about corporate events.
• VPS  Verdipapirsentralen (The Norwegian securities registry).
VPS provides annual lists of owners of all stocks listed at the OSE. The data is provided as
anonymized lists, where each owner has an unique ID. The owner also has a sector codes which
classiﬁes the owner type.
• BI  BI Norwegian School of Management.
A.2 Variables used
Accounting Income: Total Accounting Income. Data Source: Accounting data from OBI.
Debt to assets: Book value of debt divided by book value of assets. Data source: Accounting data
from OBI.
Depreciation over investment: Annual depreciation divided by the same year's investments. Data
Source: Accounting data from OBI.
Depreciation over long term assets: Annual depreciation divided by the current book value of long
term assets. Data Source: Accounting data from OBI.
Duration: Maintain Stake: The number of years until a given owner's stake drops below the initial
stake. Data Source: Verdipapirsentralen (VPS)
Duration: Keep Same Rank: The number of years until the owner's rank changes. Data Source:
VPS
Duration: Maintain Rank: The number of years until the owner's rank drops below the initial rank.
Data Source: VPS.
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest: The number of years until the owner's rank drops below 5. Data
Source: VPS.
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%: For all owners with a rank above or equal ﬁve we cal-
culate the duration deﬁnition Stay Among 5 Largest, and take the average across all these owners.
Data Source: VPS.
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Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest: For all owners with a stake above one percent we cal-
culate the duration deﬁnition Maintain Stake, and take the average across all these owners. Data
Source: VPS.
Largest owner: The fraction of company's equity held by the largest owner. Equity includes both
voting and nonvoting stock. Data source: VPS
Investment over depreciation: Annual investment divided by the same year's depreciation. Data
Source: Accounting data from OBI.
Earnings surprise: Earnings Surprise is calculated as the change in earnings from one year to the next.
The realative earnings surprise ﬁnd this as a percentage fraction of earnings in the ﬁrst of these
years. Data Source: Accounting data from OBI.
Market Value Equity: Market value of equity, estimated as share price at yearend times number of
shares outstanding. Data source: Accounting data from OBI
Firm Size: Total ﬁrm value estimated as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt.
The calculation is done at yearend. Data source: Accounting data from OBI
Fama French Residual: Residual from a Fama French tree factor model. The residual is calculated
as the sum over the year of monthly residuals. The monthly residual is calculated as
erffit = rit − αi − βimrmt − βi,smbrsmb,t − βi,hmlrhml,t
The three factors are m, the stock market, smb, the diﬀerence in return of a portfolio of Small
stocks versus a portfolios of Big stocks. The parameters αi, βim, βsmb and βhml of the model
has been estimated using 5 years of monthly data prior to the averaging period. The number is
annualized percentage return.
Herﬁndahl index: Index of ownership concentration. Deﬁned as the sum of squared ownership frac-
tions across all owners. Has a maximum of 1 with one owner, and a minimum of 1/n2 if each of
the n owners holds a fraction of 1/n each. Data source: VPS
Herﬁndahl (excluding largest): Index of ownership concentration. We exclude the largest owner.
The index is then calculated as as the sum of squared ownership fractions across the remaining
owners. The index has a maximum of 1 with one owner, and a minimum of 1/n2 if each of the n
owners holds a fraction of 1/n each. Data source: VPS.
Long term debt over total debt: Long term debt over total debt
Investment over depreciation: Annual investment divided by the same year's depreciation. Data
Source: Accounting data from OBI.
Investments over income: Company total investments (totalinvesteringer) divided by operating in-
come (driftsinntekter). Data source: Accounting data from OBI.
Marginal Q : Is a measure introduced in Mueller and Reardon (1993). It has later been used in various
corporate governance studies. The basic idea of the measure is to ﬁnd what changes in corporate
value, as measured by the market value, is a result of investments made in that particular period.
If we let Mt be the market value in the current period, δt the depreciation rate and PVt be the
present value of investments in period t, the following relation obtains
Mt = (1− δt)Mt−1 + PVt + µt
or
Mt = Mt−1 + PVt − δtMt−1 + µt
where µt is the error the capital market makes in evaluation of the true market value of the company.






− δt + µt
Mt−1
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The present value PVt is viewed as a function of investments It in the period, and qm (the marginal















How can the relation
Mt −Mt−1
Mt−1





be used as a basis for estimation? Mueller and Reardon (1993) assume that δt is 10% and sets
µt to equal zero. qm is then calculated by averaging over several years. We go with the Mueller
and Reardon (1993) method, because that way we can do a calculation on a company by company
basis. Since we are doing crossectional comparisons using the same δt on all companies this will be
OK if there are no systematic diﬀerences in the crossection related to both depreciation and other
explanatory variables. To implement the marginal q estimation on an annual basis, then, consider
Mt −Mt−1
Mt−1





and assume that µt is zero.
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The company market value can be estimated as the sum of book value of debt and market value
of equity. To estimate It, the investment in the period, we use
I = After tax proﬁts+Depreciation−Dividends+∆D +∆E
Data Source: OBI.
Primary insiders: The aggregate fraction of a company's equity held by primary insiders. Primary
insiders are deﬁned as those of the legal insiders which are board members or members of the
management team, i.e., the CEO and the ﬁrm's directors. Data source: OB & BI
Q : Tobin's Q ratio. The theoretical deﬁnition of the Q ratio is market value divided by replacement
value. We estimate Q as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided
by the book value of assets. See Perfect and Wiles (1994). Data source: Accounting data from
OBI.
Q relative to industry: The estimated Q for the company subtracted from the average of estimated
Q 's for all companies in that industry. Data Source: Accounting data from OBI and BI.
RoA: Book return on assets. Data source: Accounting data from OBI.
RoS: Annual percentage return on stock. Data source: Daily equity data from OBI.
Foreign owner: Indicator variable for whether the owner is an international owner. The owners have
sector codes: 9001000. Data source: VPS
Individual (family) owner: Indicator variable for whether the owner is a individual (private) owner.
The owners have sector codes: 790-889. Data source: VPS.
State owner: Indicator variable for whether the owner is a state owner. The owners have sector codes:
110199 and 510699. Data source: VPS.
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Nonﬁnancial (industrial) owner: Indicator variable for whether the owner is a nonﬁnancial (indus-
trial) owner. A nonﬁnancial owner is a corporation which is not a ﬁnancial corporation. The
owners have sector codes: 710-789. Data source: VPS.
Financial (institutional) owner: Indicator variable for whether the owner is a ﬁnancial owner. Fi-
nancial owners are companies which are in a ﬁnancial business (banks, insurance companies, mutual
funds, etc.) The owners have sector codes: 210499. Data source: VPS.
Industrial company: Indicator variable equal to one if the company is an industrial. Data source:
OB.
Financial company: Indicator variable equal to one if the company is a ﬁnancial. Data source: OB.
Shipping company: Indicator variable equal to one if the company is in shipping. Data source: OB.
IPO company: Indicator variable equal to one if the company is on the SMB list (recently listed, small
and medium sized ﬁrms) Data source: OB.
A.3 Data transformations
ln() The natural logarithm.
lag(n) The period is lagged n years. E.g. lag(−1) contains the variable one year earlier.
orthogonalized(a,b) Two variables a and b are orthogonalized when common variation is removed by
a ﬁrst stage regression.
interaction(a,b) This is calculated as the product of the two variables a and b. Used when one of the
variables is an indicator (dummy) variable.
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